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Defendants, the State Board of Elections (the Board) and its members in their officialcapacity, appeal from the order of the circuit court granting declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff,the Du Page County Election Commission. We reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 17, 2002, defendants, in accordance with section 7--14 of the Illinois ElectionCode (Election Code) (10 ILCS 5/7--14 (West 2002)), certified the candidates for the March 19,2002, general primary election ballot. The Election Code provides, in relevant part:

"Not less than 61 days before the date of the general primary the State Board ofElections shall meet and shall examine all petitions filled under this Article 7, in the office ofthe State Board of Elections. The State Board of Elections shall then certify to the countyclerk of each county, the names of all candidates whose nomination papers or certificates ofnomination have been filed with the Board and direct the county clerk to place upon theofficial ballot for the general primary election the names of such candidates in the samemanner and in the same order as shown upon the certification." 10 ILCS 5/7--14 (West2002).

The Election Code also provides for the same deadline with respect to when local election authoritiesmust certify candidates for consolidated primaries. 10 ILCS 5/7--13.1 (West 2002). On January 30,2002, Michael Bakalis, a democratic party candidate for governor listed on the January 17, 2002,certification, personally delivered a letter to the permanent branch office of the State Board ofElections indicating his desire to withdraw as a candidate for the democratic nomination for governorand requesting that his name not appear on the ballot. Defendants accepted Mr. Bakalis's withdrawaland issued an amended certification on February 1, 2002, omitting Mr. Bakalis's name.

On February 1, 2002, plaintiff sent a letter to defendants indicating that it refused to acceptthe amended certification because it felt that the withdrawal was untimely under section 7--12(9) ofthe Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7--12(9) (West 2002)), that it had no authority or obligation to acceptdefendants' amended certification, and that it would "not alter the ballot which *** [had] alreadybeen sent to print [on January 30, 2002,] containing the name of Michael Bakalis." Section 7--12(9)of the Election Code states, in relevant part:

"Any person for whom a petition for nomination, or for committeeman or for delegateor alternate delegate to a national nominating convention has been filed may cause his nameto be withdrawn by request in writing, signed by him and duly acknowledged before an officerqualified to take acknowledgments of deeds, and filed in the principal or permanent branchoffice of the State Board of Elections or with the appropriate election authority or localelection official, not later than the date of certification of candidates for the consolidatedprimary or general primary ballot. No names so withdrawn shall be certified or printed on theprimary ballot." 10 ILCS 5/7--12(9) (West 2002).

Since the date for certification had passed before Mr. Bakalis attempted to withdraw, plaintiff arguedthat his attempted withdrawal was untimely. Defendants responded that they believed that they hadthe authority to allow "permissive withdrawals."

On February 13, 2002, plaintiff filed a verified complaint for declaratory judgment againstdefendants. The complaint sought, inter alia, a declaration that section 7--12(9) establishes anabsolute deadline by which a candidate may withdraw from an election, that there is no right ofpermissive withdrawal under the Election Code, and that plaintiff had no authority or obligation tochange the ballot to conform with defendants' amended certification. Defendants asserted that theyhad the authority to accept Mr. Bakalis's withdrawal and to amend the certification pursuant tosection 7--14, which states, in relevant part:

"The State Board of Elections or the county clerk, as the case may be, shall issue anamended certification whenever it is discovered that the original certification is in error." 10ILCS 5/7--14 (West 2002).

According to defendants, the inclusion of the name of a candidate who has withdrawn, even aftercertification pursuant to section 7--14, causes a certification to be "in error" and, therefore,defendants have discretion to amend the certification under section 7--14.

Plaintiff filed a motion for an expedited briefing schedule in order to allow the parties to file"respective Motions for Summary Judgment" and so that the case could be decided before theelection. However, on February 27, 2002, the court entered an agreed order which supplied abriefing schedule that ran beyond the election date. Consequently, while the case was pending, thegeneral primary election took place as scheduled on March 19, 2002. As a result of plaintiff's refusalto abide by defendants' amended certification, the Du Page County ballot listed Michael Bakalis asa candidate for the democratic nomination for governor. From the votes cast in Du Page County, Mr.Bakalis was not the winner of the democratic nomination for governor. On September 23, 2002, indisposing of the matter, the trial court entered an order stating the following:

"(1) the withdrawal provision of the [E]lection [C]ode, 10 ILCS 5/7--12(9), providesan absolute deadline for a candidate to file a petition for withdrawal from an election; and (2)there is no right of permissive withdrawal under the Election Code for a candidate after thedate of certification set forth in the Election Code 10 ILCS 5/7--13.1 and 10 ILCS 5/7--14;and (3) an 'error' as defined in the Election Code means a mistake and that a candidate'swithdrawal after the date for certification does not constitute an 'error'; and (4) nothing hereinis intended to otherwise restrict the State Board's authority under the Election Code to amendcertifications."

Defendants filed a timely appeal from the circuit court's order. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction/Mootness

As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether the issues in this case became moot afterthe general primary election was held, since the circuit court's order was entered after the election. A case is moot when there exists no present controversy; that is, when a decision would have nopractical effect on the existing controversy. LaSalle National Bank, N.A. v. City of Lake Forest, 297Ill. App. 3d 36, 43 (1998). An issue can become moot when it is pending on appeal. In re Estate ofWellman, 174 Ill. 2d 335, 353 (1996). If an issue is moot, the court lacks jurisdiction to resolve theclaim. Midwest Central Education Ass'n v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 277 Ill. App.3d 440, 448 (1995).

Plaintiff is seeking a declaratory judgment regarding defendants' ability to require it to complywith the amended certification issued on February 1, 2002, and remove Mr. Bakalis's name from theballot. The purpose of a declaratory judgment action is to fix the rights of the parties before therehas been an irrevocable change of position. Rockford Title Co. v. Staaf, 275 Ill. App. 3d 476, 480(1995). However, after the March 19, 2002, general primary election was held, a court could nolonger fix the rights of the parties, as the election removed the controversy. Consequently, the issueswere, and continue to be, moot.

However, defendants contend, and plaintiff does not dispute, that the substantial publicinterest exception to the mootness doctrine is applicable in this case. Nevertheless, jurisdiction isfundamental to a court's ability to render a decision, and we must consider jurisdiction even if theparties agree it is present. Department of Public Aid ex rel. K.W. v. Lekberg, 295 Ill. App. 3d 1067,1069 (1998). Since the doctrine of mootness is jurisdictional in nature (Midwest Central EducationAss'n, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 448), we must consider mootness despite the fact that plaintiff does notdispute jurisdiction.

The substantial public interest exception to mootness provides that a moot issue can beconsidered by the court if (1) the question is of a substantial public nature; (2) there is a need for anauthoritative decision to provide future guidance; and (3) the situation is likely to recur. In re J.B.,204 Ill. 2d 382, 387 (2003). Illinois courts construe the public interest exception very narrowly andrequire that each criterion be met. Sharma v. Zollar, 265 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1028 (1994). Thisexception is applicable only when there is an extraordinary degree of public concern and the publicinterest is very clear. Sharma, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 1028.

This case involves the construction of several sections of the Election Code. The outcomeof this case will affect the ability of candidates to remove their names from the ballot aftercertification, defendants' power to issue amended certifications reflecting such removals, and,potentially, the choices Illinois voters will be able to make during general primary elections. Theprocedures for certifying candidates for election to public office are a matter of substantial publicinterest. North v. Hinkle, 295 Ill. App. 3d 84, 86 (1998). Moreover, the right to vote is fundamental(Puffer-Hefty School District No. 69 v. Du Page Regional Board of School Trustees, 339 Ill. App.3d 194, 202 (2003)) and our decision will potentially impact voting rights of the citizens of Illinois. Consequently, we find that there is a question of a substantial public nature. Furthermore, there isa need for an authoritative decision to provide future guidance; disagreement over the meaning of thestatutes at issue could lead to different ballots in different counties, as occurred in this case, becausesome counties may not believe that defendants have the authority to issue amended certificationsreflecting postcertification withdrawals. Finally, as the parties have noted, this dispute has occurredbefore and there is no reason not to expect that candidates in the future will withdraw from anelection and attempt to remove their names from the ballot after the time for certification has passed;therefore, we find that this situation is likely to recur.

Consequently, although we find the issues before us to be moot, the substantial public interestexception is applicable and we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

B. The Election Code

Statutory construction is a question of law and, as such, we review a trial court's statutoryinterpretation de novo. Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 319 (2003). "Thefundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent." People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 36, 45 (2002). Generally, the best indicator oflegislative intent is the plain language of the statute. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Menards, Inc., 202 Ill.2d 586, 591 (2002). Furthermore, we must construe the meaning of a statute so that it is consistentwith other statutes addressing the same subject. MQ Construction Co. v. Intercargo Insurance Co.,318 Ill. App. 3d 673, 681 (2000). A statute should not be construed so that it is rendered superfluousor meaningless. Matsuda v. Cook County Employees' & Officers' Annuity & Benefit Fund, 178 Ill.2d 360, 366 (1997).

Initially we note that, although the parties discuss this case in the context of the ability of acandidate to "withdraw," a candidate who no longer wishes to be a candidate cannot be forced to takeoffice and, therefore, can always withdraw from the election process. Therefore, this case concernsthe removal of a candidate's name from the ballot and not the ability of a candidate to withdraw. Consequently, the core issue before this court is whether defendants have the authority under theElection Code to issue an amended certification reflecting the withdrawal of a candidate aftercertification pursuant to section 7--14 has occurred. Defendants claim that this authority derives fromsection 7--14, which gives them discretion to issue an amended certification when the originalcertification is "in error." Defendants contend that including a candidate who has withdrawn in acertification would cause the certification to be "in error," and, therefore, that section 7--14 givesthem discretion to remove a candidate from the ballot after the deadline set forth in section 7--12(9)and to issue an amended certification omitting the candidate's name.

1. Time Frame for Issuing Amended Certifications and the Board's Discretion

Initially, we must discuss the time frame during which an amended certification may be issuedbecause, even if we hold that Mr. Bakalis's withdrawal constitutes "error" pursuant to section 7--14,defendants would be powerless to issue an amended certification if the time to do so had elapsed. Defendants assert that, because the statute allows them to amend a certification "whenever it isdiscovered" that it is "in error," they may issue amended certifications at any time, even after the timefor certification under section 7--12(9) has passed. We agree. The plain language of section 7--14,that is, "whenever it is discovered," indicates that there are no strict time limits that control whendefendants may issue amended certifications.

Even though we have held that there are no time constraints with regard to when defendantsmay exercise their section 7--14 amendment powers, it is helpful to consider whether the amendmentprovision of section 7--14 is directory or mandatory in nature. In those situations where an "error"is determined to exist, a provision that is mandatory would eliminate defendants' discretion while adirectory provision would endow defendants with discretionary authority to amend certifications. In this case, the plain statutory language, "shall issue an amended certification," indicates that theissuance of an amended certification is mandatory. However, when a statute purportedly requires apublic official or body to act, such as in this case, the determination of whether the act is mandatoryor directory depends upon the statute's purpose. Maske v. Kane County Officers Electoral Board,234 Ill. App. 3d 508, 515 (1992). As we discuss below, with respect to the issuance of an originalcertification, the Election Code sets strict time limits in certain circumstances regardless of the impactthat these time limits may have on accuracy. This leads us to believe that accuracy is not the soleconcern of the Election Code. We find that, in light of the overall structure of the Election Code, thepurpose of the amendment provision of section 7--14 is to allow defendants to issue amendedcertifications so that voters have accurate ballots when they go to vote on election day as long as theaccuracy of the ballots does not give way to other concerns, such as uniformity, if certain countieswould be unable to comply, and cost. Defendants would necessarily have discretion to take theseconcerns into account.

Furthermore, a court should avoid statutory interpretations that lead to absurd results. In reD.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418-19 (2001). We realize that there may come a point where the value ofissuing an amended certification would be outweighed by the burden of implementing it. Forinstance, if a minor "error," for example, a misplaced comma, was discovered shortly before theelection, it would likely be impractical to issue an amended certification and require the counties tocorrect their ballots. Interpreting "shall" as mandatory would lead to the absurd result of requiringdefendants to issue amended certifications even when only such a minor "error" is present. Weconclude, therefore, that the word "shall," within the context of the amendment powers given todefendants under section 7--14, is directory, not mandatory.

Accordingly, we hold that the amendment provision of section 7--14 gives defendantsdiscretion to issue amended certifications any time before the election takes place. We realize thatthe exercise of this discretion may cause some errors not to be corrected; however, we must assumethat defendant, the State Board of Elections, as the public agency charged with administering theElection Code, will exercise its discretion in good faith and for the benefit of the people of Illinois. See Bay Bottoms Drainage District v. Stokes, 291 Ill. 68, 72-73 (1919).

2. Construction of "in error"

Now we must construe what "in error" contemplates and determine whether candidatewithdrawal is encompassed by our construction. Plaintiff contends that the trial court was correctwhen it relied on Black's Law Dictionary and our supreme court's decision in Kozel v. State Boardof Elections, 126 Ill. 2d 58 (1989), and interpreted "in error" to mean a mistake, more specifically,a mistake made in the process of certification. The supreme court in Kozel stated that "[i]f a mistakeoccurs in certification, it may be corrected" pursuant to section 7--14. (Emphasis added.) Kozel, 126Ill. 2d at 68. Black's Law Dictionary defines "error" as "[a] psychological state that does not conformto objective reality; a belief that what is false is true or that what is true is false; MISTAKE." Black'sLaw Dictionary 562 (7th ed. 1999). Plaintiff urges that the trial court used these two sources tocorrectly define "in error" as a mistake made in the process of certification.

Defendants respond that plaintiff's interpretation is faulty. They claim that "in error" refersto the accuracy of the original certification itself. Therefore, defendants contend that an originalcertification that is "in error" means that the certification document is "inaccurate," not that there wasa flaw in the process of certification. To support their proposition, defendants give an example fromWebster's Third New International Dictionary. In demonstrating how the word "error" is used torefer to "setting forth what is not true," the dictionary gives the example: "the map is in errorregarding the junction." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 772 (1993). Defendantsassert that this phrase could mean that a street had been rerouted subsequent to the creation of themap, causing the map to become inaccurate. Therefore, according to defendants, even though themap was correct when created, it subsequently became "in error" due to changes in the roadways. Analogously, defendants contend that a certification could be correct when issued but subsequentlybecome "in error," that is, inaccurate, because of changed circumstances, including the withdrawalof a candidate. Further, defendants argue that section 7--14 allows amendment when a certification"is in error" not was "in error." According to defendants, if the legislature wished to confine theiramendment power solely to "errors" made prior to the time of certification, it would have used thepast tense "was" instead of the present tense "is."

Preliminarily, we find that defendants' arguments regarding the use of the word "is" insteadof "was" to be unpersuasive. If one were asked to describe a certification that is currently inaccurate,whether due to pre- or postcertification acts or events, one would respond that the "certification isin error." Use of the word "is" in this context could refer solely to events prior to certification, asplaintiff contends, or to events after certification or to both, as defendants contend. As a result, theuse of the word "is" does not impact our analysis of the reasonableness of either plaintiff's ordefendants' construction of section 7--14.

Faced with two interpretations of section 7--14, we must turn to the rules of statutoryconstruction. An agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, if contemporaneous,consistent, long-continued, and in concurrence with legislative acquiescence, creates a presumptionof correctness that is only slightly less persuasive than a judicial construction. Birkett, 202 Ill. 2d at46. However, it is also true that an agency's interpretation is not binding and will be rejected if it iserroneous. Birkett, 202 Ill. 2d at 48. We will analyze the instant case under these rules.

a. "Ambiguous"

A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of two or more reasonable interpretations. People v.Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 172 (2003). If a statute is ambiguous, the court will accord "substantialweight and deference" to the interpretation of the administrative agency charged with administeringthe statute. Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 474(1998). We begin our analysis by determining whether the phrase "in error" is ambiguous. In orderto do so, we must examine whether the interpretations of both plaintiff and defendants are reasonable.

Plaintiff's contention, and the trial court's holding, that "in error" refers solely to mistakesmade in the original certification is reasonable. We disagree with plaintiff that Kozel stands for theproposition that only mistakes made at the time of certification constitute "error" under section 7--14. Kozel simply states that mistakes in certification made by defendants are "errors" under section 7--14;it does not state that "error" is limited to mistakes in certification. Kozel, 126 Ill. 2d at 68-69. Consequently, Kozel does not answer our question of the scope of "in error." However, we do agreewith plaintiff that, following the definition in Black's Law Dictionary, the legislature could havereasonably intended that "in error" would refer only to mistakes made at the time of certificationbecause the value of having an absolute deadline, even in the face of a postcertification desire of acandidate to withdraw, outweighed any benefit of having a completely accurate ballot.

However, defendants' proposed definition of "in error," that is, inaccurate, is also reasonable. First, equating an error with an inaccuracy in the ballot would encompass the mistakes referred to inKozel. A certification could be inaccurate because of a mistake made by defendants at the time ofcertification as well as because of changed circumstances subsequent to certification. Second, it iscertainly reasonable that the legislature could have intended to give defendants the power to correctinaccuracies that occurred prior to certification and any inaccuracies that arose postcertification. Clearly the legislature has given defendants the power to issue amended certifications because it feelsthat there is value in having accurate ballots. We find it eminently reasonable that the legislaturecould have felt that it is of paramount importance to both the candidates and the citizens of Illinoisthat only those candidates who wish to accept a nomination are included on the ballots so that votesare not "wasted." Therefore, the legislature could have intended that "in error" should trigger thediscretionary power of defendants to issue amended certifications to reflect changed circumstancessuch as postcertification withdrawals.

Plaintiff offers several reasons to support their claim that defendants' interpretation is incorrectand unreasonable. Plaintiff argues that defendants' interpretation would render sections 7--12(9), 7--13.1, and 7--14 meaningless. First, plaintiff contends that section 7--12(9) clearly states that acandidate can withdraw his name from the ballot only up until the date of certification. This,according to plaintiff, establishes an absolute deadline by which a candidate may have his nameremoved from the ballot. Therefore, a withdrawal after certification cannot be an "error" because,under the Election Code, a candidate's name may not be removed from the ballot after certification.

Defendants reply that section 7--12(9) addresses the absolute right of a candidate towithdraw, not their authority to issue amended certifications under section 7--14. To support thiscontention, defendants point to the previously enacted section 10--7 of the Election Code (10 ILCS5/10--7 (West 2002)), addressing withdrawal of candidates who do not belong to a major party. Thewithdrawal provisions of section 10--7 currently mirror those of section 7--12(9); however,defendants point out that this was not always so. Previously, section 10--7 had expressly stated that"any purported withdrawal filed after [the time limit expired] shall be null and void" and it providedmonetary penalties and potential jail time for any public officer that accepted or acted upon a latewithdrawal. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, ch. 46, par. 10--7. Thus, defendants suggest, it is clear that whenthe legislature wishes to provide for strict time limits governing all forms of candidate withdrawal itdoes so expressly and not by implication.

We agree with defendants. Section 7--12(9) refers to when "[a candidate] may cause hisname to be withdrawn," not when defendants may amend a certification. There is no language insection 7--12(9) that purports to limit defendants' authority to remove a name from a ballot, unlikethe pre-amendment language of section 10--7, which stated that "any purported withdrawal filed after[the time limit expired] shall be null and void." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, ch. 46, par.10--7. By enacting the deadline imposed by section 7--12(9), the legislature has simply stated thata candidate has the absolute right to withdraw and to assure that his name does not appear on theoriginal certification. Consequently, giving section 7--14 the meaning that defendants suggest doesnot render section 7--12(9) meaningless because they address two separate issues, that is, acandidate's absolute right to withdraw and preclude his name from appearing on the originalcertification versus defendants' power to remove a candidate from the ballot.

Next plaintiff contends that defendants' construction of section 7--14 would render the timelimits for the original certification under sections 7--13.1 and 7--14 meaningless and, therefore, sucha construction is unreasonable. Section 7--14 states that defendants "shall" issue an originalcertification for general primaries "[n]ot less than 61 days before the date of the general primary." 10 ILCS 5/7--14 (West 2002). The same deadline is provided under section 7--13.1 for each localelection official to present an original certification for consolidated primaries to the local electionauthority. Plaintiff argues that by allowing defendants to issue amended certifications whenever theychoose, there essentially would be no time limit for certification. Defendants respond that there isno strict time limit for issuing an original certification because the requirement that they "shall" issuea certification "[n]ot less than 61 days before the date of the general primary" is directory, notmandatory. 10 ILCS 5/7--14 (West 2002). Defendants claim that the fact that section 7--14 providesfor no penalty for their failure to certify in time and that the legislature knows how to provide forpenalties if it so chooses as evidenced by the previous version of section 10--7, shows that there isno strict time limitation by which they must issue their original certification.

We disagree with both plaintiff and defendants. Initially, we note that defendants concede intheir opening brief that they must certify the ballot not less than 61 days before an election; they thenattempt to argue in their reply brief that this requirement is directory and not mandatory. Furthermore, the best indicator of the intent of the legislature is the plain language of the statute.Allstate Insurance Co., 202 Ill. 2d at 591. In this case, the use of the language "shall" in conjunctionwith "not less than" clearly indicates that the legislature meant for an original certification to be issuednot later than 61 days before the date of the general primary election. Moreover, as we discussbelow, the purpose of this part of section 7--14 indicates that the time set for issuing an originalcertification is mandatory.

Defendants point to Brennan v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 336 Ill. App. 3d 749 (2002),and Maske v. Kane County Officers Electoral Board, 234 Ill. App. 3d 508 (1992), to support theirproposition that a statutory provision that specifies the time for performance of an official duty butdoes not provide a penalty for noncompliance is directory and not mandatory. In Brennan, thepetitioner attempted to have a decision of the defendants, finding that he had intentionally violatedcertain provisions of the Election Code, reversed. Brennan, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 752. The petitionerargued that the defendants lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the petitioner's alleged violations of theElection Code because the time limit set in section 9--21 (10 ILCS 5/9--21 (West 2000)) for passingfinal judgment had passed. Brennan, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 759-61. The court held that section 9--21of the Election Code, which states that "the Board shall render its final judgment within 60 days ofthe date the complaint is filed" (10 ILCS 5/9--21 (West 2000)), was directory because, inter alia,there was no penalty, such as loss of jurisdiction, for rendering a final judgment beyond the 60-daytime period. Brennan, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 759-61. Similarly, in Maske, the plaintiff argued that theKane County Officers Electoral Board's decision to deny his nominating petition was a nullity becausethe board did not convene within the appropriate time period. Maske, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 513-16. The court held that section 10--10 of the Election Code, which states that the time period when theelectoral board will meet to hear objections to nominating petitions " 'shall not be less than 3 nor morethan 5 days after the receipt of the certificate of nomination or nomination papers and the objector'spetition by the chairman of the electoral board' " (emphasis omitted) (Maske, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 513,quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 46, par. 10--10), was directory because, unlike other sections of theElection Code, that section failed to indicate what would occur if the procedure was not followed. Maske, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 515-16.

In our view, when the legislature, in charging a public agency to act, uses "shall" inconjunction with additional plain language, such as "not less than," that clearly indicates that thereis a strict time limitation, we decline to read such a provision as directory simply because thelegislature has not provided a penalty for noncompliance.

Furthermore, while the cases cited by defendants do stand for the proposition that the lackof a penalty in such a statute generally makes the time limit directory and not mandatory, they alsorecognize that they could not have construed the provisions as directory if the Board's conduct hadprejudiced someone's rights. Brennan, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 759-61; Maske, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 515. Moreover, our supreme court has held that if disregard of the time limits would injuriously affectpublic interests or private rights, the statute will be held to be mandatory and not directory. Radazewski v. Cawley, 159 Ill. 2d 372, 377 (1994).

The only interests at stake in Brennan and Maske were private rights, and those courts foundthat those rights had not been prejudiced. Brennan, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 761; Maske, 234 Ill. App. 3dat 516. However, in this case, one of the purposes of the time limit set for the date of originalcertification is to protect the private rights of candidates. We believe that candidates have a right toknow who their opponents are and are entitled to have a reasonable amount of time to campaign. Furthermore, the time limit serves the best interests of the public by facilitating the ability of thecitizenry to make informed voting decisions. Candidates should have a reasonable opportunity tostate their own platforms and respond to those of their opponents. Therefore, reading the deadlinefor original certification under section 7--14 as directory would be injurious to the private rights ofcandidates and the public interest because it would potentially limit the information available to bothcandidates and voters upon which to make their decisions. Consequently, we hold that the "[n]ot lessthan 61 days" time limit set in section 7--14 by which defendants must issue their original certificationis mandatory, not directory. The reasoning we have set forth is equally applicable to section 7--13.1and, therefore, we hold the time limit set for original certification under section 7--13.1 is alsomandatory.

However, even though we hold that the provisions of sections 7--13.1 and 7--14 regardingthe time limit for issuance of an original certification are mandatory, we do not find that adoptingdefendants' interpretation of the amendment provision of section 7--14 would render time limitsmeaningless. Defendants may issue amended certifications only when the original certification is "inerror." This represents the outer limits of defendants' amendment power. Consequently, after anoriginal certification is issued, defendants may issue an amended certification only when an "error"is present, not simply because they desire to do so. Therefore, an original certification made undersection 7--14 is not meaningless because defendants may not simply choose to ignore it. Once again,our reasoning is equally applicable to certifications issued pursuant to section 7--13.1 andamendments of such certifications.

Accordingly, we hold that the amendment provision of section 7--14 is ambiguous.

b. "Contemporaneous, Consistent, Long-continued, and in Concurrence with LegislativeAcquiescence"

Plaintiff conceded during the hearing in the trial court that defendants have issued amendedcertifications reflecting postcertification withdrawals for many years. Consequently, we find that theposition of defendants has been long-continued. Furthermore, we must presume that, becausedefendants have interpreted the statute thusly for many years, the legislature is aware of defendants'interpretation. Given this awareness, the legislature has acquiesced because it has not revised theamendment provisions of section 7--14 to indicate disagreement with defendants' interpretation. SeePeople ex rel. Spiegel v. Lyons, 1 Ill. 2d 409, 414 (1953). Finally, we must consider whetherdefendants' interpretation was consistent and contemporaneous, that is, made at the same time orsoon after section 7--14 went into effect. The record does not indicate whether the interpretation hasbeen consistent or when defendants first interpreted section 7--14 in this way and, therefore, whetherthe interpretation was contemporaneous. However, we do not find the lack of such evidence to bedispositive because the other factors for granting deference to defendants' interpretation have clearlybeen met (see Yu v. Clayton, 147 Ill. App. 3d 350, 356 (1986) (holding that, although the factors tobe considered when giving deference to administrative interpretations are whether the interpretationis contemporaneous, consistent, long held, and in concurrence with legislative acquiescence, long-term adherence to a particular interpretation is not a prerequisite to judicial deference but simply addsweight to the validity of the agency's construction)). There is no indication in the record thatdefendants' interpretation has not been consistent or was not contemporaneous. Additionally,defendants may not have had occasion to immediately interpret the relevant provisions of section 7--14 contemporaneously because a postcertification candidate withdrawal may not have occurred untilsome time after section 7--14 had gone into effect.

The State Board of Elections is the administrative agency charged with administering theElection Code. Ill. Const. 1970, art. III,