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14 September 2000

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JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendants Ornda Health Corporation, Inc. (Ornda), TenetHealth Care Corporation (Tenet), and Davenport Medical Center(Davenport) (collectively hereafter referred to as corporatedefendants) bring this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order finding personal jurisdiction over them. We affirm andremand the cause.

Plaintiff Patsy Hendry brought a 23-count complaint againstthe corporate defendants and defendant Dr. John Stoner alleging,inter alia, negligence, breach of warranty, fraud, and medicalmalpractice. The corporate defendants filed a special and limitedappearance, objecting to the jurisdiction of the trial courtbecause the corporate defendants were foreign corporations that didnot do business in Illinois. Following a hearing, the trial courtdenied the special and limited appearance. The corporatedefendants were given leave to file a supplemental pleadingregarding the special and limited appearance. This, too, wasdenied. The trial court then allowed the corporate defendants'motion for interlocutory appeal. This court denied the initialapplication for leave to appeal; however, a second suchapplication, brought pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a) (166Ill. 2d R. 306(a)) was granted, and this appeal followed. Defendant Stoner is not part of this appeal.

The corporate defendants contend that the trial court erred indenying the supplemental special and limited appearance and infinding in personam jurisdiction over them. Where, as here, thetrial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing but determinedjurisdiction solely on the basis of documentary evidence, thestandard of review is de novo. See Gaidar v. TippecanoeDistribution Service, Inc., 299 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1040 (1998).

Hendry alleged in her complaint that she participated in asurgical weight-loss program run by Ornda and since purchased bydefendant Tenet. Hendry learned of the program through televisionadvertisements in Illinois and via a videotape that she orderedfrom the program. Litelife program dispatched a limousine todrive Hendry from her home in Aurora, Illinois, to the DavenportMedical Center in Davenport, Iowa, for a consultation. Eventually,Dr. Stoner performed a silastic ring vertical gastroplasty (stomachstapling) on Hendry at Davenport. Approximately eight monthslater, Hendry returned to Davenport, and Stoner performed a singlepanniculectomy (tummy tuck) to remove excess abdominal skin thathad resulted from Hendry's weight loss of over 100 pounds. Following that surgery, Hendry suffered from constant andsubstantial pain, drainage from open wounds, and frequent bleeding,even after a follow up with Stoner in Davenport. The injuries,pain, suffering, and subsequent medical treatments required are thebasis for the damages sought in this case.

Both Hendry and the corporate defendants agree that thedefendants were foreign corporations, not licensed in Illinois. AnIllinois trial court may exercise jurisdiction over suchcorporations based upon (a) the fact that the corporation has beenfound to be "doing business" in Illinois or (b) compliance with therequirements of the long-arm statute, section 2--209(a)(1) of theCode of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--209(a)(1) (1994)). General Electric Railcar Services Corp. v. Wilmington Trust Co.,208 Ill. App. 3d 459, 463-64 (1990).

Jurisdiction based upon a party's "doing business" in Illinoiswas recognized by the courts before it was codified as section 2--209(b)(4) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2--209(b)(4) (West 1994)). SeeGaidar, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 1041. A nonresident corporation isconsidered to have consented to jurisdiction if it is doingbusiness in Illinois. Rokeby-Johnson v. Derek Bryant InsuranceBrokers, Ltd., 230 Ill. App. 3d 308, 318 (1992). There is nocomprehensive test for determining what activity amounts to "doingbusiness"; however, if a corporation is conducting business inIllinois of such character and extent as to warrant the inferencethat the corporation has subjected itself to the jurisdiction andlaws of Illinois, the corporation may be found to be "doingbusiness" in Illinois. See Cook Associates, Inc. v. LexingtonUnited Corp., 87 Ill. 2d 190, 201 (1981). "Doing business"requires activities greater than mere solicitation by employees whohave authority only to solicit business (Cook, 87 Ill. 2d at 201),and business activity in the state must be carried on with a fairmeasure of permanence and continuity, not occasionally or casually. Rokeby-Johnson, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 318. The decision as towhether a corporation's activities in Illinois are sufficientlypermanent and continuous must be made on a case-by-case basis onthe unique situation presented. Hulsey v. Scheidt, 258 Ill. App.3d 567, 572 (1994).

Hendry relies upon 11 "verified facts" to support a findingthat the corporate defendants were "doing business" in Illinois. Hendry alleged that the corporate defendants (1) employed Illinoisresidents; (2) treated Illinois patients; (3) granted Illinoisphysicians admitting privileges; (4) were under contract with manyIllinois-based organizations, such as Deere and Company, HeritageNational Healthplan, Inc., Trinity Physician Hospital Organization,Ltd., and Trinity Hospital Organization, Ltd.; (5) advertised theirprograms in Illinois by way of radio, television, newspaper (i.e.,the Chicago Tribune), and the Yellow Pages, which were all targetedto Illinois residents; (6) had employees that served as faculty andlectors for seminars and conferences that took place in Illinois;(7) had presented as many as seven seminars about the LiteLifeprogram in Illinois; (8) arranged and paid for 30 separatelimousine trips (at a total cost of $8,821) from Illinois to Iowafor their Illinois LiteLife patients; (9) sent promotional videosto as many as 35 Illinois residents who were ultimately treated;(10) circulated to Illinois patients eight different newslettersthat they published; and (11) obtained authorizations from two LiteLife patients who were Illinois residents to providetestimonials for use in promotional materials. The corporatedefendants counter with the facts that Hendry was not treated inIllinois, the corporate defendants do not treat any of theirpatients in Illinois, all treatment is administered in Iowa, andthe corporate defendants have no offices in Illinois.

We conclude that the corporate defendants were not "doingbusiness" in Illinois. The vast majority of Hendry's allegationspoint to nothing more than the advertising of the corporatedefendants' services in Illinois. The fact that employees,patients, and doctors travel from Illinois to Iowa to in some waybe part of the corporate defendants' operations does notdemonstrate that the corporate defendants chose to submit to theprotection of Illinois laws. All the services provided under thecontracts with Illinois-based organizations were provided in Iowa,not Illinois. Furthermore, merely entering into a contract with aresident of Illinois is not sufficient by itself to subject anonresident to in personam jurisdiction in Illinois. See MellonFirst United Leasing v. Hansen, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1048 (1998). The only real contact the corporate defendants had with Illinoiswas the transportation they provided for 15 Illinois residents tovisit the hospital in Iowa. Three patients in 1995 and twelve patients in 1996 were transported from Illinois to Iowa, fourteen by limousine and one by airplane. No transportation was providedin 1997 or 1998. These contacts were neither sufficientlypermanent nor continuous to find that the corporate defendants were"doing business" in Illinois; these contacts were very limited andwere discontinued after only a short period. Personal jurisdictionover the corporate defendants cannot be found under section 2--209(b)(4) of the Code.

However, personal jurisdiction may be found under the long-armstatute also. The transaction of business within Illinois submitsa person to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to anycause of action arising from that transaction. See 735 ILCS 5/2--209(a)(1) (West 1994). In this case, the corporate defendantstwice hired limousines to transport Hendry from her home inIllinois to Iowa and back home during the course of her treatment. This, we conclude, was a transaction of business in Illinoissufficient to invoke personal jurisdiction over the corporatedefendants. The corporate defendants argue that they did not ownor control the limousine service and the service was not an agentor an employee of the corporate defendants; therefore, since allthe consultations and medical treatment took place in Iowa, thecorporate defendants transacted no business in Illinois. However,by sending the limousines into Illinois to fetch and return Hendry,the corporate defendants moved beyond merely advertising andsoliciting business in Illinois to physically getting business inIllinois and transporting it to Iowa. They provided a service--transportation--in Illinois. The fact that they did not operatethe transportation service is irrelevant. By providing thetransportation through a hired limousine service, the corporatedefendants have transacted business in Illinois.

The corporate defendants cite a line of cases in whichIllinois residents who traveled to other states for medicaltreatment were not allowed to prosecute malpractice actions inIllinois for injuries arising out of the treatments. See, e.g.,Rogers v. Furlow, 699 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Veeninga v.Alt, 111 Ill. App. 3d 775 (1982); Ballard v. Rawlins, 101 Ill. App.3d 601 (1981); Muffo v. Forsyth, 37 Ill. App. 3d 6 (1976). However, none of these cases makes so broad a statement regardingjurisdiction. Furthermore, each decision is based on theparticular facts of the case, and none is exactly on point.Veeninga, Ballard, and Muffo involved Illinois residents fillingprescriptions made by out-of-state doctors. More instructive inthis case is Rogers, wherein the Illinois plaintiff sued in federalcourt in Illinois the Mayo Clinic of Minnesota and several doctorsat the clinic for injuries resulting from surgery performed inMinnesota. The court found that "the mere exchange of phone callsand letters" between the plaintiff and the defendants did notconstitute "transacting business" for purposes of the statute. Rogers, 699 F. Supp. at 675. In none of these cases did thedefendant provide for the physical transportation of the plaintiffto the place of business and the return to his or her home. Thecorporate defendants did not merely solicit plaintiff. They didnot merely passively accept the patronage of plaintiff. They soughtplaintiff's business and physically brought her to Iowa to partakeof their services. This entry into Illinois through the use of thehired limousine service provides sufficient contact with Illinoisfor us to conclude that the corporate defendants transactedbusiness in Illinois and are subject to personal jurisdiction inthis state.

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of KaneCounty is affirmed, and the cause is remanded for furtherproceedings.

Affirmed and remanded.

BOWMAN, P.J., and HUTCHINSON, J., concur.