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JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

The minors, Alexis H. and Justin H., were adjudicatedneglected and made wards of the court in March 1997. The Statesubsequently filed a petition seeking termination of the parentalrights of both parents, Tracy H. and Stacey S., under section 2--13of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2--13 (West2000)). During the unfitness stage of the bifurcated proceeding,the trial court found respondents to be unfit parents. However,during the best-interest stage, the trial court found that it wasnot in the best interest of the minors to terminate respondents'parental rights. The trial court thus denied the State's petitionand set the matter for a permanency hearing, as provided by section2--28 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2--28 (West 2000)). The parents donot appeal from the finding of unfitness. Rather, in theseconsolidated appeals, the State appeals from the order denying itspetition to terminate the parental rights of respondents.

Concerned with the finality of the order from which the Stateappeals, we ordered the parties to address this court'sjurisdiction to review the trial court's order denying the State'spetition to terminate respondents' parental rights. Althoughneither party initially noted the jurisdictional issue, a reviewingcourt has a duty to consider sua sponte its jurisdiction and todismiss the appeal if it determines that jurisdiction is wanting. Ferguson v. Riverside Medical Center, 111 Ill. 2d 436, 440 (1985);Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 539 (1984).

Section 2--13 of the Act governs petitions to terminateparental rights. There are no time limitations in the Act forrefiling a petition to terminate parental rights after a petitionhas been dismissed. Section 2--13(6) provides that, at any timebefore the dismissal of the petition or before the final closingand discharge under section 2--31, one or more motions in the bestinterests of the minor may be filed. 705 ILCS 405/2--13(6) (West2000). Section 2--31(1) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2--31(1) (West2000)) sets forth the parameters for the duration of the wardshipand the discharge of the proceedings. It provides that allproceedings under the Act with respect to any minor for whom apetition was filed automatically terminate upon the minor'sattaining the age of 19 years or whenever the court determines andmakes written factual findings that the health, safety, and bestinterests of the minor and the public no longer require thewardship of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2--31(1)(2) (West 2000).

At the time the State's petition to terminate the parentalrights in this case was filed, the minors were 12 and 14 years ofage. Rather than terminating their wardship, the trial courtcontinued the cause for a permanency hearing, which is governed bysection 2--28 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2--28 (West 2000)). Theorder setting the matter for a permanency hearing did not changethe status quo of the parties and can be analogized to an orderresulting from a permanency hearing.

Until the time the permanency goal is attained, the circuitcourt must conduct permanency hearings at a minimum of every sixmonths to review and reevaluate dispositional orders. 705 ILCS405/2--28(2) (West 2000). The court must enter a writtenpermanency order. 705 ILCS 405/2--28(3)(West 2000). Such amodified disposition vacates the original disposition andsupercedes it. In re Brandon S., 331 Ill. App. 3d 757, 761 (2002). In the interim, a party may seek review of the permanency goal byfiling a motion under section 2--28(4), which provides that "[t]heminor or any person interested in the minor may apply to the courtfor a change in custody of the minor and the appointment of a newcustodian or guardian of the person or for the restoration of theminor to the custody of his parents or former guardian orcustodian." 705 ILCS 504/2--28(4) (West 2000). By statute, "allof the rights and obligations set forth in the permanency ordermust remain open for reexamination and possible revision until thepermanency goal is achieved." In re Curtis B., No. 92010, slip op.at 5 (September 19, 2002).

The jurisdictional statement set forth in the State'sappellate brief provides that the appeal is brought pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 303 (155 Ill. 2d R. 303). The State confesseserror in citing only Supreme Court Rule 303 and not Supreme CourtRule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301) as the basis for this court'sjurisdiction to review the order denying the petition, and itrequests that we entertain the jurisdictional analysis under Rule301 as well. An order is final and appealable if it terminates thelitigation between the parties on the merits or disposes of therights of the parties either on the entire controversy or on aseparate part thereof. Blott v. Hanson, 283 Ill. App. 3d 656, 660(1996). A "final judgment" is one that fixes absolutely the rightsof the parties. Flores v. Dugan, 91 Ill. 2d 108, 112 (1982). Ajudgment is final if it determines the litigation on the merits sothat, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with theexecution of the judgment. People ex rel. Scott v. Silverstein, 87Ill. 2d 167, 171 (1981).

Rule 301 governs appeals from cases in which a final order hasdisposed of the entire controversy, and Rule 303 sets forth therequirements that must be met for the preparation and filing ofappeals from final judgments in civil cases. In re Adoption ofGinnell, 316 Ill. App. 3d 789, 791 (2000)

In Brandon S., the court held that the denial of a section 2--28(4) motion to modify custody is not appealable under Rules 301and 303. Brandon S., 331 Ill. App. 3d at 760. Analogizing theorder to an order resulting from a permanency hearing, the courtfound that, because the motion "jumped the gun on the nextscheduled permanency hearing," the order was not final. BrandonS., 331 Ill. App. 3d at 761. In In re Alicia Z., No. 2--01--1465,slip op. at 17 (November 7, 2002), we agreed with the analysis inBrandon S., and held that we lacked jurisdiction under Rules 301and 303 to review the denial of a motion pursuant to section 2--28(4) of the Act. See also Curtis B., slip op. at 5 (permanencyorder entered after a section 2--28(3) permanency hearing is notfinal pursuant to Rule 304(a)). Similarly here, the appeal fromthe denial of the petition to terminate parental rights "jumps thegun" on the next permanency hearing. Accordingly, we lackjurisdiction under Rules 301 and 303 to review the denial of theState's petition.

The State alternatively asks for leave to appeal pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) (166 Ill. 2d R. 306 (a)(5)) so thatthe termination order may be timely reviewed. Rule 306(a)(5)permits an appeal when the appellant petitions for and theappellate court grants leave to appeal from an interlocutory orderaffecting the care and custody of unemancipated minors. The filingof a petition in the appellate court is a prerequisite to invokingappellate jurisdiction. 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(b). The State did notfile a petition for leave to appeal but requests that wenevertheless consider the appeal pursuant to Rule 306(a)(5).

In Curtis B., the supreme court agreed with the State that theselection of a permanency goal is not a " ' "final determination onthe merits with regard to the termination of parental rights but,rather, an intermediate procedural step taken for the protection ofand best interests of the child[ren]," ' " Curtis B., slip op. at4, quoting In re D.S., 198 Ill. 2d 309, 329 (2001), quoting In reK.H., 313 Ill. App. 3d 675, 682 (2000). Because the rights andobligations set forth in the permanency order are subject toreexamination and possible revision until the permanency goal isaccomplished, the supreme court determined that a permanency orderentered under section 2--28(3) is interlocutory. Curtis B., slipop. at 6. The supreme court held, in part, that a remand for the consideration of an interlocutory appeal was appropriate becausethe respondent filed a notice of appeal from a section of thestatute that allowed for appeals (section 2--28(3)) but that laterwas found unconstitutional. Curtis B., slip op. at 5-6. Thenoncompliance with the filing of a petition was excused because theappellant had no reason to believe the petition was necessary. Nevertheless, the supreme court rejected the respondent's argumentthat the appellate court must review a permanency order and heldthat the appellate court may review such orders as a matter ofjudicial economy. Curtis B., slip op. at 8.

We found the case of Alicia Z. procedurally distinguishablefrom Curtis B. At the time the respondent in Alicia Z. appealedfrom the dismissal of his motion to modify custody, no case orstatute suggested that section 2--28(4) of the Act was final andappealable, and, therefore, the respondent had no reason to believethat Rules 301 and 304(a) would confer jurisdiction and that hisnoncompliance with Rule 306 would be excused. Alicia Z., slip op.at 20.

Unlike Alicia Z., there are a few cases where the appellatecourt has reviewed an order denying a petition to terminateparental rights, thereby suggesting that an appeal from an orderdenying a petition to terminate parental rights is final andappealable under Rules 301 and 303. See, e.g., In re K.B., 314Ill. App. 3d 739 (4th Dist. 2000); In re J.B., 298 Ill. App. 3d 250(4th Dist. 1998); In re Perez, 173 Ill. App. 3d 922 (1988). Whilenone of these cases explicitly addressed whether it hadjurisdiction over the appeal, the State reasonably could read eachof these cases as containing an implicit affirmation by theappellate court that it had jurisdiction to review the orderdenying the petition for termination of parental rights.

However, as Curtis B. points out, only the failure to file apetition is excused, and the appellate brief is viewed as thepetition itself. See Curtis B., slip op. at 8. Therefore, even ifwe excuse the filing of the Rule 306(a)(5) petition, our decisionto grant an interlocutory appeal under Rule 306(a)(5) rests withinour discretion.

Although we may exercise our discretion and entertainjurisdiction if we deem it appropriate, we decline to do so at thistime. See Alicia Z., slip op. at 20. While we find itinappropriate to comment on whether we would affirm or reverse thetrial court's decision, we note that the standard of review ishighly deferential. See In re M.S., 302 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1003(1999). Considerable deference is given to the trial court becausethe trial court had the opportunity to hear all of the testimonyand arguments and observe the parties and the children. Moreover,given the length of time that has passed in this particularproceeding and the constant state of change involved here, eventsmay have transpired since the trial court's initial decision thatcould affect the status of the case as well as the best interestsof the children. We believe that the trial court should review andreevaluate its dispositional order before we consider a petitionfor appellate review.

Accordingly, we hold that the order denying the State'spetition for terminating parental rights was not a final andappealable order under Rules 301 and 303. We therefore dismiss theappeals on the basis of the lack of jurisdiction under Rules 301and 303. We decline to entertain the State's appeal under Rule306(a)(5).

Because we are dismissing the State's appeals, we must alsodismiss the State's motion to strike portions of Tracy's appellatebrief, which we ordered to be taken with the case.

Based on the foregoing, we dismiss the appeals from the denialof the State's petition to terminate respondents' parental rights.

Nos. 2--01--1251 and 2--01--1252, dismissed.

O'MALLEY and GROMETER, JJ., concur.