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JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

Union Underwear Company, Inc.(Union), which is not a party to this appeal, purportedlyowed plaintiff, Bill Marek's The Competitive Edge, Inc., unpaid sales commissions but mistakenlypaid them to defendant, Mickelson Group, Inc. Plaintiff made numerous demands upon defendantfor the immediate transfer of the funds to plaintiff, the funds totaling $65,008.99, and defendantrefused. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint against defendant based on the claims ofconversion and constructive trust. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgmenton the conversion count for $65,008.99, plus interest. Defendant contends on appeal that the trialcourt (1) erred in granting summary judgment for plaintiff on the conversion claim; (2) abused itsdiscretion by imposing discovery sanctions against defendant; (3) abused its discretion by failing tostrike plaintiff's supporting affidavits; and (4) erred in denying defendant's motions to dismiss for lackof jurisdiction and for failure to join Union as a necessary party. We affirm.

The following facts are taken from the complaint as well as the supporting documents andaffidavits. On January 6, 1997, plaintiff entered into a sales representative agreement with Union. Plaintiff remained a sales representative for Union until its contract was terminated by letter on May5, 1999. The original sales agreement between plaintiff and Union and the notice of termination letterprovided that plaintiff was to receive commission payments on orders taken, submitted, and shippedwithin six months after the effective date of the termination, i.e. from the effective date of May 5,1999, through December 5, 1999.

Defendant became Union's successor sales representative after the relationship between plaintiff and Union ended. Due to an administrative error, Union sent plaintiff's commissionpayments, totaling $65,008.99, to defendant.

On November 24, 1999, Union and plaintiff discovered that plaintiff's earned commissions were mistakenly sent to defendant. Union acknowledged in writing to plaintiff that it sent plaintiff'scommission payments to the wrong agency and documented the nature of the error in two reports,dated December 21 and December 22, 1999. The reports, which were referenced in a spread sheetas group "Exhibit E," were attached to plaintiff's complaint. Exhibit E was later attached to plaintiff'smotion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff then verbally demanded that defendant transfer the funds to plaintiff. Defendantfailed to transfer the funds as demanded. Defendant admitted that it is the successor salesrepresentative for Union; that it received copies of the Union reports dated December 21 and 22,1999, which documented the nature of the error in payment; and that plaintiff made numerous verbaldemands for the transfer of the funds identified in the complaint.

On December 29, 1999, Union filed for bankruptcy. Plaintiff received a creditor's notice. OnApril 11, 2000, plaintiff prepared a claim for bankruptcy court that sought, inter alia, unpaidcommissions from Union.

Thereafter, on May 4, 2000, plaintiff filed the instant complaint to collect its unpaid commissions that Union mistakenly paid to defendant. In count I, the conversion count, plaintiffalleged that defendant had no claim or right to plaintiff's sales commissions and defendant wrongfullyassumed control, dominion, and ownership over these funds. Plaintiff alleged that the ordersidentified in Exhibit E were taken by plaintiff and submitted to Union for approval on or before June5, 1999, and the products identified in Exhibit E were shipped on or before December 5, 1999. Plaintiff further alleged that there were no deductions taken against plaintiff's account and thecommissions identified in Exhibit E are plaintiff's property. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was paid the sum of $65,008.99, which represents the total commissions that were and are due and owing to plaintiff. Plaintiff further alleged that defendant did not take, submit, or ship any of the ordersidentified in Exhibit E.

On June 14, 2000, defendant filed its answer and affirmative defenses to count I. On August2, 2000, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss defendant's affirmative defenses. Thereafter, defendantfiled a motion to amend its answer and affirmative defenses. The trial court granted defendant'smotion and ordered that the case be continued for a case management conference on October 23,2000.

On October 23, 2000, the trial court granted defendant's motion for an extension of time. Thetrial court also ordered that written discovery be completed by December 22, 2000, that oraldiscovery be completed by March 23, 2001, and that the cause be heard for a pretrial conference onApril 6, 2001. Defendant filed its first amended answer and one affirmative defense.

Defendant's affirmative defense stated that the prior sales agreement between Union and plaintiff provided that commissions could not and would not be paid on bulk projections but, rather,on purchase orders identified by purchase order numbers that had been issued by the customer andon products shipped to the customer. Plaintiff denied the affirmative defense.

Plaintiff issued interrogatories, including Supreme Court Rules 213(f) and (g) interrogatories(177 Ill. 2d Rs. 213(f), (g)), on December 19, 2000. Defendant did not issue any interrogatories to plaintiff. Although the record does not contain a corresponding notice of written discovery, defendant did propound a Supreme Court Rule 214 (166 Ill. 2d R. 214) notice to produce to plaintiff,and plaintiff provided responsive documents to defendant.

On February 22, 2001, defendant answered plaintiff's Rules 213(f) and (g) interrogatories. Interrogatory number one called for the names and addresses of all witnesses who would testify attrial and requested the identification of the subject or subjects of the testimony of each witness. Defendant did not identify any subject matter. Interrogatory number two asked for the identificationof the name and address of each opinion witnesses who would testify at trial and asked that thesubject matter, the conclusions and opinions, and the qualifications of each such witness be identified. Defendant answered: "None, investigation continues." Interrogatory number six asked for theidentification of each and every person who defendant believed was of the opinion that defendantproperly received or was entitled to retain the commissions. Defendant stated, "Tim Kenney, addressunknown, investigation continues." Timothy Kenney is an affiant for plaintiff and the author of Exhibit E.

On April 13, 2001, the trial court heard the matter for a case management conference. Thetrial court closed discovery as of August 3, and set a pretrial hearing for August 10, 2001. At thepretrial hearing, the trial court closed discovery and ordered that the case be heard for trial on January7, 2002.

Thereafter, the parties agreed to present the conversion count to the trial court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, on December 28, 2001, plaintiff filed an agreed motionfor hearing on partial summary judgment. The motion stated that the parties were prepared to filetheir motions for summary judgment instanter. The trial court granted the motion and ordered theparties to file their cross-motions for summary judgment by January 4, 2002, and to respond to thecross-motions by January 30, 2002. The trial court further ordered that the cross-motions forsummary judgment be heard on February 27, 2002, and struck the trial date of January 7, 2002.

Plaintiff timely filed its motion for summary judgment. Defendant did not file a cross-motionfor summary judgment. Instead, on January 28, 2002, defendant filed a motion for judgment on thepleadings, a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and a motion to dismiss for plaintiff's failureto join Union as a necessary party. Defendant also filed a motion to strike in lieu of a response to plaintiff 's motion for summary judgment.

On February 15, 2002, plaintiff received defendant's supplemental answers to plaintiff's Rules213(f) and (g) interrogatories. On February 19, plaintiff filed a motion to strike defendant'ssupplemental answers. When the briefing schedules were set with respect to plaintiff's motion tostrike, counsel for defendant stated to the court that "the light went on after [he] received plaintiff'smotion for summary judgment" and that counsel thereafter conducted his own discovery that led to the development of the supplemental answers. The trial court found that defendant's supplementalanswers were not timely disclosed and granted plaintiff's motion to strike.

After the trial court denied defendant's motion to strike in lieu of a response to plaintiff'smotion for summary judgment, defendant asserted that it had never directly responded to thesummary judgment motion, and it sought leave to file a direct response. Defendant assumed that themotion for summary judgment would be "muted" by its other motions and therefore never directlyresponded to the summary judgment motion. The trial court allowed defendant to file a response.

On August 28, 2002, defendant filed a response to the motion for summary judgment. Attached to defendant's response were the counteraffidavits of Douglas Kelly, Daniel Raskin, andJames Gilberto. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike the affidavits. The trial court granted the motion tostrike on the basis of defendant's failure to timely answer plaintiff's Rules 213(f) and (g)interrogatories.

Following oral argument on the summary judgment motion as to the conversion count, thetrial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $65,008.99, plus interest. Because the constructive trust count requested the same relief as the conversion count, the trial court foundit unnecessary to impose a constructive trust. See Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co. v. Kapoor, 16 F.Supp. 2d 941, 952 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (under Illinois law, a constructive trust describes an equitableremedy, rather than a separate cause of action). Defendant timely appeals.

We first examine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for plaintiff on the conversion count. Summary judgment is properly granted where the pleadings, depositions,admissions, and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgmentas a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West 2002). We review de novo an order grantingsummary judgment. City of Chicago v. Holland, 206 Ill. 2d 480, 487 (2003).

Conversion is " 'any unauthorized act, which deprives a man of his property permanently orfor an indefinite time.' " In re Thebus, 108 Ill. 2d 255, 259 (1985), quoting Union Stock Yard &Transit Co. v. Mallory, Son & Zimmerman Co., 157 Ill. 554, 563 (1895). The substance ofconversion is " 'the wrongful deprivation of one who has a right to the immediate possession of theobject unlawfully held.' " Thebus, 108 Ill. 2d at 259, quoting Bender v. Consolidated Mink Ranch,Inc., 110 Ill. App. 3d 207, 213 (1982). Accordingly, to prove conversion, the plaintiff must prove the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the defendant's unauthorized andwrongful assumption of control, dominion, or ownership over the plaintiff's personal property; (2) the plaintiff's right in the property; (3) the plaintiff's right to immediate possession of the property,absolutely and unconditionally; and (4) the plaintiff's demand for possession of the property. Stathisv. Geldermann, 295 Ill. App. 3d 844, 856 (1998).

Defendant asserts that unpaid sales commissions cannot form the basis for a claim ofconversion. Defendant contends that, as a matter of law, an action for conversion may not bemaintained for a mere failure to pay money unless it is capable of being described as a specific chattel. See Fonda v. General Casualty Co. of Illinois, 279 Ill. App. 3d 894, 899 (1996). We disagree.

It is no longer necessary that money be specifically earmarked in order to sustain an actionfor conversion. An action for conversion may also be maintained where the converted funds arecapable of being described, identified, or segregated in a specific manner. See Thebus, 108 Ill. 2d at260-62; Roderick Development Investment Co., Inc. v. Community Bank of Edgewater, 282 Ill.App. 3d 1052, 1058 (1996); Fonda v. General Casualty Co., 279 Ill. App. 3d 894, 899 (1996) (insurance proceeds of $20,091.70 sufficiently identifiable to support conversion action); Addantev. Pompilio, 303 Ill. App. 172 (1940) ($3,000 transmitted to brother sufficiently identifiable tosupport conversion action). A right to an indeterminate sum is insufficient to maintain a cause ofaction in conversion. See, e.g., Mid-America Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Middleton, 127 Ill.App. 3d 887, 892 (1984).

In Thebus, 108 Ill. 2d at 264, the supreme court held that an attorney had not converted fundshe withheld from his employees' paychecks by failing to pay this money to the Internal RevenueService. The court explained that, although a specified identifiable fund could be the subject of aconversion action, there could be no conversion action for money represented by a general debt orobligation. The court decided that the character of the funds the attorney withheld for taxes was in the nature of a debt to the government rather than an identifiable fund, and the attorney did notmaintain a separate bank account in which the taxes withheld and owed to the Internal RevenueService were deposited. Similarly, he did not maintain a separate payroll account. Therefore, theattorney held no identifiable sum of money or fund for the Internal Revenue Service. The moneyowed to the government did not come into the attorney's hands from any outside source. It was anamount that accrued with each period as he wrote the payroll checks from his general checkingaccount for the net amount of wages after taxes, retaining in his checking account the differencebetween the gross wages and the amount of the checks. Thebus, 108 Ill. 2d at 263.

Unlike the funds at issue in Thebus, the funds here were specifically identifiable. The amount plaintiff claims defendant exercised control over was specifically identifiable given the sales agreementbetween plaintiff and Union, the notice of termination letter, the orders identified in Exhibit E, whichwere taken, submitted, and shipped within six months after the effective date of termination, and theaffidavits attached to the motion for summary judgment. The exact sales identified in Exhibit E show that the earned commissions amounted to $65,008.99. In particular, the affidavit of Timothy Kenney, Union's customer service manager and the author of Exhibit E, stated that the commissions generatedin Exhibit E were based on the orders generated by plaintiff and accurately reflected the businessrecords and computer data that Union maintained. Kenny averred that the orders identified in ExhibitE amounted to $65,008.99, representing the commissions which were due and owing to plaintiff.

Further, unlike the amount allegedly converted in Thebus, the amount defendant convertedin this case was not a portion of its own assets that defendant was obligated to use to satisfy a debtto plaintiff. Rather, the funds were the specific funds transferred to defendant from an outside source,Union. Therefore, the funds also were identifiable in this respect.

We also find Roderick Development Investment Co., Inc. v. Community Bank of Edgewater,282 Ill. App. 3d 1052 (1996), particularly instructive. Similar to the argument presented here, thedefendant in Roderick argued in defense of the conversion claim that the action involved money thatwas not specifically identifiable or in a separate account. In rejecting this argument, the Roderickcourt pointed out that the amount the plaintiff claimed the defendant converted did not accrue butwas specific and identifiable; it was exactly 5% of the final payment that was due under the purchaseagreement, which was paid in a lump sum. The court further noted that the money was identifiablebecause it was a specific amount transferred from an outside source. Roderick, 282 Ill. App. 3d at1059.

The Roderick court also rejected the defendant's argument that the amount claimed by theplaintiff was not identifiable because it was not segregated or kept in a separate account. Roderick,282 Ill. App. 3d at 1062-63. The court explained that, where the allegedly converted funds comefrom an outside source, the failure to segregate the funds does not make them unidentifiable. Thecourt stated that it would be unfair to fashion a rule that prohibits a conversion action for funds thatare not segregated. "Such a rule gives the alleged converter control over whether certain funds aresubject to conversion because, depending on the type of account in which he chooses to place thefunds, the funds may or may not be considered identifiable and, therefore, may or may not be subjectto conversion. A party, such as the plaintiff, with no contractual relationship with the allegedconverter could not dictate the manner in which the funds were held." Roderick, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 1063; see also Greene County Board of Education v. Bailey, 586 So. 2d 893, 898 (Ala. 1991)(requirement that there be earmarked money or specific money capable of identification before therecan be a conversion has been complicated as a result of the evolution of our economic system);Autoville, Inc. v. Friedman, 20 Ariz. App. 89, 91, 510 P.2d 400, 402 (1973) (converted funds mustbe described, identified, or segregated in a specific manner). We are persuaded by the Roderickcourt's reasoning.

Defendant argues that the relationship between defendant and plaintiff is one of debtor-creditor, and therefore, a conversion action is inappropriate. Contrary to defendant's argument, therelationship between defendant and plaintiff is not one of debtor and creditor. In General MotorsCorp. v. Douglass, 206 Ill. App. 3d 881 (1990), for example, the court held that a conversion actionwas not appropriate because the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant was representedby a general debtor obligation. General Motors maintained a "holdback" account for its dealers fromwhich it made periodic payments. It mistakenly paid one of its dealers, the defendant, $37,364.36,although it owed the defendant only $12,836.88. The defendant refused to return the amount GeneralMotors had overpaid it. General Motors, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 883. As explained in General Motors,206 Ill. App. 3d at 888, a debtor-creditor relationship is created when a party (the creditor)voluntarily transfers his property to another (the debtor). See also Fonda, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 901.Because General Motors had created a debtor-creditor relationship with the defendant when itvoluntarily transferred money to the defendant, the court held that there could be no conversion. General Motors, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 891-92. Similarly, in Thebus, the government became a creditorof the attorney by allowing the attorney to collect withholding taxes for it. See also Katz v. BelmontNational Bank of Chicago, 112 Ill. 2d 64 (1986) (third party's action in depositing plaintiff's fundsinto defendant bank created a lawful creditor-debtor relationship between third party and bank so thatlegal title passed to bank and therefore plaintiff could not bring conversion action against bank).

Here, by contrast, there was no creditor-debtor relationship between plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff never voluntarily transferred funds to defendant. Rather, defendant mistakenly received plaintiff's funds from a third party. The funds were not a debt and, therefore, were subject toconversion.

Defendant further argues that, once it received the money from Union, it never committed anact of conversion. The uncontroverted evidence shows that plaintiff was due a percentage of the salescommissions, which were earned before Union fired plaintiff, in the amount of $65,008.89; that thisamount represents the property of plaintiff; that there were no deductions or setoffs against plaintiff'saccount; and that the amount of the commissions identified represents the total amount paid todefendant. It is further undisputed that plaintiff made a demand for its unpaid sales commissions thatwere mistakenly paid to defendant, and defendant refused to pay the amount to plaintiff. Once plaintiff made the demand to transfer its property and defendant refused to do so, defendantcommitted an act of conversion.

We next address whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing discovery sanctionsagainst defendant. Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in striking its proposedsupplemental answers to plaintiff's Supreme Court Rules 213(f) and (g) interrogatories (177 Ill. 2dRs. 213 (f), (g)), and barring defendant from presenting any witnesses as a sanction pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 219 (166 Ill. 2d R. 219). We note that defendant's arguments rely on revisedSupreme Court Rule 213, which became effective July 1, 2002. However, because discovery closedon August 3, 2001, the previous rule governs this analysis. See Official Reports Advance Sheet No.8 (April 17, 2002), Rs. 213(f), (g), eff. July 1, 2002.

Supreme Court Rule 213(f) provides that "[u]pon written interrogatory, a party must furnishthe identity and location of witnesses who will testify at trial, together with the subject of theirtestimony." 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(f). Rule 213(i) imposes on a party the continuing duty to supplementdiscovery responses, including the disclosure of witnesses and proposed testimony, "whenever newor additional information subsequently becomes known to that party." 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(i). Underthe rules, to avoid surprise, a party has the obligation of disclosing the identity, location, andanticipated testimony of all witnesses who will testify at trial. Athans v. Williams, 327 Ill. App. 3d700, 702 (2002).

Defendant supplemented its responses to plaintiff's interrogatories on February 15, 2002, afterdiscovery had closed and after plaintiff had filed its motion for summary judgment. Defendant statedthe names of Peter Lewis, Doug Kelly, James Gilberto, Frank Novelli, Bette Nelson, Hugh Hoffman,and Daniel Raskin as witnesses whom defendant intended to call at trial and stated the subject of theirtestimony as follows. Defendant did not list Lewis's qualifications. Defendant stated only that Lewiswould acknowledge the oral agreement between defendant and Pro Player Sports Apparel Company,a subsidiary of Union. Defendant stated that Doug Kelly, the president of Pro Player, was aware ofthe payment issues between plaintiff and defendant in December 1999. Kelly was also fullyknowledgeable about the reports used in Pro Player's commission statements, as well as the definitionof a "Bulk Order" and a "Confirmed Purchase Order." Based on his knowledge, position, andbackground, Kelly believed that the commissions on the sales identified in Exhibit E were earned byand payable to defendant. Defendant did not list Gilberto's qualifications. Defendant stated thatGilberto's testimony would confirm that plaintiff's bulk orders were nonbinding because they wereroutinely changed, canceled, or reworked. Gilberto would also state that defendant's orders wereconfirmed purchase orders for the several accounts within its territory, and that the commissions fromthese orders ultimately belonged to defendant, not plaintiff. Raskin, the vice president of sales forPro Player, hired defendant to replace plaintiff and would testify to the particulars of the relationshipbetween defendant and Pro Player. Hoffman, an independent sales contractor who entered into anagreement with defendant on June 6, 1999, for services as a key account salesman for Kohl'sDepartment Stores, would testify that due to a buyer change at Kohl's after the first week in June1999, many of the bulk orders that plaintiff initially entered were completely changed and reenteredby defendant due to the new buyer's product selection on those bulk orders. Hoffman worked withNelson, who was his customer service associate. Nelson would confirm Hoffman's testimony.

Here, neither the identity of the witnesses nor the subject matter of their testimony was timelydisclosed. Moreover, these disclosures were issued without leave of court. Defendant did not filea motion for leave to supplement its answers. Nor did defendant file a motion to extend or reopendiscovery or file a motion to modify the briefing schedule set on the original cross-motions forsummary judgment. Instead, after defendant received plaintiff's summary judgment motion, defendantundertook ex parte discovery.

Supreme Court Rule 219 specifies the consequences for a litigant's refusal to comply with therules or court orders regarding discovery. 166 Ill. 2d R. 219. Supreme Court Rule 219(c) empowers the trial court to enter sanctions, including barring witnesses from testifying, for a party'sunreasonable failure to comply with the rules or court orders regarding discovery. 166 Ill. 2d R.219(c)(iv). The imposition of sanctions for the failure to comply with discovery lies in the trial court'sdiscretion. Athans, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 703. The trial court's decision in fashioning such a remedywill not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Athans, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 703.

In determining whether the exclusion of a witness was a proper sanction for nondisclosurepursuant to Rule 213(f) or (g), the court must consider the following factors: (1) the surprise to theadverse party; (2) the prejudicial effect of the testimony; (3) the nature of the testimony; (4) thediligence of the adverse party; (5) the timely objection to the testimony; and (6) the good faith of theparty calling the witness. Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville v. Martin, 155 Ill. 2d 305, 314(1993).

In this case, defendant was obligated to provide the names of the trial witnesses and thesubjects of their testimony in advance of trial so that plaintiff was apprised of defendant's position and the facts defendant intended to rely on in its defense. After the trial date, defendant disclosed newinformation that changed the entire defense. The disclosure substantially changed defendant's originalanswers to plaintiff's interrogatories, which stated that Kenney was the only person of the opinion that defendant had a right to retain the commissions identified in the complaint. Plaintiff relied upon defendant's original disclosure and proceeded to trial, and ultimately summary judgment, on the basisthat Kenney was the uncontroverted and critical witness in the case. For defendant to change thisposture after agreeing to decide the case at the summary judgment stage was clearly a surprise andprejudicial to plaintiff.

We further find that defendant's failure to seasonably supplement its responses to theinterrogatories prior to trial demonstrates a lack of diligence. Defendant had ample time andopportunity to investigate the matter through discovery. There is no indication in the record thatthese witnesses could not have been located or otherwise previously deposed. Defendant did notoffer any reasonable excuse for its delay in locating them or disclosing the information. Other thanstating that defense counsel conducted his own discovery after he received plaintiff's summaryjudgment motion and "the light went on," defendant offers no explanation for supplementing theinterrogatories beyond the date set for trial. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abusedits discretion in striking the answers and barring the witnesses from testifying as a sanction pursuantto Rule 219.

Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by striking its affidavits. OnAugust 28, 2002, more than a year after all discovery closed and eight months after the trial date,defendant offered the affidavits of Doug Kelly, Dan Raskin, and James Gilberto. Our review of theaffidavits shows that they substantially mimic the statements and opinions contained in thesupplemental answers to the interrogatories that the trial court struck as a sanction pursuant to Rule219. For the same reasons as above, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking the affidavits.

Defendant asserts that its affidavits are acceptable because the trial date was stricken. Thetrial date was vacated so that the trial court could hear count I on the cross-motions for summaryjudgment. Defendant apparently chose not to file a cross-motion for summary judgment. However,the record does not reflect that trial was continued to permit further discovery. The practice ofcontinuing trial for parties to depose an undisclosed opinion witness should not be, and is not, lookedupon favorably. Warrender v. Millsop, 304 Ill. App. 3d 260, 267 (1999). Accordingly, we reject defendant's argument.

We next address whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motionto strike plaintiff's affidavits for failing to comply with Supreme Court Rule 191(a) (145 Ill. 2dR.191(a)). Rule 191(a) provides that affidavits "shall be made on the personal knowledge of theaffiants; shall set forth with particularity the facts upon which the claim, counterclaim, or defense isbased; shall have attached thereto sworn or certified copies of all papers upon which the affiant relies;shall not consist of conclusions but of facts admissible in evidence; and shall affirmatively show that the affiant, if sworn as a witness, can testify competently thereto." 145 Ill. 2d R. 191(a). The rulefurther provides that "[i]f all of the facts to be shown are not within the personal knowledge of oneperson, two or more affidavits shall be used." 145 Ill. 2d R. 191(a). The granting or denying of amotion to strike a summary judgment affidavit is within the sound discretion of the trial court. LakeCounty Trust Co. v. Two Bar B, Inc., 238 Ill. App. 3d 589, 599 (1992).

Defendant argues that plaintiff's affidavits do not support the motion for summary judgmentbecause they are replete with personal opinions and hearsay, the affiants have no personal knowledgeof the terms of the agreement between defendant and Union, and the affiants are not competent tospeak on behalf of Union. We disagree.

Plaintiff presented the affidavits of Bill Marek, Mark Appleman, Peter Lewis, and TimothyKenney in support of its motion for summary judgment. The affidavits, when read in their entirety,contain the relevant facts to support Exhibit E and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. BillMarek is the principal for plaintiff. Mark Appleman was the national sales manager for Union. PeterLewis was the key account sales manager for Kohl's, Sears, and Wards, and Timothy Kenney was thecustomer service manager for Union who authored the two reports for Union, commonly referencedas Exhibit E.

Exhibit E was authenticated by the affidavits as true, accurate, and maintained in the normalcourse of business. Each witness stated that he was familiar with the exhibit and that it was the typeof report that he normally relied upon in his capacity as an employee or manager for Union. Thecommissions from sales that were generated by plaintiff during the relevant time period wereidentified in Exhibit E as earned by plaintiff, but were incorrectly paid to defendant by Union. Assuch, their affidavits complied with Rule 191, and we cannot say that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in finding them to be admissible.

Finally, we examine whether the case should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction andfailure to join a necessary party. Defendant asserts that the trial court could not determine the valueof plaintiff's services to Union without Union's presence. Defendant further contends that the courtwas without jurisdiction because all matters against Union had to be brought in the bankruptcy courtunder the principle of federal preemption. Defendant asserts that plaintiff's status as a creditor in theUnion bankruptcy means that plaintiff should protect the interests of Union. Defendant implies that plaintiff's claim against the bankrupt entity bars plaintiff from prevailing on its claim for conversion.

Illinois law provides that a necessary party is one who has a legal or beneficial interest in thesubject matter of the litigation and will be affected by the action of the court. Holzer v. MotorolaLighting, Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 963, 970 (1998). Case law has analyzed the concept of a necessaryparty in terms of the reasons such parties must be joined, such that a lawsuit ought not proceed in aparty's absence: (1) to protect an interest that the absentee has in the subject matter of the controversythat would be materially affected by a judgment entered in its absence; (2) to protect the interests ofthose who are before the court; or (3) to enable the court to make a complete determination of thecontroversy. Holzer, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 970.

Defendant has failed to demonstrate any interest that Union has in the subject matter of thiscontroversy. There is no support for the proposition that plaintiff's bankruptcy claim against Unionbars plaintiff from prevailing on its claim for conversion against defendant. Union filed forbankruptcy on December 29, 1999. The documents filed in support of the motion for summaryjudgment confirm that Union sent plaintiff's commissions to defendant prior to filing for bankruptcy. Thus, Union no longer had an interest in the asset as it belonged to either plaintiff or defendant. Moreover, while plaintiff might be barred from having a double recovery, there is nothing in the lawor in Union's bankruptcy matter that bars plaintiff from pursuing recovery of its funds that arewrongfully possessed by defendant.

Even if Union had an interest in the subject matter of the litigation, which it does not, thedoctrine of representation resolves this matter. See Holzer, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 973 (a necessary partyneed not be joined if his interests are fully and adequately represented). Here, the funds identified in plaintiff's complaint irrefutably belong to either plaintiff or defendant. No other possibility isdemonstrated by the pleadings in this matter. As such, regardless of the decision of the trial court, the "interests" of Union are actually protected because the proper party in interest, vis-a-vis Union,will possess the funds.

Furthermore, if defendant believed that Union was a necessary party, for whatever reason,then defendant should have brought Union into this action. Defendant possessed a clear right to bringin a new party if it so desired. See 735 ILCS 5/2--406 (West 2002). We reject defendant'sarguments.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

CALLUM and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.