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Plaintiff, Commonwealth Edison Company, appeals the judgmentof the circuit court of Ogle County granting summary judgment infavor of relator, John H. Coffman, county treasurer and taxcollector of Ogle County (defendant), and denying summary judgmentto plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that the Byron Forest PreserveDistrict (Forest Preserve) improperly levied taxes to retirecertain bonds that were issued in violation of the Local GovernmentDebt Reform Act (Debt Reform Act) (30 ILCS 350/1 et seq. (West2000)) and the Downstate Forest Preserve District Act (DownstateAct) (70 ILCS 805/1 et seq. (West 2000)), and are thereforeunlawful and void. We affirm.

In 1989, the Forest Preserve decided to acquire certain landand construct a golf course. On December 21, 1989, the board ofcommissioners of the Forest Preserve adopted Ordinance No. 893,authorizing the issuance of $3,525,000 of general obligation landdevelopment bonds (alternate revenue source), series 1989 of thedistrict (1989 alternate bonds), pursuant to section 15 of the DebtReform Act (30 ILCS 305/15 (West 2000)). The ordinance providedthat individual $5,000 bonds with an issue date of December 30,1989, were to be sold on the municipal bond market to raise thefunds needed for the golf course. The bonds were to accruesemiannual interest as high as 9%, with $100,000 of the bondsmaturing and fully payable on December 30, 1993; $125,000 onDecember 30, 1994, 1995, and 1996; $150,000 on December 30, 1997,and 1998; $175,000 on December 30, 1999, and 2000; and furtherstaggered maturities for the remaining half of the $3,525,000 issuethrough December 30, 2009. The ordinance also provided that theindebtedness resulting from the bond issue would be payable fromtwo sources. One source, called "pledged revenues," was theprincipal proceeds the Forest Preserve might realize from issuinggeneral obligation bonds and from other Forest Preserve fundsappropriated for such payment. The other source of payment, called"pledged taxes," was an ad valorem tax levied against the taxableproperty within the district.

The 1989 alternate bonds complied with section 15(b) of theDebt Reform Act (30 ILCS 305/15(b) (West 2000)). Section 15(b)requires publication of the ordinance authorizing the bond issuanceand a notice of the Forest Preserve's intent to issue bonds. Itallows the voters to petition for a referendum on the question ofissuing the bonds, termed a "backdoor referendum." The voters inthe Forest Preserve District did not seek a backdoor referendum inconnection with the 1989 alternate bond issue.

In 1997, the Forest Preserve adopted Ordinance No. 97--7. Theordinance provided that the Forest Preserve would issue $900,000 ofnonreferendum general obligation bonds (1997 G.O. bonds), of which$392,000 was earmarked to pay the principal and interest due on thematurity dates of December 30, 1997, and June 30, 1998, for the1989 alternate bonds.

In June 1998, the Forest Preserve adopted Ordinance No. 98--2. The ordinance provided that the Forest Preserve would issue$3,120,000 of general obligation bonds, series 1998 (alternaterevenue source) (1998 alternate bonds). The Forest Preserve issuedthe 1998 alternate bonds in order to raise money to refund theoutstanding 1989 alternate bonds, thus enabling the Forest Preserve to restructure the Forest Preserve's debt incurred in developingthe golf course. Once again, the ordinance provided that theindebtedness incurred in conjunction with the 1998 alternate bondswould be payable from two sources: general obligation bonds theForest Preserve might issue and funds appropriated for the purpose(pledged revenues), and ad valorem taxes levied against taxableproperty within the district (pledged taxes). The 1998 alternatebonds were also issued in compliance with section 15(b) of the DebtReform Act, and the voters did not seek a backdoor referendum.

On November 30, 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint objecting tothe real estate taxes levied against its Ogle County property forthe 1997 tax year. Plaintiff objected to the $392,000 of the 1997G.O. bonds earmarked to refund the 1989 alternate bonds as improperunder the Debt Reform Act.

On December 19, 1998, the Forest Preserve adopted OrdinanceNo. 98--10. The ordinance provided for the issuance of $1,395,000of nonreferendum general obligation bonds (1998 G.O. bonds), ofwhich $495,000 was earmarked as a revenue source to pay theprincipal and interest due on the 1998 alternate bonds on December30, 1998, and June 30, 1999.

On November 8, 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint objecting tothe portion of the 1998 G.O. bonds that were issued in order toprovide a revenue source to refund the 1998 alternate bonds thatwere maturing. Once again, plaintiff contended that the ForestPreserve had not followed the requirements of the Debt Reform Act.

On November 16, 1999, the Forest Preserve adopted OrdinanceNo. 99--6. The ordinance provided for the issuance of $1,452,000of nonreferendum general obligation bonds (1999 G.O. bonds), ofwhich $502,000 was allocated to provide a revenue source to pay theprincipal and interest due on the 1998 alternate bonds on December30, 1999.

Also on that date, the Forest Preserve adopted Ordinance No.99--7, which provided for the issuance of $53,000 of nonreferendumgeneral obligation bonds bearing an issue date of June 23, 2000,and maturing on July 7, 2000 (2000 G.O. bonds). The $53,000 wasallocated to pay the interest due on June 30, 2000, on the 1998alternate bonds.

On November 15, 2000, plaintiff filed a third tax objectioncomplaint. Plaintiff objected to that portion of the 1999 G.O.bonds allocated to pay the principal and interest accruing on the1998 alternate bonds. Plaintiff also objected to the 2000 G.O.bonds. Plaintiff again contended that these bonds were illegallyrefunding the 1998 alternate bonds coming due on December 30, 1999,and June 30, 2000.

Defendant filed motions for summary judgment in each of thethree tax objection actions. Plaintiff filed cross-motions forsummary judgment. On December 12, 2001, the trial court heard theparties' arguments on the motions and cross-motions for summaryjudgment. On that date, the trial court issued its oral ruling,granting defendant's motions and denying plaintiff's motions forsummary judgment. The trial court determined that, when the ForestPreserve adopted Ordinance No. 893, it specifically provided forfunding via the issuance of general obligation bonds. The trialcourt concluded that the bonds to which plaintiff objected were notissued to refund the 1989 alternate bonds or the 1998 alternatebonds but were issued to provide a revenue source to pay off the1989 and 1998 alternate bonds, as mandated by the Forest Preserve'sOrdinance No. 893. On January 15, 2002, final orders were enteredin each of the three tax objection actions. Plaintiff's motion toreconsider was denied and plaintiff timely appeals.

Plaintiff contends that the 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000 G.O.bonds were unlawfully issued. Plaintiff argues that, pursuant tothe terms of the Downstate Act, the Forest Preserve was required tosubmit the 1997-2000 G.O. bonds to its electorate in a referendumbefore the bonds could be lawfully issued. Plaintiff concludesthat, because the bonds were issued without lawful authority, theyare void and, consequently, the taxes levied by the Forest Preserveare invalid. We disagree.

We begin our analysis by first considering the familiarprinciples governing our review of a grant of a motion for summaryjudgment. Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,depositions, admissions, affidavits, and exhibits on file, whenviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, showthat there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movingparty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 2000); Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, 191Ill. 2d 278, 291 (2000). We review the trial court's grant ofsummary judgment de novo. Jones, 191 Ill. 2d at 291. Our functionon an appeal from the grant of summary judgment is limited todetermining whether the trial court correctly determined that nogenuine issue of material fact existed and, if that was the case,whether the trial court correctly entered judgment as a matter oflaw. State Farm Insurance Co. v. American Service Insurance Co.,332 Ill. App. 3d 31, 36 (2002). Where the parties have filedcross-motions for summary judgment, they agree that there are nofactual issues present and that the cause presents only legalissues to resolve. State Farm, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 36. The court,nevertheless, must determine for itself that there are no factualissues sufficient to preclude summary judgment, after which thecourt may determine the issues presented as questions of law. State Farm, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 36.

Plaintiff asserts that the 1997-2000 G.O. bonds were requiredto be issued in accordance with section 13 of the Downstate Act (70ILCS 805/13 (West 1996)). Section 13 provides:

"The board of any forest preserve district organizedhereunder may, for any of the purposes enumerated in this Act,borrow money upon the faith and credit of such district, andmay issue bonds therefor. However, a district with apopulation of less than 3,000,000 may not become indebted inany manner or for any purpose to an amount including existingindebtedness in the aggregate exceeding 2.3% of the assessedvalue of the taxable property therein, as ascertained by thelast equalized assessment for State and county purposes. Nodistrict may incur (i) indebtedness in excess of .3% of theassessed value of taxable property in the district, asascertained by the last equalized assessment for State andcounty purposes, for the development of forest preserve landsheld by the district, or (ii) indebtedness for any otherpurpose except the acquisition of land including acquiringlands in fee simple along or enclosing water courses, drainageways, lakes, ponds, planned impoundments or elsewhere whichare required to store flood waters or control other drainageand water conditions necessary for the preservation andmanagement of the water resources of the District, unless theproposition to issue bonds or otherwise incur indebtedness iscertified by the board to the proper election officials whoshall submit the proposition at an election in accordance withthe general election law, and approved by a majority of thosevoting upon the proposition. *** Before or at the time ofissuing bonds, the board shall provide by ordinance for thecollection of an annual tax to pay the interest on the bondsas it falls due, and to pay the bonds as they mature." 70ILCS 805/13 (West 1996).

Plaintiff argues that, because the bond issues for the 1997-2000G.O. bonds were never submitted to a referendum, they violate therequirements of section 13 of the Downstate Act and are thereforevoid. We disagree.

The 1989 and 1998 alternate bonds were issued in accordancewith section 15 of the Debt Reform Act (30 ILCS 350/15 (West2000)). Section 15 provides:

"Whenever revenue bonds have been authorized to be issuedpursuant to applicable law or whenever there exists for agovernmental unit a revenue source, the procedures set forthin this Section may be used by a governing body. Generalobligation bonds may be issued in lieu of such revenue bondsas authorized, and general obligation bonds may be issuedpayable from any revenue source. Such general obligationbonds may be referred to as 'alternate bonds'. Alternatebonds may be issued without any referendum or backdoorreferendum except as provided in this Section, upon the termsprovided in Section 10 of this Act without reference to otherprovisions of law, but only upon the conditions provided inthis Section. Alternate bonds shall not be regarded as orincluded in any computation of indebtedness for the purpose ofany statutory provision of limitation except as expresslyprovided in this Section.

Such conditions are:

(a) Alternate bonds shall be issued for a lawfulcorporate purpose. If issued in lieu of revenue bonds,alternate bonds shall be issued for the purposes for whichsuch revenue bonds shall have been authorized. If issuedpayable from a revenue source in the manner hereinafterprovided, which revenue source is limited in its purposes orapplications, then the alternate bonds shall be issued onlyfor such limited purposes or applications. Alternate bondsmay be issued payable from either enterprise revenues orrevenue sources, or both.

(b) Alternate bonds shall be subject to backdoorreferendum. The provisions of Section 5 of this Act[detailing the procedures of a backdoor referendum] shallapply to such backdoor referendum, together with theprovisions hereof. ***

(c) To the extent payable from enterprise revenues, suchrevenues shall have been determined by the governing body tobe sufficient to provide for or pay in each year to finalmaturity of such alternate bonds all of the following: [costsof operation or maintenance of the utility or enterprise, debtservice, fund or account requirements, contractual or tortobligations, and a reserve amount.] *** The conditionsenumerated in this subsection (c) need not be met for thatamount of debt service provided for by the setting aside ofproceeds of bonds or other moneys at the time of the deliveryof such bonds.

(c-1) In the case of alternate bonds issued as variablerate bonds (including refunding bonds), debt service shall beprojected based [on the requirements enumerated in subsection(c-1)]. ***

(d) The determination of the sufficiency of enterpriserevenues or a revenue source, as applicable, shall besupported by reference to the most recent audit of thegovernmental unit ***. ***

(e) The enterprise revenues or revenue source, asapplicable, shall be in fact pledged to the payment of thealternate bonds; and the governing body shall covenant, to theextent it is empowered to do so, to provide for, collect andapply such enterprise revenues or revenue source, asapplicable, to the payment of the alternate bonds and theprovision of not less than an additional.25 [sic] times debtservice." 30 ILCS 350/15 (West 2000).

"Revenue source" is defined as "a source of funds, other thanenterprise revenues, received or available to be received by agovernmental unit and available for any one or more of itscorporate purposes." 30 ILCS 350/3(l) (West 2000).

Ordinance No. 893 provided that the Forest Preserve would:

"issue its general obligation bonds or notes from time to timeto the fullest extent permitted by law, including Section 13of the [Downstate Act], and that the [Forest Preserve would]appropriate its funds annually and in such amounts and in atimely manner so as to provide for the payment of the Bondsand not less than an additional .25 times debt service. Theprincipal proceeds of such Bonds or notes, together with suchother funds of the [Forest Preserve] as may be lawfullyavailable and annually appropriated for such purpose(collectively, the 'Pledged Revenues'), shall be depositedinto the Bond Fund."

Ordinance No. 98--2 contains a virtually identical provision. Bythese provisions, the Forest Preserve pledged future generalobligation bonds as a revenue source by which to fund the 1989 and1998 alternate bonds. The language of section 3(l) of the DebtReform Act is broad enough to encompass the issuance of generalobligation bonds to provide such a revenue source for the 1989 and1998 alternate bonds. The Forest Preserve's use of the 1997-2000G.O. bonds to provide a revenue source for the 1989 and 1998alternate bonds was specified in the enabling ordinance for eachbond issue as well as authorized under the Debt Reform Act. Plaintiff's argument that the 1997-2000 G.O. bonds were issuedunlawfully is unavailing.

Plaintiff argues that the use of general obligation bonds to refund the 1989 and 1998 alternate bonds violates section 11 of theDebt Reform Act (30 ILCS 350/11 (West 2000)). Section 11 statesthat "[g]eneral obligation bonds shall not be issued to refundrevenue bonds or alternate bonds except as expressly permitted byapplicable law." 30 ILCS 350/11 (West 2000). Plaintiff urges thatthis prohibition makes illegal the issuance of those portions ofthe 1997-2000 G.O. bonds used to pay the principal and interest ofthe 1989 and 1998 alternate bonds.

Plaintiff's argument misses the mark. The 1997-2000 G.O.bonds were issued in order to provide the revenue source specifiedin Ordinance Nos. 893 and 98--2. Because the bonds are plainly"revenue sources" as contemplated by section 3(l) of the DebtReform Act, they were properly issued.

In addition, we note that plaintiff's argument that the 1997-2000 G.O. bond issues needed to be subjected to a referendum iswithout merit. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, section 13 of theDownstate Act requires a referendum only if the aggregateindebtedness exceeds 0.3% of the assessed valuation of the taxableproperty in the district. It is undisputed that the ForestPreserve's indebtedness did not exceed 0.3% of the total assessedvaluation of the taxable property in the district. Therefore, theForest Preserve properly could issue the 1997-2000 G.O. bondswithout recourse to a referendum. Furthermore, plaintiff does notattack the issuance of the 1989 and 1998 alternate bonds, and it isundisputed that they were issued in accord with all of theprovisions and requirements of section 15 of the Debt Reform Act.

Plaintiff argues that the 1997-2000 G.O. bonds were notincurred for the development of forest preserve lands, citingPeople ex rel. Kucharski v. McGovern, 42 Ill. 2d 119, 121-23(1969). In Kucharski, the court determined that the relevantprovisions of "An Act to provide for the creation and management offorest preserve districts" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 57