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JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, the court allowed plaintiffs, Toddand Lisa Gibson, to rescind a contract to purchase real estate fromdefendants, Anthony and Beverly Capasso. Defendants appeal aportion of the amended judgment order that required plaintiffs topay defendants for the time plaintiffs occupied the premises. Defendants argue that the trial court miscalculated the amountplaintiffs owed.

Plaintiffs filed a four-count amended complaint againstdefendants. Plaintiffs had contracted to buy a house fromdefendants and alleged that defendants misrepresented theproperty's size. Count I sought rescission of the contract, countII alleged a violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive BusinessPractices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2000)), count IIIalleged fraud, and count IV alleged breach of contract. Defendantscounterclaimed against plaintiffs, arguing that plaintiffs hadfailed to make payments under the agreement for deed and had failedto pay for personal property they were purchasing from defendants. Defendants also alleged that plaintiffs had committed waste to theproperty.

The trial court ordered the contract rescinded based on areasonable mistake regarding the amount of acres actually conveyed. The court stated in the order that the parties executed anagreement for deed on January 29, 1999. The court orderedplaintiffs to deliver possession of the property to defendants, paydefendants $42,504 for plaintiffs' use of the property "through May31, 2000," and pay defendants $2,400, the balance due for personalproperty plaintiffs purchased from defendants. The court thenordered defendants to pay plaintiffs $66,065.63, which representedthe $64,615.46 plaintiffs paid to defendants for the purchase ofthe property and the $1,450.17 paid by plaintiffs for improvementson the property. The trial court's order did not provide a finalfigure that defendants were required to pay plaintiffs in light ofthe offsetting figures. The court dismissed counts II, III, and IVof the amended complaint and count I of the counterclaim, except asto the agreement to purchase personal property. The court alloweddefendants to withdraw count II of the counterclaim. The courtentered this judgment on April 25, 2000.

Both sides filed timely postjudgment motions. On April 28,2000, plaintiffs moved for reconsideration. Plaintiffs allegedthat the court miscalculated the amount they should have to pay forusing the property, stating that they delivered possession of theproperty to defendants on March 24, 2000, earlier than the May 31,2000, date provided for in the trial court's judgment. Thus,plaintiffs sought a reduction of the amount they owed defendantsfor the use of the premises, stating that they should have to payfor the use of the property for 9 months and 24 days, rather than12 months.

On May 3, 2000, defendants moved to amend the judgment. Defendants asked the court to vacate its rescission order. In thealternative, defendants argued that the trial court erred byordering defendants to pay plaintiffs $1,450.17 for improvementsmade by plaintiffs to the property at issue. In addition,defendants asked the court to recalculate the amount due todefendants for rent by adding an additional $668 a month forproperty taxes. Defendants also filed a petition for attorneyfees.

On May 12, 2000, the trial court disposed of the parties'motions. The trial court amended the original judgment order,granting plaintiffs' request to reduce the amount of rent owed from12 months to 10 months. The trial court denied defendants' motionexcept for the request for "an adjustment of the rental amount toreflect the obligation of taxes." The trial court then enteredjudgment in plaintiffs' favor and against defendants in the amountof $21,961.63.

On May 18, 2000, defendants moved to reconsider and vacate thesecond judgment entered May 12, 2000. Defendants argued that thetrial court erred by calculating rent and taxes for 10 monthsinstead of 14 months. Defendants argued that plaintiffs occupiedthe property from January 20, 1999, through or about March 31,2000. Defendants also argued, again, that the trial court erred byordering defendants to pay plaintiffs $1,450.17 for improvementsplaintiffs made to the property. The trial court denieddefendants' motion on June 19, 2000. On June 26, 2000, defendantsfiled their notice of appeal, contesting in part, the judgmentsentered May 12, 2000, and June 19, 2000.

Initially, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction todecide this appeal. The parties did not raise this issue in their initial briefs to this court. However, we are always mindful thatthis court has an independent duty to consider our jurisdictionbefore considering the merits of any case. See Almgren v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 162 Ill. 2d 205, 210(1994). Thus, given the multiple posttrial motions and judgments,we requested the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing theissue of jurisdiction.

It is well settled that a timely notice of appeal isjurisdictional. Childers v. Kruse, 297 Ill. App. 3d 70, 73 (1998). Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) provides that a notice of appeal mustbe filed within 30 days of the final judgment or, "if a timelypost-trial motion directed against the judgment is filed, whetherin a jury or a nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of theorder disposing of the last pending post-judgment motion." 155Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). A final judgment is one that disposes of therights of the parties with regard to the entire controversy or adefinite and separate part thereof. Dubina v. Mesirow RealtyDevelopment, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496, 502 (1997).

Here, there were two judgments, one on April 25, 2000, thatwas superseded by the second judgment, entered on May 12, 2000. This May 12, 2000, judgment finally determined and disposed of therights of the parties and, thus, was a final judgment for purposesof Rule 303. Defendants filed one timely posttrial motion directedagainst the May 12, 2000, judgment, and this motion was disposed ofby the trial court on June 19, 2000. Thus, according to SupremeCourt Rule 303(a)(1), defendants had 30 days from the entry of thisJune 19, 2000, order confirming the second final judgment to filetheir notice of appeal. Because defendants filed their notice ofappeal seven days after the order disposing of the onlypostjudgment motion directed at the only extant final judgment,their appeal is timely, and we have jurisdiction to consider themerits of this case.

We take notice of Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2), which provides that "[n]o request for reconsideration of a ruling on apost-judgment motion will toll the running of the time within whicha notice of appeal must be filed." 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(2).However, this rule does not apply here, where there were twojudgments and defendants' second postjudgment motion did not seekreconsideration of a ruling on a postjudgment motion; rather,defendants' second postjudgment motion attacked an amended and,thus, the only final, judgment.

There are at least three alternative dispositions that canarise when the court rules upon a postjudgment motion under SupremeCourt Rule 303. First, the motion may be denied and the finaljudgment remains intact. Second, the motion may be granted and thefinal judgment ceases to exist and a new final judgment arises. Third, the motion may be granted and the judgment is vacated and anew trial is ordered. In the first instance, further motions forreconsideration may be filed within 30 days of the denial, but theywill not stay the time for filing a notice of appeal. In thesecond instance, a postjudgment motion filed in apt time will staythe time for filing a notice of appeal, as it is not areconsideration of the first final judgment but the firstpostjudgment motion filed against a new final judgment. In thethird instance, there is no final judgment, and the right to appealis not from a final judgment under Supreme Court Rule 303 but froman order granting a new trial under Supreme Court Rule 306. Thecase at bar presents us with the second example. Thus, because thesecond postjudgment motion addressed a new final judgment, theclock was reset and the time to file a notice of appeal startedagain.

To support its position that defendants' notice of appeal wasuntimely, plaintiffs cite Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d 253 (1981),Deckard v. Joiner, 44 Ill. 2d 412 (1970), Bernhauser v. Glen EllynDodge, Inc., 288 Ill. App. 3d 984 (1997), and Rose v. CentraliaTownship High School District No. 200, 59 Ill. App. 3d 606 (1978). We understand these cases to hold that successive posttrialmotions, attacking the only existing final judgment, do not tollthe time to file a notice of appeal. Thus, one posttrial motionfiled by a party is permitted for each final judgment. Further, anorder that merely denies a posttrial motion is not considered a"final judgment" for purposes of this rule. Rather, an orderdenying relief confirms the preceding final judgment. Thereafter,a second postjudgment motion is, in fact, a request forreconsideration of a ruling as contemplated by Supreme Court Rule303(a)(2). These cases do not support the proposition advanced byplaintiffs that the time to appeal is not tolled by the filing ofa posttrial motion that attacks a successive judgment that becomesthe only final judgment. In these cases there was only onejudgment disposing of the merits of the case. See Sears, 85 Ill.2d at 260 (in one of the cases in this consolidated appeal, thesecond judgment merely denied a posttrial motion; in the othercase, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render the secondjudgment and, thus, the second judgment was improper); Deckard, 44Ill. 2d at 417; Bernhauser, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 988 (the secondorder merely denied the plaintiff's motion to reconsider); Rose,59 Ill. App. 3d at 606-07 (the second order merely denied theplaintiff's motion to reconsider). In contrast, here, there was asecond judgment that altered the rights of the parties as they weredetermined in the first judgment. This second judgment became thefinal judgment. Thus, these cases are not controlling here.

We acknowledge that, in cases where a second posttrial motionwas deemed to toll the time for a notice of appeal, the courtsreasoned that the issues raised in the second posttrial motionscould not have been raised in the first posttrial motions. See,e.g., Jeanblanc v. Mellott, 152 Ill. App. 3d 801, 809-10 (1987);Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. H.W. Stout & Associates, Inc., 112 Ill.App. 3d 570, 575 (1983); In re Marriage of Viehman, 91 Ill. App.3d 315, 319-20 (1980). We also acknowledge that the exceptionapplied in those cases is not present here. That is, in this case,the issues raised by defendants in their second posttrial motioncould have been raised in their first posttrial motion (and in factone issue was raised in both posttrial motions). However, contraryto plaintiffs' contentions, we do not believe that the exceptionapplied in Jeanblanc, Aetna, and Viehman is the only circumstancethat will toll the time for filing a notice of appeal under SupremeCourt Rule 303. Rather, we believe that, where a trial courtamends its initial final order, the clock is reset regarding thefiling of posttrial motions attacking this new final judgment and,thus, the time is reset regarding the time for the filing of anotice of appeal.

We also question the logic of these cases. Unless there is anew judgment that alters the rights of the parties, there could notbe an issue that could not have been addressed in the firstpostjudgment motion. We believe these cases engrafted a rationaleexplaining why only one postjudgment motion is required with acause that has only one final judgment. Rather than analyzing thefact that a new final judgment was entered that could alter theparties' rights, these courts looked to an exception to therationale and made it a rule. They essentially looked at whethera new issue existed that could not be raised previously. What theyfailed to discern was that the new issue arose only because a newfinal judgment had been entered. We believe the prior cases couldnot see the tree for the twigs, i.e., could not see the new finaljudgment because they were focusing on the judgment's constituentparts and the new issues raised in the new final judgment.

Further, we are mindful that, when interpreting a supremecourt rule, we must consider the reasons and necessity for itsenactment, the evil to be remedied, and the purpose of the rule. See Hill v. Behr & Sons, Inc., 293 Ill. App. 3d 814, 817 (1997). One of the purposes of Supreme Court Rule 303, that of preventingendless litigation by allowing a losing party to extend the timefor appeal indefinitely, is not thwarted by our application ofthese rules in the case at bar. In the case before us, weunderstand the supreme court rule and the holdings of the casesinterpreting the rule as simply, for each final judgment, onepostjudgment motion will extend the time for appeal. Othersuccessive postjudgment motions attacking the identical finaljudgment will not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. This application supports "the interests of finality, and ofcertainty and ease of administration in determining when the timefor appeal begins to run." Sears, 85 Ill. 2d at 259. It alsopromotes another purpose of Supreme Court Rule 303, that ofefficiency, because it allows the trial court to reconsider andcorrect any defects in the new final judgment before the need forappeal arises. Accordingly, we determine that we have jurisdictionto consider the merits of this case.

Defendants argue on appeal that the trial court's May 12,2000, judgment rescinding the parties' contract must be amended toreflect the 14 months that plaintiffs had possession of theproperty. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court's judgmentreflected a lump sum for plaintiff's possession and was not basedon a monthly figure. We disagree with plaintiffs.

It is well settled that when a court orders a contract to berescinded, the contract is canceled and the parties must berestored to their status before contracting. Majcher v. LaurelMotors, Inc., 287 Ill. App. 3d 719, 728 (1997). To restore theparties to their status before contracting, the purchaser mustreceive back any consideration paid and the seller must receiveback any benefit received by the purchaser. See Majcher, 287 Ill.App. 3d at 728.

In its April 25, 2000, order, the trial ordered plaintiffs topay defendants $42,504 for use of the property through May 31,2000. Defendants argue and plaintiffs acknowledge in their postjudgment motion that this figure represented a monthly payment of$3,542. Contrary to their previous position, plaintiffs now claimfor the first time on appeal that this figure represents a lump sumfigure. However, this argument is not supported by the record.There is nothing in the record supporting a lump sum figure of$42,504. The record contains no evidence that the lump sum valueof the benefit received by the plaintiffs for possession was$42,504. However, there is support in the record for the monthlyvalue of possession of $3,542. The record reflects that plaintiffsmade three monthly payments to defendants of $3,542. Multiplying$3,542 by 12 renders the sum of $42,504, the precise amount thetrial court ordered plaintiffs to pay defendants for possession ofthe property. Thus, the only conclusion that can be drawn from therecord is that the trial court found that this was the monthlyvalue of the benefit plaintiffs received for possession of theproperty. No other conclusion is supported by the record. We notethat the parties agree that the trial court also ordered plaintiffsto pay defendants for taxes at a rate of $668 a month. Therefore,the trial court intended plaintiffs to pay defendants $4,210 amonth for possession of the property.

This brings us to the crux of the matter, that is, how manymonths did the trial court intend to order plaintiffs to pay forthe possession of the property? Defendants argue that, since thesale closed on January 29, 1999, and plaintiffs relinquishedpossession on March 24, 2000, plaintiffs must pay for 14 months. Although we do not agree that plaintiffs should pay for 14 months,the record reveals that the trial court erred in counting thecorrect number of months in its calculation.

The record supports the trial court's findings that the saleclosed on January 29, 1999, plaintiffs discovered the mistakeregarding the size of the property conveyed in March 1999, and theyreturned possession of the property on March 24, 2000. The recordreveals that plaintiffs lived in the house for one week afterclosing but then returned to Colorado until March 1999 so that LisaGibson could give birth. Therefore, the fewest months the trialcourt reasonably could have found that plaintiffs derived a benefitfrom the property is for 13 months and 24 days. Accordingly, thetrial court abused its discretion by ordering plaintiffs to pay foronly 10 months' possession. The correct figure plaintiffs must paydefendants for possession of the property is $58,261, representinga prorated calculation of "rent" and taxes rounded to the nearestdollar.

Defendants also assert that it is entitled to a setoff of$2,400 for plaintiffs' purchase of personal property fromdefendants. However, because plaintiffs have not receivedpossession of this personal property, defendants are not entitledto a setoff. This portion of the judgment may be executed when thepersonal property is delivered to plaintiffs.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court ofKane County, but modify it as follows: Defendants owe plaintiffs$66,065.63, representing $64,615.46 as reimbursement for theamounts paid by plaintiffs to defendants and $1,450.17 forimprovements plaintiffs made to the property. Plaintiffs owedefendants $58,261, for the benefit received from possession of theproperty. After a setoff of these figures, defendant owesplaintiffs $7,804.63.

Affirmed as modified.

O'MALLEY, J. concurs.

JUSTICE CALLUM, dissenting:

Because the majority acts beyond its jurisdiction, I cannotjoin its opinion. Defendants' notice of appeal was filed more than30 days after the court resolved the parties' postjudgment motionsand was thus untimely and ineffective to invoke this court'sjurisdiction. Accordingly, we should dismiss the appeal. Instead,the majority saves the appeal by erasing posttrial practice as ithas existed in this state for years and inventing a new rule thatis unsupported by any authority. Indeed, the policy rationale themajority offers to support its judicial legislation proves why themajority's new rule is both ill-conceived and unwise. Therefore,I must respectfully dissent.

The majority's holding is as follows: anytime a trial courtmakes any modification to its judgment in response to a posttrialmotion, the entire judgment is open to a new round of posttrialmotions, even those solely raising issues that either have been orcould have been raised in the first motion. This rule is contraryboth to the plain language of the supreme court rules and thecommon law of this state.

A timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional. Childers v.Kruse, 297 Ill. App. 3d 70, 73 (1998). The notice of appeal mustbe filed within 30 days of final judgment or, "if a timely post-trial motion directed against the judgment is filed, whether in ajury or a nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of the orderdisposing of the last pending post-judgment motion." 155 Ill. 2dR. 303(a)(1). Importantly, "[n]o request for reconsideration of aruling on a post-judgment motion will toll the running of the timewithin which a notice of appeal must be filed." 155 Ill. 2d R.303(a)(2).

The proper resolution of this case under Rule 303 is simple. The trial court issued a final judgment on April 25, 2000, and bothparties filed timely postjudgment motions. The court resolved bothmotions in an order entered on May 12, 2000. In this order, thecourt modified its judgment in two respects and otherwise deniedthe motions. On May 18, defendants filed a motion to reconsider,raising one issue that they raised in the first motion and one thatthey could have raised. The court denied this motion on June 19,2000, and defendants filed their notice of appeal on June 26.

Because the court ruled on the postjudgment motions on May 12,2000, the notice of appeal had to be filed within 30 days of thatdate. Defendants apparently believed they could extend the timefor appeal by filing a motion to reconsider. They were mistaken. Rule 303(a)(2)'s proscription could not be more clear: "No requestfor reconsideration of a ruling on a post-judgment motion will tollthe running of the time within which a notice of appeal must befiled under this rule." 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(2).

Also irrelevant is the fact that the second postjudgmentmotion was filed within 30 days of the original order. As weexplained in Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Gary-WheatonBank, 203 Ill. App. 3d 672, 676-77 (1990), the time for appeal isnot extended by a successive postjudgment motion filed within 30days of the original order if the second motion is filed only afterthe court disposes of the first one.

Faced with the unmistakably clear language of Rule 303(a)(2),the majority is forced to say that the rule does not apply becausethe trial court's May 12 order was not a ruling on a postjudgmnentmotion. The court's order begins, "This cause coming to be heardon plaintiff's motion to reconsider, defendant's motion toreconsider and defendant's motion for fees, due notice having beengiven, the court being fully advised in the premises[,] it ishereby ordered ***." Following this opening clause are threedispositive rulings on the postjudgment requests. The trial judgeobviously believed that he was ruling on the parties' postjudgmentmotions, and his order disposed of them.

The majority asserts that, because the court's ruling includeda modification of the judgment, there was then a new finaljudgment. That may be true, but there is no authority for theproposition that the entire posttrial process began anew.

It has long been the rule that a party is entitled to oneposttrial motion. In jury trial cases, posttrial motions aremandatory to preserve issues for review. The applicable statutespecifically provides that all relief sought after trial must berequested in a single motion. 735 ILCS 5/2--1202(b) (West 2000). Postjudgment motions are not mandatory following bench trials, butthe statute applicable to such motions (735 ILCS 5/2--1203 (West2000)) has also been interpreted to allow only one motion. SeeBenet Realty Corp. v. Lisle Savings & Loan Ass'n, 175 Ill. App. 3d227, 234 (1988); People ex rel. McGraw v. Mogilles, 136 Ill. App.3d 67, 71-72 (1985); Rose v. Centralia Township High SchoolDistrict No. 200, 59 Ill. App. 3d 606, 607-08 (1978).

As the Historical and Practice Notes to Rule 303 recognize,when the supreme court added to Rule 303(a)(2) the languagerelating to reconsiderations of rulings on postjudgment motions, itessentially codified what was already established by case law:

"When subparagraph (a)(2) was adopted, the Court alsoincluded language to give expression to the principle thatrequests for reconsideration of a ruling on a post-trialmotion will not toll the running of the time for filing anotice of appeal. This again was a familiar rule, but onethat had continued to cause difficulty and therefore borerepeating. It was always the rule that a party was entitledabsent some highly unusual circumstances to only one post-trial motion which would serve to extend the time for appeal." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, R. 303,Historical & Practice Notes, at 94 (Smith-Hurd 1985).

The majority's holding--that any action of the trial court ona postjudgment motion, other than an outright denial, restarts theentire posttrial process--is an impermissible rewriting of Rule303(a)(2). The majority is rewriting the rule to read, "No requestfor reconsideration of a denial of a postjudgment motion willextend the time in which a notice of appeal must be filed underthis rule." The rule does not say "denial," it says "ruling," andwe have no authority to rewrite the supreme court rules by judicialfiat. Defendants' request for the court to reconsider its rulingson the postjudgment motions did not extend the time for filing anotice of appeal.

As the majority notes, the appellate court has recognized a limited exception to the rule against successive postjugmentmotions when the court modifies its judgment in response to apostjudgment motion and the second motion attacks the modifiedjudgment and raises something that could not have been raised inthe previous motion. See Jeanblanc, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 809-10;Aetna, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 575-76; Viehman, 91 Ill. App. 3d at 319-20. The rationale of these cases is essentially that a partyshould have at least one chance to ask the court to reconsider eachpart of its ruling.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that this exception wascreated by the appellate court and that a party still proceeds atits own risk by filing a second postjudgment motion. The IllinoisInstitute of Continuing Legal Education thus cautions attorneys asfollows:

"Successive post-trial motions are not permitted innonjury cases. Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d 253 (1981). Anarrow exception to this rule has been recognized when new oradditional relief is granted against a party for the firsttime in an order disposing of a timely filed post-trialmotion. See Jeanblanc v. Mellott, 152 Ill. App. 3d 801(1970); Viehman v. Viehman, 91 Ill. App. 3d 315 (1980); AetnaLife Insurance Co. v. H.W. Stout & Associates, Inc., 112 Ill.App. 3d 570 (1983). This exception has not been ruled on bythe Supreme Court. Thus, extreme caution should be usedbefore relying on it." J. Torshen & A. Spreyer, Post-TrialNotions in Illinois Civil Practice