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JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner, Frank Heabler, Jr., appeals from the March 19,2003, judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County that affirmedthe decision of the Municipal Officers Electoral Board of theVillage of Lakemoor (the Electoral Board) sustaining objections topetitioner's nominating papers filed for the April 1, 2003, Villageof Lakemoor (Lakemoor) trustee election. We affirm.

On January 13, 2003, petitioner filed nominating papers to bea candidate for trustee in the April 1, 2003, consolidated electionin Lakemoor. The nominating papers included both a statement ofcandidacy and petitions for nomination that were signed by voters. There were two different types of trustee offices to be filled inthe election. The first type was the full-term trustee office andcarried a term of four years. The second type was created by avacancy and carried a term of two years. A document distributed tocandidates by Lakemoor stated that there were three four-yeartrustee offices and one two-year office to be filled in theelection. The same document admonished the candidates to consultcompetent legal counsel in filing their petitions for nomination. Despite the two types of trustee offices available, petitioneridentified the office he sought only as "trustee" on all of hisnominating papers.

Ralph Brindise, an incumbent trustee who was also running inthe April 1 election, objected to petitioner's nominating papers onthe basis that they did not identify which type of trustee positionpetitioner sought. On February 3, 2003, the Electoral Board helda hearing on Brindise's objections. At the hearing, petitionertestified that the office he sought was trustee for a four-yearterm. On February 5, 2003, the Electoral Board sustainedBrindise's objections, finding that petitioner had not identifiedwhich type of trustee office he was seeking in any of hisnominating papers. As a result of this decision, petitioner's namewas removed from the ballot. On March 19, 2003, the circuit courtof McHenry County affirmed the Electoral Board's decision.

This court has granted accelerated review of this case underSupreme Court Rule 311 (155 Ill. 2d R. 311). We review the decision of the Electoral Board de novo because it involves aquestion of law. Brennan v. Kolman, 335 Ill. App. 3d 716, 719(2002).

On appeal, petitioner argues that his description of theoffice sought as "trustee" was sufficient because a generaldescription of an office is presumed to refer to the full-termoffice unless otherwise specified. We disagree.

A description of the office sought by a candidate is generallysufficient where there is "no basis for confusion as to the officefor which the nominating papers were filed." Lewis v. Dunne, 63Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1976). There is no basis for confusion where,looking at the nominating papers as a whole, it is clear whichposition the candidate seeks. Lewis, 63 Ill. 2d at 53.

In Lewis, a candidate for appellate judge described the office he sought only as " 'Judge of the Appellate Court of Illinois,First Judicial District' " on his statement of candidacy. Lewis,63 Ill. 2d at 50. The candidate properly described the office as" 'Judge of the Appellate Court of Illinois, First JudicialDistrict, to fill the vacancy created by the retirement of theHonorable Robert E. English' " on his petitions for nomination. Lewis, 63 Ill. 2d at 49-50. The candidate's nominating papers werechallenged on the basis that the statement of candidacy did notdescribe the specific vacancy the candidate sought. Lewis, 63 Ill.2d at 50. The supreme court held that the nominating papers werevalid based on two factors. First, there was "no basis forconfusion as to the office for which the nominating papers werefiled." Lewis, 63 Ill. 2d at 53. Taken as a whole, the nominatingpapers, of which both the statement of candidacy and the petitionsfor nomination are part, clearly identified the office that thecandidate sought because a specific description of the office wasincluded in the petitions for nomination. Lewis, 63 Ill. 2d at 53. Second, there was nothing about the statement of candidacy itselfthat made it necessary for the specific description of the officeto be included therein. The purpose of a statement of candidacy isto obtain a sworn statement from the candidate establishing hisqualifications to enter the primary election for the office heseeks. Lewis, 63 Ill. 2d at 53. The general description of theoffice is the functional equivalent of the specific description forthis purpose. Lewis, 63 Ill. 2d at 53. Thus, there was no reasonfor the statement of candidacy to contain more than a generaldescription of the office where other nominating papers containedthe specific description.

Zapolsky v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board, 296 Ill.App. 3d 731 (1998), a First District case cited by respondent, heldthat the failure to specify the precise office sought on petitionsfor nomination per se renders nominating papers invalid even wherethe specific office is identified on other nominating papers. InZapolsky, there were full-term offices and a vacancy to be filledin the election. Zapolsky, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 732. Thecandidate, however, described the office she sought on herpetitions for nomination only as " 'Commissioner of theMetropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago.' " Zapolsky, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 732. The candidate correctlyidentified the office in her statement of candidacy and economicstatement as " 'Commissioner of the Metropolitan Water ReclamationDistrict of Greater Chicago to fill the vacancy for the unexpiredtwo (2) year term.' " Zapolsky, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 732. As inLewis, there was no basis for confusion as to the office for whichthe nominating papers were filed because the statement of candidacyand economic statement sufficiently delineated that information. The court, however, held that petitions for nomination always must

identify the specific vacancy sought because of their distinctivepurpose. Zapolsky, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 734. According to thecourt, "[t]he apparent purpose of nominating petitions signed byvoters is to expand the informed participation of members of therespective parties in their primary election." Zapolsky, 296 Ill.App. 3d at 734. The court concluded that to accomplish thispurpose "[a] potential signatory to a nominating petition has theright to know the specific vacancy sought by the candidate so thatthe signatory may make an informed decision to sign the petition orsupport another candidate for the same vacancy." Zapolsky, 296Ill. App. 3d at 734.

The conclusion in Zapolsky is questionable. Zapolsky premisedits holding on its finding that "[t]he apparent purpose ofnominating petitions signed by voters is to expand the informedparticipation of members of the respective parties in their primaryelection." Zapolsky, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 734. Zapolsky cited noauthority for this finding. Other cases have held, more logically,that the primary purpose of the signature requirement is to reducethe electoral process to manageable proportions by confining ballotpositions to a relatively small number of candidates who havedemonstrated initiative and at least a minimal appeal to eligiblevoters. Lockhart v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board, 328 Ill.App. 3d 838, 844 (2002); Huskey v. Municipal Officers ElectoralBoard, 156 Ill. App. 3d 201, 206 (1987); Merz v. Volberding, 94Ill. App. 3d 1111, 1118 (1981); Briscoe v. Kusper, 435 F.2d 1046,1054 (7th Cir. 1970).

We need not decide whether to adopt the Zapolsky holding inthe Second District, however. Unlike Zapolsky and unlike Lewis,here petitioner did not identify which of the two offices he soughton any of his nominating papers. A candidate's description of theoffice he seeks may not create "basis for confusion as to theoffice for which the nominating papers were filed." Lewis, 63 Ill.App. 3d at 53. In Lewis, the supreme court held that the failureto specifically identify the office sought in a statement ofcandidacy was excused where other nominating papers did so. Lewis,63 Ill. App. 3d at 53. Here none of the nominating papers indicatewhich of the two trustee offices petitioner sought. As a result,it is not clear from the nominating papers which trustee officepetitioner intended to run for. This constitutes a basis forconfusion as to the office for which the nominating papers werefiled.

Petitioner argues that his general description of the officehe sought was sufficient because nominating papers are consideredfiled for the full-term office unless otherwise specified. According to petitioner, only a candidate seeking to fill an officecreated by a vacancy need give a specific description of the officehe seeks because a vacancy is "an exception to the statutoryscheme." Petitioner premises this assertion on the fact that thestatute provides for trustees to serve a four-year term. 65 ILCS5/3.1--25--5 (West 2000). The trouble with this argument is thatthe statute also provides for trustees to serve less than a four-year term where they fill a vacancy. 65 ILCS 5/3.1--10--50(b)(West 2000). Thus, an office created by a vacancy is not "anexception to the statutory scheme" but, rather, specificallyprovided for by statute.

Petitioner, in essence, asks us to create a default rule thata general description of an office sought is presumed to refer tothe full-term office unless otherwise specified. We have found noauthority that supports such a rule. Under Lewis, a candidate mustmake clear the office that he seeks somewhere in his nominatingpapers. We do not find this rule unduly burdensome such that weneed qualify it today. Accordingly, petitioner's nominating papersare invalid because he failed to specify which of the two trusteepositions he sought.

Petitioner additionally argues that the Electoral Board wasestopped to remove his name from the ballot because Lakemoorpublished a document listing available offices that classified boththe two-year and the four-year trustee offices as "trustee." Before an estoppel against a public body can be found, it must beshown that an affirmative act occurred on the part of thegovernmental body that induced substantial reliance by thelitigant. Schumann v. Kumarich, 102 Ill. App. 3d 454, 460 (1981). Petitioner does not even argue that he relied on the document infailing to specify which of the two trustee positions he sought. Nor can he. The same document made clear that there were two typesof trustee offices available and even admonished petitioner toconsult competent legal counsel in filing his petitions fornomination. The Electoral Board was not estopped to removepetitioner's name from the ballot.

The judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

KAPALA, J., concurs.

JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I believe that the petitionercomplied with section 7--10 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7--10(West 2000)), which requires that a candidate's nominating papersstate the office that the candidate seeks.

Specifically, section 7--10 of the Election Code provides thatthe statement of candidacy must state the candidate's name, hispolitical party, his place of residency, and the office he seeks.10 ILCS 5/7--10 (West 2000). The statement of candidacy must alsobe notarized. 10 ILCS 5/7--10 (West 2000). Additionally, section7--10 of the Election Code provides that a candidate's petitionsfor nomination be uniform in size, contain a certain number ofsignatures, and be fastened together in book form. 10 ILCS 5/7--10(West 2000). Each nominating petition must state the candidate'sname, his address, and the office he seeks. 10 ILCS 5/7--10 (West2000).

In accordance with section 7--10 of the Election Code, thepetitioner stated, in both his nominating petition and statement ofcandidacy, that he sought the office of "trustee." That thepetitioner did not designate whether he desired a four-year or two-year term did not render his description of the officeinsufficient. As noted above, section 7--10 of the Election Codesets out the precise form of a candidate's nominating papers. However, nowhere in section 7--10 of the Election Code does itrequire a candidate to designate the term of the office he desires.See 10 ILCS 5/7--10 (West 2000).

The majority's imposition of such a requirement on a candidatethat he state the length of term he desires is, in the presentcase, superfluous, as the term of office of a trustee is defined bystatute. Particularly, the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1--25--5 (West 2000)) (the Municipal Code) provides: "In each villageincorporated under this Code, the electors of the village shallelect 6 trustees. The term of office of the trustees shall be 4years ***."

Although the Municipal Code also provides for trustees toserve less than four years in instances where they fill a vacancy(65 ILCS 5/3.1--10--50 (West 2000)), this does not contravene thegeneral rule that a trustee is an elected four-year position. The majority's position that there was a basis for confusion herein istherefore flawed. It was obvious that the petitioner was notseeking to fill a vacancy. The petitioner's nominating petitionand statement of candidacy clearly indicated that the petitionerwas seeking the position of trustee, which by statute is definedwith a four-year term. Accordingly, the majority's suggestion thatthere was confusion over how long a term of office the petitionerwas seeking is unfounded.

Even if section 7--10 of the Election Code did require thepetitioner to state the length of the term he sought, such anomission was inconsequential, and the Electoral Board should havefound that the petitioner substantially complied. It is afundamental principle that access to a place on the ballot is asubstantial right and not lightly to be denied. Nolan v. CookCounty Officers Electoral Board, 329 Ill. App. 3d 52, 55 (2002). The petitioner's failure to describe the position he sought moreprecisely was, at maximum, a minor error. A minor error in acandidate's nominating papers should not result in a candidate'sremoval from the ballot. Sullivan v. County Officers ElectoralBoard, 225 Ill. App. 3d 691, 693 (1992).

I am mindful that compliance with section 7--10 of theElection Code has been held to be mandatory and not directory. SeeBowe v. Chicago Electoral Board, 79 Ill. 2d 469, 470 (1980). However, substantial compliance has been held, in somecircumstances, to satisfy even certain mandatory requirements ofthe Election Code, including section 7--10. See Courtney v. CountyOfficers Electoral Board, 314 Ill. App. 3d 870, 876 (2000) (findingthat the candidate had substantially complied with section 7--10 of the Election Code even though he failed to simultaneously file hisnominating petitions with his statement of candidacy); Panarese v.Hosty, 104 Ill. App. 3d 627, 628-29 (1982) (finding that thecandidate substantially complied with section 7--10 of the ElectionCode even though he omitted his street and number from hisnominating petition); Madden v. Schumann, 105 Ill. App. 3d 900, 903(1982) (holding that the candidate's omission of the phrase "is aregistered voter" from the circulator's oath, as required bysection 7--10 of the Election Code, was a technical deviation thatdid not warrant removal from the ballot); Stevenson v. CountyOfficers Electoral Board, 58 Ill. App. 3d 24, 26 (1978) (findingthat the candidate's failure to number his nominating petitionsconsecutively, as required by section 7--10 of the Election Code,was a mere technical deficiency that did not render his nominatingpapers invalid).

Even Lewis, upon which the majority hangs its hat, establishesthat a candidate can satisfy section 7--10 of the Election Codewith substantial compliance. The Lewis court specifically heldthat the candidate "substantially complied" with section 7--10 ofthe Election Code even though he failed to describe the particularvacancy that he was seeking in his statement of candidacy. Lewis,63 Ill. 2d at 53. Although the Lewis court predicated its findingof substantial compliance on the fact that the candidate'snominating papers as a whole did describe the particular vacancythat the candidate was seeking, describing a particular vacancy inthis case was not necessary because, as noted above, the petitionerwas not seeking a vacancy. What was required, rather, was that thepetitioner state the office he was seeking. This, I believe, thepetitioner did.

On a final note, the provisions of the Electoral Code aredesigned to protect the integrity of the electoral process. Welchv. Johnson, 147 Ill. 2d 40, 56 (1992). Furthermore, villages suchas Lakemoor have a legitimate interest in regulating the number ofcandidates on the ballot. Yet, when access to the ballot isinvolved, the restriction on that access should require the leastdrastic measure to achieve these ends. In this case, removing thepetitioner from the ballot was a drastic measure that did little toprotect the integrity of the electoral process. Moreover, theVillage of Lakemoor's interests in this case were far outweighed bythe petitioner's right to access on the ballot and the voters'right to elect a candidate of their choice. Frank Heabler shouldhave been listed on the ballot for the April 1, 2003, election asa candidate for trustee.

For the above reasons, I believe the Electoral Board's removalof the petitioner from the ballot was erroneous.