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SIXTH DIVISION
June 30, 2004

JUSTICE GALLAGHER delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs Karry and Tobey Young appeal from the trial court's dismissal of therespondeat superior and estoppel counts in plaintiffs' second amended complaint. Plaintiffs alsoappeal the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of defendant Allstate InsuranceCompany (Allstate) and denial of partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. This casearose due to a dispute between the parties regarding the type of insurance policy issued toplaintiffs and the amount of coverage provided under that policy. In this appeal, plaintiffs firstcontend that the trial court erroneously ruled that Allstate issued an actual cash value policy andnot a stated value policy to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erroneouslydismissed the respondeat superior and estoppel counts with prejudice because the dismissal ofthese counts was based on the trial court's erroneous ruling that Allstate issued an actual cashvalue policy. Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court erred in granting Allstate's motion forsummary judgment based on the inclusion of an appraisal clause in the policy and that section155 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2000)) preempts the Consumer Fraudand Deceptive Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2000)) count. Plaintiffs further contend that the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion for partialsummary judgment because Allstate's failure to timely pay the undisputed portion of theinsurance claim was unreasonable and vexatious. For the reasons stated below, we affirm thejudgment of the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. In 1996, plaintiffs purchased a 1976Cadillac Eldorado convertible and fully restored the vehicle. Plaintiffs negotiated and procured aphysical-damage insurance policy for the vehicle through Allstate's agent, Jacqueline Walton(Walton).⁽¹⁾ Plaintiffs informed Walton that the appraised value of the restored vehicle wasapproximately $30,000. Walton did not request additional information regarding the vehicle'svalue or conduct any further investigation concerning the vehicle's condition.

Plaintiffs insured seven vehicles with Allstate under the policy at issue in this appeal. The vehicles covered included "classic" and typical vehicles. The 1976 Cadillac and 1953Mercedes would be considered "classic" vehicles. The 1994 Lexus, 1997 Chevrolet truck, 1986Jaguar, 1995 Corvette and 1997 Oldsmobile mini-van would be considered typical vehicles. Theauto collision and auto comprehensive coverage limits relating to the 1995 Corvette were actualcash value; for the 1976 Cadillac, those limits were $30,000 or actual cash value; and for the1953 Mercedes, those limits were $50,000 or actual cash value.

The 1976 Cadillac Eldorado was involved in a collision on July 19, 1998. On or aboutAugust 5, 1998, Allstate declared the vehicle a "total loss." Plaintiffs submitted a claim toAllstate for $30,000 in benefits. Allstate responded that the policy covered the actual cash valueof the vehicle at the time of loss. Allstate offered plaintiffs $8,685 to settle the property damageclaim. Plaintiffs responded that they restored the vehicle and believed they purchased a statedvalue policy insuring the vehicle for $30,000. Allstate then offered plaintiffs $9,600 to settle theclaim. Plaintiffs rejected this offer. Both parties arranged for the vehicle's appraisal, whichresulted in an appraised value of $12,000 on October 2, 1998. On June 28, 2000, Allstate sentplaintiffs' counsel a check for $12,000 as satisfaction of the undisputed amount.

Plaintiffs retained counsel because they insisted that the policy provided stated valuecoverage of $30,000, but Allstate insisted it was liable for the vehicle's actual cash value at thetime of loss, which was appraised at $12,000.

Plaintiffs alternatively contended that if Allstate issued an actual cash value policy, thenWalton was negligent for failing to procure the type and amount of coverage requested. Plaintiffs contacted Allstate and requested payment of $30,000 for the claim based on its agent'snegligent actions. Allstate denied the claim. As a result, plaintiffs filed the underlying suit.

On July 19, 1999, plaintiffs filed a complaint against Allstate and Walton alleging breachof contract (count I), negligence (count II) and bad faith (count III). On February 1, 2000,plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging breach of contract (count I), negligence (count II),bad faith (count III), estoppel (count IV) and consumer fraud (count V). On November 14, 2000,plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint alleging breach of contract (count I), respondeatsuperior (count II), bad faith (count III), estoppel (count IV) and consumer fraud (count V). OnMarch 12, 2001, Allstate filed its answer and affirmative defenses to the bad faith and consumerfraud counts of plaintiffs' second amended complaint, and a motion to strike and dismiss therespondeat superior and estoppel counts.

On August 9, 2001, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion and order dismissingthe respondeat superior and estoppel counts with prejudice. On July 2, 2002, Allstate filed itsmotion for summary judgment. On August 1, 2002, plaintiffs filed their motion for partialsummary judgment. On January 22, 2003, the trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for partialsummary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate and against plaintiffs onall pending counts of plaintiffs' second amended complaint. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs raise three issues on appeal. First, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred infinding that the policy was an actual cash value policy and not a stated value policy. Second,plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the respondeat superior and estoppelcounts with prejudice. Finally, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting Allstate'smotion for summary judgment and denying plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.

A. Nature of the Policy Issued

Plaintiffs' first issue on appeal is that the trial court erroneously held plaintiffs procuredan actual cash value and not a stated value policy from Allstate. Plaintiffs' contention that astated value policy was procured rests with documents contained in the record, primarily fourdocuments generated by Allstate and the language included on the policy declaration page. First,plaintiffs rely on a letter dated December 17, 1998, written by Allstate that stated in part: "[W]ebelieve Jacqueline Walton acted in good faith when she sold a stated value policy to Mr. Young. *** If you have any further questions regarding our agent, or the stated value policy pleasecontact me at 630-932-6124." Second, plaintiffs rely on a claim diary entry dated September 10,1998, regarding an internal conversation with Walton concerning the loss that stated in part:"[A]sked why she chose stated value policy over regular collision for the car. She states insdstated it was a classic and he had it appraised at $30,000 ***." Plaintiffs next rely on the policydeclaration pages, which provide different collision and comprehensive coverage for the two"classic" vehicles and the other typical vehicles. Plaintiffs contend that the premium they paidfor the 1976 Cadillac was comparable to the premium for the 1995 Corvette. Plaintiffs suggestthis creates an inference that Allstate valued the vehicle for premium purposes at a value inexcess of $30,000. Finally, plaintiffs compare Allstate's underwriting file for the 1995 Corvette,which leaves the stated value line blank, whereas the stated value line relating to the 1976Cadillac was filled in with a value of $30,000. Plaintiffs contend that these four documentsconclusively established that Allstate sold plaintiffs a stated value policy.

In response, Allstate contends that the policy's language is unambiguous and the policy isan actual cash value policy. Allstate claims the policy is unambiguous because it contained thewords "$30,000 or actual cash value" under the "Limits" heading on the declaration page. Allstate also claims that if a court can determine the meaning of the language used in a contract,the express provisions govern and no construction or inquiry regarding intent is required. Brzozowski v. Northern Trust Co., 248 Ill. App. 3d 95, 99, 618 N.E.2d 405, 409 (1993). Allstatefurther claims that under the "four corners rule," a written agreement must be presumed to speakthe intention of the parties who signed it and the intentions regarding its execution must bedetermined from the language used, unchanged by extrinsic evidence. Air Safety, Inc. v.Teachers Realty Corp., 185 Ill. 2d 457, 462, 706 N.E.2d 882, 884 (1999). Since the languageused in the policy is unambiguous, Allstate claims, it is unnecessary to consider the documentsplaintiffs identified in their brief, such as the letter dated December 17, 1998, and internal diarynotes, to determine the policy's meaning.

Allstate further responds that several provisions included in the policy are inconsistentand contradictory with those included in a stated value policy. Allstate claims that interpretingthe policy as a stated value policy renders multiple provisions of the contract meaningless andthe word "limit" on the declaration page must be ignored. Specifically, Allstate points to thelimits of liability provision, which states:

Limits of Liability

Our limit of liability is the actual cash value of the property ordamaged part of the property at the time of loss. The actual cash valuewill be reduced by the deductible for each coverage as shown on thepolicy declarations. However, our liability will not exceed what itwould cost to repair or replace the property or part with other of likekind and quality. Our limit for loss to any covered trailer notdescribed on the policy declarations is $500.

Allstate also points to the right to appraisal provision, which states:

Right to Appraisal

Both you and Allstate have a right to demand an appraisal of the loss. Eachwill appoint and pay a qualified appraiser. Other appraisal expenses will beshared equally. The two appraisers, or a judge of record, will choose anumpire. Each appraiser will state the actual cash value and the amount of loss. If they disagree, they'll submit their differences to the umpire. A writtendecision by any two of these three persons will determine the amount of loss.

Allstate claims that characterizing the policy as a stated value policy renders the right to appraisalprovision and plaintiffs' participation in the appraisal process meaningless because an appraisal isunnecessary if Allstate's coverage liability is fixed at $30,000 as plaintiffs claim. Allstate maintainsthe only reasonable interpretation of the phrase "Limits: $30,000 or actual cash value" is that Allstatewill pay the vehicle's actual cash value not to exceed $30,000, which is consistent with the policy'slimits of liability and right to appraisal provisions. Allstate also rejects plaintiffs' interpretation ofthe word "limit" as meaning a minimum amount of indemnity. Allstate claims that the policy is anactual cash value policy as identified by the clear and unambiguous language used in the policy.

Unambiguous clauses must be enforced according to their terms. Jones v. State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Co., 289 Ill. App. 3d 903, 910, 682 N.E.2d 238, 244 (1997). Suggestions of creative possibilities regarding the interpretation of a contract do not render itambiguous, but rather, the relevant inquiry to determine if ambiguity exists is whether thecontract's provisions are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. See Hall v. GeneralCasualty Co. of Illinois, 328 Ill. App. 3d 655, 658, 766 N.E.2d 680, 682 (2002); Lapham-HickeySteel Corp. v. Protection Mutual Insurance Co., 166 Ill.2d 520, 529, 655 N.E.2d 842, 846(1995). Controversy between the parties regarding the meaning of a provision also does notrender the provision ambiguous. See General Insurance Co. of America v. Robert B. McManus,Inc., 272 Ill. App. 3d 510, 514, 650 N.E.2d 1080, 1083 (1995). When interpreting contractprovisions, words are given their plain and ordinary meaning and courts should refrain fromadopting interpretations resulting in distortions and creating ambiguities where none exist. Straus v. Allstate Insurance Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 289, 293-94, 378 N.E.2d 1308, 1311-12 (1978). Interpreting a contract requires an examination of the complete document and not an isolated partor parts. Straus, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 292, 378 N.E.2d at 1311. A stated value policy differs froman actual cash value policy because the parties predetermine the insurance company's liability,whereas the company's liability under an actual cash value policy is determined after the lossbased on the vehicle's actual cash value immediately before the loss. Allied American InsuranceCo. v. Washburn, 159 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 1039, 513 N.E.2d 50, 53 (1987).

We agree with Allstate that the policy is unambiguous and is an actual cash value policy. We note that stated under the "Limits" heading in the policy's declaration is "$30,000 or actualcash value." We also take note of the policy's language set forth in the "Limits of Liability"provision, which states in part: "Our limit of liability is the actual cash value of the property ordamaged part of the property at the time of loss. *** However, our liability will not exceedwhat it would cost to repair or replace the property or part with other of like kind and quality." We conclude that the language in this provision, taken in conjunction with the language on thedeclaration page, supports Allstate's interpretation that the policy is an actual cash value policy. We also agree with Allstate that plaintiffs' interpretation of the policy would render the right toappraisal provision meaningless and would be inconsistent with plaintiffs' actions ofparticipating in an appraisal and then contesting the appraised value. Moreover, if we were toadopt plaintiffs' interpretation of the policy, the words "Limits" on the declaration page and"actual cash value" on the declaration page and in the limit of liability provision would berendered superfluous.

We are cognizant that when interpreting a contract, the words used are given their plainand ordinary meaning. Straus, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 293-94, 378 N.E.2d at 1312. The plain andordinary meaning of the word "limit" is the "prescribed maximum or minimum amount, quantity,or number." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1312 (1993). The word "maximum"is defined as "the greatest quantity or value attainable in a given case." Webster's Third NewInternational Dictionary 1396 (1993). The word "liability" is defined as "the quality or state ofbeing liable." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1302 (1993). "Liable" is defined as"bound or obligated according to law or equity." Webster's Third New International Dictionary,1302 (1993). Based on the plain and ordinary definition of the words "limit," "maximum" and"liability," we agree with Allstate and the trial court's interpretation that Allstate's liability underthe policy is actual cash value and the greatest amount of its liability is $30,000 or actual cashvalue. See Seckinger-Lee Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 1348,1351-52 (N.D. Ga.1998). Moreover, using the ordinary definition of those words in the context of an insurancepolicy supports Allstate's interpretation that the most Allstate will pay to settle a claim is theactual cash value of the vehicle not to exceed $30,000. Despite plaintiffs' contention, insertingwords or changing the order of words is not required to reach this conclusion; rather, we mustlook to the definition and meaning of the words used in the policy to interpret and understand thecoverage provided under the policy. Again, to adopt plaintiffs' interpretation of the policy wouldrequire us to ignore the plain and ordinary meaning of the following words purposely inserted inthe policy: "our limit of liability is the actual cash value" and the word "limit" on the declarationpage. Accordingly, we reject plaintiffs' interpretation of the policy as a stated value policy.

We are also mindful that an insurance policy is to be interpreted by examining thecomplete document and not isolated parts. Straus, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 292, 378 N.E.2d at 1311. Examining the complete policy, including the policy's declaration, the limit of liability provisionand the right to appraisal provision, we fail to detect ambiguity in the meaning of the words usedin the complete policy. While we acknowledge plaintiffs' interpretation of the policy, theirinterpretation creates ambiguity where it does not exist. See Straus, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 293-94,378 N.E.2d at 1312. Plaintiffs' mistaken belief that the actual cash value of the vehicle was$30,000 also does not create an ambiguity regarding the policy's meaning. Because we concludethat the meaning of the policy can be determined on the face of the policy, it is unnecessary toconsider the extrinsic documents plaintiffs point to in their brief generated subsequent to theissuance of the policy to assist in determining the policy's meaning. Air Safety, Inc., 185 Ill. 2dat 462-63, 706 N.E.2d at 884. Based on the ordinary, plain meaning of the words used in thepolicy, we agree with the trial court's finding that Allstate issued an actual cash value policy toplaintiffs.

B. Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs' next issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in dismissing the respondeatsuperior and estoppel counts of the second amended complaint with prejudice because the rulingwas based upon the trial court's erroneous finding that the policy was unambiguously an actualcash value policy. In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)), the court "must accept as true all well-pleaded factsin the complaint and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom." Feltmeier v.Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 263, 267, 798 N.E.2d 75, 79 (2003). The court should grant the motion ifthe complaint fails to state a cause of action on which relief can be granted after viewing theallegations in the complaint in light most favorable to the plaintiff. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d at 267,798 N.E.2d at 79. We review a section 2-615 dismissal de novo. Weis v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co., 333 Ill. App. 3d 402, 406, 776 N.E.2d 309, 311 (2002).

Plaintiffs contend as a preliminary matter that the trial court erred in finding that Waltondid not breach a duty to plaintiffs because the trial court based this finding on its prior erroneousfinding that the policy's language was unambiguously an actual cash value policy. Beforeaddressing the elements of the respondeat superior and estoppel counts, plaintiffs in their briefaddressed the trial court's finding that the policy's language was not ambiguous. Plaintiffscontend that the discrepancies in the policy language and declarations, in conjunction withAllstate's letter confirming Walton sold plaintiffs a stated value policy, should have beeninterpreted and construed in favor of plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs set forth six contentions demonstrating that the policy was ambiguous andmisleading and therefore should have been construed in plaintiffs' favor. For brevity purposes,each of these six contentions is summarized as follows: (1) according to the general rules ofcontract construction, words should be given their plain, ordinary and popular meaning andwords susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation should be construed in favor of theinsured and against the insurer that drafted the policy; (2) more than one reasonableinterpretation of the phrase "$30,000 or actual cash value" is possible; (3) ambiguity in the policyshould have been construed in favor of plaintiffs; (4) use of the conjunction "or" in the phrase"$30,000 or actual cash value" means that each part of the phrase should be taken separately; (5)the trial court is prohibited from rewriting insurance policies by reversing the order in which keyterms appear in the policy, ignoring the disjunctive "or" and substituting the conjunctive andlimiting phrase "not to exceed"; and (6) a policyholder's obligation to read and inform the insurerof mistakes in the policy does not apply to ambiguous policy terms. Plaintiffs argue that thesesix contentions are sufficient to support a finding that the trial court erred in ruling the policy'slanguage was unambiguous and that judgment should have been entered in favor of plaintiffs.

We recognize and have considered each of plaintiffs' contentions and the underlying rulesof law set forth by plaintiffs. These contentions raised by plaintiffs are related to plaintiffs' firstissue on appeal regarding whether an actual cash value or stated value policy was issued. A re-analysis of the policy's language is not now necessary, and we accordingly adopt and restate ourconclusion that the policy provided for actual cash value coverage and was not ambiguous.

Plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the respondeat superiorcount because a cause of action for respondeat superior based on negligence was sufficientlypled. To establish a cause of action based on negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) theexistence of a duty owed to plaintiff; (2) a breach of the duty; and (3) injury proximatelyresulting from the breach. Bajwa v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 208 Ill. 2d 414, 421, 804N.E.2d 519, 526 (2004). An agent's duties to a prospective insured are to promptly evaluate theinsurance application by providing coverage for the applicant or notifying the applicant ofrejection of coverage to prevent the insured from being harmed by a delay in seeking coverageelsewhere or from feeling a false sense of security. Wheaton National Bank v. Dudek, 59 Ill.App. 3d 970, 972, 376 N.E.2d 633, 635 (1978).

Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in finding that Walton, the insurance agent, didnot breach a duty to plaintiffs. An independent insurance agent may owe duties to both theinsurance company and insured. A&B Freight Line, Inc. v. Ryan, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 1097,576 N.E.2d 563, 566 (1991). When an insurance agent's negligent actions cause damage to aninsured, the agent can be liable to the insured for the loss sustained. See Perelman v. Fisher, 298Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1011-12, 700 N.E.2d 189, 192 (1998). To recover for the loss sustained, theinsured must prove that the agent negligently performed his duty to secure the type of coveragerequested by the insured. Perelman, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1012, 700 N.E.2d at 192. Plaintiffscontend that Walton, by her failure to procure for plaintiffs the stated value coverage negotiated,promised and paid for, breached her duty to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim that they sufficiently pleda cause of action for respondeat superior based on negligence because Walton had a duty of careto plaintiffs that was breached by her failure to provide a stated value policy for plaintiffs,plaintiffs were damaged as a result of the breach, and Allstate conceded that Walton was actingwithin the scope of her employment and was Allstate's agent.

Plaintiffs also claim that the trial court erred in dismissing the respondeat superior countbased on plaintiffs' alleged failure to read the policy because the failure to read a policy is "nevercontributory negligence as a matter of law." Black v. Illinois Fair Plan Ass'n, 87 Ill. App. 3d1106, 1111, 409 N.E.2d 549, 553 (1980). In support of this claim, plaintiffs rely on Black v.Illinois Fair Plan Ass'n, 87 Ill. App. 3d 1106, 1111, 409 N.E.2d 549, 553 (1980), and Perelmanv. Fisher, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 700 N.E.2d 189 (1998). In Black, the insured procured aninsurance policy from an insurance broker who became the insured's agent thereby creating afiduciary relationship between the insurance broker and the insured. See Black, 87 Ill. App. 3d at1109-10, 409 N.E.2d at 551-52. This court in Black held that due to the insurance agent'sfiduciary duty to the insured and because the policy was not being altered to prejudice a party tothe contract, the insured's failure to read the contract and identify errors in its basic terms couldnever be contributory negligence as a matter of law. Black, 87 Ill. App. 3d at 1111, 409 N.E.2dat 553. Adopting its earlier holding in Black, this court in Perelman held that an insured's failureto read and understand the terms in a policy procured by his broker was not an absolute bar to theinsured's right to recover against his broker based on the broker's breach of a fiduciary duty. Perelman, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1013, 700 N.E.2d at 193. Relying on Perelman and Black,plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the respondeat superior count due toplaintiffs' failure to read the policy and identify discrepancies between their understanding ofcoverage and the coverage provided under the policy.

Allstate responds that the trial court properly dismissed the respondeat superior countbecause Allstate did not owe a duty to plaintiffs. Allstate claims plaintiffs' pleadingsdemonstrate Allstate provided plaintiffs with insurance coverage because the pleadings stated inpart: "in the valid and enforceable policy attached hereto as Exhibit 2." If an exhibit attached to apleading is inconsistent with the exhibit, the exhibit controls over the pleading. Johnson v.Johnson, 244 Ill. App. 3d 518, 523, 614 N.E.2d 348, 352 (1993). Allstate contends that theexhibit attached to plaintiffs' pleading was unambiguous regarding the type of coverage providedunder the policy. Allstate also contends that plaintiffs had the responsibility to read the policyand to inform the insurer of any discrepancy prior to filing a claim. Floral Consultants, Ltd. v.Hanover Insurance Co., 128 Ill. App. 3d 173, 176, 470 N.E.2d 527, 529 (1984).

We agree with Allstate that the cause of action for respondeat superior was notsufficiently pled because plaintiffs failed to set forth a duty Walton owed to plaintiffs. "A brokerowes a duty to the insured; an agent owes a duty to the insurer." Farmers Automobile InsuranceAss'n v. Gitelson, 344 Ill. App. 3d 888, 892, 801 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (2003). An independentbroker may act as agent of the insurer and insured in certain circumstances. Gitelson, 344 Ill.App. 3d at 892, 801 N.E.2d at 1068. Determining whether a person is acting as agent or brokeridentifies to whom the individual owes a duty. Gitelson, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 892, 801 N.E.2d at1068. Such a determination requires analysis of the following four factors: "(1) who first set theagent in motion; (2) who controlled the agent's action; (3) who paid the agent; and (4) whoseinterests the agent was protecting." Gitelson, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 892, 801 N.E.2d at 1068.

Application of these four factors to the instant case supports a conclusion that Waltonacted as Allstate's agent and accordingly, owed a duty to Allstate and not plaintiffs. Based on therecord in this case, we conclude that Walton had a fixed and permanent relationship with Allstatebecause the policy declarations list Walton as an Allstate agent. Moreover, plaintiffs did notdispute that Walton was an Allstate agent. As such, we can infer Allstate first set Walton inmotion to provide coverage to a prospective insured, controlled her actions and paid her, and shein turn protected Allstate's interests. Since Walton is an insurance agent with a fixed andpermanent relation to Allstate, Walton has duties and allegiances to Allstate. See Galiher v.Spates, 129 Ill. App. 2d 204, 207, 262 N.E.2d 626, 628 (1970). The extent of an agent'sresponsibility to a prospective insured is to promptly provide insurance coverage or to inform theparty of the rejection of coverage. In the instant case, despite the dispute concerning the amountof insurance coverage, plaintiffs received automobile damage insurance. Thus, plaintiffs wereinsured for automobile damage under the policy. Therefore, we reject plaintiffs' contention thatWalton owed and breached a duty of care to plaintiffs. We also find plaintiffs' reliance on Blackand Perelman misplaced. This court in Black and Perelman concluded that the individual whosold the insured the insurance policy was the insured's agent and owed the insured a fiduciaryduty. Here, unlike in Black and Perelman, we conclude that Walton was Allstate's agent and hada fiduciary relationship with Allstate, not plaintiffs. Given this disparity in the facts of this casewith Black and Perelman, we do not find Black and Perelman dispositive. Since we decideplaintiffs failed to sufficiently plead a cause of action for which relief can be granted based onrespondeat superior, the trial court properly dismissed this count.

Plaintiffs next contend that a cause of action for estoppel was sufficiently pled and thetrial court erred in dismissing this count. To prevail in a cause of action for estoppel, a plaintiffmust show: "(1) he was misled by the acts or statements of the insurer or its agents (2) relianceby the insured on the representations of the insurer (3) the reliance was reasonable and (4) thereliance was to the detriment of the insured." Meier v. Aetna Life & Casualty Standard FireInsurance Co., 149 Ill. App. 3d 932, 938, 500 N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (1986). In determiningwhether a claim for estoppel can be established, the reasonableness of the insured's reliance mustbe examined. Meier, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 938-39, 500 N.E.2d at 1099. A plaintiff bringing acause of action based on estoppel ' "cannot shut his eyes to obvious facts, or neglect to seekinformation that is easily accessible, and then charge his ignorance to others." ' [citations.] Hubble v. O'Connor, 291 Ill. App. 3d 974, 987, 684 N.E.2d 816, 825-26 (1997). To prevail onan estoppel theory, "the plaintiff must have 'had no knowledge or means of knowing the truefacts.' " [citations.] Hubble, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 987, 684 N.E.2d at 826.

Plaintiffs claim that each element for estoppel was established. First, plaintiffs contendthat they were mislead by Walton and Allstate's acts and statements because Walton offered tosell them stated value coverage in the amount of $30,000. Second, plaintiffs contend they reliedon Walton's representation and paid enhanced premiums for more than a year. Third, plaintiffscontend that the reliance was reasonable because Walton indicated that plaintiffs purchased astated value policy, Allstate did not request additional information regarding the vehicle's valueor condition prior to issuing the policy and the vehicle underwent a $20,000 restoration prior tothe purchase of insurance. Fourth and finally, plaintiffs contend that the reliance was detrimentalbecause Allstate offered $12,000, or actual cash value, to settle the claim.

Plaintiffs also rely on Meier v. Aetna Life & Casualty Standard Fire Insurance Co., 149Ill. App. 3d 932, 500 N.E.2d 1096 (1986), to support their position that an insured can bring acause of action for estoppel against an insurer. The insurance agent in Meier contacted theinsured and offered to sell $5,000 of stated value insurance for a vehicle as inducement to changeinsurance companies. See Meier, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 935, 500 N.E.2d at 1097. In Meier, theinsurer offered $2,000 in settlement of the insured's claim after the vehicle was involved in acollision, but the insured rejected the offer, contending that the vehicle was insured for $5,000. Meier, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 936, 500 N.E.2d at 1098. The trial court awarded the insured $5,000. See Meier, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 940, 942, 500 N.E.2d at 1100, 1102. This court affirmed the trialcourt's ruling reasoning that the insurer was estopped from denying the coverage amount underthe stated value policy and the insurer's actions of delaying settlement amounted to vexatious andunreasonable conduct. See Meier, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 940, 942, 500 N.E.2d at 1100, 1102. Plaintiffs claim that similar to the insured in Meier, plaintiffs were misled by Walton intobelieving a stated value policy was procured, which estops Allstate from challenging the $30,000benefits provided by the policy. Plaintiffs also claim that the trial court failed to comply with thelimitations of a motion to dismiss relating to the estoppel count, as well as the respondeatsuperior count, because the trial court ignored well-pled facts in the second amended complaintand the pleadings and supporting documents should have been interpreted in the light mostfavorable to plaintiffs.

Allstate responds that the trial court properly dismissed the estoppel count of the secondamended complaint because no facts could be pled entitling plaintiffs to relief. Allstate claimsthat plaintiffs attempted to estop Allstate from relying on the appraisal to determine the amountof indemnification under the policy. Allstate argues that an insured attempting to deny theeffectiveness of a part of an insurance policy has a duty to read the policy and inform the insurerof any discrepancy prior to filing a claim. Floral Consultants, Ltd., 128 Ill. App. 3d at 176, 470N.E.2d at 529. Allstate contends that plaintiffs neglected this duty even though they had accessto the policy, which contained clear and unambiguous language. Allstate also contends thatplaintiffs participated in an appraisal process to determine the vehicle's value at the time of loss,which is inconsistent with plaintiffs' position that a stated value policy was issued. Allstatefurther contends that plaintiffs are attempting to use estoppel to increase the coverage providedunder the policy from the vehicle's actual cash value of $12,000 to $30,000, which is prohibited. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Filos, 285 Ill. App. 3d 528, 534, 673 N.E.2d 1099, 1103(1996). Thus, Allstate claims that the trial court properly dismissed the estoppel count.

Allstate further responds that the trial court properly complied with the limitations of amotion to dismiss. Allstate argues that facts included in an exhibit negate inconsistentallegations of fact included in the body of a complaint. Metrick v. Chatz, 266 Ill. App. 3d 649,653, 639 N.E.2d 198, 162 (1994). Allstate claims that the policy attached as an exhibit toplaintiffs' pleadings provides for an appraisal to determine the actual cash value of the vehicle,which is in direct contradiction with plaintiffs' allegation that they purchased a stated valuepolicy. Thus, Allstate contends, plaintiffs' second amended complaint and related exhibitsdemonstrate Allstate was entitled to judgment and the trial court properly dismissed the countswith prejudice.

We agree with Allstate that the trial court properly dismissed the estoppel count. Toaddress this contention, we must determine whether the facts set forth in plaintiffs' pleadingsdemonstrate that plaintiffs' reliance on Walton's acts or statements was reasonable. Wepreviously concluded that the policy clearly and unambiguously provided for actual cash valuecoverage and not stated value coverage. Since plaintiffs possessed a copy of the policy, plaintiffshad the ability to learn of and to determine the policy's coverage in the event of a total loss. Aparty neglecting to seek easily accessible information or ignoring obvious facts cannot prevail onan estoppel theory. See Hubble, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 987, 684 N.E.2d at 825-26. We agree withthe trial court that plaintiffs' failure to read the unambiguous policy and inform Allstate of anydiscrepancies in the policy and their understanding of coverage precludes plaintiffs from relyingon estoppel. Given the information accessible to plaintiffs regarding the policy's coverage, weconclude that plaintiffs' reliance was unreasonable.

Also, we find Meier distinguishable from the instant case. Unlike in Meier, here, Waltondid not contact plaintiffs in an attempt to lure plaintiffs from another insurance company. Alsounlike Meier, the insurance policy in the instant case does not contain express languageindicating that the policy issued was for stated value insurance; rather, the policy unambiguouslyprovided for actual cash value indemnification. Therefore, plaintiffs' reliance on Meier ismisplaced. We also disagree with plaintiffs that Walton's lack of further investigation regardingthe vehicle's value demonstrates that their reliance was reasonable. Moreover, we agree withAllstate that plaintiffs' participation in the appraisal process but rejection of the appraised valueis an attempt to increase insurance coverage, which cannot be accomplished through an estoppelclaim. See Meier, 149 Ill. App. 3d 932, 500 N.E.2d 1096. Due to plaintiffs' unreasonablereliance, no facts could be pled entitling plaintiffs to relief on an estoppel theory and, therefore,the trial court properly dismissed the estoppel count.

We further agree with Allstate that the trial court properly dismissed the respondeatsuperior and estoppel counts from the second amended complaint. Interpreting all pleadings andrelated exhibits in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, we have concluded that the policy wasunambiguous and an actual cash value policy for which no relief could be granted to plaintiffsunder a respondeat superior or an estoppel theory. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed thesecounts from the second amended complaint with prejudice.

C. Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs last issue on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment infavor of Allstate and denying partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contendthat the trial court erred in granting Allstate's motion for summary judgment because the findingwas based on the prior erroneous finding that the policy was unambiguously an actual cash valuepolicy. Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court erred in not granting partial summary judgmentin favor of plaintiffs because Allstate's failure to timely pay the undisputed portion of the claimviolated Illinois Department of Insurance Regulations and Illinois case law.

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavitsdemonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law. Progressive Insurance Co. v. Universal Casualty Co., 347 Ill. App.3d 10, 17, 807 N.E.2d 577, 583 (2004), citing 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002). To determineif a genuine issue of material facts is present, courts must construe the pleadings, depositions,admissions and affidavits in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb InsuranceCo. v. DeChambre, ___ Ill. App. 3d ___, ___, 808 N.E.2d 37, 40 (2004). We review a trialcourt's granting or dismissal of summary judgment motions de novo. DeChambre, ___ Ill. App.3d at ___, 808 N.E.2d at 40.

Turning to plaintiffs' first summary judgment contention, plaintiffs set forth three claimssupporting its position that the trial court erred in granting Allstate's summary judgment motion. First, the trial court erred in granting this motion because the trial court failed to considermaterial facts presented in the pleadings. Second, the appraisal clause included in the policydoes not support the granting of summary judgment in favor of Allstate. Finally, section 155does not preempt plaintiffs' cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act. We will now addresseach of these contentions.

Plaintiffs first contend that the trial court was obligated to review the facts that arose inthis case after the parties began discovery. Plaintiffs contend that the order dismissing therespondeat superior and estoppel counts was an interlocutory order that did not dispose of all theparties' rights and liabilities and no discovery was yet conducted when the trial court entered theorder. See Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Austin, 147 Ill. App. 3d 26, 31, 497 N.E.2d 790,794 (1986). However, when the motion for summary judgment was filed, some discovery wasconducted. Plaintiffs contend that Allstate's documents filed in response to production requestsand answers to interrogatories demonstrated that Allstate issued plaintiffs a stated value policy. Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court ignored relevant facts that raised genuine issues ofmaterial fact sufficient to preclude the granting of summary judgment. Plaintiffs further contendthat the trial court disregarded the contradictory positions that Allstate presented during litigationregarding the issuance of a stated value policy, which is apparent from the claim file, Allstate'scorrespondence and discovery conducted during litigation.

Plaintiffs next contend that inclusion of the appraisal provision does not justify grantingsummary judgment in favor of Allstate on the breach of contract, Consumer Fraud Act andsection 155 claims. Plaintiffs contend that the appraisal provision was inapplicable to thoseclaims because the claims are premised on Allstate's failure to honor the stated value policyissued to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cite Lundy v. Farmers Group, Inc., 322 Ill. App. 3d 214, 219, 750N.E.2d 314, 318 (2001), in which this court held that inclusion of a provision in a contract doesnot establish that the parties' dispute is covered by the provision. Plaintiffs contend that ampleevidence existed demonstrating that Allstate sold plaintiffs a stated value policy, which rendersthe appraisal clause meaningless. Thus, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in grantingAllstate's motion for summary judgment based on the appraisal provision included in the policy.

Plaintiffs' last contention regarding the propriety of the trial court's granting summaryjudgment in favor of Allstate is that section 155 does not preempt plaintiffs' cause of actionunder the Consumer Fraud Act. The relevant inquiry regarding a Consumer Fraud Act claim iswhether the alleged conduct implicates consumer protection issues. Central Diversey M.R.I.Center, Inc. v. Medical Management Sciences, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 575, 578 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Section 155 "provides an extracontractual remedy for policyholders who have sufferedunreasonable and vexatious conduct by insurers with respect to a claim under the policy." Cramer v. Insurance Exchange Agency, 174 Ill. 2d 513, 523-24, 675 N.E.2d 897, 902 (1996). Section 155 sets forth a remedy for "insurer misconduct that does not rise to the level of a well-established tort." Cramer, 174 Ill. 2d at 527, 675 N.E.2d at 904.

Plaintiffs claim that Allstate's reliance on Cramer v. Insurance Exchange Agency, 174 Ill.2d 513, 675 N.E.2d 897 (1996), to support its position that section 155 preempts claims based onthe Consumer Fraud Act is misplaced. Plaintiffs contend that Cramer stands for the propositionthat an insured may bring any cause of action, except one based on the tort theory of bad faith,against the insurer. Plaintiffs also contend that contrary to Allstate's position, Cramer does nothold or imply that section 155 has a preemptive effect on statutes such as the Consumer FraudAct. Plaintiffs further contend that Allstate charges insureds enhanced premiums for stated valuecoverage but treats the policy as the lesser of stated value or actual cash value for settlementpurposes. Plaintiffs claim that the trial court erred in granting Allstate's motion for summaryjudgment on the basis that the Consumer Fraud Act claim was preempted by section 155.

Allstate responds that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor ofAllstate and denied plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs compliedwith the appraisal provision of the unambiguous policy. Allstate contends that plaintiffs attemptto introduce extrinsic evidence of events occurring after the formation of the contract to createambiguity in an unambiguous policy. However, under the "four corners rule," " '[a]n agreement,when reduced to writing, must be presumed to speak the intention of the parties who signed it. Itspeaks for itself, and the intention with which it was executed must be determined from thelanguage used. It is not to be changed by extrinsic evidence.' " [citation.] Air Safety, Inc., 185Ill. 2d at 462, 706 N.E.2d at 884. Allstate also contends that the appraisal clause is a validprovision in the policy and substantial deference is given to an appraisal when the policyexplicitly provides for determination by an appraiser. See Lundy, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 218-19, 750N.E.2d at 315; General Casualty Co. v. Tracer Industries, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d 418, 421, 674N.E.2d 473, 474 (1996).

Allstate further responds that the Consumer Fraud Act claim is preempted by section 155. Allstate contends that the Consumer Fraud Act should not apply to simple breach of contractclaims. Golembiewski v. Hallberg Insurance Agency, Inc., 262 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1093, 635N.E.2d 452, 460 (1994). Allstate claims that the Consumer Fraud Act establishes a cause ofaction sounding in tort; however, plaintiffs' claim is premised on a breach of an insurancecontract. Allstate contends that a separate tort theory is unnecessary in this case because acontractual remedy is available pursuant to statute. Allstate contends that any tort-based theoryof recovery under the Consumer Fraud Act is preempted by section 155.

We conclude that section 155 preempts plaintiffs' Consumer Fraud Act claim. Werecognize that "an insurer's conduct may give rise to both a breach of contract action and aseparate and independent tort action." Cramer, 174 Ill. 2d at 528, 675 N.E.2d 904. A plaintiffmay bring an independent tort action for insurer misconduct if the plaintiff alleges and proves theelements of the separate tort. Cramer, 174 Ill. 2d at 528, 675 N.E.2d 904. Allegations of aninsurer's bad faith or unreasonable and vexatious conduct do not alone constitute a tort. Cramer,174 Ill. 2d at 528, 675 N.E.2d 897. The supreme court held in Cramer that "irrespective of astatutory remedy, the existence of a contractual remedy would have made the tort theoryunnecessary." Voyles v. Sandia Mortgage Corp., 196 Ill. 2d 288, 297, 751 N.E.2d 1126, 1132(2001), citing Cramer, 174 Ill. 2d 513, 675 N.E.2d 897. In the instant case, plaintiffs brought abreach of contract claim alleging Allstate refused to tender the amount due under the insurancecontract. Based on Cramer, a separate tort claim is not necessary and is inapplicable in thepresent case because a contractual remedy is available to plaintiffs.

We reject plaintiffs' contention that the trial court ignored relevant facts that raisedgenuine issues of material fact. We have concluded that Allstate issued an actual cash valuepolicy that was not ambiguous, making analysis and reliance on extrinsic documents executedafter the issuance of the policy inappropriate under the "four corners rule." While we agree withplaintiffs that this court held in Lundy that a court must determine whether a dispute is coveredby an arbitration or appraisal clause, we find the facts of Lundy distinguishable from the instantcase because the insured in Lundy did not participate in the appraisal process that was disputedby the parties. Here, plaintiffs participated in the appraisal process to determine the vehicle'svalue at the time of loss but rejected the resulting appraised value of $12,000. We conclude thatplaintiffs' participation in the appraisal process lends support to the ruling that the appraisalprovision in the policy was both valid and applicable to the parties' dispute, which furthersupports the conclusion that an actual cash value policy was issued to plaintiffs. Therefore, weagree with the trial court's ruling that no genuine issues of material fact exist and Allstate isentitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs' final contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs'motion for partial summary judgment premised on Allstate's failure to timely pay the undisputedportion of the settlement. Plaintiffs contend that section 919.50 of the Illinois Department ofInsurance Regulations (50 Ill. Adm. Code