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Defendant, G. Josh Williams, appeals (1) the trial court'sorder barring him from testifying as a witness as a sanctionpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 219 (166 Ill. 2d R. 219) and (2) theresultant judgment entered against him in the amount of $4,932.83plus costs. We reverse and remand.

On September 15, 1999, plaintiff, George C. Athans, filed asmall claims complaint seeking repayment on a loan to defendant inthe amount of $4,932.83. Since the complaint was filed in smallclaims, it contains no information concerning the nature of thedebt. From the information that can be gleaned from the record, itappears that plaintiff employed defendant and that the debt atissue concerned sums of money plaintiff allegedly paid to defendantin three separate transactions. On November 29, 1999, the partieswere granted leave to conduct discovery pursuant to Supreme CourtRules 213 and 214 (177 Ill. 2d R. 213; 166 Ill. 2d R. 214).

On March 10, 2000, defendant answered an interrogatory posedby plaintiff, among others, as follows:

"Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(f), providethe name and address of each witness who will testify at trialand state the subject of each witness' testimony.

ANSWER: Josh Williams."

Defendant also provided plaintiff with 69 pages of informationin response to a request to produce documents.

The case proceeded to trial on August 11, 2000. There is notranscript of the proceeding. Nevertheless, it appears from therecord that plaintiff testified in his case in chief. Whendefendant took the stand in his case in chief, plaintiff moved tobar him from testifying because the subject matter of his testimonywas not provided in his answer to the interrogatory cited above. The trial court entered an order barring defendant from testifying. Defendant had no other witnesses, and the trial court enteredjudgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $4,932.83 pluscosts. Defendant appeals the trial court's order barring him fromtestifying as a witness and the judgment entered against him in theamount of $4,932.83.

Defendant first contends that the trial court abused itsdiscretion by barring him from testifying at trial as a sanctionpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 219 for his alleged failure todisclose the subject matter of his testimony as requested inplaintiff's Rule 213(f) interrogatory (177 Ill 2d R. 213(f)). See166 Ill. 2d R. 219.

Supreme Court Rule 213(f) provides that "[u]pon writteninterrogatory, a party must furnish the identity and location ofwitnesses who will testify at trial, together with the subjectmatter of their testimony." 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(f). Rule 213(i)imposes on a party the continuing duty to supplement discoveryresponses, including the disclosure of new witnesses and proposedtestimony, "whenever new or additional information subsequentlybecomes known to that party." 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(i). Under therules, to avoid surprise, a party has the obligation of disclosingthe identity, location, and anticipated testimony of all witnesseswho will testify at trial.

Here, the identity of defendant as the sole defense witnesswas properly disclosed in response to plaintiff's interrogatory. Although defendant neglected to include the subject matter of histestimony in his answer to one particular question, his answers toother interrogatories posed by plaintiff indicate that plaintiffwas apprised of his position and the facts he intended to rely onin his defense.

Nevertheless, defendant does not address the issue of whetherhe violated Supreme Court Rule 213(f) but instead focuses on thesanction of barring him from testifying at trial. Accordingly,without addressing the issue of whether defendant even violatedSupreme Court Rule 213(f), we are left with the question of what,if any, sanction was appropriate for an assumed violation of therules of discovery.

Supreme Court Rule 219 specifies the consequences for alitigant's refusal to comply with the rules or court ordersregarding discovery. 166 Ill. 2d R. 219. With respect to aparty's failure to answer written discovery, Supreme Court Rule219(a) provides as follows:

"[I]f a party fails to answer any interrogatory served uponhim or her, or to comply with a request for the production ofdocuments or tangible things or inspection of real property,the proponent of the question or interrogatory or the partyserving the request may on like notice move for an ordercompelling an answer or compliance with the request. If thecourt finds that the refusal or failure was withoutsubstantial justification, the court shall require theoffending party or deponent, or the party whose attorneyadvised the conduct complained of, or either of them, to payto the aggrieved party the amount of the reasonable expensesincurred in obtaining the order, including reasonableattorney's fees." 166 Ill. 2d R. 219(a).

The supreme court rules on discovery are mandatory rules ofprocedure that courts and counsel must follow. Supreme Court Rule219(c) empowers the trial court to enter sanctions, includingbarring a witness from testifying, for a party's unreasonablefailure to comply with the rules or court orders regardingdiscovery. 166 Ill. 2d R. 219(c)(iv); Ashpole v. Brunswick Bowling& Billiards Corp., 297 Ill. App. 3d 725, 727 (1998). Theimposition of sanctions for the failure to comply with discoverylies in the trial court's discretion. See Warrender v. Milsop, 304Ill. App. 3d 260, 268 (1999). The trial court's decision infashioning such a remedy will not be reversed absent a clear abuseof discretion. Warrender, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 268.

In determining whether the exclusion of a witness was a propersanction for nondisclosure pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 213(f) or213(g) (166 Ill. 2d R. 213 (g)), the court must consider thefollowing factors: (1) the surprise to the adverse party; (2) theprejudicial effect of the testimony; (3) the nature of thetestimony; (4) the diligence of the adverse party; (5) the timelyobjection to the testimony; and (6) the good faith of the partycalling the witness. Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville v.Martin, 155 Ill. 2d 305, 314 (1993); Warrender, 304 Ill. App. 3d at268; Ashpole, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 727.

Our review of the record indicates that plaintiff was apprisedthrough defendant's answers to interrogatories, which were servedfive months before the case proceeded to trial, that defendantwould testify at trial. Although defendant's answer to questionNo. 13 cited above does not list the subject matter of his proposedtestimony, there was no surprise or prejudice to plaintiffconcerning the subject matter of defendant's testimony at trial. Defendant's answers to other questions posed in the same set ofinterrogatories propounded by plaintiff list the defendant'saddress, his occupation, his employment with plaintiff's company,and his salary and bonus. His answers also included theinformation that plaintiff issued a check for a final payment of alease for a Mercedes-Benz vehicle used by defendant in 1995 andreturned to the lessor, that he was given a Bonneville automobileas a bonus by plaintiff in 1996, and that he contended that thesepayments were gifts or bonuses paid by plaintiff during hisemployment. Defendant also gave the information requested byplaintiff concerning a check payable to defendant drawn onplaintiff's account, including defendant's position that the check"was suppose [sic] to be a bonus in recognition of [his] work forDirect Dimensions and to provide [him] with some money to meetcertain personal obligations in lieu of a formal raise of hissalary, which the Athans [sic] did not believe they could afford atthe time." In addition, plaintiff indicates that defendantprovided him with 69 pages of documents in response to hisdiscovery requests.

In striking defendant's testimony at trial, the trial courtfocused on the one interrogatory answer listing defendant as awitness, but ignored the remaining answers. It is clear thatdefendant apprised plaintiff of his position that the payments byplaintiff were bonuses accrued during defendant's employmentthrough his answers to other interrogatories posed by plaintiff inthe same set of questions, answered on the same date, five monthsbefore the case proceeded to trial. Given the information thatdefendant did disclose in his answers to interrogatories, to whichplaintiff failed to raise any objection prior to trial, it isunreasonable for plaintiff to suggest that he was taken by surprisebecause he was unaware that defendant would be called as a witnessor that defendant intended to testify that the payments made byplaintiff were work-related bonuses.

Supreme Court Rule 213 was enacted to facilitate full andcomplete disclosure of witnesses and their testimony in advance oftrial and to eliminate prejudice and surprise when new witnessesand testimony are adduced at trial without prior disclosure.Because plaintiff propounded interrogatories to defendantrequesting the names of trial witnesses and their proposedtestimony, defendant was obligated to provide this information toplaintiff in advance of trial. Given the disclosures that weremade by defendant in his answers to the interrogatories and to therequest to produce documents five months prior to trial, to whichplaintiff raised no objection until defendant took the stand attrial, the sanction of striking defendant's testimony in toto wasan abuse of discretion.

Assuming a Supreme Court Rule 213(f) violation has occurred,an appropriate sanction by the trial court would have limiteddefendant to testifying as to those facts and the logicalinferences from those facts that were previously disclosed indiscovery. Because the trial court's exclusion of defendant'stestimony directly impacted on the trial court's judgment in favorof plaintiff in the amount of $4,932.83, the judgment must bereversed and the case remanded for a new trial. On remand,defendant should be allowed to testify concerning those facts andthe logical inferences from the facts contained in his answers toplaintiff's interrogatories and request for production of documentsserved in March 2000. Likewise, defendant should be allowed tointroduce documentary evidence, with proper foundation, that wassimilarly disclosed in discovery.

Defendant further contends that he should be entitled to raisethe issue of the statute of frauds as a defense concerning hisalleged promise to pay plaintiff $2,500. Plaintiff asserts thatdefendant has waived this issue for failing to raise the statute offrauds as a defense at trial.

Ordinarily, if a defendant wishes to assert an affirmativedefense such as the statute of frauds at trial, he is required tospecifically plead it so that the plaintiff is not taken bysurprise. 735 ILCS 5/2--613(d) (West 2000). If a party fails toplead an affirmative defense, he is deemed to have waived thedefense, and it cannot be considered even if the evidence suggeststhe existence of the defense. Harvey v. McKinney, 221 Ill. App.3d 140, 142 (1991).

However, the rules governing small claims actions differ. Supreme Court Rule 286(a) provides that, if a defendant appears atthe time the case is called for trial, "he need not file an answerunless ordered to do so by the court; and when no answer is orderedthe allegations of the complaint will be considered denied and anydefense may be proved as if it were specifically pleaded." 145Ill. 2d R. 286(a).

Defendant appeared for trial. However, his testimony wasbarred as a discovery sanction. Since he appeared at the time oftrial and was not ordered to file an answer, he was entitled,pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 286(a), to prove any defense to theallegations of the small claims complaint as though it werespecifically pleaded, including the statute of frauds. On remand,defendant should be entitled to present evidence in an attempt toprove the defense of the statute of frauds.

The judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County isreversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for furtherproceedings consistent with the opinion of this court.

Reversed and remanded.

BYRNE and KAPALA, JJ., concur.