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PRESIDING JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

The record establishes that in August 1998, plaintiff sustained neck and back injuries whileassisting with an ambulance call. According to plaintiff, he then began to experience headaches andneck and back pain, as well as numbness and loss of grip strength in one hand. Plaintiff did not workfor the rest of 1998. He returned to full time work in 1999, but in April of that year he was assignedto a light-duty position. In December 1999, plaintiff filed a petition with the Pension Board, seekinga disability pension. A hearing on the petition was conducted in April 2000. Plaintiff was examinedby three independent physicians selected by the Pension Board. Two of them concluded that plaintiffwas unable to perform the duties of a firefighter, but the third concluded that there was "no medicalreason why he cannot perform his full time full duty work without restriction." Based upon thisevidence, other documentary medical evidence, and testimony at the hearing, the Pension Boardfound that plaintiff's physical and medical condition did not constitute a physical disability renderinghim permanently disabled for service in the Downers Grove fire department. Accordingly, thePension Board denied plaintiff's petition.

The Village, acting through Fire Chief Ruscetti, subsequently filed charges with the Boardof Commissioners, seeking plaintiff's discharge. Testimony at the hearing on the charges establishesthat in June 2000, plaintiff was sent to the firefighter's training academy in Elgin. Plaintiffcomplained of severe pain after performing one of the training exercises, and his training wasdiscontinued. Plaintiff testified that the training "greatly aggravated" his condition. Plaintiffreturned to full duty briefly in the summer of 2000. During that time, an incident occurred in whichplaintiff experienced pain and loss of grip strength while carrying a stretcher, nearly causing him todrop it. After that incident, plaintiff was sent home sick and did not return to full duty as afirefighter. Instead, he was placed on administrative leave for several weeks and was later assignedto light duty, such as helping to organize fire prevention week and working on an accreditationproject.

In October 2000, plaintiff and his attorney met with representatives of the Village and a unionofficial to discuss plaintiff's ability to perform his duties. According to one of the Villagerepresentatives who attended, plaintiff indicated at the meeting that he did not feel that he couldguarantee that he could perform the duties of a firefighter without putting his fellow firefighters,other citizens, or himself at risk.

Testimony and medical records from the Pension Board proceedings were also admitted intoevidence in the hearing before the Board of Commissioners. The Board of Commissioners foundthat plaintiff "was unwilling and unfit to perform the job of a full-time firefighter." The Board ofCommissioners concluded that this constituted cause for termination.

Plaintiff thereafter filed his complaint seeking, inter alia, administrative review of the Boardof Commissioners' decision. The trial court reversed the decision on the basis that it was barredunder principles of res judicata by the Pension Board's finding that plaintiff was not disabled. Thisappeal followed.

In an appeal from the judgment in an administrative review proceeding, the appellate courtreviews the administrative agency's decision, not the trial court's. Grever v. Board of Trustees of theIllinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 353 Ill. App. 3d 263, 265 (2004). The standard of reviewapplicable to an agency's decision depends on the type of question presented. An agency's findingsof fact will be upheld unless against the manifest weight of the evidence, i.e., unless the oppositeconclusion is clearly evident. Du Page County Airport Authority v. Department of Revenue, 358Ill. App. 3d 476, 482 (2005). On the other hand, an agency's rulings on questions of law arereviewed de novo. Du Page County Airport Authority, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 482.

Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under an intermediate standard. Du PageCounty Airport Authority, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 482. A mixed question exists where the historical factsare admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the only issue is whether the factssatisfy the settled statutory standard. Du Page County Airport Authority, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 482. The agency's decision will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous--that is, unless the reviewing courtis left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Du Page CountyAirport Authority, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 483.

The first issue before the court is whether the Board of Commissioners' decision was barredby the doctrine of res judicata. The question is one of law subject to de novo review. The doctrineof res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction isconclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and as to them, constitutes an absolute barto a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Torcasso v. StandardOutdoor Sales, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 484, 490 (1993). For res judicata to apply, the following elementsmust exist: (1) an identity of the parties or their privies; (2) an identity of the causes of action; and(3) a final judgment on the merits. Cabrera v. First National Bank of Wheaton, 324 Ill. App. 3d 85,92 (2001).

While res judicata bars subsequent actions involving identical causes of action, the relateddoctrine of collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of issues decided in earlier proceedings. "Therequirements for application of collateral estoppel are: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudicationis identical to that presented in the current action; (2) the party against whom the estoppel is assertedwas a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (3) the prior adjudicationresulted in a final judgment on the merits." Bagnola v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories,333 Ill. App. 3d 711, 723 (2002).

Defendants maintain that although the trial court couched its ruling in terms of res judicata,the real question--whether the parties could relitigate an issue decided in the earlier administrativeproceeding--implicates collateral estoppel principles. They contend, however, that collateralestoppel does not apply, because the parties to the successive administrative proceedings wereneither identical nor in privity. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that collateral estoppel is notthe "appropriate theory" applicable to this case and that the trial court correctly held that res judicataapplies. He contends that under the "transactional test" adopted in River Park, Inc. v. City ofHighland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 311 (1998), the two administrative proceedings involved the samecause of action. He further argues that the Board of Commissioners and the Pension Board are inprivity. We note that neither party disputes that Pension Board's decision constitutes a "finaljudgment" on the merits for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Both doctrines apply toadministrative decisions that are adjudicatory, judicial, or quasi-judicial. Bagnola, 333 Ill. App. 3dat 717.

We conclude that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applies in the present case. First,plaintiff's view that the proceedings before the Pension Board and those before the Board ofCommissioners involved the same cause of action is dubious at best. "[P]ursuant to the transactionalanalysis, separate claims will be considered the same cause of action for purposes of res judicata ifthey arise from a single group of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theoriesof relief." River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 311. It is plaintiff's position that the claims in twoadministrative proceedings both essentially grew out of his injury. However, plaintiff fails to explainhow the Village could have sought his discharge in the proceedings before the Pension Board, whichwere limited to consideration of his application for a disability benefit. Res judicata does not applywhere the relief sought in the second proceeding was previously unavailable because of limitationson the subject matter jurisdiction of the court or other tribunal in the earlier proceeding. Cabrera,324 Ill. App. 3d at 92. Moreover, plaintiff overlooks that a pure transactional analysis does not applywhen, as in this case, the separate claims do not belong to the same party, but to adverse parties. Insuch circumstances, the defendant (or the party postured as such) might have a counterclaim in thefirst proceeding (although, as noted, it is not clear that such is the case here). However, Illinoisfollows the rule stated in section 22 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, that a defendant whomay interpose a claim as a counterclaim, but fails to do so, is not thereby precluded from maintainingan action on that claim unless "[t]he relationship between the counterclaim and the plaintiff's claimis such that successful prosecution of the second action would nullify the initial judgment or wouldimpair rights established in the initial action" (Restatement (Second) of Judgments