Gusciara v. Lustig

Case Date: 03/26/2004
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-03-0310 Rel

No. 2--03--0310


IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT


BONNIE GUSCIARA,

          Petitioner,

v.

JACQUELINE LUSTIG, Chief Legal Counsel
of the Department of Human Rights;

THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS; CORPORATE EXECUTIVE
OFFICES, INC.; and JOSEPH BLANK,

          Respondents.

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Petition for review of order of Chief Legal
Counsel of Department of Human Rights.


Charge No. 01--CF--1667








 

 

JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner, Bonnie Gusciara, appeals an order of respondent Jacqueline Lustig, chief legalcounsel of the Illinois Department of Human Rights (Department), dismissing part of petitioner'scharge against her employer, Corporate Executive Offices, Inc. (CEO), and its president, JosephBlank (collectively respondents). As pertinent here, petitioner's charge alleged that respondentssubjected her to sexual harassment by engaging in acts that had the purpose or effect of substantiallyinterfering with her work performance or creating a hostile working environment (see 775 ILCS 5/2--101(E) (West 2000)). The chief legal counsel ruled that these allegations were barred by section 7A--102(A)(1) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/7A--102(A)(1) (West 2000)) becausethe charge was filed more than 180 days after the alleged civil rights violation was committed.

On appeal, petitioner argues that the sexual harassment claims were timely because the allegedhostile work environment resulted in part from acts that occurred within the 180-day period ofsection 7A--102(A)(1). Petitioner asserts that because sexual harassment that causes a hostile workenvironment is a single prohibited practice, a charge based on that practice is timely if any of theharassment that contributed to the hostile work environment occurred no more than 180 days beforethe charge was filed. Petitioner relies on National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,153 L. Ed. 2d 106, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002), which, she claims, establishes a similar construction ofthe limitations provision for "hostile work environment" claims brought under Title VII of the CivilRights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.