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SECOND DIVISION
December 19, 2000

Plaintiff Zurich Insurance Company ("plaintiff" or "Zurich") appeals from the judgement of the circuit court of CookCounty dismissing its lawsuit as subrogee of Jerome Patrick ("the insured" or "Patrick") against Amcast IndustrialCorporation ("defendant" or "Amcast"). On appeal, Zurich argues that the trial court erred in finding that its suit to recoverfor property damage is barred as res judicata due to an earlier suit by Patrick against Amcast for personal injury arising outof the same accident. We reverse.

The initial facts of this case from Zurich's complaint follow. Zurich is an insurance carrier which insured a truck owned byPatrick. On or about February 22, 1995, Patrick was driving his truck from Amcast's place of business in Wisconsin toCicero, Illinois, hauling cargo which consisted of "baskets of aluminum casting." The cargo in the truck allegedly shiftedduring the trip due to Amcast's negligence in not securing it properly. As a result, Patrick lost control of his truck whichcrashed and rolled over on its side. Zurich subsequently paid Patrick the sum of $21,653.75, for the damage to his truck,pursuant to its obligations under the insurance policy. Zurich then became subrogated to Patrick's right to recover againstAmcast for the damage to Patrick's truck.

The procedural facts of this case are not in dispute. On January 6, 1999, Zurich filed a complaint against Amcast allegingthat Amcast's negligence in failing to properly secure the cargo in Patrick's truck caused the weight of the cargo to shiftduring the trip and the truck to crash. Amcast filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619(4) of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(4)(West 1999)), on May 14, 1999, arguing that the lawsuit was barred by res judicata due toan earlier lawsuit filed against Amcast by Patrick. This earlier lawsuit (the "DuPage litigation") was filed in the circuitcourt of DuPage County on June 16, 1995, and was styled Jerome S. Patrick v. Amcast Industrial Corporation, 96 AR 1718. In its response to the motion to dismiss, Zurich offered an affidavit of the attorney who represented Patrick in the DuPagelawsuit against Amcast. The affidavit averred that even though property damage is mentioned in the DuPage complaint,damages were only recovered for Patrick's personal injuries and the damage to Patrick's eyeglasses. The affidavitdisavowed any recovery for or litigation of the damage to Patrick's vehicle. The DuPage litigation was resolved througharbitration and Patrick was awarded $11,090.

In the instant case, the trial court granted Amcast's motion to dismiss on June 8, 1999. Zurich then made a motion toreconsider on July 7, 1999. In its response to this motion, Amcast included the complaint from the DuPage litigation andnoted that the complaint in the DuPage lawsuit states that, "as a direct and proximate result of one or more of the forgoingnegligent acts or omissions, plaintiff's semi-tractor was damaged so that it was costly to repair." Zurich's motion toreconsider was denied on September 2, 1999. This appeal followed.

"A section 2-619 motion to dismiss affords a defendant a means of obtaining a summary disposition when the plaintiff'sclaim can be defeated as a matter of law or on the basis of easily proved issues of fact." McGee v. State Farm Fire &Casualty Company, 315 Ill. App. 3d 673, 680, 734 N.E.2d 144, 150 (2000). "A section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits allwell-pleaded facts in the complaint" and "[a]ll documents submitted in support of the motion must be considered in a lightmost favorable to the nonmoving party." Ericksen v. Rush Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center, 289 Ill. App. 3d 159,165, 682 N.E.2d 79, 83 (1997). "If a cause of action is dismissed pursuant to a section 2-619 motion, the questions onappeal are (1) whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and (2) whether the defendant is entitled to a judgement as amatter of law." McGee, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 680, 734 N.E.2d at 150. "A reviewing court exercises de novo review of ordersgranting motions to dismiss." Ericksen, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 165, 682 N.E.2d at 83.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court incorrectly applied the doctrine of res judicata in barring its claim. In support, plaintiffcontends that res judicata should not apply here because the DuPage lawsuit involved a different cause of action than theinstant suit which the trial court found to be barred by res judicata. We find that the instant litigation is not barred. Resjudicata will not apply where the prior litigation involved a different cause of action than the litigation which the partyinvoking res judicata intends to terminate. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son v. Manulife Real Estate Company, 238 Ill. App. 3d550, 553, 606 N.E.2d 463, 465 (1992) ("To establish res judicata a party must show *** (3) that the former adjudicationinvolved the same cause of action and the same subject matter as the current case").

In Illinois the test for what constitutes a cause of action under the doctrine of res judicata has undergone a major shift overtime. Although not cited by either of the parties, until very recently, our supreme court's decision in Clancey v. McBride,338 Ill. 35, 169 N.E. 729 (1929), controlled the question as to whether a claim for personal injury would bar a subsequentaction for property damage which arose out of the same incident or vice-versa. The test applied in Clancey is consistentwith the traditional "same evidence" test as originally advocated in the first Restatement of Judgements. Restatement ofJudgements