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September 18, 2001

No. 2--00--0491

This matter comes before the court as an interlocutory appealpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). We arepresented with the following certified question:

"Must [a] petitioner for intervention allege thatrepresentation by the State's Attorney is inadequate in a taxrate objection case under Section 23-10 of the Property TaxCode in order to be considered for intervention as of rightunder Section 2-408(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure?"

We answer the question in the negative.

The relevant facts are as follows. A group of taxpayers,including ABN Ambro Services Co., Inc. (objectors), filedobjections in the circuit court of Du Page County. Objectorsalleged that the 1997 tax levy adopted by the Naperville ParkDistrict (Park District) failed to comply with the noticeprovisions of the Truth in Taxation Law (35 ILCS 200/18--55 et seq.(West 1998)). The Property Tax Code (Tax Code) (35 ILCS 200/1--1et seq. (West 1998)) grants the State's Attorney the authority tocompromise and settle tax objections with property owners. See 35ILCS 200/23--30 (West 1998); In re Application of the CountyCollector for Delinquent Taxes, for at Least Five Years Prior to1987, 155 Ill. 2d 520, 527 (1993).

On August 13, 1999, before any tax objections were settled,the Park District filed a petition for leave to intervene, claimingthat it was entitled to intervene as a matter of right undersection 2--408(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Code)(735 ILCS 5/2--408(a)(3) (West 1998)) because it was "so situatedas to be adversely affected by the distribution or otherdisposition of the property subject to the control or dispositionof the court." The Park District complained that, if the taxobjections were upheld or settled, approximately $150,000 would bewithheld from its future tax distributions.

In their answer to the Park District's petition, objectorsresponded, inter alia, that the Park District had no right tointervene. Objectors claimed that the only basis for interventionunder Illinois law is that of inadequate representation by theState's Attorney (see 735 ILCS 5/3--408(a)(2) (West 1998);Channahon Park District v. Bosworth, 145 Ill. App. 3d 820, 825(1986)) and that the Park District did not present any evidencethat the State's Attorney's representation was inadequate.

On November 10, 1999, the trial court denied without prejudicethe Park District's petition to intervene. In response, the ParkDistrict filed a motion entitled "Motion to Reconsider, or, in theAlternative, Motion for Rule 308(a) or 304(a) Finding." Followinga hearing on February 16, 2000, the trial court denied the ParkDistrict's motion. However, it certified the following questionfor review pursuant to Rule 308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)):

"Must the petitioner for intervention allege thatrepresentation by the State's Attorney is inadequate in a taxrate objection case under Section 23-10 of the Property TaxCode in order to be considered for intervention as of rightunder Section 2-408(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure?"

This court denied permissive interlocutory appeal. The ParkDistrict then filed a petition for leave to appeal with our supremecourt. The supreme court issued a supervisory order vacating thiscourt's denial of an interlocutory appeal and directing this courtto allow the application for interlocutory appeal and to considerthe merits of the appeal. ABN Ambro Services Co. v. NapervillePark District, 191 Ill. 2d 525 (2000).

Before we resolve the question certified by the trial court,we address some matters raised by objectors as to why we should notanswer the question. At the outset, objectors claim thataddressing the question certified in this case requires this courtto render an advisory opinion. According to objectors, the ParkDistrict cannot prove that it has property which is "in the custodyor subject to the control or disposition of the court or a courtofficer" as required by section 2--408(a)(3) of the Civil Code (735ILCS 5/2--408(a)(3) (West 1998)). Since the Park District cannotmeet the basic requirements for intervention under section 2--408(a)(3), objectors reason that a ruling on the certified questionwould be advisory. We disagree. The certified question we areasked to answer is whether a party wishing to intervene undersection 2--408(a)(3) of the Civil Code is also required to allegethat the State's Attorney's representation was inadequate. Theissue whether the Park District has met the basic requirementsnecessary to intervene under section 2--408(a)(3) is a whollyseparate matter that is not before us today. The trial courtrecognized as much when, at the hearing on the Park District'smotion to reconsider, it noted that it was not yet deciding whetherthe Park District had any property subject to the control ordisposition of the court.

Objectors also contend that the intervention provision ofsection 2--408(a) of the Civil Code does not apply to tax objectioncases. We disagree. To the extent that the Tax Code does notregulate matters of procedure, the Civil Code applies. See Peopleex rel. Southfield Apartment Co. v. Jarecki, 408 Ill. 266, 274(1951)("where the Revenue Act [the statute that formerly containedthe relevant provisions of the Tax Code] is silent, * * * the CivilPractice Act and rules of court apply"); In re Application of theCook County Collector for Judgment & Order of Sale Against Lands &Lots Returned Delinquent for Nonpayment of General Taxes for theYear 1987 & Prior Years, 271 Ill. App. 3d 12, 16 (1995) ("To theextent that the Revenue Act does not regulate matters of procedure,the Code of Civil Procedure applies"); In re Application ofRosewell, 236 Ill. App. 3d 165, 168-69 (1992). Indeed, section 2--108(b) of the Civil Code provides:

"(b) In proceedings in which the procedure is regulatedby statutes other than those contained in the Act, such otherstatutes control to the extent to which they regulateprocedure but Article II of this Act applies to matters ofprocedure not regulated by such other statutes." 735 ILCS5/1--108(b) (West 1998).

While the Tax Code contains a section relating to procedures forand adjudication of tax objections (see 35 ILCS 200/23--5 et seq.(West 1998)), objectors do not cite, and we have been unable tolocate, any provision in the Tax Code in which intervention isregulated. Accordingly, we find that the Civil Code's interventionprovision applies to proceedings under the Tax Code.

We now address the certified question. The resolution of thecertified question requires us to interpret section 2--408(a) ofthe Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2--408(a)(West 1998)). The fundamentalprinciple of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effectto the intention of the legislature. In re Application of theCounty Collector of Du Page County for Judgment for DelinquentTaxes for the Year 1992, 181 Ill. 2d 237, 244 (1998). Thelegislature's intent is best discerned from the language of thestatute itself. In re Marriage of Devick, 315 Ill. App. 3d 908,915 (2000). Where the statutory language is clear, the court mustgive it effect without resorting to other aids of construction(Devick, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 915) and may not read into the statuteexceptions, conditions, or limitations that the legislature did notexpress (Moon v. Smith, 276 Ill. App. 3d 958, 962 (1995)). Inaddition, we note that statutes pertaining to intervention are tobe liberally construed. In re Application of County Collector ofDu Page County, 63 Ill. App. 3d 8, 11 (1978).

Section 2--408(a) provides:

"