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JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

On April 6, 1999, the petitioners, R.R.E. and T.M.D., filedpetitions in the circuit court of Kendall County to adopt K.L.P.,who was born on October 31, 1989, and K.M.P., who was born on March19, 1991. R.R.E. is the biological father of the children, andT.M.D. is R.R.E.'s wife. In their petitions, they alleged that therespondent, R.P., who is the biological mother of the children, was an unfit parent under sections 1(D)(b), (D)(d), (D)(e), (D)(f),(D)(g) and (D)(m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (D)(d),(D)(e), (D)(f), (D)(g), (D)(m) (West 1998)), and they requestedthat the trial court terminate the respondent's parental rights. Prior to trial, the respondent informed the court that she couldnot afford to hire an attorney and requested that the court appointthe public defender to represent her. The trial court denied therequest and set the cause for a hearing on the petitions. Following separate hearings on parental unfitness and the bestinterests of the children, the trial court found the respondent tobe an unfit parent and terminated her parental rights. Therespondent appeals, contending that her rights to due process andequal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) were violated whenshe was not afforded the right to counsel during the proceedings toterminate her parental rights.

A court reporter was not present for any of the proceedings inthis adoption case, and therefore the record does not contain anyreport of proceedings. However, the record does contain acertified bystander's report of the proceedings pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 323(c) (166 Ill. 2d R. 323(c)). That bystander's reportreveals that on June 22, 1999, the respondent appeared pro sebefore the trial court and informed the court that she could notafford to hire an attorney and requested time to hire counsel,which the trial court allowed. On July 20, 1999, the respondentagain told the court that she could not afford to hire an attorney. She stated that she went to several attorneys, including PrairieState Legal Services. She noted that she could not afford to hireany of the attorneys she spoke with and that Prairie State LegalServices had sent her a letter rejecting her as a client. Therespondent then asked the court to appoint the public defender torepresent her. The trial court refused her request for appointmentof counsel and set the case for a trial on the issue of parentalunfitness.

The record further reveals that on April 20, 1995, severalyears prior to the petitions for adoption, the Department ofChildren and Family Services (the DCFS) took protective custody ofK.M.P and then filed petitions for adjudication of wardship,alleging that she was an abused and neglected minor (case Nos. 95--J--29 and 95--J--121). On February 5, 1996, the DCFS tookprotective custody of K.L.P. and filed a petition for adjudicationof wardship alleging that she was a neglected minor (case No. 96--J--4). Prior to the hearings on those petitions, which werebrought pursuant to section 2--3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987(the Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2--3 (West 1998)), therespondent was notified of her right to court-appointed counsel atall stages of the proceeding in the event that she was financiallyunable to employ counsel (see 705 ILCS 405/1--5(1) (West 1998)). The trial court appointed the public defender to represent therespondent in the proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act. Thetrial court subsequently entered orders adjudicating K.M.P. anabused and neglected minor and adjudicating K.L.P. a neglectedminor. The State was granted leave to file a petition to terminateparental rights. However, no such petition was ever filed by theState. The court placed custody of the children with thepetitioner father. The trial court thereafter dismissed the casespending under the Juvenile Court Act.

On April 6, 1999, the petitioners filed their petitions foradoption, alleging that the respondent was an unfit mother andrequesting that her parental rights be terminated. On September28, 1999, the hearing began on the unfitness portion of the case. At that hearing, the petitioners presented the testimony of varioussocial workers, counselors, and DCFS investigators and caseworkers,showing that the respondent had abused the children and had failedto make reasonable progress toward the DCFS client service plangoals and the return home of the children.

After the petitioners rested their case, the mother presentedher case but did not call any witnesses. She did testify on herown behalf at the unfitness hearing that she had had a rough startas a mother and had made "mistakes." On cross-examination, sheacknowledged that the "mistakes" she had referred to in hertestimony were those testified to by the petitioners' witnesses. She also admitted that a third child of hers had been removed fromher care by DCFS and had been placed with the respondent's mother.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found thatthe respondent was an unfit parent. The cause then proceeded to abest-interest hearing to determine whether the respondent'sparental rights should be terminated. Gertrude Kleckner, alicensed clinical social worker, gave testimony on behalf of thepetitioners consistent with a letter that she wrote to the court onSeptember 30, 1999. In that letter, Kleckner stated that she hadworked with the petitioners and the children for the past year. She noted that the children expressed sadness, anger, fear, hatred,and anxiety when discussing the respondent. She further noted thatthey did not have a bond with the respondent and did not wish tosee or talk to her again. She also noted that the petitionersprovided an excellent healing environment for the children and thatthe children had made much progress since coming to live with thepetitioners. She stated, however, that this progress was fragileand could be jeopardized by any forced contact with the respondent. She concluded that it would be in the children's best interest tobe adopted by the petitioners.

The petitioners both testified about the significant progressthat the children had made since they came to live with thepetitioners. Their testimony indicated that, when the childrenfirst came to live with them, the children exhibited signs ofanxiety, including nightmares, baby talk, and self-injury. Theynoted the children's regression when the possibility of having togo to court and face the respondent was mentioned. PetitionerT.M.D. described her close relationship with the children and herlove for them.

The respondent did not call any witnesses to testify on herbehalf at the best interest hearing. Moreover, the respondentherself did not testify at the best-interest hearing.

After hearing all of the evidence, the trial court stated that"the facts were severe enough" to terminate the respondent'sparental rights and that termination was "necessary and just." Inits written order, the court found that the allegations of thepetitions concerning "physical cruelty" and "lack of interest" wereproved and that it was in the best interests of the children thatthe prayers of the petitioners for adoption be granted.

On appeal, the respondent argues that she was denied dueprocess and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to theUnited States Constitution when she was not afforded counsel duringthe proceedings to involuntarily terminate her parental rights. She maintains that due process principles as set forth in Lassiterv. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640,101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981), required the trial court to appoint hercounsel under the facts of the present case. She also contendsthat her right to equal protection was violated because she was notstatutorily entitled to court-appointed counsel in this proceedingfiled under the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West1998)), while the appointment of counsel is statutorily mandatedfor similarly situated respondents who are facing the terminationof parental rights pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS405/1--5(1) (West 1998)). We will first address the respondent'sdue process claim.

In Lassiter, the United States Supreme Court consideredwhether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendmentroutinely requires the appointment of counsel for indigent parentsin every parental-rights termination proceeding. Lassiter, 452U.S. at 31, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 652, 101 S. Ct. at 2161-62. The Courtnoted that an indigent litigant has an automatic right to appointedcounsel only when he may be deprived of his physical libertybecause it is the defendant's interest in personal freedom thattriggers the right to appointed counsel. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25,68 L. Ed. 2d at 648, 101 S. Ct. at 2158. However, the Courtcontinued its analysis, recognizing that "a parent's desire for andright to 'the companionship, care, custody, and management of hisor her children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrantsdeference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,protection.'[Citation.]" Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d at649-50, 101 S. Ct. at 2159-60. The Court analyzed and weighed thethree factors from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976), namely, the private interest at stake,the government's interest, and the risk that the procedures usedwill lead to erroneous decisions, against the presumption thatthere is no right to appointed counsel when there is no risk oflost liberty. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 649, 101S. Ct. at 2159.

The Lassiter Court concluded that a weighing of the Eldridgefactors would not always rebut the presumption that the appointmentof counsel for indigent parents facing the termination of parentalrights was not constitutionally required. The court explained:

"If, in a given case, the parent's interests were attheir strongest, the State's interests were at their weakest,and the risks of error were at their peak, it could not besaid that the Eldridge factors did not overcome thepresumption against the right to appointed counsel, and thatdue process did not therefore require the appointment ofcounsel. But since the Eldridge factors will not always be sodistributed, and since 'due process is not so rigid as torequire that the significant interests in informality,flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed,'[citation], neither can we say that the Constitution requiresthe appointment of counsel in every parental terminationproceeding." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 652,101 S. Ct. at 2162.

Thus, the Court held that the appointment of counsel was notautomatically required to assure a fair adjudication; instead, acase-by-case determination of the need for counsel would suffice,an assessment to be made in the first instance by the trial court,subject to appellate review. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32, 68 L. Ed.2d at 652, 101 S. Ct. at 2162.

The petitioners in the present case argue that the due processanalysis of Lassiter is inapplicable to the present case becausethe state did not initiate the termination proceeding. Relying onBlum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 73 L. Ed. 2d 534, 102 S. Ct. 2777(1982), they contend that because private individuals, a stepparentand natural father, initiated the proceedings, there is no stateaction necessary to trigger the due process clause.

The petitioners' reliance on Blum is misplaced. In that case,medicaid patients challenged decisions by nursing homes in whichthey resided to discharge patients without notice or an opportunityfor a hearing. Blum, 457 U.S. at 993, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 539-40, 102S. Ct. at 2780. The Court specifically emphasized that particularstate regulations or procedures were not challenged and the lawsuitsought to hold state officials liable for the actions of privateparties. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1003, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 545-46, 102 S.Ct. at 2785. The Supreme Court in Blum relied on its priorprecedent in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 42L. Ed. 2d 477, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974), for the notion that the merefact that a business is subject to state regulation does not byitself convert its action into that of the state for purposes ofthe fourteenth amendment. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004, 73 L. Ed. 2d at546, 102 S. Ct. at 2786. In such cases, the complaining party mustshow that there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state andthe challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action ofthe latter may fairly be treated as that of the state. Blum, 457U.S. at 1004, 73 L. Ed.2d at 546, 102 S. Ct. at 2786.

We find Blum and Jackson to be inapplicable here. Unlike inBlum and Jackson, the instant respondent's parental rights could beterminated only pursuant to a comprehensive statutory scheme. Here, the respondent is challenging the lack of a provision in theAdoption Act for the appointment of counsel for indigentrespondents. Thus, a specific procedure of the state is beingchallenged. This case is more closely analogous to the SupremeCourt's decisions in Troxel v. Granville, ___ U.S. ___, ___ L. Ed.2d ___, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000), where the Supreme Court held thata Washington statute involving grandparent visitation violatedsubstantive due process as applied, and M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S.102, 136 L. Ed. 2d 473, 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996), where the Court heldthat a state procedure requiring an indigent mother to pay a fee toappeal the termination of her parental rights violated due processand equal protection. In those cases, it was not important thatthere was not a state-initiated action filed, in that thegrandparents filed the petition for visitation in Troxel (Troxel,___ U.S. at ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d at ___, 120 S. Ct. at 2057), and thefather and his new wife filed the petition for adoption in M.L.B.(M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 482, 117 S. Ct. at 559). Instead, the important fact was that specific procedures orregulations of the state were at issue.

Although it was not cited by the parties in the instant case,we are obliged to discuss the decision of the Appellate Court,First District, in Rosewell v. Hanrahan, 168 Ill. App. 3d 329(1988). There, the First District court concluded that, because ofa lack of "state action," the due process principles as set forthin Lassiter did not apply in an adoption proceeding filed by thematernal grandparents that requested the termination of parentalrights. Rosewell, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 333. However, Rosewellsimply relied on Blum and Jackson. As we have previouslydiscussed, Rosewell and Jackson must be distinguished from thepresent case. Because we believe that Rosewell was wronglydecided, we decline to follow it.

Even though Lassiter involved a state-initiated parentalrights proceeding, whereas the present case involves a proceedingunder the Adoption Act, we note that courts have applied therationale of Lassiter when considering the question of whether theappointment of counsel for an indigent parent was necessary whenthe involuntary termination of parental rights was at stake throughprivate adoption proceedings that were not initiated by the State. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Dale A., 453 Pa. Super. 106, 683 A. 2d297 (1996); In re Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1993). In K.A.S., the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that thestate's involvement in a stepparent adoption was substantial enoughto trigger constitutional protections because the termination ofparental rights is accomplished through a state mechanism with theinvolvement of state agencies even though the state may not alwaysbe an adversary. K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d at 566. In reaching itsconclusion, the K.A.S. court quoted the response of the CaliforniaCourt of Appeal to a similar argument:

" 'A stepparent adoption differs from other parentaltermination cases in that it is not an action brought by thestate and argued by state attorneys. But neither is theadoption proceeding a purely private dispute. The state iscalled upon to exercise its exclusive authority to terminatethe legal relationship of parent and child and establish a newrelationship, in accordance with an extensive statutoryscheme.' " K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d at 565-66, quoting In re JayR., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 262, 197 Cal. Rptr. 672, 680 (1983).

We agree with the above-noted rationale. Because the commonlaw did not provide for the concept of the adoption of children,adoption rights and duties are determined by statute. In re M.M.,156 Ill. 2d 53, 63 (1993); In re Estate of Edwards, 106 Ill. App.3d 635, 636 (1982). Under the Illinois statutory scheme, anadoption results in a complete and permanent severance of theparental rights between a biological parent and child. In re M.M.,156 Ill. 2d at 62. Furthermore, a proceeding to involuntarilyterminate parental rights is a drastic measure (In re D.R., 307Ill. App. 3d 478, 482 (1999)) that may only be brought under thestatutory authority of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS405/1--1 et seq. (West 1998)) or the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01et seq. (West 1998))(see In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 61). Regardless of under which act the termination action is brought,the goals of the proceedings are identical--(1) to determinewhether the natural parent is unfit and, if so, (2) to determinewhether the adoption will best serve the child's needs. In reM.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 61. Yet, under the Juvenile Court Act anindigent respondent is entitled to court-appointed counsel, whereasno similar provision exists under the Adoption Act. In thatregard, section 1--5(1) of the Juvenile Court Act affords indigentparents certain rights, including the right to counsel as follows:

"[P]arties respondent have the right to be present, to beheard, to present evidence material to the proceedings, tocross-examine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files andrecords and also, although proceedings under this Act are notintended to be adversary in character, the right to berepresented by counsel. At the request of any partyfinancially unable to employ counsel *** the court shallappoint the Public Defender or such other counsel as the casemay require. Counsel appointed for *** any indigent partyshall appear at all stages of the trial court proceeding, andsuch appointment shall continue through the permanencyhearings and termination of parental rights proceedings ***." 705 ILCS 405/1--5(1) (West 1998).

The Adoption Act, however, does not provide similarly for theappointment of counsel in all cases where indigent parents arefacing the involuntary termination of parental rights. Instead,section 13(B)(c) of the Adoption Act provides for the appointmentof counsel only when an indigent parent is alleged to be an unfitperson pursuant to section 1(D)(p) of the Act, which involves aparent's "[i]nability to discharge parental responsibilities"because of "mental impairment, mental illness or mentalretardation." 750 ILCS 50/13(B)(c), 1(D)(p) (West 1998).

Given the nature of adoption and the fact that resort to thestatutory scheme and the judicial process is necessary for itsaccomplishment, we find that the required state action is presenthere. The state is responsible for the specific conduct of whichthe respondent complains. The state action in this case issignificant in that it provides the statutory scheme. Moreover,the state was involved in the initial proceedings in this casepertaining to the adjudications of wardship and much of theevidence presented at the adoption proceedings was garnered as aresult of the state's investigations. At one point, the State'sAttorney even asked leave of court to file a termination petitionunder the Juvenile Court Act. However, no such petition was everfiled, and the proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act weredismissed when guardianship was granted to R.R.E. Under thesecircumstances, the specter could be raised that the stateintentionally chose to forego prosecution of a termination ofparental rights petition, knowing that the accomplishment of itsgoal could be reached with greater ease and less expense withoutits involvement in a proceeding to terminate parental rights if therespondent could be denied the benefit of court-appointed counsel. It is the state's procedure of not providing counsel in the presentcase that is at issue. Under the circumstances, we find that therequisite state action is present in this case to trigger ananalysis on due process grounds.

We now turn to the question of whether the respondent wasdenied due process under the facts of this case. With respect tothe particular facts in Lassiter, the Supreme Court concluded thatthe trial court did not deny the indigent mother involved in thatcase due process when it did not appoint counsel for her. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 33, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 653, 101 S. Ct. 2163. Inso finding, the Court found it significant that the petition toterminate parental rights contained no allegations of neglect orabuse upon which criminal charges could be based; no expertwitnesses testified; the case did not present any speciallytroublesome points of law, either procedural or substantive; and,despite the admission of hearsay evidence, the weight of theevidence was sufficiently great that the presence of counsel on themother's behalf could not have made a determinate difference. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 653, 101 S. Ct. 2162. The Court also found it significant that the mother demonstratedher indifference by failing to appear at a custody hearing. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 653, 101 S. Ct. 2162-63. We find the facts of the present case to be similar to thosein Lassiter. Here, there was no claim that criminal charges couldbe brought based on the allegations of neglect and abuse, no expertwitnesses testified, and the case did not present any troublesomepoints of law. Furthermore, the evidence in this case was notclosely balanced and we are unable to say that the presence ofcounsel would have made a determinative difference. Accordingly,we find that the trial court did not err in failing to appointcounsel for the respondent on procedural due process grounds.

We next consider whether allowing the involuntary terminationof the parental rights of an indigent parent without theappointment of counsel through an adoption proceeding would violatethe equal protection clause. The respondent points out that theJuvenile Court Act provides for the appointment of counsel forindigent parents facing the involuntary termination of parentalrights pursuant to that act (see 705 ILCS 405/1--5(1) (West 1998)),while the Adoption Act contains no similar provision for parentsfacing involuntary termination. The respondent argues that theJuvenile Court Act and the Adoption Act must be read in concertwith one another to allow for the appointment of counsel in bothcases; otherwise, the denial of counsel to her would violate herequal protection rights as applied.

The same analysis is used in assessing equal protection claimsunder both the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Jacobsonv. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996). Theguarantee of equal protection requires that government deal with"similarly situated" individuals in a similar manner. Jacobson,171 Ill. 2d at 322. It does not preclude the state from enactinglegislation that draws distinctions between different categories ofpeople, but it does prohibit the government from accordingdifferent treatment to persons who have been placed by statute intodifferent classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to thepurpose of the legislation. People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d 489,499 (1992). In reviewing a claim that a statute violates equalprotection, the court applies different levels of scrutinydepending on the nature of the statutory classification involved. Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 33(1996). Classifications based on race or national origin oraffecting fundamental rights are strictly scrutinized. Jacobson,171 Ill. 2d at 323. Intermediate scrutiny applies todiscriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at 323. In all other cases, the courtemploys a rational basis review. Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at 323.

The applicable standard of review in this case depends uponwhether the complained-of disparate treatment interferes with orimpinges upon a fundamental right. Committee for EducationalRights, 174 Ill. 2d at 33. A fundamental right for equalprotection purposes is one that lies at the heart of therelationship between the individual and a republican form ofnationally integrated government. Committee for Educational Rights,174 Ill. 2d at 33. It is beyond dispute that a parent's interestin maintaining a parental relationship with her child is afundamental liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. Troxel, ___ U.S. at ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d at ___, 120 S. Ct. at 2060;M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 118-19, 124, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 489, 493, 117 S.Ct. at 565, 568; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 71 L. Ed.2d 599, 606, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95 (1982); In re D.R., 307 Ill.App. 3d 478, 482 (1999). Decrees forever terminating parentalrights are in the category of cases in which the state may not"bolt the door to equal justice." M.L.B, 519 U.S. at 124, 136 L.Ed. 2d at 493, 117 S. Ct. at 568.

Having or not having a court-appointed counsel when a parentis facing the termination of parental rights affects a fundamentalright, and not having counsel impairs the exercise of thatfundamental right. K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d at 565. Therefore, we willapply a strict scrutiny analysis.

A law will not survive strict scrutiny unless it is necessaryto promote, and is narrowly tailored to serve, a compelling stateinterest. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d at 500. Thus, we must determinewhether the classification of failing to provide court-appointedcounsel to indigent parents facing involuntary termination inproceedings under the Adoption Act, while providing counsel tosimilarly situated parents under the Juvenile Court Act, isnecessary to promote a compelling state interest and narrowlytailored to serve that interest.

Here, we can find no compelling state interest in denying anindigent parent counsel in proceedings to involuntarily terminateparental rights under the Adoption Act while affording counsel toindigent parents facing termination under the Juvenile Court Act. The state undoubtedly has a legitimate pecuniary interest inproviding counsel in as limited a number of cases as possible. However, it cannot be said that the state's interest is significantenough to overcome a parent's "commanding" interest in the"accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or herparental status." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27-28, 68 L. Ed. 2d at650, 101 S. Ct. at 2160.

Where a statute is defective on equal protection groundsbecause of a constitutionally underinclusive scheme, a court mayextend the coverage of the statute to include those who areaggrieved by the exclusion. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 738,79 L. Ed. 2d 646, 656, 104 S. Ct. 1387, 1394-95 (1984). We alsonote that section 2.1 of the Adoption Act provides that theAdoption Act and Juvenile Court Act should be construed in concertwith one another. 750 ILCS 50/2.1 (1998). Accordingly, to avoida constitutional defect, we will construe the Adoption Act asrequiring the same procedural safeguards required by the JuvenileCourt Act in cases where indigent parents are facing theinvoluntary termination of their parental rights. Since the ordersterminating the respondent's parental rights were obtained withoutaffording her counsel, the trial court's judgments must be reversedand the cause remanded for a new hearing on the petitions foradoption at which the respondent shall be represented by counsel ifshe so requests and establishes her indigence.

The respondent next argues that the trial court erred inallowing the petitioners to prosecute the proceeding to terminateher parental rights. She contends that there is no statutoryauthority allowing a private individual to prosecute suchproceedings and that our recent decision in In re D.S., 307 Ill.App. 3d 249 (1999), suggests that only the state can prosecute sucha proceeding.

The respondent's argument must be rejected. Section 5 of theAdoption Act provides that a proceeding to adopt a child shall becommenced by the filing of a petition to adopt and that thepetition list the "full names of the petitioners." 750 ILCS 50/5(A), (B)(a) (West 1996). Section 5 further provides that, if theadoption is nonconsensual, the petition must allege that the personwith the authority to consent is an unfit person and the groundtherefor. 750 ILCS 50/5(B)(j) (West 1998). The Adoption Act alsovests the trial court with the authority to terminate the parentalrights of a parent and enter an order of adoption. See 750 ILCS50/13(B)(d), 14, 17 (West 1998). We believe that the statutorylanguage of the Adoption Act clearly evinces an intent by thelegislature to allow private parties to file and prosecute suchpetitions.

Unlike the Juvenile Court Act, the Adoption Act does notrequire the filing of a petition in respect of a minor to be filed"through the State's Attorney." 705 ILCS 405/2--13(1) (1998). Inre D.S., cited by the respondent, is not helpful to her position. There, we simply held that the trial court could order the state toprosecute a petition to terminate parental rights filed by aprivate party under the Juvenile Court Act and that only the Statehad the authority to prosecute such petitions filed under that act. In re D.S., 307 Ill. App. 3d at 255, 256. In contrast, thepetition to adopt in this case, which requested the termination ofparental rights, was filed under the Adoption Act. Accordingly, weconclude that the trial court did not err in allowing thepetitioners to prosecute their petitions in this case.

The respondent next argues that her due process rights wereviolated when she was not provided, at the government's expense, acourt reporter at the hearings to terminate her parental rights. She relies upon M.L.B., 519 U.S. 102, 136 L. Ed. 2d 473, 117 S. Ct.555, to support her position.

In M.L.B., a Mississippi chancery court terminated themother's parental rights in an adoption proceeding. M.L.B., 519U.S. at 106, 136 L. Ed. 2d 481, 117 S. Ct. at 559. The trial judgein that case had stated in his order, without elaboration, that thepetitioners had met their burden of proof by "clear and convincingevidence." M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 108, 136 L. Ed. 2d 482, 117 S. Ct.at 559. The mother then sought to appeal the decision, but herappeal was dismissed when she could not afford to pay the recordpreparation fee required by state law. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 106,136 L. Ed. 2d 481, 117 S. Ct. at 559-60. Relying upon proceduraldue process and equal protection principles, the Supreme Court heldthat the state could not condition the mother's appeal on herability to pay the record fee and that the state could not withholdfrom the mother "a record of sufficient completeness to permitproper [appellate] consideration of [her] claims." M.L.B., 519U.S. at 107, 128, 136 L. Ed. 2d 481, 495, 117 S. Ct. at 559, 570.

M.L.B. is clearly distinguishable from the present case. Here, the respondent was not denied the right to appeal. Additionally, the record contains a 15-page bystander's report ofthe facts introduced at the hearing summarizing the testimony ofthe witnesses testifying at the hearing. Under the circumstances,we find the record was sufficiently complete to permit properappellate consideration of her claims. Accordingly, we hold thatthe respondent's constitutional rights were not violated by thelack of a court reporter.

Our resolution of the above-discussed issues renders moot theremaining issues raised by the respondent. For the foregoingreasons, we reverse the judgments of adoption and the orders of thecircuit court of Kendall County terminating the respondent'sparental rights. We remand the causes for further proceedings,including a new hearing on the petitioners' petitions for adoption,at which the respondent shall be represented by counsel if she sorequests and establishes her indigence.

The judgments of the circuit court of Kendall County arereversed, and the causes are remanded for further proceedingsconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

BOWMAN, P.J. and INGLIS, J., concur.