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PRESIDING JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Robert L. Grever, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Lake Countyaffirming a decision of the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund(Fund) disqualifying plaintiff from receiving benefits from the Fund because of felony convictions. We reverse and remand.

Plaintiff served as supervisor of Ela Township (Township) in Lake County (County) from1981 to 2001. From 1990 to 2000, plaintiff was also a member of the Lake County Board and acommissioner for the Lake County Forest Preserve District (District). The Township, the County,and the District all participate in the Fund, which provides retirement and other benefits to theiremployees (including officers such as plaintiff). The Fund is governed by Article 7 of the IllinoisPension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/7--101 et seq. (West 2002)). However, in 2002, plaintiff wasconvicted of multiple counts of official misconduct (720 ILCS 5/33--3 (West 1998)), a Class 3 felony,in connection with the performance of his duties as Township supervisor. Thereafter, he receivednotice from the Fund of an administrative staff determination that the felony convictions disqualifiedhim from receiving any further benefits from the Fund. Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed theadministrative staff decision to the Board, which issued a final decision disqualifying plaintiff fromreceiving any benefits from the Fund. He then filed a complaint seeking administrative review of theBoard's decision. The circuit court affirmed the Board's decision, and this appeal followed.

We initially consider the appropriate standard of review. In an appeal from an administrativereview proceeding, we review the decision of the agency, not the judgment of the trial court. DuPage County Board of Review v. Department of Revenue, 339 Ill. App. 3d 230, 235 (2003). Thefindings and conclusions of an administrative agency on questions of fact are deemed prima facie trueand correct and will not be disturbed on review unless they are against the manifest weight of theevidence. Trettenero v. Police Pension Fund, 333 Ill. App. 3d 792, 801 (2002). Here, however, therelevant facts are not really in dispute. Rather, this appeal raises an issue of statutory construction,which is a question of law. O'Callaghan v. Retirement Board of Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund,302 Ill. App. 3d 579, 582 (1998). "Illinois courts may defer to an administrative agency'sinterpretations and enforcement of statutes because of the considerable experience and expertise itmay have concerning the issues before it." Rockwood Holding Co. v. Department of Revenue, 312Ill. App. 3d 1120, 1123 (2000). However, an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute is notbinding on this court. O'Callaghan, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 582.

Turning to the merits, section 7--219 of the Code provides, "[n]one of the benefits providedfor in this Article shall be paid to any person who is convicted of any felony relating to or arising outof or in connection with his service as an employee." 40 ILCS 5/7--219 (West 2002). There is nodispute that plaintiff's felony convictions related to or arose out of or in connection with his serviceas an employee of the Township, and plaintiff concedes that he has forfeited the right to any benefitsearned through service to the Township. The parties differ, however, on the extent of the forfeitureunder section 7--219. Plaintiff contends that the forfeiture applies only to benefits earned from hisservice as an employee of the Township and that he is entitled to benefits accruing from hisemployment with the County and the District. The Board contends that the forfeiture applies to allbenefits payable from the Fund regardless of the positions from which they were earned.

We find the recent First District case of Taddeo v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois MunicipalRetirement Fund, No. 1--03--2950 (September 27, 2004), to be directly on point. In Taddeo, theplaintiff, who had been convicted of a felony arising from his position as mayor of Melrose Park, wasdenied pensions from his employment with Melrose Park as well as from his employment as townshipsupervisor for Proviso Township. Taddeo, slip op. at 1. After setting out the standard of review aswe have above, the First District relied on case law interpreting pension disqualification statutes inholding that the plaintiff was entitled to pension benefits for his Proviso Township employmentbecause there was no connection between the plaintiff's criminal wrongdoing and the performanceof his Proviso Township employment. Taddeo, slip op. at 6, citing Devoney v. Retirement Board ofthe Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 199 Ill. 2d 414, 419 (2002); Siwek v. Retirement Board ofthe Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 324 Ill. App. 3d 820, 824 (2001); Cullen v. RetirementBoard of Policeman's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1109 (1995). We agree withthe holding in Taddeo that there must be a nexus between an employee's wrongdoing and hisperformance of his official duties in order for the employee's pension to be forfeited. Because thatnexus is lacking in regard to plaintiff's employment with the County and with the District, we holdthat plaintiff is not disqualified from receiving benefits accruing from his employment with thoseentities.

Our holding is bolstered by our independent reading of the statute. The cardinal rule ofstatutory construction is that the court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Marriage of King, 208 Ill. 2d 332, 340 (2003). In doing so, the court should look first to thelanguage of the statute, giving the terms their plain and ordinary meaning. King, 208 Ill. 2d at 340. In determining the legislature's intent, the court should consider, in addition to the statutory language,the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, and the objects and purposes sought. Peoplev. Smith, 345 Ill. App. 3d 179, 185 (2004). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, the courtmust apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Hall v. Henn, 208 Ill.2d 325, 330 (2003).

The Board maintains that under the plain language of the statute, an employee convicted ofa felony in connection with his or her employment is entitled to "none of the benefits" provided forunder Article 7 of the Code. The Board reasons that the forfeiture here extends to benefits thatplaintiff earned through service with the County and the District because such benefits are providedfor under Article 7. We believe that the Board's interpretation is overly literal. "[C]ourts must avoidreading statutory language either too literally or too broadly, and must try to garner what thelegislature intended." Village of Lake Villa v. Bransley, 348 Ill. App. 3d 280, 284 (2004). A literalinterpretation is not controlling where the spirit and intent of the General Assembly in enacting astatute are clearly expressed, its objects and purposes are clearly set forth, and a literal interpretationof a particular clause would defeat the obvious intent (In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300,312 (2002)); where literal enforcement of a statute will result in great injustice that was notcontemplated by the General Assembly (Robinson v. Meadows, 203 Ill. App. 3d 706, 710 (1990));or where a literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result (Grams v. Autozone, Inc., 319 Ill.App. 3d 567, 570 (2001)).

These considerations militate against applying the statute to cause a forfeiture of benefits fromemployment unrelated to the misconduct. The purpose of the forfeiture provision is to "discourageofficial malfeasance by causing a forfeiture of benefits to which a public official otherwise would beentitled." Cirignani v. Municipal Employees', Officers', and Officials' Annuity and Benefit Fund, 317Ill. App. 3d 732, 736 (2000). "The rationale is to deter public officials from committing a breach ofthe public trust so that the public officials *** do not profit from their wrongdoing." (Emphasisadded.) Cirignani, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 736. Plaintiff has not been found guilty of any wrongdoing inconnection with his employment with the County and the District. Accordingly, forfeiture of pensionbenefits earned from that employment would not serve the purpose of the forfeiture provision andwould defeat the salutary objectives of Article 7 of the Code. Moreover, our review reveals nothingto indicate that the General Assembly specifically contemplated this situation, where an individualearns benefits from several municipal employers but commits malfeasance only in connection withone, and we believe that a literal application of the statute to strip an employee of benefits fairlyearned and untainted by malfeasance would amount to a substantial injustice. Thus, although thestatute does not explicitly limit the scope of the forfeiture to benefits from service to any particularmunicipal employer, such a limitation is reasonably implicit. That which is implied in a statute is asmuch a part of it as that which is expressed. Baker v. Miller, 159 Ill. 2d 249, 260 (1994). Additionally, the language of pension statutes must be liberally construed in favor of the rights of thepensioner. Shields v. Judges' Retirement System of Illinois, 204 Ill. 2d 488, 494 (2003). Accordingly, based on our adoption of the holding in Taddeo and also our independent review of thestatute, we conclude that a conviction of a felony in connection with service to a particular municipalemployer results in the forfeiture of benefits earned only from that particular employment relationship.

The Board also contends that one of the benefits available to municipal employees underArticle 7 is the ability to earn service credit for concurrent service with different municipal employersand to combine earnings for purposes of determining the size of their retirement annuities. Accordingto the Board, section 7--219 results in the forfeiture of concurrent service credit. The Board furthercontends that "since all of [the] calendar months [of concurrent service] must be used in order tocalculate a pension for plaintiff's employment with Lake County, plaintiff's entire pension must beforfeited." To the contrary, even if plaintiff forfeits credit for service with the Township, it is stillpossible to calculate his pension benefits based on earnings and credit for service with the County andthe District. Doing so would eliminate any benefits related to service with the Township and thuseffectuate section 7--219. Accord Taddeo, slip op. at 9 ("The result of plaintiff's disqualificationmakes it as though the pension earned as mayor never existed, and plaintiff no longer has concurrentservice credits").

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County andremand for entry of judgment reinstating plaintiff's pension rights in connection with his service tothe County and the District.

Reversed and remanded.

GROMETER and KAPALA, JJ., concur.