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No. 2--02--1379

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IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

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JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, David Westcott, appeals from the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss apetition for a plenary order of protection, requesting that he stay away from and not contact plaintiff,Alison C. He argues that the court erred by denying the motion because he and plaintiff were not ina "dating relationship" and, thus, plaintiff was not a person protected by the Illinois DomesticViolence Act of 1986 (the Act) (750 ILCS 60/101 et seq. (West 2002)). We reverse.

Plaintiff and defendant are both high school students. In the evening of November 3, 2002,defendant telephoned plaintiff at her home and invited her to lunch the next day. Plaintiff agreed. The following day, plaintiff and defendant met for lunch near the front of the school. They left theschool grounds in defendant's car. After driving around for about 10 minutes, defendant informedplaintiff that he did not have any money to pay for lunch and suggested that they "go park somewhereand chill." Defendant then parked his car in a deserted parking lot.

Defendant began to touch plaintiff. Plaintiff tried to pull defendant's hands away but wasunable to do so. She repeatedly told him to stop touching her, but, instead, he indicated that he hada gun, sat on top of her, and "touch[ed] [her] breasts and put[] his hands down [her] pants." Eventually, plaintiff was able to push defendant away, and he angrily drove them back to the school.

On November 7, 2002, plaintiff petitioned the court for an order of protection from defendant. The court entered an emergency order of protection that day and scheduled a hearing for November26. The high school removed defendant from plaintiff's classes and placed him in independent study. Plaintiff also pursued criminal charges against defendant.

At the November 26 hearing, defendant orally moved to dismiss the petition (735 ILCS 5/2--619 (West 2002)). As grounds for the motion, defendant argued that, because the parties had goneon only one lunch date, they were not engaged in a "dating relationship" and, therefore, plaintiff wasnot a person protected by the Act. The court disagreed and, noting that plaintiff's testimony aboutthe incident was uncontroverted, entered the plenary order of protection. Under that order, defendantwas to refrain from any contact with plaintiff for two years; however, defendant was permitted toremain at the same school. Defendant appeals.

A trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss presents a question of law that we review denovo. Brandt v. Boston Scientific Corp., 204 Ill. 2d 640, 644-45 (2003). During our review, weaccept as true all well-pleaded facts and their reasonable inferences. In addition, issues requiringstatutory interpretation are also questions of law subject to a de novo review. Eads v. HeritageEnterprises, Inc., 204 Ill. 2d 92, 96 (2003).

The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to thelegislature's intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04(2000). The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinarymeaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994). Where statutory languageis clear, it must be applied as written; however, if the language is susceptible of more than oneinterpretation, the court may look beyond the language to consider the legislative purpose. Reda v.Advocate Health Care, 199 Ill. 2d 47, 55 (2002). Legislative intent must be ascertained from aconsideration of the entire act, its nature, its object, and the consequences resulting from differentconstructions. Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 96 (1990).

The Act was designed to prevent abuse and harassment between family and householdmembers. 750 ILCS 60/201(a) (West 2002). Section 103(6) of the Act defines "family or householdmembers" as:

"spouses, former spouses, parents, children, stepchildren and other persons related byblood or by present or prior marriage, persons who share or formerly shared a commondwelling, persons who have or allegedly have a child in common, persons who share orallegedly share a blood relationship through a child, persons who have or have had a datingor engagement relationship, persons with disabilities and their personal assistants, andcaregivers as defined in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of Section 12--21 of the CriminalCode of 1961. For purposes of this paragraph, neither a casual acquaintanceship nor ordinaryfraternization between 2 individuals in business or social contexts shall be deemed toconstitute a dating relationship." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 60/103(6) (West 2002).

The Act was originally enacted in 1986. Pub. Act 84--1305, eff. August 21, 1986. In thisinitial version, it did not protect persons in a "dating relationship." See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40,par. 2311--3. This language was added in 1993. Pub. Act 87--1186, eff. January 1, 1993 (amendingIll. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 40, par. 2311--3.) The Act explains that the phrase "dating or engagementrelationship" does not include "a casual acquaintanceship nor ordinary fraternization between 2individuals in business or social contexts." 750 ILCS 60/103(6) (West 2002).

The trial court interpreted the phrase "dating relationship" in section 103(6) of the Act asincluding the parties' situation, which was limited to a single date. Defendant disagrees, contendingthat the Act protects only persons who share an intimate, intertwined relationship that could notoccur after just one date. The language in question is unclear, and both interpretations arereasonable. Thus, we find the language ambiguous.

When a statute is ambiguous, we may look beyond the language as written to discern thelegislative intent and consider the purpose of the law, the evils that the law was designed to remedy,and the legislative history. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 542-43 (1997). A review of the legislativehistory does not shed any light on the reason the protections of the Act were extended to persons ina "dating relationship." Nevertheless, the Act instructs us that it "shall be liberally construed andapplied to promote its underlying purposes." 750 ILCS 60/102 (West 2002). Among the purposesdelineated in the Act is to "[r]ecognize domestic violence as a serious crime against the individual andsociety which produces family disharmony in thousands of Illinois families, promotes a pattern ofescalating violence which frequently culminates in intra-family homicide, and creates an emotionalatmosphere that is not conducive to healthy childhood development." 750 ILCS 60/102(1) (West2002). In other words, the Act was created to prevent abuse between persons sharing intimaterelationships. Glater v. Fabianich, 252 Ill. App. 3d 372, 376 (1993).

Because one of the purposes of the Act is to prevent abuse between persons involved inintimate relationships, we cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion that the parties' one dateestablished a "dating relationship" under the Act. In addition to the Act's stated purpose, we findsupport for this resolution in Oriola v. Thaler, 84 Cal. App. 4th 397, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 822 (2000). While considering a similar issue, the Oriola court extensively examined what types of datingrelationships are encompassed by other states' domestic violence protection statutes (DVPS). Oriola,84 Cal. App. 4th at 410-11, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831-32. For instance, in Massachusetts, that state'sDVPS covers persons involved in a "substantive dating or engagement relationship," as determinedby such factors as the amount of time the parties were involved in the relationship and the frequencyof their interaction. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A,