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FOURTH DIVISION
September 16, 2004

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Zurich Insurance Company (Zurich), appeals from the circuit court's entry ofsummary judgment against it in a declaratory judgment action to determine Zurich's obligationsunder a commercial general liability (CGL) policy issued to defendant, Walsh ConstructionCompany of Illinois, Inc. (Walsh). Zurich contends that the circuit court (1) erred in finding thatWalsh adequately complied with the notice conditions of the policy, thereby obligating Zurich todefend it in the underlying litigation; and (2) erred in finding that prejudice was an importantfactor in determining whether Walsh breached the notice conditions of the policy. For thefollowing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

The underlying litigation in this insurance dispute arises from a series of work-relatedaccidents that allegedly occurred during a construction project (the Blue Cross Project) in whichWalsh was serving as the general contractor. Four individuals, including Brent Guptill, TobyAnzivino, Scott Vuletic, and Edward Rau, filed suit against Walsh for injuries sustained whileemployed by Rankin Steel Company, a subcontractor on the Blue Cross Project. Guptill filed hisaction against Walsh on January 20, 1998, with respect to a February 12, 1996 accident. Anzivino filed his action against Walsh on January 26, 1998, with respect to a February 25, 1996accident. Vuletic filed his action against Walsh on November 4, 1999, with respect to an April12, 1996 accident, and Rau filed his action on April 10, 2000, with respect to an April 15, 1996accident.

Walsh was insured for the Blue Cross Project under a "wrap-up" policy issued by RelianceInsurance Company (Reliance). It is undisputed that the Reliance policy provided a coveragelimit of $1 million per occurrence and $2 million aggregate, supplemented by a $100 millionumbrella policy. It is further undisputed that Walsh's first notice that a claim would be filed inconnection with the Blue Cross Project was the filing of the respective complaints by Guptill,Anzivino, Vuletic and Rau. Walsh timely provided notice of the four lawsuits to Reliance andReliance assumed its duty to defend under the terms of its policy.

In addition to the insurance provided by Reliance, Zurich issued a CGL policy to Walshwhich provided a coverage limit of $1 million per occurrence and $2 million aggregate, subject toa $50,000-per-occurrence deductible. The parties appended several endorsements to the policy. Endorsement 23 provides in pertinent part as follows:

"It is agreed that this policy is hereby amended as indicated. Allother terms and conditions of this policy remain unchanged.* * *

INSURED'S INTEREST IN A WRAP-UP OR JOINT VENTUREENDORSEMENT

It is understood and agreed that this policy is amended to includecoverage for the Named Insured, as their interest may appear, inany Wrap-Up or Joint Venture. This insurance is excess of[,] andnon-contributing to[,] any other valid and collectible insurance."

Thus, pursuant to the terms of the endorsement, the parties agree that the coverage provided byZurich was rendered excess to the coverage provided by Reliance with respect to the Blue CrossProject.

The Zurich policy also contains the following relevant conditions:

"3. Insured's Duties in the Event of Occurrence, Claim or Suit.

(a) In the event the named insured, or any insured under thispolicy, learns or is put on notice of any occurrence thatmight reasonably give rise to a claim or potential claim,alone or in combination with other claims or potentialclaims, and in the event of a claim or suit brought againstthe named insured, written notice * * * shall be given by orfor the named insured * * * within fifteen (15) days or assoon as is reasonably practicable thereafter.

(b) If a claim or suit is brought against the named insured, thenamed insured shall immediately forward to the companyevery demand, notice, summons or other process receivedby him or his representative.

* * *

(d) The company may deny coverage with respect to eachoccurrence for which the named insured does not give thecompany notice in strict compliance with the foregoingnotice requirements."

Additionally, endorsement 7 provides in pertinent part that "[i]n the event of anoccurrence, written notice * * * shall be given * * * as soon as practical after notice has beenreceived by the Insured."

Subsequently, during the pendency of the underlying litigation, on October 3, 2001, theCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania entered an order of liquidation for Reliance, rendering itinsolvent. Twelve days later, on October 15, 2001, Walsh notified Zurich of the pending lawsuits,provided Zurich with copies of the complaints, and requested that Zurich defend and indemnify itunder the terms of its policy. Zurich undertook the defense of Walsh in the underlying lawsuitspursuant to a reservation of its rights under the policy.

Thereafter, Zurich filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that Walshbreached the notice conditions of the Zurich policy by failing to provide timely notice of theaccidents and four lawsuits, thereby relieving Zurich of its duty to defend Walsh in connectionwith the underlying litigation. Walsh filed an answer and a counterclaim, seeking a determinationthat the policy did not require notice of a claim until Walsh reasonably believed that the excesscoverage was reasonably likely to be implicated. Subsequently, the trial court denied Zurich'smotion to dismiss the counterclaim and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgmentpursuant to section 2-1005 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2002)). After a hearing on the motions, the trial court granted Walsh's motion forsummary judgment, and entered a judgment against Zurich. Zurich timely filed its notice ofappeal.

ANALYSIS

Zurich contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Walshand against Zurich where Walsh breached the notice conditions of the policy, relieving Zurich ofits duty to defend. Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, andadmissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as toany material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000); Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 335, 775 N.E.2d 987, 994(2002). We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Guillen v. Potomac Insurance Co.of Illinois, 203 Ill. 2d 141, 149, 785 N.E.2d 1, 6 (2003).

In the present case, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and do notdispute the essential facts. Rather, the dispute revolves around the interpretation of the Zurichinsurance policy. The construction of the provisions of an insurance policy is a question of law,subject to de novo review. American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 479-80,687 N.E.2d 72, 75 (1997). In construing the language of the policy, the court's primary objectiveis to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties to the contract. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at479, 687 N.E.2d at 75. In order to ascertain the meaning of the policy's language and the parties'intent, the court must construe the policy as a whole and "take into account the type of insurancepurchased, the nature of the risks involved, and the overall purpose of the contract." Koloms,177 Ill. 2d at 479, 687 N.E.2d at 75. The conditions inserted into insurance policies are to beconstrued most favorably to the insured. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co.,144 Ill. 2d 64, 74, 578 N.E.2d 926, 930 (1991); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 231 Ill. App. 3d 143, 149, 595 N.E.2d 1311, 1315(1992).

Applying these broad principles to the present case, we consider whether Walshadequately complied with the notice provisions in the Zurich policy. Generally, the noticeprovisions in a policy are intended to ensure that the insurer will be able to timely investigate anddefend claims against its insured. See American Country Insurance Co. v. Efficient ConstructionCorp., 225 Ill. App. 3d 177, 181, 587 N.E.2d 1073, 1075 (1992). The notice provisions are notmerely technical requirements but, rather, conditions precedent to the triggering of the insurer'scontractual duties. Northbrook Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Applied Systems, Inc., 313Ill. App. 3d 457, 464, 729 N.E.2d 915, 920-21 (2000); American Mutual Liability Insurance Co.v. Beatrice Co., 924 F. Supp. 861, 874 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Thus, when the insured fails to complywith these provisions, the insurer may be relieved from its duty to defend and indemnify theinsured under the policy. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 324 Ill. App. 3d441, 449, 753 N.E.2d 999, 1005 (2001); Applied Systems, Inc., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 464, 729N.E.2d at 921.

Zurich argues that Walsh breached the notice conditions in the policy where notice of theaccidents was not provided until almost 5