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28 June 2000

JUSTICE RAPP delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Boswell Memorial Hospital, sued defendant, CamilleC. Bongiorno, for failing to pay the medical expenses of herdeceased husband, Michael Bongiorno. After concluding that themedical costs were a "family expense" under section 15(a)(1) of theRights of Married Persons Act (Act) (750 ILCS 65/15(a)(1) (West1998)), the trial court granted plaintiff summary judgment andawarded Michael's medical costs, 18% annual interest, andreasonable attorney fees. On appeal, defendant argues that aquestion of fact about Michael's mental condition at the time ofhis admission precluded the trial court from granting summary judgment. Defendant also contends that the interest and theattorney fees are not "family expenses" under the Act. We affirm.

Plaintiff treated Michael from August 11 to August 22, 1995. At the time he was admitted, Michael signed an "Admission/ServiceAgreement" which required him to pay 18% interest annually on anymedical costs he failed to pay before he left the hospital. Theagreement also permitted plaintiff to recover reasonable attorneyfees it might incur while seeking payment. Michael died four daysafter he left the hospital, and his insurance provider deniedcoverage. Defendant did not respond to plaintiff's repeatedrequests for payment.

On December 12, 1997, plaintiff sued defendant for nonpayment,seeking 18% interest and reasonable attorney fees. Plaintiffsubmitted affidavits that itemized Michael's medical expenses andthe attorney fees the hospital incurred. The trial court grantedplaintiff's motion for summary judgment and awarded $38,342 for themedical expenses and $5,473 for the attorney fees. The courtawarded an additional $11,589, which amounted to 9% interest on themedical costs. Plaintiff moved to amend the judgment, arguing thatit was entitled to 18% interest under the contract. The trialcourt granted plaintiff's motion and increased the interest awardto $23,178.

A trial court should grant summary judgment only if thepleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file showthat there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movingparty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2--1005 (West 1998). Where reasonable persons could draw differentinferences from the undisputed material facts or where there is adispute over a material fact, summary judgment should be denied andthe issue decided by the trier of fact. A trial court's decisionto grant summary judgment is subject to de novo review. Douglassv. Dolan, 286 Ill. App. 3d 181, 185 (1997).

On appeal, defendant concedes that she is liable for Michael's medical expenses, but she challenges the trial court'sdecision to award interest and attorney fees. Defendant contendsthat, because Michael allegedly suffered from a "life-threateningillness" when he entered the hospital, he could not freely assentto the admission agreement. Defendant alleges that the trial courterroneously granted plaintiff summary judgment because a factualquestion existed about whether Michael's medical conditionprevented him from contracting with plaintiff voluntarily.

If a party moving for summary judgment introduces facts which,if not contradicted, would entitle him to a judgment as a matter oflaw, the opposing party may not rely on his pleadings alone toraise issues of material fact. Hermes v. Fischer, 226 Ill. App. 3d820, 824 (1992). In this case, plaintiff supplied the trial courtwith the admission agreement and documents describing the medicalservices performed and the attorney fees incurred. However,defendant submitted no counteraffidavit describing Michael'scondition at the time he was admitted to the hospital. Onlydefendant's pleadings allege that Michael could not understand orassent to the agreement. We conclude that defendant's baldassertions do not create a question of material fact. Nothingsuggests that Michael's medical condition affected his ability tocontract with plaintiff. Persons of mature age are presumed to besane and mental incapacity cannot be inferred. The burden ofproving mental incapacity lies upon the party who seeks to setaside the transaction. See In re Estate of Neprozatis, 62 Ill.App. 3d 563, 567 (1978).

Defendant also argues that the interest and attorney feesawarded pursuant to the contract are not "family expenses" asdefined by section 15(a)(1) of the Act. Section 15(a)(1) providesin relevant part:

"The expenses of the family and of the education of thechildren shall be chargeable upon the property of both husbandand wife, or of either of them, in favor of creditorstherefor, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly orseparately." 750 ILCS 65/15(a)(1) (West 1998).

The law is well settled that medical expenses are "familyexpenses" under section 15(a)(1) and that a husband and wife areeach liable for the medical expenses of the other. See, e.g., St.Mary of Nazareth Hospital v. Kuczaj, 174 Ill. App. 3d 268, 273-74(1988); Fortner v. Norris, 19 Ill. App. 2d 212, 215-16 (1958). Thepurpose of the Act is to protect creditors. Proctor Hospital v.Taylor, 279 Ill. App. 3d 624, 627 (1996).

A family expense contributes to the welfare of the family andbenefits or maintains its integrity. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 222 Ill. App. 3d 738, 741 (1991). Defendant argues that, under this definition, the contractualinterest and attorney fees are not family expenses. We disagree. Components of the compensation agreed to by the parties in returnfor the hospital care are deemed to be a family expense. We holdthat, when a spouse is liable for a family expense under section15(a)(1) of the Act, a creditor may recover all components agreedupon, such as interest and reasonable attorney fees, that thecontract permits.

In St. Luke's Medical Center v. Rosengartner, 231 N.W.2d 601(Iowa 1975), a hospital sued a husband for his wife's medicalcosts. After concluding that the costs were "family expenses," theIowa Supreme Court awarded the hospital interest on the unpaidcosts. St. Luke's, 231 N.W.2d at 602. Although it is unclearwhether the interest in St. Luke's was contractual or statutory,the case nevertheless supports our ruling. See North ShoreCommunity Bank & Trust Co. v. Kollar, 304 Ill. App. 3d 838, 844(1999) (when reviewing a claim under the Act, Illinois courts oftenconsider Iowa decisions because the Illinois Act is based on theIowa statute).

In contrast, defendant's reliance on Kellman v. Tilton, 306Ill. App. 504 (1940) (abstract of op.), is misplaced. In thatcase, an attorney sought payment for representing a husband in acriminal matter. This court ruled that the cost of defending theprosecution was not a family expense that would render the wifeliable under the Act. In this case, the medical costs Michaelincurred are a family expense, and the interest and attorney feesare included in the contract.

Plaintiff is entitled to the unpaid medical expenses, the 18%annual interest, and the reasonable attorney fees. Defendant doesnot challenge the trial court's calculation of plaintiff's damages,and we conclude that those amounts are correct.

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of LakeCounty is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and GALASSO, JJ., concur.