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The petitioners, Brian Robert Pacetti II (Brian) and JoanGinnell-Pacetti (Joan), appeal from an order of the circuit courtof Kane County denying their petition to adopt Justin ChristopherGinnell (Justin), the minor child of Joan and the respondent, AaronVelazquez (Aaron). On appeal, Brian and Joan contend that thetrial court erred in finding that they did not prove Aaron'sparental unfitness beyond a reasonable doubt.

Before we can address the merits of this case, we must firstdetermine whether we have jurisdiction. Even where no party raisesthe question, a reviewing court has a duty to consider sua sponte its jurisdiction. Cashmore v. Builders Square, Inc., 207 Ill. App.3d 267, 269 (1990).

In their jurisdictional statement, the petitioners set forththat jurisdiction for this appeal may be found under either SupremeCourt Rules 301 and 303 (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 303) (appeal from afinal order), Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a))(appeal from a final order as to fewer than all claims or parties),or Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304 (b)(1)) (appealfrom a judgment or order entered in the administration of anestate, guardianship, or similar proceeding that finally determinesa right or status of a party).

The purpose of the jurisdictional statement required bySupreme Court Rule 341(e)(4)(ii) (177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(4)(ii)) isnot merely to tell this court that it has jurisdiction. In reMarriage of Ruchala, 208 Ill. App. 3d 971, 976 (1991). Instead,the jurisdictional statement requirement was intended to provokecounsel to make an independent determination of the right to appealbefore writing the brief. Ruchala, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 976.

Rules 301 and 303 govern appeals from cases in which the finalorder has disposed of the entire controversy. Rule 304 governscases in which a final order has been entered as to a separate partof the controversy. In order to determine which, if any, of therules cited by the petitioners provides this court withjurisdiction, we must first review the procedural history of thiscase.

On September 25, 1998, Aaron filed a petition to establish aparent and child relationship. In his petition, Aaron sought anorder establishing the existence of the relationship between Justinand himself, requiring him to pay child support, and awarding himjoint custody and/or reasonable visitation with Justin. On October14, 1998, Joan filed an answer to Aaron's petition, and on thatsame date Joan and Brian filed a petition to adopt Justin. OnDecember 11, 1998, the trial court granted Joan's motion toconsolidate the two petitions.

Pursuant to the allegations contained in the petition foradoption, a hearing was held on the issue of Aaron's fitness as aparent. The hearing commenced on June 8, 1999, and was finallyconcluded on January 25, 2000. On that date, Judge Roger Eichmeierentered an order denying the petition for adoption, finding thatthe petitioners had failed to show by clear and convincing evidencethat Aaron was unfit as a parent. At that point in theproceedings, the trial court should have conducted a custodyhearing pursuant to section 20 of the Adoption Act (the Act) (750ILCS 50/20 (1998)). Instead, the trial court referred the case toJudge Wiley Edmondson for determination of the issues of childsupport and visitation. On January 31, 2000, Judge Edmondsonissued an order setting a visitation schedule and providing fortemporary support. The case was continued until March 17, 2000,for a hearing on permanent visitation and current and retroactivesupport.

On February 1, 2000, Joan and Brian filed their notice ofappeal from the January 25, 2000, order. On February 4, 2000, Joanfiled a motion to reconsider the unsupervised weekly visitationprovisions contained in the January 31, 2000, order. OnFebruary 23, 2000, Aaron filed a motion for immediate visitation.On February 28, 2000, Judge Eichmeier entered an order finding thatthe January 25, 2000, order was a final order and that there was nojust reason for delaying the enforcement or the appeal of thatorder. On March 2, 2000, Joan and Brian filed a new notice ofappeal. On March 17, 2000, by agreement of the parties, JudgeEdmondson entered an order that gave supervised visitation to Aaronfor periods up to Memorial Day 2000, continued the motion forreconsideration and the determination of support generally, to beheard on notice, and set the case for review on May 31, 2000.

Thus, at the time Joan and Brian filed their second notice ofappeal, the entire controversy had not yet been resolved, since thematters of child support, visitation, and a ruling on Joan's motionto reconsider remained pending and undetermined. Therefore, Rules301 and 303 do not provide this court with jurisdiction over thisappeal. However, Rule 304 permits an appeal from a final judgmentas to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims.While Rule 304(a) requires a specific finding that no just causeexists to delay enforcement or appeal of the order, Rule 304(b)does not require such a finding. However, under either section ofRule 304, the order appealed from must be a final one. Therefore,we must determine whether the order of January 25, 2000, whichdenied the adoption petition, was a final judgment as to one ormore of the parties or claims pending in this case.

Our supreme court has defined a claim, for purposes of Rule304(a), as " 'any right, liability or matter raised in an action.'[Citation.]" People ex rel. Block v. Darm, 267 Ill. App. 3d 354,356 (1994). Consequently, courts have concluded that an order orjudgment is final for purposes of Rule 304(a) if it disposes ofsome definite or separate part of the controversy. Block, 267 Ill.App. 3d at 356.

The present case actually presents two separate claims thatwere consolidated into one case in the trial court: the adoptionpetition brought by Joan and Brian, and Aaron's petition seekingthe establishment of a parental relationship with Justin, a supportorder, and joint custody and/or reasonable visitation. The issuesas to support and visitation are related to Aaron's petition, whichis a claim separate from that of the adoption. Moreover, JudgeEichmeier made a Rule 304(a) finding as to the January 25, 2000,order. Therefore, the fact that the child support and visitationissues were still pending at the time of the appeal in this casedoes not impair the appealability of that portion of the orderdenying the adoption petition. Now, however, we must determinewhether the adoption petition presents one or more separate claims.

In Baldassone v. Gorzelanczyk, 282 Ill. App. 3d 330 (1996),the reviewing court determined that an order of parentage andtemporary child support was not final and appealable, even with aRule 304(a) finding, where the order continued the matter for adetermination of permanent child support and reserved ruling onretroactive child support and medical insurance. Baldassone, 282Ill. App. 3d at 334. The court observed that an analogoussituation occurs in dissolution of marriage cases. Citing In reMarriage of Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d 114 (1983), the court noted thatthe numerous issues raised in a dissolution of marriage case arenot appealable under Rule 304(a) until all matters are finallyresolved because, instead of representing separate, unrelatedclaims, they are separate issues relating to the same claim.Baldassone, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 334; see Leopando, 96 Ill. 2d at119.

We are of the opinion that a petition for adoption advances asingle claim but with separate issues relating to it, one of whichis the custody of the child sought to be adopted. We now mustdetermine if the order was a final judgment as to the adoptionclaim.

A final judgment is one that fixes absolutely and finally therights of the parties in the lawsuit; it is final if it determinesthe litigation on the merits so that, if affirmed, the only thingremaining is to proceed with the execution of the judgment. In reGuzik, 249 Ill. App. 3d 95, 98 (1993). To be final, a judgmentmust dispose of or terminate the litigation or some definite partof it. Guzik, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 99. If jurisdiction is retainedfor the future determination of matters of substantial controversy,the order is not final. Guzik, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 99. The merepresence of a finding pursuant to Rule 304(a) will not make anonfinal order final and appealable. Baldassone, 282 Ill. App. 3dat 333-34. Instead of making a judgment final, the Rule 304(a)language simply makes appealable a final order in a case thatinvolves multiple parties or multiple claims. Baldassone, 282 Ill.App. 3d at 334.

Neither party has made reference to section 20 of the AdoptionAct (the Act) (750 ILCS 50/20 (West 1998)). That section providesin pertinent part as follows:

"In the event a judgment order for adoption is vacated ora petition for adoption is denied, the court shall promptlyconduct a hearing as to the temporary and permanent custody ofthe minor child who is the subject of the proceedings pursuantto Part VI of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution ofMarriage Act [(750 ILCS 5/601 et seq. (West 1998))]. Theparties to said proceedings shall be the petitioners to theadoption proceedings, the minor child, any biological parentswhose parental rights have not been terminated, and otherparties who have been granted leave to intervene in theproceedings." 750 ILCS 50/20 (West 1998).

In the present case, the trial court denied Joan and Brian'spetition to adopt Justin but did not hold a hearing as to temporaryand permanent custody as required by section 20 of the Act. Thereis no evidence in the record that the parties waived therequirement of the custody hearing. In light of the fact thatAaron's petition also sought joint custody, we cannot conclude fromthe record before us that the custody issue had been resolved.

Prior to the 1994 amendment, which added the requirement of acustody hearing to section 20 of the Act, the vacation of aninvalid adoption resulted in the automatic reversion of custody toany fit parent who had not otherwise consented to therelinquishment of his or her rights to the care, custody, andcontrol of the child. In re Petition of Kirchner, 164 Ill. 2d 468,498 (1995). Section 20 now requires a hearing to resolve the issueof custody left pending by the denial of the petition for adoption.Therefore, an order denying a petition for adoption without asection 20 hearing does not completely dispose of a separate claimfor purposes of an appeal pursuant to Rule 304(a). More remainsthan to execute on the judgment, for even if we were to affirm thedenial of the petition to adopt, we would still be required toremand this case for a section 20 hearing as to custody. Moreover,the denial of an adoption petition without a section 20 hearingdoes not "finally determine the rights or status of a party" forpurposes of an appeal pursuant to Rule 304(b)(1). See Guzik, 249Ill. App. 3d at 99 (trial court finding that the respondent was aperson subject to involuntary commitment but continuing the casefor a social assessment was not a final and appealable order undereither Rule 301 or Rule 304(b)(1) because the order did not finallydetermine the respondent's rights and status, and the matter wassubject to further determination by the court).

Finally, it can be argued that the amendment to section 20 wasnot intended to apply to related adoptions but, rather, wasdesigned to give adoptive parents standing to seek permanentcustody of the child in a failed, nonrelated adoption. SeeKirchner, 164 Ill. 2d at 494. Indeed, in Kirchner, our supremecourt, looking at the legislative history of the amendment, notedthat the legislature had passed this amendment to alter the effectof its decision invalidating the adoption of "Baby Richard." Kirchner, 164 Ill. 2d at 498; see In re Petition of Doe, 159 Ill.2d 347 (1994). In Kirchner, the supreme court was considering therequirement for a custody hearing following the denial or vacationof an adoption on appeal found in section 20(b) (750 ILCS 50/20b(West 1994)). We note that the legislature added the provisionsfor the custody hearing to both section 20 and to section 20b. SeePub. Act 88--550, art. 9,