Find Legal Information

22 August 2000

In 1995, plaintiffs, David and Lynn Albee, purchased a parcelof real estate commonly known as 320 Elk Street, Galena, Illinois.In the 1995 quadrennial assessment, the subject property wasassessed at $41,673. For the 1996 tax year, the assessed valuationof the subject property was increased to $65,162. Plaintiffsinitially filed an objection with the Jo Daviess County Board ofReview, which subsequently denied the objection. On November 12, 1997, plaintiffs filed a 1996 tax objection complaint against CarolA. Soat, Jo Daviess County treasurer and ex officio countycollector. Therein, they alleged that the 1996 assessment wasexcessive and incorrect, that the valuation was made withoutstatutory authority, and that Jo Daviess County had "wholly failed,neglected and/or refused to prepare and maintain tax maps contraryto and in violation of 35 ILCS 200/9--35." Plaintiffs' complaintsought a determination that the 1996 assessment and the 1996property taxes were "excessive, incorrect, illegal and void." Thecomplaint further sought a determination of the proper amount ofthe 1996 assessment and the appropriate amount of property taxesfor the 1996 tax year. Finally, plaintiffs asked for an orderdirecting defendant to refund any taxes "adjudged by the Court tobe excessive, illegal, incorrect and void."

Included in discovery were defendant's answers to plaintiffs'requests to admit. Therein, defendant admitted that the 1995assessment of plaintiffs' property was correct and that plaintiffshad not made any alterations or improvements to the property from1995 to 1996. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment,which was fully briefed, and the trial court conducted a hearing onthe motion.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court grantedplaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. In so holding, the trialcourt stated:

"[The 1995] assessed valuation of the property was correct.*** Based on that admission when there aren't any alterationsor additions what's [sic] we're looking at is a situationwhere, as you point out [defense counsel], the court has theauthority to make those changes which need to be made in theinterest of justice. But if the 1995 assessment is correct,and there's been no changes [to the property], then assumingthat it was correct in 1995 and it was just, I think we'restymied to pull it out of the air, and I'm going to grant themotion for summary judgment."

Defendant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal, andplaintiffs filed a timely notice of cross-appeal.

On appeal, defendant argues that she had the authority toreassess plaintiffs' property in a nonquadrennial year and that,accordingly, the trial court's granting of plaintiffs' motion forsummary judgment was improper. On cross-appeal, plaintiffsmaintain that the failure of Jo Daviess County to maintain tax mapsvitiates the entire property tax assessed, levied, and extendedagainst the subject property.

Initially, we note that the appropriate standard of review wasset out by this court in Rivas v. Westfield Homes of Illinois,Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 304, 307-08 (1998):

"Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings,depositions, and admissions on file, together with affidavits,if any, disclose that there is no genuine issue as to anymaterial fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment asa matter of law. [Citation.] While plaintiffs need not provetheir cases at the summary judgment stage, they must comeforward with some facts that would arguably entitle them tojudgment. [Citation.] Indeed, summary judgment is a drasticmeasure and should be granted only if the movant's right tojudgment is clear and free from doubt. [Citation.] Therefore, where a reasonable person can draw divergentinferences from undisputed facts, summary judgment should bedenied. [Citation.] Finally, our review of the trial court'sentry of summary judgment is de novo."

We first address defendant's argument that the trial courterred in granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.Specifically, defendant argues that it had statutory authority toreassess plaintiffs' property in a nonquadrennial year. Plaintiffsrespond that, under the facts of this case, defendant had noauthority to reassess their property.

The Illinois Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS 200/1--1 etseq. (West 1994)) provides in pertinent part:

"[I]n counties having the township form of government andwith less than 3,000,000 inhabitants, the general assessmentyears shall be 1995 and every fourth year thereafter." 35ILCS 200/9--215 (West 1994).

"On or before June 1 in each general assessment year inall counties with less than 3,000,000 inhabitants, *** theassessor *** shall actually view and determine as near aspracticable the value of each property listed for taxation asof January 1 of that year *** and assess the property at 331/3% of its fair cash value ***." 35 ILCS 200/9--155 (West1994).

"The assessment, as modified or equalized or changed asprovided by law, shall be the assessment upon which taxesshall be levied and extended during the general assessmentperiod for which the assessment is made ***." 35 ILCS 200/9--95 (West 1994).

"The chief county assessment officer of any county with lessthan 3,000,000 inhabitants *** may in any year revise andcorrect an assessment as appears to be just." 35 ILCS 200/9--75 (West 1994).

Essentially, defendant maintains that the above-cited languagepermitted it to reassess plaintiffs' property between 1995, thequadrennial year, and 1996, a nonquadrennial year. If anything,this statutory language thoroughly undercuts defendant's position.Section 9--215 indicates that in counties of less than 3 million, the quadrennial assessments will start in 1995 and be in everyfourth year thereafter. Section 9--155 of the Code merely statesthat, at the beginning of the quadrennial year, the assessor willview the property, determine its value, and assess the property at33% of its fair cash value. This section says nothing about anassessor going through this process during a nonquadrennial year.

Section 9--75 permits an assessor to "revise and correct anassessment as appears to be just." 35 ILCS 200/9--75 (West 1994).The assessor does not have the authority to revise or correct. Ifthe legislature so intended it would have so indicated. Thecircumstances of the instant appeal do not require a revision andcorrection of the assessment to cure an "unjust" assessment in1995. The record shows that the reason for the reassessment in1996 was not due to an incorrect assessment in the 1995 quadrennialyear or to changes made to the property.

However, there is support for the defendant's position foundin other sections of the Code, which were not cited to the trialcourt or this court. Section 9--210 provides in pertinent part:

"Equalization by chief county assessment officer;counties of less than 3,000,000. The chief county assessmentofficer in a county with less than 3,000,000 inhabitants shallact as an equalizing authority for each county in which he orshe serves. The officer shall examine the assessments in thecounty and shall equalize the assessments by increasing orreducing the entire assessment of property in the county orany area therein or of any class of property, so that theassessments will be at 33% of fair cash value. Theequalization process and analysis described in this Sectionshall apply to all property except farm and coal propertiesassessed under Sections 10--110 through 10--140 and 10--170through 10--200.

For each township or assessment district in the county,the supervisor of assessments shall annually determine thepercentage relationship between the estimated 33% of thefair cash value of the property and the assessed valuations atwhich the property is listed for each township, multi-townshipor assessment district. To make this analysis, he or sheshall use property transfers, property appraisals, and othermeans as he or she deems proper and reasonable.

With the ratio determined for each township or assessmentdistrict, the supervisor of assessments shall then determinethe percentage to be added to or deducted from the aggregateassessments in each township or assessment district, otherthan property assessed under Sections 10--110 through 10--140and 10--170 through 10--200, in order to produce a ratio ofassessed value to fair cash value of 33%. That percentageshall be issued as an equalization factor for each township orassessment district within each county served by the chiefcounty assessment officer. The assessment officer shall thenchange the assessment of each parcel of property byapplication of the equalization factor." 35 ILCS 200/9--210(West 1994).

This section mandates that the assessor shall annuallydetermine the percentage relationship between 33% of the fair cashvalue of the property and the assessed valuations for eachtownship, multitownship, or district.

The Department of Revenue may order a reassessment by thelocal assessing officers of a given year of all or any class ofproperty in the county or assessing district. 35 ILCS 200/13--10(West 1994). Boards of review are required to apply the sameequalization process based upon sales and other transfers (35 ILCS200/16--65 (West 1994)) as is the Department of Revenue (35 ILCS200/17--5 (West 1994)). The Department of Revenue is required toannually compile sales ratio studies to determine the quality oflocal assessments. Based upon this study, the Department ofRevenue may apply an equalization factor to all property in acounty or assessment district where the Department finds thevaluation to be more or less than 33% of the fair cash value. 35ILCS 200/17--15, 17--20, 17--25 (West 1994). The county clerk,each year, is then required to add or deduct from the assessedvalue of property by applying the equalization factor. 35 ILCS200/17--30 (West 1994). None of the sections cited herein containlanguage that limits their application to quadrennial years.

It is clear that the adoption of this Code is an attempt toequalize the method of valuation of real estate for tax purposes sothat all persons owning property within a specific taxing body'sboundaries will pay the same proportionate share of taxes levied tooperate the taxing body. Plaintiffs' position that reassessmentsare limited to quadrennial years ignores the annual processestablished by the legislature to accomplish equalization.

We cannot determine from the record whether defendant compliedwith section 9--210 of the Code. Pursuant thereto, the assessordoes have the authority to annually change the quadrennialassessment to achieve a 33% fair cash value assessment; however,when doing so the new ratio must be applied uniformly to the entirecounty, township, or district and not to just some of theproperties therein. Based upon the record, there appears to be aquestion of fact as to whether the percentage increase was appliedto the entire township, to an area in the township, or to justcertain properties in the township. In any event, defendant didraise a question of fact relative to compliance with section 9--210. An order allowing summary judgment will be reversed on appealif the reviewing court determines that a genuine issue of materialfact exists. Simon v. Wilson, 291 Ill. App. 3d 495, 509 (1997). Accordingly, the order granting plaintiffs' motion for summaryjudgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Finally, we address plaintiffs' cross-appeal, wherein theycontend that the failure of Jo Daviess County to prepare andmaintain tax maps vitiates the entire property tax "assessed,levied and extended" against the subject parcel of property. Ourperusal of the record indicates that, despite plaintiffs' strenuousefforts, the trial court did not make a ruling on this matter. Asa result, this cross-appeal is not properly before us. We notethat if, upon remand, the trial court finds that defendant had theauthority to reassess plaintiffs' property in a nonquadrennialyear, then it will have to address the issue raised by plaintiffsregarding the tax maps.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuitcourt of Jo Daviess County is reversed, and the cause is remandedfor further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

BOWMAN, P.J., and RAPP, J., concur.