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JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

Following adjudicatory and dispositional hearings, the trial court enteredneglect adjudications for Alicia Z. and Zayda Z., the daughters of respondent,Jose Z., and awarded guardianship of the girls to the Department of Children andFamily Services (DCFS). Respondent did not appeal the court's orders. On August7, 2001, more than two years after DCFS was awarded guardianship and afterseveral permanency review hearings, respondent filed a motion to modifyguardianship and custody of his children. See 705 ILCS 405/2--28(4) (West 2000). On November 21, 2001, the trial court denied the motion, and respondentchallenges the order in appeal No. 2--01--1465.

On April 12, 2002, the trial court transferred guardianship of the minorsfrom DCFS to the foster parents, and respondent and DCFS each filed notices ofappeal from that order. In appeal No. 2--02--0395, respondent argues that thetrial court should have transferred guardianship and custody of the children tohim rather than to the foster parents. In appeal No. 2--02--0505, DCFS arguesthat guardianship should have remained with DCFS and that the permanency goalshould have been set to "return home" to respondent. In this regard, DCFS andrespondent agree that the trial court erred when it set a permanency goal ofprivate guardianship by the foster parents. The foster parents are not partiesto these consolidated appeals.

We dismiss appeal No. 2--01--1465 for lack of jurisdiction. As to appealNos. 2--02--0395 and 2--02-0505, we conclude that the trial court's transfer ofguardianship from DCFS to the foster parents is against the manifest weight ofthe evidence. However, we further conclude that the denial of respondent'srequest for guardianship and custody is not against the manifest weight of theevidence. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's April 12, 2002, ordertransferring guardianship and remand the cause with directions.

FACTS

Alicia was born on February 17, 1997. DCFS took custody of her six monthslater when Elgin police responded to a report of a break-in and observed Alicia'smother handling the girl roughly. The mother refused to cooperate with thepolice and assaulted a DCFS worker the next day. Respondent and the mother werenever married. When the case began, Alicia lived with her mother and hermaternal grandmother in Elgin. Respondent lived in Elgin and worked there andin Beloit, Wisconsin. Respondent gave the mother $50 per week for Alicia,expressed a desire to gain custody of the girl, and offered to have familymembers watch her while he was at work.

DCFS filed a petition for an adjudication of neglect alleging that Alicia'sparents had failed to immunize Alicia and that the mother had used illegal drugsin Alicia's presence. At the September 17, 1997, hearing, respondent appearedpro se and admitted to a neglect adjudication but insisted that he would doeverything he could to regain custody. DCFS recommended "return home to theparents" as the first permanency goal.

At a subsequent status hearing, the trial court told respondent that hisappearance at the dispositional hearing was unnecessary if he was "willing toallow [DCFS] to have guardianship and custody in this case." Respondent did notattend the dispositional hearing. Following two hearings in October 1997, thetrial court awarded DCFS guardianship of Alicia, set the permanency goal of"return home," and authorized weekly supervised visitation by the parents. DCFSplaced Alicia in foster care after the maternal grandmother declined to takecustody.

After the first permanency review in January 1998, the trial courtpermitted the parents to visit Alicia more frequently. At the April 1998permanency review, the court found that the parents had attended parentingclasses as directed, and the court directed the parents to demonstrate parentingskills during the supervised visits.

Zayda was born on May 16, 1998, and the trial court granted DCFS temporarycustody after hearing evidence that the mother verbally abused hospital and DCFSstaff and tested positive for marijuana when Zayda was born. Zayda was placedwith Alicia's foster family. On August 26, 1998, the trial court appointed anattorney for respondent and began an adjudicatory hearing in Zayda's case. Psychologist Julia Klco testified that she evaluated the mother and respondentand observed one of respondent's visits with Alicia and Zayda. Klco stated thatrespondent was "extremely attentive" to Alicia and that he told Klco that hestayed with the mother for his daughters' sake. Klco recommended that respondentterminate his relationship with the mother. Klco believed that respondent couldparent successfully if he received legal assistance and day care services.

Chris Hinde, a DCFS caseworker, testified that respondent was "very gentleand very delicate" when interacting with the children. Respondent attendednearly all of the scheduled visits and otherwise cooperated. However, Hinde wasconcerned that respondent's status as an illegal alien showed his disregard forthis country's laws, including the child welfare laws.

The adjudicatory hearing was delayed because the mother initially deniedthat respondent was Zayda's father. A subsequent paternity test confirmed thatrespondent is the girl's father, and respondent readily admitted paternity.

On November 30, 1998, the court adjudicated Zayda neglected, concludingthat Zayda's home environment was injurious to her welfare because Alicia wasstill in the custody of DCFS, the mother had been violent toward respondent, andthe mother had tested positive for marijuana when Zayda was born. The trialcourt made Zayda a ward of the court, appointed DCFS guardian, and granted thefoster parents custody. The court also changed Alicia's permanency goal ofreturn home to "substitute care pending termination of parental rights" afterreviewing a report in which Hinde indicated that both parents were emotionallyunstable, failed to cooperate with DCFS, and repeatedly disregarded the authorityof the judicial system. Hinde noted that respondent had immigrated illegally andthat respondent and the mother had been arrested repeatedly for trafficviolations. Furthermore, the mother continued to vacillate between respondentand another boyfriend, and she often verbally abused respondent.

At Zayda's December 16, 1998, dispositional hearing, John Ayala, a DCFScaseworker who speaks both English and Spanish, testified to respondent's conductduring visits with Alicia and Zayda. Ayala stated that respondent had bondedwith the girls and that he was very tender and very nurturing when interactingwith them. Ayala believed that respondent's visits could be unsupervised if themother did not participate in them. The court granted DCFS guardianship of Zaydaand directed respondent to continue the recommended counseling, sign anynecessary releases, complete parenting classes, submit to a substance abuseevaluation, and provide a safe home environment. The court permitted DCFS toschedule unsupervised visits for respondent. Nancy M., the court-appointedspecial advocate (CASA) and the guardian ad litem, suggested that respondent'sparental rights should be terminated, and the court stated that a discussion ofsuch a termination was premature because respondent had been denied theopportunity to reunite with the children.

At the June and August 1999, permanency review hearings, the CASA and thefoster parents again recommended terminating respondent's parental rights. However, the court found that respondent had made substantial progress toward thereturn of both Alicia and Zayda and set the permanency goal for both girls atreturn home within 12 months as recommended by DCFS and the State. The courtpermitted unsupervised visits at respondent's home in Beloit, Wisconsin.

At a December 1999, permanency review hearing, the court reviewed aparenting assessment prepared by Patricia Voloschin-Weiner, a psychologistretained by DCFS. In her evaluation, Voloschin-Weiner stated that respondent hadbeen prejudiced because DCFS had provided respondent with services in Englisheven though his primary language is Spanish. She also opined that respondentpossessed adequate parenting skills and that he had developed a lovingrelationship with his daughters. The court left the permanency goal at returnhome and authorized overnight unsupervised visits with respondent in Wisconsin.

In January 2000, Zayda was diagnosed with fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS), andthe court ordered early intervention therapies, developmental classes, andoccupational and speech therapy. By this time, DCFS was developing a plan tocoordinate services with the appropriate Wisconsin agencies. Around that time,respondent learned that the foster parents baptized Alicia and Zayda in areligion other than respondent's.

On June 22, 2000, the court ordered respondent to "actively participate"in Zayda's early intervention therapies. The therapies were administered at ornear the foster parents' home in Aurora, and respondent's visits were conductedat his home in Wisconsin, which was several hours away. Respondent attended thetherapy sessions, but the foster parents did not allow him to participate whenhe occasionally arrived late. After acknowledging that some hostility haddeveloped between the parties, the court authorized the foster parents to excluderespondent from a session if he was more than 10 minutes late.

The next permanency review hearing ran from October through November 2000. Dr. Constance Blade, a pediatrician, testified that Zayda suffered from FAS buthad an IQ of 100, which is in the "normal" range. Dr. Blade had never metrespondent to evaluate him and his household for the appropriateness of atransition. However, Dr. Blade opined that Zayda would regress and require evenmore services if she left the foster parents' home permanently.

Ayala testified that respondent had ended all contact with the girls'mother. Respondent was rated "satisfactory" for the client service plan tasksof investigating Zayda's developmental delays and participating in her treatment. Respondent prepared nutritious meals for the girls and planned age-appropriateactivities for them. The interpreter who participated in the sessions told Ayalathat the foster parents were rude and that there was "a lot of tension in theair." Respondent and a second interpreter told Ayala that the foster parentsexcluded respondent from some of the sessions. Ayala concluded that respondentexceeded the minimum standards of parenting set by DCFS because he could provideshelter and food and could address Zayda's special needs. After noting thatsocial services were in place in Wisconsin, Ayala recommended return home as apermanency goal.

David Langenstrass, Ayala's DCFS supervisor, rated respondent as"satisfactory" for his compliance with the service plan tasks. DCFS recommendedthat the permanency goal remain at return home because respondent had bondedemotionally with the children and developed adequate parenting skills. He alsorecently attended more therapy sessions than usual. Dr. Alome Stein,respondent's therapist, testified that respondent understood Zayda's FASdiagnosis and used that knowledge while interacting with his daughters.

The foster mother testified that she hired a private investigator toinvestigate respondent and his family. She contacted a state senator andexpressed frustration that DCFS and other agencies knew of respondent's statusas an illegal immigrant but had not taken any action against him.

Respondent testified that the foster parents had treated him very badly,excluding him from several of Zayda's therapy sessions after he had drivenseveral hours from Wisconsin. Respondent acknowledged that Zayda suffers fromFAS and that she requires extra attention. Respondent used games, puzzles, andtoys to teach her to remain focused on tasks. He also calmed Zayda when shebecame disoriented, frustrated, anxious, and afraid. Respondent recently stoppedattending Zayda's speech therapy sessions because no interpreter was present. Ayala told respondent that he should not participate in the sessions until thetrial court reviewed the permanency goal.

On November 3, 2000, the court changed the permanency goal from return homewithin 12 months to private guardianship by the foster parents. The courtdecided that the goals of return home within five months and within one year wereinappropriate because the previous goal of return home within one year had notbeen achieved.

The court found that DCFS had rendered adequate services since the fall of1998 even though an interpreter did not consistently attend Zayda's therapysessions until July 2000. The court noted that respondent possessed at least theminimum parenting skills because he could feed, clothe, babysit, and shelter thechildren. He had made reasonable progress toward the return of the children andpossessed "a rudimentary understanding" of Zayda's condition, but he had notattended all of the therapy sessions. The court believed that the FAS diagnosiswas a "significant" change in the case and that Zayda would "regress" ifrespondent regained custody. The court believed that respondent could learn tocare for Zayda but that he was unprepared to do so at that time.

On August 7, 2001, respondent filed a "Motion for Modification of theDispositional Order of Guardianship to the Department of Children and FamilyServices and for Return of Custody to Father-Respondent." The trial court agreedto combine a hearing on respondent's motion with a previously scheduledpermanency hearing.

Ayala testified that respondent understood Zayda's special needs but hadnot completed several tasks recently assigned by DCFS. The foster parentscompleted the "KIDS" program, but respondent attended only one session. Respondent failed to furnish holiday visitation or transportation plans, and hedid not meet with a particular psychologist as directed. Ayala acknowledged thatthe therapists denied respondent's request to change Zayda's therapy schedule. A translator was not consistently provided at the therapy sessions, andrespondent was often forced to miss work.

Respondent did not attend Zayda's therapy sessions after the court set thepermanency goal of transferring guardianship to the foster parents, but Ayalabelieved that respondent was not required to do so. Zayda's sessions ended uponher third birthday because the Aurora school district concluded that she did notrequire special education. Ayala had never seen respondent treat the childreninappropriately, and when someone alleged that respondent had struck thechildren, Ayala determined that the allegations lacked merit.

D. Jean Ortega-Piron, the DCFS guardianship administrator, recommended thatthe permanency goal be set at "return home" to respondent. Ortega-Pirontestified that her intervention was necessary in this case because it had "reallygone off track" and the children should have been returned home sooner.

Ortega-Piron concluded that DCFS was not complying with the requirement ofplacing children of Spanish-speaking parents in a Spanish-speaking foster home. The requirement ensures that the children can communicate with their biologicalparents, maintain their heritage, and acclimate to their parents' home when theyreturn. Ortega-Piron believed that Alicia and Zayda were not fluent in Spanishbecause Spanish services were not provided at the start of the case. She alsocriticized the children's placement with nonrelative foster parents because arelative had previously volunteered to care for the children. Ortega-Pironadmitted that she had not met with respondent, the foster parents, or the girls,and that she did not review the foster parents' "cultural plan."

Ortega-Piron stated that, despite the inadequacy of the DCFS services,respondent had remained involved in the children's lives since their births. Respondent had financially supported the children while they lived with theirmother, and he provided for them during their weekly visits. Ortega-Piron wastroubled that Zayda's therapies were held at the foster parents' Aurora home,where respondent was not welcome. Moreover, DCFS should have better accommodatedrespondent so that he was not required to travel from Wisconsin to Aurora toattend weekday sessions beginning at 8:30 a.m. Respondent was excluded from thedevelopment of Zayda's future therapy plans. Furthermore, respondent did notattend all of the therapy sessions partly because DCFS did not clarify whichsessions he was required to attend. Alicia and Zayda had not participated in theRoman Catholic Church as respondent wished. Respondent had never abused orneglected the children, and Zayda's condition was improving steadily. Respondenthad difficulty "working with systems in this country," but he neverthelessdiligently sought custody.

Ricardo Ruiz, another Spanish-speaking DCFS counselor, testified that hehad been respondent's DCFS therapist since March 2001 and had observedrespondent's visits with Alicia and Zayda. Respondent generally described toRuiz the physical and behavioral effects of FAS, such as hyperactivity,unresponsiveness, and a lack of comprehension. However, respondent doubted thatZayda suffered from FAS. Respondent was patient with his daughters and playedwith them appropriately. He also cooked for them and disciplined them whennecessary. Alicia and Zayda interacted well with respondent, his fiancée, andtheir son. Respondent usually spoke to the girls in English, but he attemptedto teach them Spanish. Ruiz felt that respondent could manage Zayda's specialneeds, and he recommended returning Alicia and Zayda to respondent.

Dr. Blade again testified that Zayda suffered from FAS and had been "kickedout" of two day care centers for behaving badly. Zayda's condition had improved,which displayed her ability to extract and use learned information, but Zaydawould probably "fail" if she did not receive additional services. Respondent was"appropriately interested" and "very concerned" about Zayda. However, Dr. Bladerecommended that Zayda remain in the foster parents' home because the girl wasattached to them and would have difficulty adapting to a change. Dr. Blade didnot know whether respondent could care for Zayda because she had met with himonly once and was unfamiliar with his child care arrangements. She acknowledgedthat Zayda's biological ties to respondent were important and that a transitionto respondent's home was possible if respondent and his fiancée could meet "somevery big emotional requirements."

Dr. Susan Echiverri, a pediatric geneticist, opined that Zayda did notsuffer from FAS, fetal alcohol effects (FAE), or alcohol-relatedneurodevelopmental disorder (ARND). A child with FAS ordinarily has an IQ of 60to 70 but could have an IQ as high as 120. Dr. Echiverri spent between 30minutes and one hour assessing Zayda and recommended that Zayda continue hertherapy sessions. Zayda did not exhibit the facial features or growthretardation that are typical of FAS children. Dr. Echiverri explained thatZayda's race might have contributed to the misdiagnosis. The doctor alsoconcluded that Zayda's misbehavior was more likely caused by a behavioraldisorder than by neurodevelopmental abnormalities. Zayda earned "high average"scores in expressive language and vocabulary skills, which would be unusual fora child suffering from FAS. Zayda's attention span was normal for a three-year-old. The doctor stated that, even if Zayda suffered from FAS, respondent couldcare for her as long as he possessed a layman's understanding of the conditionand utilized available community resources.

Dr. Echiverri's diagnosis was based on an assumption that the mother hadnot consumed alcohol during her pregnancy. The doctor hypothesized that, if themother had consumed alcohol, Zayda's symptoms would support a diagnosis of fetalalcohol effects. The court explained that it had previously found that themother had, in fact, consumed alcohol during her pregnancy.

Respondent testified through an interpreter that he deeply desired custodyof Alicia and Zayda and wished to "help them better themselves like any fatherwould." For the past three years the girls visited respondent in Wisconsin,where he lived with his fiancée and their son. During the visits, respondentplayed games with the girls, took them to the park, read them children's booksin Spanish, cooked for them, and bathed them. Respondent used "time-outs" todiscipline the children and never used corporal punishment. He stated that hehas an extensive family network of nieces, nephews, and cousins that could helphim parent the girls. At the time of the hearing, respondent worked at asupermarket, and he had driven to work for the past three years even though heobtained a driver's license less than two months before the hearing.

Respondent explained that FAS is a congenital condition caused by themother's drinking of alcohol during her pregnancy. He acknowledged that adiagnosis of FAS would explain why things were harder for Zayda early in herlife. By the time of the hearing, Zayda acted normally, and respondent gave herspecial attention. Respondent learned during Zayda's occupational therapy howto limit her play.

When respondent asked Ayala to reschedule the therapy sessions in Aurora,Ayala either told respondent that is was not possible or redirected theconversation. Respondent was not included in the development of Zayda's earlyintervention family service plans, and only some of the sessions were conductedin Spanish. Respondent stopped attending the sessions in November 2000 becausehe thought he was no longer required to attend them.

Respondent was very concerned that the foster parents baptized the childrenin the Protestant faith even though they knew that respondent is Catholic. DCFSnever followed through on a promise to move the children to a Spanish-speakinghome. Respondent believed that the girls' understanding of their cultural,religious, and linguistic heritage had been adversely affected.

The State called Thomas Leo, a family therapist, who evaluated respondent,Zayda, Alicia, and the foster parents separately at the request of DCFS. Respondent vigorously challenged Leo's qualifications to testify as an expert,arguing that he was unlicensed, he did not rely upon any DCFS standards inreaching his conclusions, and each of his evaluations was less than one hourlong. However, the court permitted Leo to render an opinion in the case becausehe had significant "life experience" and had testified in juvenile cases before. Leo recommended that Alicia and Zayda remain with the foster parents and thatrespondent's overnight visits end.

At the evaluation, Leo spoke to the respondent in Spanish, but respondentspoke to his daughters in English. Zayda appeared to be quite impulsive, butrespondent and the girls exhibited a "nice interaction." Respondent's vigilancewas "more than adequate," and he met the minimal standards of parenting. However, Leo was uncertain of the degree of attachment between the girls andrespondent. The foster parents understood Zayda's therapies. Leo concluded thatthe children's proposed return to respondent would create stress in respondentand his fiancée and would disrupt the psychological bonds the children haddeveloped with the foster parents. Although he never met respondent's fiancée,Leo concluded that she could not care for Alicia and Zayda because she was only18 years old and had a son of her own. Leo knew that respondent never"mistreated or neglected the children," but he believed that respondent was not"positioned in a good way" for the transition and that a transition would havebeen easier two years earlier. Leo stated that the girls were thriving becauseof the foster parents' daily care.

Nancy M., the CASA and the guardian ad litem, opined that Alicia and Zaydashould remain in the foster home because nothing had changed since the November2000 permanency review. Nancy M. believed that respondent did not meet theminimal standards of parenting because he had rejected the diagnosis of FAS anddenied that Zayda had special needs. Ten people told Nancy M. that respondenthad struck Alicia and Zayda, and Nancy M. believed that "the hitting [had]escalated." Nancy M. stated that the foster mother is "phenomenal" and that thefoster parents are a "far and away superior choice." On cross-examination, NancyM. admitted that she had not spoken with respondent since the most recentpermanency review in November 2000. Her recent information about respondent camefrom the foster parents, service providers, and day care providers.

Nancy M. identified reports prepared by Dr. Ira Chasnoff and Dr. LindaSchwartz of the Child Custody Center. According to the reports, the motheradmitted significant drinking during Zayda's pregnancy. Dr. Chasnoff diagnosedZayda with FAS because she exhibited neurobehavioral symptoms such as aggression,impulsivity, sleeping problems, and increased sensitivity to auditory stimuli. Zayda exhibited normal cognitive functioning when examined, but the expertspredicted that her condition would deteriorate if she was not placed in a stable,nurturing home with adequate services. Dr. Schwartz reported that Alicia saidrespondent struck the girls when he was angry.

On November 21, 2001, the trial court denied respondent's motion to modifyguardianship and custody and again set a permanency goal of awarding privateguardianship to the foster parents. The court found that Zayda had special needsthat were most likely caused by the mother's prenatal substance abuse. Zayda,therefore, would likely require professional therapeutic services and follow-through by the primary caretaker. Respondent had several opportunities to learnabout and participate in Zayda's therapies but chose not to do so. The courtconcluded that the best interests of Alicia and Zayda would be served if theyremained with the foster parents.

The court's November 21, 2001, permanency order was consistent with theNovember 2000 permanency order. DCFS retained guardianship pending the goal oftransferring guardianship to the foster parents. The court entered supplementalfindings that "a pattern of either negligent or purposeful misrepresentationoccurred with DCFS, such as the failure to give Dr. Susan Echiverri the completeinformation about prenatal substance abuse." The court attributed Zayda'sineligibility for special education to successful intensive therapies. The courtalso downplayed the significance of the experts' conflicting diagnoses, notingthat they agreed that Zayda should continue her therapy sessions. The court wasmost troubled by respondent's failure to participate in the sessions. Moreover,the foster parents' "cultural plan" adequately addressed respondent's concernthat Alicia and Zayda were losing touch with their heritage. The court notedthat any "perceived misfeasance committed by DCFS" should not be considered whendetermining the children's best interests.

The court subsequently granted respondent overnight visitation and entereda written finding of finality pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2dR. 304(a)). Respondent also requested and received certification of anappealable question under Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)), but this courtdenied his application for leave to appeal under that rule. On December 20,2001, respondent filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his motion to modifycustody, and this court docketed the case as appeal No. 2--01--1465.

On April 12, 2002, the trial court held a status hearing at which the Stateand the foster parents requested that the court transfer guardianship of Aliciaand Zayda from DCFS to the foster parents. Respondent and DCFS objected, citingthe need for the court to monitor respondent's visitation and Zayda's specialservices. The trial court nevertheless transferred guardianship of the minorsfrom DCFS to the foster parents, relying only upon the evidence presented at thehearings on respondent's motion to modify custody and the concurrent permanencyreview. The court also closed the case, thereby ending the periodic permanencyreview hearings, depriving the minors of the court's supervision, and removingthe statutory mechanism by which respondent's access to the children could bemonitored.

On April 16, 2002, respondent filed a second notice of appeal challengingthe transfer of guardianship, and we docketed the case as No. 2--02--0395. OnMay 17, 2002, DCFS filed its own notice of appeal from the guardianship transfer,and we docketed the case as No. 2--02--0505. The appeals have been consolidated.

APPEAL No. 2--01--1465

The trial court awarded DCFS guardianship of Alicia and Zayda on October15, 1997, and on December 16, 1998, respectively. Respondent did not appealthose dispositional orders. However, in appeal No. 2--01--1465, respondentchallenges the November 21, 2001, order in which the trial court denied his"Motion for Modification of the Dispositional Order of Guardianship to theDepartment of Children and Family Services and for Return of Custody to Father-Respondent." Respondent contends that this court has jurisdiction to review theNovember 21, 2001, order pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 301, 304(a) (155 Ill.2d Rs. 301, 304(a)), and 306(a)(5) (166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5)).

Section 2--28 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2--28(West 2000)) governs court proceedings to review dispositional orders. In reS.M., 223 Ill. App. 3d 543, 547 (1992). At least every six months, the circuitcourt must review the permanency goal (705 ILCS 405/2--28(2) (West 2000)) andenter a written permanency order (705 ILCS 405/2--28(3) (West 2000)). Such amodified disposition vacates the original disposition and supercedes it. In reBrandon S., 331 Ill. App. 3d 757, 761 (2002). A party may seek review of thepermanency goal in the interim by filing a motion under section 2--28(4), whichprovides that "[t]he minor or any person interested in the minor may apply to thecourt for a change in custody of the minor and the appointment of a new custodianor guardian of the person or for the restoration of the minor to the custody ofhis parents or former guardian or custodian." 705 ILCS 405/2--28(4) (West 2000).

An order is final and appealable if it terminates the litigation betweenthe parties on the merits or disposes of the rights of the parties either on theentire controversy or on a separate part thereof. Blott v. Hanson, 283 Ill. App.3d 656, 660 (1996). Rule 301 governs appeals from cases in which a final orderhas disposed of the entire controversy. In re Adoption of Ginnell, 316 Ill. App.3d 789, 791 (2000). In Brandon S., the Appellate Court, First District, recentlyheld that the denial of a section 2--28(4) motion to modify custody is notappealable under Rules 301 and 303 because such a motion "jump[s] the gun on thenext scheduled permanency hearing and the order resulting therefrom could beanalogized to an order resulting from a permanency hearing." Brandon S., 331Ill. App. 3d at 761. We agree with the analysis of Brandon S. and hold that welack jurisdiction under Rule 301 to review the denial of respondent's motionunder section 2--28(4) of the Act.

Rule 304 governs cases in which a final order has been entered on aseparate part of the controversy. Ginnell, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 791. Rule 304(a)provides in part that "[i]f multiple parties or multiple claims for relief areinvolved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one ormore but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court has madean express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying eitherenforcement or appeal or both." 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).

We are unaware of any Illinois court that has considered whether the denialof a section 2--28(4) motion is appealable under Rule 304(a). However, oursupreme court has recently held that an order entered after a permanency reviewhearing pursuant to section 2--28(3) is interlocutory and not appealable underRule 304(b)(1). In re Curtis B., No. 92010, slip op. at 5 (September 19, 2002). Curtis B. guides our analysis because orders resulting from a motion undersection 2--28(4) are analogous to orders entered after a section 2--28(3)permanency hearing. See Brandon S., 331 Ill. App. 3d at 761.

A permanency goal is " ' "not a final determination on the merits withregard to termination of parental rights but, rather, an intermediate proceduralstep taken for the protection of and best interests of the child." ' " CurtisB., slip op. at 4, quoting In re D.S., 198 Ill. 2d 309, 329, (2001), quoting Inre K.H., 313 Ill. App. 3d 675, 682 (2000). Section 2--28 provides that "all ofthe rights and obligations set forth in the permanency order must remain open forreexamination and possible revision until the permanency goal is achieved." Curtis B., slip op. at 5. Therefore, the supreme court decided that a permanencyorder entered under section 2--28(3) (705 ILCS 405/2--28(3) (West 2000)) ismerely interlocutory and not final or appealable under Rule 304(b)(1). CurtisB., slip op. at 5. The court severed the appeal provision of section 2--28(3)after concluding that the legislature violated the doctrine of separation ofpowers when it attempted to make the nonfinal judgments under that sectionappealable. Curtis B., slip op. at 5.

Section 2--28(3) and section 2--28(4) each provide a procedure by which thecircuit court may reexamine and revise the rights and obligations set forth ina permanency order. Because an order entered after a section 2--28(3) proceedingis not appealable under Rule 304, we hold that an order disposing of a motion tomodify guardianship or custody under section 2--28(4) also is interlocutory andnot final and appealable under Rule 304. Cf., Curtis B., slip op. at 5 (holdingthat a permanency order entered under section 2--28(3) is interlocutory).

In this case, the trial court granted respondent's request for a writtenfinding of finality. However, the court's Rule 304(a) finding does not renderthe nonfinal order appealable. See Blott, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 660. Accordingly,we conclude that we lack jurisdiction under Rules 301 and 304(a) because theorder denying respondent's motion to modify custody is not a final order.

The State contends that we lack jurisdiction to review the denial ofrespondent's motion to modify custody because, unlike section 2--28(3), section2--28(4) does not expressly authorize an appeal. However, the appeal provisionof section 2--28(3) of the Act is unconstitutional. Therefore, we note that,even if the legislature had included an appeal provision in section 2--28(4), itwould be unconstitutional under the supreme court's separation-of-powers analysisset forth in Curtis B. See Curtis B., slip op. at 5.

We next consider whether Rule 306(a)(5) confers appellate jurisdiction. Rule 306(a)(5) permits an appeal when the appellant petitions for and theappellate court grants leave to appeal from an interlocutory order affecting thecare and custody of unemancipated minors. 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5). Rule 306requires, as a prerequisite to invoking appellate jurisdiction, the filing of apetition "in the Appellate Court in accordance with the requirements for briefswithin 30 days after the entry of the order." 166 Ill.2d R. 306(b). Respondentfailed to file a petition for leave to appeal, but he contends that we mustnevertheless consider the appeal under Rule 306(a)(5). We disagree in part.

In Curtis B., the supreme court rejected the respondent's argument that theappellate court must review a permanency order entered under section 2--28(3) ofthe Act. The court held that the appellate court may review such an order as amatter of judicial economy under Rule 306(a)(5). Curtis B., slip op. at 8. Theappellate court had dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because therespondent's jurisdictional statement cited only the appeal provision of section2--28(3) of the Act and Rule 304(b)(1).

The supreme court agreed that neither section 2--28(3) nor Rule 304(b)(1)conferred appellate jurisdiction. The court nevertheless reversed the appellatecourt's dismissal of the appeal and remanded the cause for the appellate courtto consider granting leave to appeal under Rule 306(a)(5) even though therespondent had not cited the rule or filed a petition under Rule 306(b). Thecourt held that a remand was appropriate because the respondent filed her noticeof appeal before the appellate court held that the appeal provision of section2--28(3) was unconstitutional. Curtis B., slip op. at 9.

The supreme court relied upon In re Marriage of Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d 114(1983), in excusing the respondent's noncompliance with Rule 306. In Leopando,the defendant appealed a custody order in a dissolution-of-marriage case and thesupreme court held that the issue was not a separate claim that could be appealedunder Rule 304(a). However, the court did not dismiss the appeal because "[i]tseem[ed] clear that the law at the time of the instant appeal implied thatcustody orders, containing the requisite Rule 304(a) language by the trial court,were immediately appealable." Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at 117.

This case is procedurally distinguishable from Leopando and Curtis B. Atthe time respondent appealed from the dismissal of his motion to modify custodyhere, no case or statute suggested that such an order was final and appealable. Therefore, respondent had no reason to believe that Rules 301 and 304(a) wouldconfer jurisdiction and that his noncompliance with Rule 306 would be excused. We do not construe Curtis B. to hold that the appellate court must alert apotential appellant of his option to file a Rule 306(b) petition for leave toappeal and then wait indefinitely for the party to file one or waive therequirement altogether. However, we may exercise our discretion and entertainjurisdiction if we deem it appropriate. See In re Marriage of Agustsson, 223Ill. App. 3d 510, 517 (1992) (after a timely notice of appeal was filed, theappellate court entertained jurisdiction in the interests of judicial economyalthough a proper Rule 306 petition was not filed).

We dismiss respondent's appeal from the denial of his motion to modifycustody and guardianship because we lack jurisdiction under Rules 301 and 304(a). We refuse to entertain respondent's appeal under Rule 306(a)(5), as judicialeconomy will not be served. We nevertheless address respondent's substantivearguments in appeal No. 2--02--0395 in which he challenges the trial court'sorder transferring guardianship to the foster parents and closing the case.

APPEAL No. 2--02--0505

DCFS and respondent each appeal from the April 12, 2002, order transferringguardianship to the foster parents and closing the case. An order closing ajuvenile case under section 2--31(2) of the Act is final and appealable (In reBettie Jo R., 277 Ill. App. 3d 401, 402 (1995)), and an appeal from a finaljudgment draws into issue all prior nonfinal orders that produced the finaljudgment (Yamada Corp. v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 305 Ill. App. 3d362, 367 (1999)). Therefore, we have jurisdiction to consider the two appealsfrom the April 12, 2002, order closing the case. DCFS appeals the order inappeal No. 2--02--0505.

DCFS argues that the trial court's order was against the manifest weightof the evidence and that DCFS should have retained guardianship with thepermanency goal of returning the minors to respondent's home. We agree.

The purpose of the Act is to serve the best interests of children. 705ILCS 405/1--2(1) (West 2000). Whenever possible, everything must be done toreturn a child to the care and custody of a biological parent. 705 ILCS 405/1--2(1) (West 2000). Once a child is adjudicated neglected and placed in thecustody of DCFS, the court must regularly conduct "permanency hearings" duringthe pendency of the case to determine the proper placement of the child. 705ILCS 405/2--28(2) (West 2000); In re D.S., 198 Ill. 2d 309, 326 (2001).

At the conclusion of a permanency hearing, a written order must be enteredsetting forth a permanency placement goal for the child. 705 ILCS 405/2--28(3)(West 2000). The circuit court has the discretion to select a permanency goaland to render a final decision as to the placement of the child that is in hisor her best interests, and the court's decision will not be disturbed unless itis against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d467, 472 (2000). The finding of a trial court is against the manifest weight ofthe evidence if a review of the record reveals that the opposite result was theproper one. D.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 472.

The available permanency goals are as follows: (1) return home within fivemonths, (2) return home within one year, (3) return home pending a statushearing, (4) substitute care pending court determination on termination ofparental rights, (5) adoption after the termination of parental rights, (6)private guardianship, (7) substitute care pending independence, or (8) substitutecare due to developmental disabilities or mental illness. 705 ILCS 405/2--28(2)(A) through (2)(G) (West 2000). "In selecting any permanency goal, thecourt shall indicate in writing the reasons the goal was selected and why thepreceding goals were ruled out." 705 ILCS 405/2--28(2) (West 2000).

The factors to consider when deciding the best interests of the child areas follows: (1) the age of the child, (2) other options available for permanence,(3) the current placement of the child and the intent of the family regardingadoption, (4) the emotional, physical, and mental status or condition of thechild, (5) the types of services previously offered and whether or not theservices were successful and, if not successful, the reasons the services failed,(6) the availability of services currently needed and whether the services exist,and (7) the status of siblings of the minor. 705 ILCS 405/2--28(2) (West 2000). The court must also consider the permanency goal recommended by DCFS, theappropriateness of the services provided, the parties' efforts to achieve thegoal, and the extent to which the goal has been achieved. 705 ILCS 405/2--28(2)(West 2000).

In November 2000, the trial court changed the permanency goal from returnhome within 12 months to private guardianship. The court ruled out the goal ofreturn home for both girls after finding that respondent had not attended enoughof Zayda's therapy sessions. However, the court failed to state in writing whyit was ruling out the other preceding permanency goals, such as substitute careand adoption, as is required by statute. See 705 ILCS 405/2--28(2) (West 2000). In November 2001, the court again set the goal at private guardianship despitefinding irregularities in DCFS's management of the case. Ortega-Piron, the DCFSguardianship administrator, acknowledged that respondent had not receivedadequate services and recommended that the goal remain at return home even thoughthe minors had spent nearly all of their lives with the foster parents.

At the time DCFS took Alicia and Zayda into protective custody, respondentwas the noncustodial parent. Respondent acquiesced in the neglect adjudicationsbut immediately asserted that he desired custody. The DCFS administrator lateradmitted that respondent's progress with the various service plans was adverselyaffected by DCFS's failure to provide him with adequate services in Spanish. Forexample, respondent initially earned low scores on psychological and parentingevaluations because they were administered in English, but his scores improvedwhen he was tested again in Spanish. Moreover, Hinde, the primary caseworkerassigned to the case from October 1997 to September 1998, did not speak Spanish.

Respondent was employed throughout the case, and his employer, who is alsohis aunt, allowed a flexible work schedule to accommodate respondent's visitationand participation in Zayda's therapy sessions. The trial court was mostconcerned with respondent's failure to participate in all of the sessions, butDCFS admitted that respondent received conflicting information about whichsessions he was required to attend. Therefore, his noncompliance with that taskcan be at least partially attributed to DCFS.

Furthermore, the foster parents' guardianship of the girls undermined theircultural, religious, linguistic, and familial ties and therefore was not in theirbest interests. See 705 ILCS 405/1--3(4.05) (West 2000). Respondent and thefoster family speak different languages and practice different religions. Thegirls spoke little Spanish despite court-ordered tutoring sessions, and thefoster parents baptized the children without respondent's knowledge.

The foster parents repeatedly attempted to exclude respondent from Zayda'stherapy sessions in Aurora even though he drove two hours from Wisconsin eachtime. The trial court addressed the problem by unreasonably barring respondentfrom those sessions at which he arrived more than 10 minutes late. Also, thefoster mother alerted several agencies to respondent's immigrant status to hastenthe minors' permanent transition into the foster home. DCFS was told thatrespondent had struck the girls and that they were anxious after returning fromcertain visits, but these accusations were proved to be unfounded. The fosterparents' attempts to alienate respondent from his children are even moretroubling when viewed in light of respondent's good-faith, diligent effort toregain custody.

Despite the foster parents' adversarial tactics and DCFS's frequentlyinappropriate administration of the case, respondent made consistent progresstoward the return of Alicia and Zayda. Respondent completed the psychologicalevaluation, drug and alcohol testing, parenting classes, and counseling sessionsas required. Respondent established a permanent residence in Wisconsin,consistently visited his daughters, and met with doctors and therapists to learnmore about Zayda's condition. Moreover, respondent ended his relationship withthe mother, whose conduct was the primary basis for the neglect adjudications. Thereafter, respondent developed a healthy and serious relationship with hisfiancée, and they now share a son. DCFS confirmed that respondent, his fiancée,and his son interacted well with Alicia and Zayda during the girls' visits toWisconsin.

Respondent attended several of Zayda's therapy sessions, displayed anunderstanding of her condition, and acknowledged that her "special needs" requirecontinued treatment. DCFS concluded that Zayda is a "high functioning" child whoshould be returned to respondent after additional DCFS services are coordinatedwith those in Wisconsin. Even if respondent were unprepared to care for Zayda,nothing suggests that he could not provide adequate food, shelter, and clothingfor Alicia, who has no special needs.

After reviewing all of the evidence, we conclude that the trial court'sNovember 2000 and November 2001 orders setting the permanency goal to privateguardianship and the April 12, 2002, order transferring guardianship to thefoster parents are against the manifest weight of the evidence because a returnhome to respondent was in the best interests of Alicia and Zayda at that time.

APPEAL No. 2--02--0395

Like DCFS, respondent appeals from the April 12, 2002, order transferringguardianship. However, unlike DCFS, respondent contends that the trial courtshould have granted him immediate guardianship and custody of the minors. Respondent argues that (1) he was denied his constitutional "fundamentalrights/superior rights" to the children, (2) the Act required the court to awardrespondent guardianship and custody, (3) the trial court violated international,federal, and other state laws, and (4) the trial court's finding that a placementwith the foster parents was in the minors' "best interests" is against themanifest weight of the evidence. We reject respondent's first three arguments. However, for the reasons set forth in our analysis of DCFS's appeal, we agreewith respondent's fourth argument.

We initially comment on counsel's inclusion of excessive footnotes and aninadequate factual statement in respondent's opening brief. Supreme Court Rule341(a) ordinarily limits such briefs to 75 pages and prohibits the use offootnotes to evade the page limitation (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21(October 17, 2001), R. 341(a), eff. October 1, 2001). We increased the pagelimitation to 100 pages at counsel's request. Thereafter, counsel filed a 96-page brief with more than two dozen footnotes. Because the brief would haveexceeded the 100-page limit easily if counsel had included the footnotes in thetext, we can conclude only that counsel was attempting to evade the generous pagelimit, and we ignore the footnotes. Moreover, the brief contains a 46-pagestatement of facts omitting certain evidence that undermines respondent's case. Rule 341(e)(6) requires an accurate statement of facts, without argument,necessary to an understanding of the case, and we admonish counsel for failingto comply with the rule.

Next we address respondent's contention that the trial court denied his"fundamental liberty interest" in Alicia and Zayda. Respondent essentiallycontends that the court's guardianship determination should have focused on hisrights as the biological parent rather than on the best interests of thechildren. We disagree.

It is well settled that a parent has superior rights to the care andcustody of a child, unless the child is placed elsewhere due to an adjudicatedfinding that the parent abused or neglected the child. In re J.J., 327 Ill. App.3d 70, 77 (2001); In re S.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d 121, 132. If a child is made award of the court, the child's best interests are "superior to all otherfactors, including the interests of the biological parents." J.J., 327 Ill. App.3d at 77. If the "best interests" standard can be attained only by placing thechild in the custody of someone other than the natural parent, it is unnecessaryfor the court to find the natural parent unfit to care for the child. J.J., 327Ill. App. 3d at 77.

Respondent cites Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455 (2000), for theproposition that, "unless the parent has forfeited his right as the decision-maker for his child through his own abuse or neglect of the child, it is theparent, not a court, who gets to decide how to raise [the] child." In Lulay, thesupreme court held unconstitutional a statute that granted grandparentsvisitation rights over the objection of the biological parents. Lulay, 193 Ill.2d at 463.

Respondent asserts that the trial judge in this case had no greater rightto intervene in the minors' lives than would their grandparents. However,respondent's argument ignores the trial court's adjudications of neglect andinstead erroneously focuses on the judge's comments during the subsequentpermanency reviews that respondent had not "neglected or abused" the minors. Thejudge's comments merely reflected her belief that the goal of return home wasappropriate at that time. A review of the record reveals that the judge neverintended to disturb the prior adjudications of neglect. We conclude that Lulayand the analogous United States Supreme Court cases that respondent cites do notapply here because none of them involve an adjudication of neglect.

In this case, respondent's rights as a biological parent must yield to thebest interests of Alicia and Zayda because each child was adjudicated neglectedand made a ward of the court. We recognize that both neglect adjudications werebased primarily on the mother's misconduct and that respondent lacked the benefitof counsel when he consented to Alicia's adjudication. However, respondentreadily admitted that he had not immunized Alicia, and the trial court decidedthat, because he sent money to Mexico each month, respondent was not indigentand, therefore, had no right to appointed counsel. Moreover, respondent remainedromantically involved with the mother at the time of both adjudications, and atleast one DCFS caseworker testified that the chaotic relationship placed Aliciaand Zayda at serious risk. We conclude that the court properly adjudicated theminors neglected and that the "best interests" standard applies to the permanencygoal and guardianship determinations.

We next address respondent's contention that the Act required the trialcourt to award respondent guardianship and immediate custody of Alicia and Zayda. In her brief, counsel for the State opines that her own experience teachingchildren with learning disabilities qualifies her to comment on the minors' bestinterests and Zayda's special needs. We strike this portion of the State's briefbecause it violates Rule 341(e)(7), which prohibits the introduction of evidencenot contained in the record on appeal.

As previously discussed, we conclude that the trial court's decisions toset the permanency goal at private guardianship and to transfer guardianship tothe foster parents are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Several DCFSrepresentatives testified that DCFS should retain guardianship until respondentwas fully prepared for Alicia and Zayda to return home. Furthermore, DCFS wasworking with Wisconsin agencies to coordinate services for respondent and theminors. All of the medical experts opined that Zayda required additionalservices to address her special needs. Therefore, it was not against themanifest weight of the evidence for the trial court to conclude implicitly thatan immediate return home was not in the minors' best interests.

Finally, respondent claims that the court violated his rights under theVienna Convention (Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21U.S.T. 77) and under federal and state law. For example, respondent asserts thatDCFS's two-year delay in notifying the Mexican Consulate of the juvenileproceedings prejudiced him because the Consulate ultimately discovered evidencethat supports his case. Respondent also argues that he was prejudiced by theplacement of the minors with English-speaking foster parents and by the orderdirecting him to participate in certain therapy sessions at which no interpreterwas provided. However, respondent does not explain how these alleged violationswould entitle him to immediate custody of his children. We decline to grantrespondent this relief and remand the cause without deciding the merits of thesegrievances.

CONCLUSION

We dismiss respondent's appeal from the denial of his motion to modifycustody and guardianship. We reverse the order transferring guardianship fromDCFS to the foster parents. We also remand the cause for the trial court toreopen the case, set an appropriate permanency goal for the minors, and orderrespondent and the foster parents to cooperate with DCFS to facilitate atransition of Alicia and Zayda into respondent's home if such a transition isstill appropriate.

No. 2--01--1465, Dismissed.

Nos. 2--02--0395 and 2--02--0505, Reversed and remanded with directions.

McLAREN and BOWMAN, JJ., concur.