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Filed:  January18, 2002

No. 2--00--1326

JUSTICE GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Gary C. Schiavo, filed a motion to quash his arrestfor driving under the influence of alcohol and suppress theevidence flowing therefrom. The circuit court of Du Page Countygranted this motion. Following the denial of its motion toreconsider, the City of Naperville (City) filed a certificate ofimpairment (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), and this appeal ensued. Forthe reasons that follow, we reverse and remand this cause forfurther proceedings.

The pertinent facts in this case are undisputed. Atapproximately 12:30 a.m on February 5, 2000, defendant was stoppedby Steve Baker, a police officer employed by the City, and citedfor driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant alsoreceived a citation for having an inoperative rear registrationlight. The trial court found Baker's testimony regarding theinoperative registration light not credible, and the City does notcontest this finding on appeal.

Baker testified that, prior to stopping defendant, he wassitting in a parking lot monitoring traffic near the corner ofAurora Avenue and Ogden Avenue. A small white vehicle pulled up tohis car rather quickly. The driver, a man, told Baker that a redFord Taurus was heading westbound on Aurora Avenue and was "weavingall over the road." The man also provided Baker with a partiallicense plate of "DEAL." From where he was sitting, Baker couldsee one vehicle traveling westbound, and he proceeded to go afterit. When he caught up to the vehicle, it was stopped at a redtraffic signal. Baker confirmed that it was, in fact, a red FordTaurus and it bore the license plate "DEAL 911." When the lightturned green, the vehicle proceeded forward. Baker immediatelyeffected a traffic stop. Defendant was subsequently arrested andcited.

The trial court granted defendant's motion to quash arrest andsuppress evidence. After having rejected Baker's testimonyregarding the equipment violation, the court determined that Bakerlacked a reasonable suspicion that defendant was violating the lawsuch that an investigatory stop was warranted. The trial courtfound that the information provided by the driver of the whitevehicle was, without corroboration, an insufficient basis to stopdefendant.

We generally will not interfere with a trial court's decisionon a motion to suppress evidence unless the decision is clearlyerroneous or contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d 863, 867-68 (1997). However, denovo review is appropriate where, as here, neither the facts northe credibility of the witnesses is at issue. People v. James, 163Ill. 2d 302, 310 (1994). Defendant asserts that, because the trialcourt rejected Baker's testimony regarding the alleged equipmentviolation, de novo review is inappropriate. However, thistestimony bears no relation to whether a stop was permissible basedupon what the driver of the white car told Baker, and defendantpoints to no other disputed facts or credibility issues. Accordingly, we will review this issue de novo.

Absent a warrant, a search or seizure is unreasonable unlessit falls within a specific and well-delineated exception to thewarrant requirement. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 868. The UnitedStates Supreme Court set forth one such exception in Terry v. Ohio,392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Inappropriate circumstances, a police officer may briefly detain anindividual for investigatory purposes and, if necessary, conduct alimited protective search for weapons. People v. Flowers, 179 Ill.2d 257, 262 (1997). Such an investigatory stop is permissiblewhere a police officer reasonably believes that the individual hascommitted or is about to commit a crime. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at262. The officer's suspicion must be based on specific andarticulable facts; a hunch or an unparticularized suspicion is notsufficient. Village of Gurnee v. Gross, 174 Ill. App. 3d 66, 69(1988). A lesser showing is required to meet the reasonable-suspicion standard than is necessary to establish probable cause. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 867. Whether this standard has been metis analyzed considering the totality of the circumstancesconfronting the officer at the time of the stop. People v. Yarber,279 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524-26 (1996). A brief stop of a vehicle,like the brief detention of an individual, may be conducted if areasonable suspicion exists. People v. Moraca, 124 Ill. App. 3d561, 563-64 (1984).

The facts relied on by an officer in determining if areasonable suspicion to conduct a stop exists need not have beenpersonally observed by the officer. People v. Earley, 212 Ill.App. 3d 457, 465 (1991). An officer may rely on facts related tohim or her by third parties. People v. Tisler, 103 Ill. 2d 226,237 (1984). (Tisler and some of the other cases cited herein involve probable cause determinations rather than reasonablesuspicion in the Terry context; such cases nevertheless provideguidance for the present inquiry, keeping in mind the lowerstandard involved here (see Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 869).) However, before the officer is entitled to rely on informationprovided by a third person, the information must bear some indiciaof reliability. Village of Gurnee, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 69-70. Indetermining whether any indicia of reliability exist, a courtshould consider the reliability of the source of the information aswell as whether the information is corroborated sufficiently toshow the overall reliability of the tip. Earley, 212 Ill. App. 3dat 465. As we are considering the totality of the circumstances,a deficiency in one area may be overcome by the strength ofanother. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 873.

Regarding the reliability of the source, courts havehistorically drawn a distinction between police informants andprivate citizens. People v. Jones, 196 Ill. App. 3d 937, 955(1990). Prior to 1989, the law of this state presumed thatinformation provided by private citizens was reliable and therefore not subject to the same scrutiny as information provided by aninformer who was being compensated for his or her assistance. People v. Hood, 262 Ill. App. 3d 171, 175 (1994). In People v.Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 398 (1989), our supreme court stated "therigidity embodied in the presumptions concerning [these]classifications is no longer applicable." However, the supremecourt did hold that this distinction is still relevant in assessingthe reliability of the source of the information. Adams, 131 Ill.2d at 398. Moreover, information that comes from a victim or froman eyewitness is entitled to particularly great weight. People v.Aguilar, 286 Ill. App. 3d 493, 496-97 (1997).

Alternatively, information provided by a third party may bedeemed sufficiently reliable to permit an investigatory stop if itis adequately corroborated. Earley, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 465. Thecorroboration of predictions about future behavior or details thatare not commonly known demonstrates a special familiarity with thesuspect's affairs, which, in turn, indicates that the third partylikely also possesses special knowledge about the suspect'scriminal activities. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110L. Ed. 2d 301, 310, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2417 (1990). Conversely, thecorroboration of generally known facts, like a description of thesuspect, does little to demonstrate that the third party possessesany special knowledge about the suspect. See Yarber, 279 Ill. App.3d at 528-29; City of Lake Forest v. Dugan, 206 Ill. App. 3d 552,555-56 (1990).

Because we are concerned with the totality of thecircumstances under which the stop was made, additional factors mayinform our inquiry. For example, information containing concretefacts is entitled to more weight than information that consists ofconclusory allegations. Compare City of Lake Forest, 206 Ill. App.3d at 555, with Jones, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 956. Further,individuals who come forward and give information that isimmediately verifiable, thus exposing themselves to the risk ofsanctions for making a false complaint, cloak themselves with anair of reliability. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 32 L.Ed. 2d 612, 617, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923-24 (1972).

In the present case, Baker observed defendant sitting at atraffic signal and immediately stopped him as he was pulling away. Thus, Baker did not observe defendant while he was driving. Duringthis period, Baker was able to confirm only details of theinformation he received from the driver of the white car insofar asthey related to a description of defendant, namely, the color,make, model, and license plate number of defendant's car. Thesedetails were merely descriptive in nature and would have been knownby anyone who had seen defendant driving down the road. As notedabove, the corroboration of such facts is entitled to little weightin assessing whether the information Baker received was reliable. See City of Lake Forest, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 555-56 (holding thatthe mere fact that a police officer observed a car with the samelicense plate and of the same make and model as one identified byan informant as being driven by an intoxicated person wasinsufficient corroboration to justify a stop). Accordingly, if thestop of defendant was justified, it had to be because theinformation Baker received came from a credible source.

The man who provided Baker with the information upon whichBaker decided to stop defendant approached Baker directly. The manwas in a vehicle. At the time this information was conveyed, Bakercould see defendant's car. Aside from providing Baker withdescriptive details, the man stated that defendant's car was"weaving all over the road." The man's identity was, and remains,unknown. These facts present us with a situation lying somewherebetween that of an anonymous informant, whose reliability isnecessarily unknown (see People v. Wiley, 174 Ill. App. 3d 444, 450(1988)), and that of a known citizen who voluntarily comes forwardto aid the police, which courts have traditionally consideredreliable (see Hood, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 175). We believe the casebefore us is more similar to the latter scenario.

This court confronted an analogous situation in In re J.J.,183 Ill. App. 3d 381 (1989). In that case, a security guard at aMcDonald's restaurant called the police and reported that there wasa man with a gun in the restaurant. The guard had not seen the gunhimself; rather, he had been told about it by a customer. Therespondent argued that the police lacked reasonable suspicion todetain him, in that the detention was based solely upon informationprovided by an anonymous person. J.J., 183 Ill. App. 3d at 384. We rejected this argument despite the fact that the informant'sidentity was unknown, noting that the information was provided bya citizen who voluntarily came forward and conveyed it, in person,to the security guard. J.J., 183 Ill. App. 3d at 387. Further,prior to the stop, the police were able to corroborate onlydescriptive details about the respondent. J.J., 183 Ill. App. 3dat 386-87. Similarly, in the present case, the stop was based oninformation provided by someone who, though unknown, openly cameforward to provide the information. Also, like the officers inJ.J., Baker corroborated only descriptive details before initiatingthe stop. The present case actually presents a more compellingcase for upholding the stop, in that the unidentified persondirectly approached a police officer rather than a security guard. See also People v. Delk, 96 Ill. App. 3d 891, 896 (1981) (holdingthat an unidentified woman who provided a tip directly to thepolice was entitled to greater credibility in the absence of anyindication that she was a professional informant rather than anordinary citizen).

Numerous other jurisdictions confronting the issue of anunidentified civilian coming forward to provide information to lawenforcement have held that an investigatory stop is permissibleunder such circumstances. In United States v. Sierra-Hernandez,581 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit upheld aninvestigatory stop where an unidentified citizen approached aborder patrol agent and informed the agent that a vehicle wastransporting marijuana. The court first noted that "[i]nformationfrom a citizen who confronts an officer in person to advise that adesignated individual present on the scene is committing a specificcrime should be given serious attention and great weight by theofficer." Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d at 763. The court went on toobserve that, by "presenting himself to the agent and doing sowhile driving a car from which his identity might easily be traced,the informant was in a position to be held accountable for hisintervention," thus increasing the reliability of the informationprovided. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d at 763. Other courts haveupheld investigatory stops in similar situations. See State v.Ramey 129 Ohio App. 3d 409, 416-18, 717 N.E.2d 1156, 1158-59(1998); State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995);Rittman v. Department of Public Safety, 875 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Okla. App. 1994); People v. Willard 183 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 6-7, 228Cal. Rptr. 895, 895-96 (1986); State v. Davis, 393 N.W.2d 179, 180-81 (Minn. 1986); see also State v. Slater, 267 Kan. 694, 701, 986P.2d 1038, 1043 (1999) ("Second on the scale of reliability arethose tips in which, although the informant does not identifyhimself or herself, the informant gives enough information that hisor her identity may be ascertained. This occurs where theinformant states that he or she is calling from his or her place ofbusiness, or where the informant in person makes contact with thepolice officer. In such cases, courts generally find such a tip tobe reliable"). We find the reasoning of these courts to bepersuasive.

When the man in the white car approached Baker, he did notknow if Baker would request his name. Moreover, he was driving avehicle from which Baker easily could have obtained theregistration number. Thus, it is apparent that the man was notconcerned with preserving his anonymity. The man provided aconcrete fact--that defendant was swerving--rather than asubjective opinion as to defendant's state of intoxication. Finally, at the time the information was conveyed, defendant was insight of Baker, making the information immediately verifiable. Under such circumstances, the man in the white car openly exposedhimself to possible sanctions for making a false complaint, thusimbuing himself with an air of credibility. See Adams, 407 U.S. at146-47, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 617, 92 S. Ct. at 1923-24.

Defendant relies on Moraca, 124 Ill. App. 3d 561; however, wefind that case distinguishable. Moraca involved an anonymoustelephone call, the substance of which was relayed to the police bya crime prevention organization, rather than a citizen conveyinginformation to the police in a face-to-face setting. Moraca, 124Ill. App. 3d at 562. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268, 146 L.Ed. 2d 254, 258-59, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 1377 (2000), also relied on bydefendant, is distinguishable for the same reason. Defendant alsobriefly relies on Village of Gurnee, 174 Ill. App. 3d 66. However,in that case, no evidence was presented regarding the basis orreliability of the information conveyed to the police or theidentity of the source of the information. Village of Gurnee, 174Ill. App. 3d at 68. In fact, that opinion does not even reveal themanner in which the information was conveyed to the police. In thecase before us, we know the information was obtained from thedriver of the white car.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial courterred in granting defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppressevidence. Baker was entitled to rely on the information providedby the citizen who voluntarily came forward and reportedpotentially illegal behavior occurring simultaneously with and inthe immediate vicinity of the report.

The order of the circuit court quashing defendant's arrest andsuppressing the evidence flowing therefrom is reversed, and thecause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the viewsexpressed in this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

GEIGER and BYRNE, JJ., concur.