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FIRST DIVISION
September 30, 2004

Defendants, Abdel Raouf El-Ganzouri, M.D., his anesthesiology practice group,University Anesthesiologists, S.C. (hereinafter collectively referred to as Dr. El-Ganzouri), andRush Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center (Rush), appeal from a $12,598,591 medicalmalpractice judgment entered against them and in favor of plaintiff, James York, M.D., pursuantto a jury's verdict. On appeal, Dr. El-Ganzouri contends that the trial court's time limitation onvoir dire, and effective preclusion of the use of Dr. York's day-in-the-life video by the voir diretime restriction, precluded him from receiving a fair trial. He also contends that the trial courterred in allowing his expert witness to be impeached with Supreme Court Rule 213(g) (177 Ill. 2dR. 213(g)) interrogatory answers not signed by the expert. Finally, he contends that the trialcourt should have reduced Dr. York's damages for past medical expenses by the amounts alreadycompensated for by his health insurance. Rush, in addition to adopting Dr. El-Ganzouri'sarguments, contends that the trial court should have granted its motion for directed verdict, and ifnot that motion, then its motion for judgment non obstante verdicto, or, at the very least, grantedits request for a new trial because Dr. York proved neither that Rush held out Dr. El-Ganzouri asits agent nor that he sufficiently relied on Rush for his care for vicarious liability to attach. For allthe reasons discussed below, we affirm as to both defendants.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND⁽¹⁾

Dr. James York was an orthopedic surgeon. He also led an active lifestyle outside of hiswork, running marathons, playing tennis, and providing free medical treatment in Africa through achurch-sponsored program. However, athletics and aging led to knee problems for Dr. Yorkrequiring multiple surgeries. Dr. York always sought out the best surgeon for the procedures herequired. Besides Chicago, Dr. York had traveled to Toronto, Canada, Pennsylvania, andBaltimore, Maryland, for knee surgeries.

On February 9, 1998, Dr. York was to undergo a cemented total knee arthroplasty in hisleft knee. This was to be his third surgery at Rush, all performed by his chosen surgeon, Dr.Rosenberg. Dr. El-Ganzouri and Dr. Miller, an anesthesiology resident at Rush at the time, cameto perform a combined spinal epidural on Dr. York prior to the surgery.

In a combined spinal epidural procedure, a local anesthetic is first applied to the patient'sback. This anesthetic prevents the patient from experiencing any pain when a large "Touhy"needle is inserted between the bones in the spine, but short of the spinal column itself. A finer"Whittaker" needle is then advanced through the Touhy needle. The Whittaker needle pierces thedura, a thick skin protecting an area known as the subarachnoid space which contains cerebralspinal fluid and the spinal cord itself. A doctor knows he has pierced the dura by feeling a pop,described at trial as akin to the feeling a user of a fork experiences when piercing the skin of asausage. At that point, the anesthesiologist can confirm that he has accessed the subarachnoidspace, and is ready to inject anesthesia, by aspirating cerebral spinal fluid. Needles are supposedto enter through the lumbar area of the spine, beneath the end of the spinal cord itself. The end ofthe spinal cord is known as the conus. By making the injection through the lumbar area, theanesthesiologist avoids the risk of contacting the spinal cord, though he still faces the risk ofstriking a complex of nerves that hang from the conus like a horse's tail, and are thus known asthe cauda equina. After the injection of the spinal anesthesia, an epidural catheter is placedthrough the same insertion point, but short of the subarachnoid space, allowing for ongoingadministration of anesthesia as needed.

Something happened during Dr. York's combined spinal epidural. Twice, as Dr. El-Ganzouri inserted needles into his back, Dr. York expressed feeling pain. According to Dr. El-Ganzouri, they were fairly mild expressions; but, according to Dr. Miller, they were screams thelikes of which he had never heard before. During one of the needle insertions, Dr. York's rightthigh cramped and his right calf swelled. Dr. York subsequently went numb as the anesthetictook effect and underwent surgery.

After the knee surgery, Dr. York could not feel or move his right leg. He had lost boweland bladder control, and experienced sexual dysfunction. Dr. York underwent an extensivecourse of rehabilitation, but only with partial success. His caregivers anticipated that his deficitswould increase with age.

Dr. York and his wife filed a complaint against Dr. El-Ganzouri and UniversityAnesthesiologists. They later amended the complaint to include Rush on the theory that Dr. El-Ganzouri was Rush's apparent agent at the time of his combined spinal epidural. Both defendantsanswered the complaints and discovery ensued.

The plaintiffs charged that Dr. El-Ganzouri breached the standard of care foranesthesiologists by inserting the spinal needles too high on Dr. York's spine, which allowed himto then pierce and directly insert anesthesia into Dr. York's spinal cord, killing nerves and causinghis injuries. Plaintiffs claimed that Dr. El-Ganzouri erroneously injected anesthetic even as he wason notice of improper needle placement by Dr. York's screams. Plaintiffs contended that the errorcame about because Dr. El-Ganzouri felt pressure to perform the procedure quickly, and becausehe lost track of the proper disc space between which to insert the needles. Dr. El-Ganzouri hadmarked the insertion point by making an impression with his thumbnail, but he subsequentlyturned away to prepare more of the instruments needed for the procedure. The Yorks argued thatRush was accountable for Dr. El-Ganzouri's negligence because nobody informed Dr. York thathe was an independent contractor, because he appeared to be a hospital employee based on thelanguage in the consent form Dr. York signed and by his wearing scrubs with Rush's name andinsignia on them, and because Dr. York relied on the hospital to provide the anesthesiologist forthe procedure. Dr. El-Ganzouri countered that he met the standard of care in performing thecombined spinal epidural and that Dr. York's injuries actually resulted from a spinal infarction,meaning a deprivation of blood to the spine, that resulted from a drop in blood pressure duringthe surgery. He contended that Dr. York's expressions of pain resulted from needles strikingnerves in the cauda equina, which would not have produced his severe injuries, nor been adeviation from the standard of care. Dr. El-Ganzouri denied that he ever injected anesthesia whileDr. York expressed pain, instead, withdrawing and reinserting the needle until there were noexpressions of pain from Dr. York. Rush, in turn, denied that Dr. York relied on it to provide ananesthesiologist, claiming that Dr. York relied on his son Jeff, who was an anesthesiology residentat Rush and fully aware that University Anesthesiologists was a group of independent contractors,to choose a specific anesthesiologist for the procedure.⁽²⁾ Rush further denied that Dr. York couldreasonably have believed that Dr. El-Ganzouri was a Rush employee because he had previouslyreceived a bill from University Anesthesiologists for one of his prior surgeries, and because, basedon his own experience as an independent contractor in the medical profession, working withindependent anesthesiologists, Dr. York had to know that anesthesiologists were independentcontractors.

II. ANALYSIS OF DR. EL-GANZOURI'S CLAIMS

A. Alleged Unreasonable Time Restriction on Voir Dire

On May 28, 2002, with trial to begin the following Monday, Judge Flannery reminded theparties of his policies for voir dire. He explained that each side was limited to 20 minutes ofquestioning per panel of 14 prospective jurors, meaning that Dr. El-Ganzouri and Rush wouldreceive 10 minutes apiece per panel. He encouraged the attorneys to address the panel as agroup. Judge Flannery advised that venirepersons providing answers that suggested an inability tobe fair or to serve based on significant hardship would be called back to his chambers for follow-up questioning. Defendants had no objection at that time.

The following day, May 29, the parties again came before the trial court. At that time,counsel for Dr. El-Ganzouri stated:

"I did though want to ask the court *** if the court would reconsidermaybe giving the defendants a little bit more time. I did the math. It worksout to just under 43 seconds per venire person ***.

* * *

I have been told by the plaintiff's attorney that he perceives this is acase that could potentially be larger than the limits of the doctor, and Irespectfully ask the court to reconsider giving us more than 43 seconds perperson."

Rush's counsel also indicated that he "would take advantage of a little bit more time if the courtwas so inclined." The trial court denied the request, however, and the defendants did not pursuethe matter further. Jury selection then began.

After asking collectively if the venirepersons knew him, any of the parties, any of theanticipated witnesses, or any of the attorneys, Judge Flannery questioned each of the members ofthe first panel of venirepersons individually. Judge Flannery asked each venireperson where he orshe lived, what his or her occupation was, if he or she was married, and if he or she had children. He inquired about the occupation of the spouses of the married venirepersons. Judge Flannerythen asked the panel collectively to volunteer if any of them had served on a jury before. When avenireperson indicated that he or she had, Judge Flannery inquired as to the nature of the case andif it would affect the venireperson's ability to be fair in this case. Judge Flannery also asked themembers of the venire panel to volunteer if they, their family, or any close friends had beeninvolved in litigation. Again, when a venireperson indicated that he or she had, Judge Flanneryinquired as to the nature of the case and if it would affect the venireperson's ability to be fair inthis case. Judge Flannery repeated this procedure for two additional panels of venirepersons. After the judge questioned a panel, he would then turn the panel over to the attorneys forexamination.

The judge's questioning revealed a great deal of information about the venirepersons. Forexample, the judge's questions revealed that the panel included people whose work touched onissues involved in the case or who were close to people with such experience. The venireincluded two nurses, a nursing student, a husband to a nurse, a professor of economics, a billingclerk for a medical practice, and a hospital food service worker. The judge's questions alsodisclosed the significant prior litigation experience of the venirepersons. The venire contained oneclose friend and one relative to plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases; six plaintiffs, or relatives ofplaintiffs, in auto crash cases, including one case in which the venireperson's daughter died; twoformer defendants, or relatives of defendants, in auto crash cases; the relative of a former plaintiffinvolved in commercial litigation and a resulting attorney malpractice case; a former plaintiff in aconsumer fraud case; a plaintiff in eviction proceedings; and finally, one plaintiff and one relativeof a defendant in slip and fall cases.

Plaintiff's counsel's questions revealed a good deal more. Dr. York's attorney inquired asto the panel's outlook on medical malpractice litigation. Examining one venireperson who workedfor an insurance company, the following conversation occurred:

"MR. CLIFFORD [plaintiff's counsel]: At the end of the case, it would be and ismy intention to ask on behalf of my client for the jury to return an award of many millionsof dollars.

Would you be able to do that if the law and evidence supported our case, sign sucha verdict?

JUROR: Not for a large amount of money like that, no.

MR. CLIFFORD: Okay. Thank you. And I appreciate your candor."

Two other jurors from the second panel made similar statements. In response to anotherrepresentation by plaintiff's counsel that he would be asking for a multimillion dollar award, andhis question if that large monetary figure meant that Dr. York would be "starting out behind theeight ball with you," one venireman replied "[i]t would be a problem to be fair to you," while theother stated "I have exactly the same view *** [s]ky high settlements, I am opposed to." Inresponse to further questioning, the second juror indicated that unless Dr. York was extremelyyoung, or a paraplegic, he would have difficulty being fair to him.

Dr. El-Ganzouri's and Rush's counsel were similarly effective in extracting importantinformation from the venire. Their questioning revealed four venirepersons who, based on theseverity of Dr. York's injuries, were not certain that they could bring themselves to return averdict of not liable. Their exploration into the prior medical experiences and care of the panel,and of the panel's friends and relatives, revealed a venireperson who had undergone spinalanesthesia at Rush with a bad result, a venireperson whose aunt suffered paralysis after receivingspinal anesthesia, and a venireperson who felt that her niece's daughter's death had occurred as aresult of hospital malpractice.

Dr. El-Ganzouri's counsel was advised during his examination of the first two panels ofvenirepersons when he had only had five minutes left. During his questioning of the final panel ofvenirepersons, the court advised counsel to conclude with "one more question." However, at nopoint, other than before beginning voir dire, did Dr. El-Ganzouri's counsel ever ask for additionaltime. Moreover, he never purported to proceed up to his time limit while conducting voir dire. In fact, in response to the court's instruction to only ask one more question, counsel stated: "Ithink the last one [the last question asked] is pretty good. I'm done. Thanks a lot."

The court excused a number of the venire for cause, including those under considerationthat had expressed an unwillingness to grant a large award and those who expressed a reluctanceto award judgment to the defendants because of Dr. York's significant injuries. Defendantsexercised all of the seven peremptory challenges granted by the court, while plaintiff exercised six.

The final jury of 14, including 2 alternates, consisted of a software trainer who had been aplaintiff in an auto crash, and who received bad care at a hospital for cuts to her arm;⁽³⁾ a hospitalfood service worker who was a plaintiff in an automobile negligence case in which her daughterhad died; an operations manager for a chemical company; a cabinetmaker whose wife had to use awalker as a result of bone cancer; a billing clerk for a medical practice who had received trainingto be an occupational therapy volunteer at Rush; a train car repairman whose wife was a nurse; aclerk; an employee of a tax preparation firm; a Denny's restaurant manager; a machinist who hadbeen a defendant in an auto crash case; a newspaper delivery employee who had undergone spinalanesthesia without complication; a clerk at the Chicago Ford Motor Company plant; a pharmacyaccounts payable manager who had undergone a spinal epidural without incident at another ofRush's facilities; and an unemployed production supervisor whose parents had been sued whensomeone fell on their property. This jury was sworn and impaneled without objection by thedefendants.

Dr. El-Ganzouri contends that Judge Flannery's time limitation on voir dire, which hecharacterizes as "extreme and unreasonable," denied him his "right to a fair and impartial trial byjury" and violated Supreme Court Rule 234 (177 Ill. 2d R. 234), which states:

"The court shall conduct the voir dire examination of prospectivejurors by putting to them questions it thinks appropriate touching upontheir qualifications to serve as jurors in the case on trial. The court maypermit the parties to submit additional questions to it for further inquiry if itthinks they are appropriate, and shall permit the parties to supplement theexamination by such direct inquiry as the court deems proper for areasonable period of time depending upon the length of examination by thecourt, the complexity of the case, and the nature and extent of thedamages."

Dr. El-Ganzouri contends that as a result of the trial court's time restriction he was unable toindividually address questions to each of the jurors on all three panels. Further, he claims that thetime limit prevented him from inquiring about the second panel's experience with disabled people,and from exploring any prejudice or bias in the third panel surrounding damages. Dr. Yorkinitially counters that Dr. El-Ganzouri has waived any challenge to Judge Flannery's voir direprocedure as he did not specifically object to the procedure, nor make an offer of proof in thecircuit court as to what questioning the time limit prevented. Alternatively, Dr. York argues thatthe parameters set by the trial judge were reasonable and allowed sufficient questioning of thevenire to ferret out prejudice and bias. We agree with both of Dr. York's arguments.

To begin, Dr. El-Ganzouri has waived any challenge to Judge Flannery's voir dire timelimitations by failing to make a timely objection to the procedure. To preserve a trial error forreview on appeal, a party must make a timely objection. People v. Stewart, 343 Ill. App. 3d 963,979, 799 N.E.2d 1011, 1024 (2003). "Where a party fails to make an appropriate objection in thecourt below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is waived." Inre April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 242, 760 N.E.2d 85, 98 (2001). A primary purpose of thewaiver rule is to ensure that the trial court has the opportunity to correct the error. Stewart, 343Ill. App. 3d at 979, 799 N.E.2d at 1024. A trial court cannot correct the error and preventprejudice when the objection is not made as the error occurs. See Prairie v. Snow Valley HealthResources, Inc., 324 Ill. App. 3d 568, 573, 755 N.E.2d 1021, 1027 (2001) (finding an objectionto testimony untimely when the testimony was presented twice and only objected to the secondtime); Sramek v. Logan, 36 Ill. App. 3d 471, 473-74, 344 N.E.2d 47, 49 (1976) (finding a claimof error surrounding comments in closing argument waived when not objected to as thecomments were made). In this case, Dr. El-Ganzouri's counsel requested additional time for voirdire before the proceedings began, anticipating that he would not be able to expose bias in thevenire in the amount of time allotted. However, he did not make any further efforts to procureadditional time when he actually conducted the voir dire. In that respect, the rule would beanalogous to that which generally applies to motions in limine, where ordinarily the advanceruling will not suffice to preserve error in the absence of a contemporaneous objection to theactual use or exclusion of that evidence in its actual trial context. See Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill.2d 541, 569, 763 N.E.2d 720, 738 (2002) ("[t]he denial of a motion in limine does not in itselfpreserve an objection to disputed evidence that is introduced later at trial. *** '[A]contemporaneous objection to the evidence at the time it is offered is required ***.' [Citation.]");accord Bachman v. General Motors Corp., 332 Ill. App. 3d 760, 791-92, 776 N.E.2d 262, 290-91(2002). Therefore, the time for Dr. El-Ganzouri to object was as the alleged damage was beingdone, namely, at the time that the trial court cut off his voir dire examination while he hadpertinent questions yet to ask. Yet, he did not make any objection at any time during voir dire. Instead, on two occasions he ceased questioning the venire prior to any final warning from thetrial court, and when informed he could only ask one more question of another panel, he declinedto do so.

Even more overridingly, Dr. El-Ganzouri waived any claim of error in the voir direprocedure by accepting the jury without objection. As the Florida Supreme Court observed,when reviewing a claim of error in voir dire proceedings:

"[The defendant] affirmatively accepted the jury immediately prior to itsbeing sworn without reservation of his earlier-made objection. We agreewith the district court that counsel's action in accepting the jury led to areasonable assumption that he had abandoned, for whatever reason, hisearlier objection. It is reasonable to conclude that events occurringsubsequent to his objection caused him to be satisfied with the jury aboutto be sworn. We therefore approve the district court to the extent that thecourt held that *** [the defendant] waived his *** objection when heaccepted the jury." Joiner v. State, 618 So. 2d 174, 176, (Fla. 1993).

Accord Green v. State, 679 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. App. 1996) (finding challenge to time limits on voirdire waived by acceptance of jury without objection). These holdings are also consistent withIllinois law, which recognizes that courts may infer a party's subsequent acquiescence in courtprocedures after making contrary motions. See People v. Ephraim, 411 Ill. 118, 123, 103 N.E.2d363, 366 (1952) ("[t]he record here shows that the defendant made a pro forma request that he beallowed to defend himself, then failed to actively or sincerely pursue it until his appearance in thiscourt. *** [T]he record shows that he waived that right by his acquiescence in, and failure toobject to, the appointment of [an] attorney"); see also Comerford v. Jones, 73 Ill. App. 2d 90, 218N.E.2d 502 (1966) (abstract of op.) ("[W]here a litigant is represented by competent andexperienced counsel, and objections are not made, we must conclude that the choice was aconscious one weighing the possible prejudice of objecting in the presence of the jury against theprejudice of the objectionable matter itself"). By accepting the impaneling of the jury withoutobjection, Dr. El-Ganzouri allowed a reasonable conclusion that he had no ongoing objection tothe voir dire procedure as it had been applied, and deprived the trial court of a reasonableopportunity to correct any error by allowing further questioning or by striking the venire andstarting jury selection over again. Thus, on this basis too, Dr. El-Ganzouri has waived anyarguments surrounding voir dire.

Finally, Dr. El-Ganzouri has waived his voir dire argument on appeal because he failed tomake a record in the trial court of what questions he yet wanted to ask of what venirepersons soas to demonstrate prejudice. As the Texas Court of Appeals observed, "[w]hen objecting to avoir dire limitation, it is the attorney's burden to preserve error by informing the trial court of thequestions he or she was not permitted to ask, at a time when the court can act to rectify anyerror." Dhillon v. State, 138 S.W.3d 583, 591 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004); see also People v. Daniels,172 Ill. 2d 154, 166, 665 N.E.2d 1221, 1227 (1996) ("defendant adequately preserves the error[of the provision of insufficient peremptory challenges] by making an appropriate and timelyrequest for the full number of peremptories, if defendant uses all of the peremptory challengesallowed by the court, and if defendant brings to the trial court's attention during voir dire factsrelevant to defendant's claim that he or she would have exercised additional peremptorychallenges against one or more jurors had additional challenges been allowed" (emphasisadded)). Without this record, a court of review cannot determine whether the trial courtimproperly limited voir dire, as the limitation of questioning would have been appropriate werethe precluded questions irrelevant, immaterial, repetitious, or otherwise improper. Dhillon, 138S.W.3d at 589-90. Dr. El-Ganzouri identifies now what questions he wanted to ask of at leastsome of the jurors on the third panel, but now it is too late; he needed to make this record in thetrial court.

Waived errors may still be subject to plain error review. Prairie, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 574, 755 N.E.2d at 1027. However, "[p]lain error is a limited and narrow exception to the generalwaiver rule." In re Detention of Traynoff, 338 Ill. App. 3d 949, 963, 789 N.E.2d 865, 877(2003). Relief under the plain error doctrine should be "exceedingly rare" in civil cases, limited tocircumstances where the proceedings deprived the appellant of a fair trial and amounted to "anaffront to the judicial process." Dowell v. Bitner, 273 Ill. App. 3d 681, 693, 652 N.E.2d 1372,1380 (1995). We detect no such circumstances here.

"The purpose of voir dire is to insure the selection of an impartial panel of jurors free frombias or prejudice." Stewart, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 977, 799 N.E.2d at 1022. As Professor Mauetpoints out in his practical treatise:

"[S]everal basic background characteristics *** are seen as the best ***predictors of likely attitudes [among venirepersons]:

1. age

2. education

3. employment history

4. residence history

5. marital and family history

6. hobbies and interests

7. reading, television, and computers

8. participation in organizations

9. experiences in life related to case on trial." T. Mauet, TrialTechniques 43-44 (6th ed. 2002).

The court through its own questioning touched on the venirepersons' employment histories andmarital and family situations. The approximate age of the venirepersons would have beenapparent to the parties by their appearance. The court also drew out many of the venirepersons'experiences in life related to the present case by eliciting their litigation experience, plus theexperiences of their friends and families, and their prior jury service. As noted previously, counselfor all parties were then able to elicit more information about the venire's relevant experiences byasking group and individual questions regarding their and their loved ones' medical histories. Defense counsel were likewise able through their questioning to identify venirepersons involved inorganizations identical or similar to those Dr. York participated in, discovering three fellow Navyveterans and two active church members. "It must be remembered that all a party to a suit isentitled to in any lawsuit is a jury composed of persons who have sworn under oath that they can*** judge the case solely on the facts produced in open court and on the law given them by thetrial judge." Hockett v. Dawdy, 180 Ill. App. 3d 491, 498, 536 N.E.2d 84, 89 (1989). In light ofthe wealth of information about the venire revealed between the trial court's questions and thosepropounded by counsel in the time allotted, we believe Dr. El-Ganzouri was able to ensure that hereceived a jury capable of honest service and find no affront to the judicial process through theimposition of the time limitation. Moreover, while we explicitly disclaim any attempt to establisha bright-line rule for acceptable time limits, and further note that our affirmance of the impositionof relatively rigid time limits in no way reflects our personal inclinations, we recognize that othercourts have upheld 20-minute time limits per side, or even less, at least when the trial court alsopropounds questions. See Dhillon, 138 S.W.3d 583 (15 minutes); State v. Martinez, 131 N.M.746, 42 P.3d 851 (App. 2002) (20 minutes); Roberts v. State, 268 Ind. 127, 373 N.E.2d 1103(1978) (20 minutes).

Finally, we note that while Dr. El-Ganzouri now claims that he was deprived of sufficienttime for voir dire, the record reflects that he was less than efficient in utilizing the time allowed. Three venirepersons pointedly stated in their answers to plaintiff's counsel's questions that theycould not be fair because they opposed multimillion dollar awards, such as plaintiff indicated thathe would ask for in this case, irrespective of what evidence Dr. York would present. With thosestatements, which should be appreciated for their candor, Dr. El-Ganzouri should have realizedthat those venirepersons could not serve on the jury. However, Dr. El-Ganzouri then wasted timeattempting to rehabilitate these venirepersons, apparently in the hope of preventing their dismissalfor cause, thereby forcing plaintiff to exercise peremptory challenges against them. Dr. El-Ganzouri asked these venirepersons broadly if they understood that it was the jury's responsibilityto determine the verdict and if they could award a "fair" verdict. Not surprisingly, in light of theirearlier statements, when called to Judge Flannery's chambers for further examination, the twoveniremen from the second panel even more strongly emphasized their unequivocal opposition tolarge medical malpractice verdicts. One said that he "would be fighting against" his fellow jurorsto prevent them from making such an award if he were impaneled, the other that he would "fighttooth and nail" to keep any verdict under $1 million, regardless of what the trial evidence mightbe. Judge Flannery appropriately excused all three venirepersons for cause. Parties may notcomplain of an inadequate opportunity to question the venire when they waste the time they aregiven. See Dhillon, 138 S.W.2d at 587-88 ("[w]hen a party complains of an inability to ***question the venire, a two part test applies: (1) whether the complaining party attempted toprolong the voir dire *** . A party attempts to prolong the voir dire when he asks irrelevant,immaterial, or repetitious questions"); see also Martinez, 131 N.M. at 755, 42 P.3d at 860 (notingthat with better organization of her voir dire, counsel could have asked the questions claimed tobe precluded within the trial court's time limits).

Along these same lines, we also note that the record does not show that Dr. El-Ganzouriever proposed questions to be asked of the venire by the judge, as permitted under Rule 234,which would not have counted against his time. At oral argument, Dr. El-Ganzouri stressed thathe was not invited by the trial court to propose supplemental questions for its voir direexamination. However, we see no reason logically, or under the rule, for him to not seize theinitiative and, instead, wait to be invited.

Dr. El-Ganzouri makes one other related argument surrounding voir dire. He claims thatby indicating that it would count any use of Dr. York's "day-in-the-life" video against his 10minutes for voir dire, the circuit court effectively, improperly precluded him from using the videoin voir dire.

The following exchange also occurred during the May 28 discussion between the partiesand the court surrounding voir dire:

"THE COURT: Let's talk about it real quickly. What I am saying is, there was anissue, and do you want to use it? Is anybody asking to use the day in life in jury selection?

MR. PETREK: I am, without sound.

* * *

MR. CLIFFORD: And we are opposed of showing it during the voir direexamination. I think that to do so highlights one piece of evidence, unfairly prejudices theplaintiff and ought not to be permitted.

THE COURT: Is it going to be used during the trial?

MR. CLIFFORD: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. The objection is overruled. You could use it if you want. You have ten minutes. I don't know long the film is. If you want to take five minutes ofthe film to use it, go ahead, then you have five minutes left to do your questioning. Youcould use it if you want. Whatever you need, have it here.

MR. CLIFFORD: So it goes against his time?

THE COURT: Yes.

* * *

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?"

After this exchange, Dr. El-Ganzouri's counsel made no further statements to the circuit court. During voir dire, he made no objection to his perceived inability to use the video and otherwiseconduct a thorough examination of the venire. Dr. York contends that, based on his lack ofobjection, Dr. El-Ganzouri has waived this voir dire claim on appeal as well as his claimsurrounding the circuit court's time limit. In keeping with our previous analysis, we agree andtherefore decline to review this issue.

B. Alleged Improper Impeachment of Dr. Meyer with Rule 213(g) Answers Prepared and SwornTo By Defense Counsel

At trial, Dr. Meyer testified on direct examination, on behalf of Dr. El-Ganzouri, that Dr.York's injuries resulted from a spinal infarct, meaning a deprivation of blood and oxygen to thespine, causing the death of the deprived tissues. Dr. Meyer opined that the infarction resultedfrom systemic hypotension (low blood pressure) during the knee replacement surgery. He deniedthat an injury was caused by the entry of a needle and injection of anesthesia into Dr. York's spinal cord, explaining that he would have expected to find a "blob" or "puddle" of anesthesiaaround the point of insertion in MRIs of Dr. York's spine, but he did not find such a mass. Theeffect of this testimony was to attribute Dr. York's injuries to the knee surgery and not to theanesthesia procedures.

The following exchange occurred when Dr. Meyer was subject to cross-examination:

"Mr. CLIFFORD: Okay. And then after you got those additional records, youconferred with Counsel; did you not?

Dr. MEYER: Yes.

Mr. CLIFFORD: And you told Counsel your opinions; did you not?

Dr. MEYER: Yes.

Mr. CLIFFORD: And those opinions, I believe, were filed with the Court onAugust 14, 2001; and one of them was, 'It is more likely than not that James Yorksustained a spinal cord infarct. This infarct more likely than not was caused by either thespinal needle, catheter, agent or a combination thereof coming in contact with a vessel,which in turn caused ischemia to the patent's spinal cord.' That was one of your originalopinions; true?

Dr. MEYER: Yes.

Mr. CLIFFORD: And that is not your opinion today; true?

Dr. MEYER: That's correct, and that was clarified at the deposition.

* * *

Mr. CLIFFORD: Doctor, just so we deal with this in a perspective of time, theseopinions of yours initially to the effect that the spinal-you've always had the view that hehad a spinal cord infarct, right?

Dr. MEYER: Yes.

Mr. CLIFFORD: But you originally held the view that the spinal cord infarct wascaused by either the needle, the catheter, the agent, which I take to be the Marcaine, or acombination thereof coming into contact with a vessel, which in turn caused ischemia; isn'tthat right?

Dr. MEYER: Yes.

Mr. CLIFFORD: And you gave-those opinions were disclosed on August 21 of2001 signed by that lady Irwin, right?

Dr. MEYER: By Shirley Irwin, that's correct.

Mr. CLIFFORD: And but Shirley Irwin is not a doctor, right? You know that tobe a fact; don't you?

Dr. MEYER: Yes.

Mr. CLIFFORD: And the fact is that what she wrote down and what she filed incourt she got from you and confirmed by you, correct?

Dr. MEYER: She did get that from me. I don't know that it was completelyconfirmed prior to those being filed.

Mr. CLIFFORD: Okay. Fair enough. And this clarification, your word, not mine,that you're talking about here, you gave your deposition in this case on September 4,2001, some 10, 15 days later, so say two weeks later. So you're telling us that betweenAugust 21 and September 4th, two weeks, you did further study that gave you thisenlightenment about hypotensive events that contributed to the spinal cord infarct, right?

Mr. PETREK: Objection, your Honor. That assumes facts not in evidence.

THE COURT: Overruled.

* * *

Mr. CLIFFORD: Okay. So when you tell us that you've clarified, the fact is you'venot withdrawn the idea- or maybe you are. Let's get this straight. Are you withdrawingthe idea that the spinal cord infarct was caused either by the spinal needle, the cath, theagent or a combination thereof coming into contact with a vessel; are you withdrawingthat?

Mr. PETREK: Object to the form of the question.

* * *

Mr. CLIFFORD: Are you withdrawing that opinion?

Dr. MEYER: I just don't know what it means to withdraw it in a legal sense, soyou might-

Mr. CLIFFORD: Drop it, give it up, throw it out.

Dr. MEYER: That's not what I think happened.

Mr. CLIFFORD: I'm talking about the opinion now.

Dr. MEYER: Yes.

Mr. CLIFFORD: Are you still holding to that opinion, yes or no?

Dr. MEYER: No, I don't think that that's the opinion.

Mr. CLIFFORD: Okay. But you do think that the opinion that you came up withat your deposition two weeks later is the answer to what occurred here?

Mr. PETREK: Object to the form of the question."

Dr. El-Ganzouri contends that such impeachment was improper because an attorney, asopposed to Dr. Meyer himself, prepared and swore to the interrogatory answer, which shouldtherefore not be attributable to Dr. Meyer, and that Dr. Meyer was therefore not subject to anyimpeachment as his deposition and trial testimony were identical. Dr. York counters first that Dr.El-Ganzouri waived this challenge by his failure to make an appropriate, timely objection, andsecondly because the explicit language of Rule 213 allows for such interrogatory answers to beused for impeachment. We agree with both of plaintiff's arguments.

Defendant contends that he has preserved this alleged error for review by objecting. However, as discussed in our analysis of Dr. El-Ganzouri's waiver of his voir dire challenge,merely objecting is not enough to preserve errors for review. To be effective in preserving anerror, an objection must be timely, meaning contemporaneous with the objectionable conduct. See Prairie, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 573, 755 N.E.2d at 1027. Here, however, just like in Prairie,multiple references to the interrogatory answer, to which the appellant would object on appeal,went by unchallenged in the trial court before an objection was made. Moreover, an objectingparty must identify the same basis for his objection in the trial court that he will argue on appeal. Gausselin v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 260 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1079, 631 N.E.2d 1246, 1254(1994) ( "when an objection is made, specific grounds must be stated and other grounds notstated are waived on review"). Thus, in Gausselin, the court found that the plaintiff/appellant hadwaived his challenge to the appellee's calling of a certain witness as an expert when "plaintiffnever raised Rule 220 [Rule 213's predecessor] as an objection, nor did he ever complain that [thewitness] was offering expert testimony," and the record revealed "that plaintiff's objections werelimited to such grounds as lack of foundation ***, speculation, leading, and relevance." Gausselin, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 1079, 631 N.E.2d at 1254. Similarly, Dr. El-Ganzouri neverobjected to Dr. York's counsel's use of the interrogatory answer for Dr. Meyer but ratherobjected, primarily, to what he perceived to be vagueness or incomprehensibility in opposingcounsel's impeachment questions. Thus, if subject to any review, Dr. El-Ganzouri's impeachmentclaims would be reviewed for plain error. See Prairie, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 574, 755 N.E.2d at1027. Moreover, even without relying on waiver, we detect no error here, let alone an error thatwould constitute an affront to the judicial process.

To begin, as Dr. York suggests, the plain language of the rule supports the availability ofRule 213(g) interrogatory answers for impeachment of an expert witness. Section (h) of the rulestates: "answers to interrogatories may be used in evidence to the same extent as a discoverydeposition." 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(h). Supreme Court Rule 212(a)(1), addressing the use ofdiscovery depositions, explains that "[d]iscovery depositions *** may be used *** for the purposeof impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness in the same manner and to the sameextent as any inconsistent statement made by a witness." 188 Ill. 2d R. 212(a)(1); see also Estateof Whittington v. Emdeko National Housewares, Inc., 96 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1011, 422 N.E.2d26, 30 (1981) (observing the same interrelation between the two rules).

That the interrogatory answers may have been completed and signed by an attorney, asopposed to the expert, in our view, cannot justify modification of the plain meaning of the Ruleallowing impeachment. Courts have long understood that the answers to 213 interrogatoriessurrounding experts are a collaboration between the expert and the retaining party. As the RulesCommittee explained in its comments to the most recent revision of the Rule: "[t]he party cancount on full cooperation from [controlled expert] witnesses ***, so the amended rule requiresthe party to provide all of the details required by the former rule." Official Reports Advance SheetNo. 8 (April 17, 2002) R. 213(f), Committee Comment; see also Regala v. Rush North ShoreMedical Center, 323 Ill. App. 3d 579, 585, 752 N.E.2d 443, 448 (2001) ("[e]xperts must be madeaware by their attorney of the importance that their opinions at trial are consistent with theirpretrial disclosures") (emphasis added); Copeland v. Stebco Products Corp., 316 Ill. App. 3d 932,938, 738 N.E.2d 199, 205 (2000) ("[l]itigants have an obligation *** to disclose the testimony oftheir experts") (emphasis added). Yet, in spite of this knowledge, our supreme court stillauthorized the use of interrogatory answers for impeachment, without qualification for Rule213(g) interrogatory answers, in section (h) of the rule.

Further, we note that the appellate court has already held that "[t]he fact that a documentis not signed by the witness does not render it incompetent for impeachment." Estate ofWhittington, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 1012, 422 N.E.2d at 31. The determinative factor as to when adocument prepared by and signed by another may be used against a witness is whether the witnesswas aware of and approved of the contents of the document. Contrast Estate of Whittington, 96Ill. App. 3d at 1012, 422 N.E.2d at 31 ("there was sufficient evidence that Mrs. Walker swore tothe contents of the interrogatory and authorized her attorney to sign. Hence the trial court didnot err in allowing the document to be used for impeachment purposes"), and Nystrom v. Bub, 36Ill. App. 2d 333, 348-49, 184 N.E.2d 273, 280 (1962) (allowing a party to be impeached with theinterrogatory answer prepared by its attorney when "[t]he defendants' attorney had authority tomake the admission; the weight to be given the testimony and the admission were for the jury"),with Castle v. Searles, 306 Ill. App. 304, __, 28 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1940) (holding a writtenstatement signed by a witness's daughter not valid to impeach the witness when he did not recallproviding information for the statement or authorizing his daughter to sign for him). In light ofthe collaborative nature of the preparation of Rule 213 interrogatories, and attorneys' duty tostress the importance to their experts of the accuracy and completeness of their pretrialdisclosures (Regala, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 585, 752 N.E.2d at 448), which we will assume attorneysfulfill, we are inclined to think that retained experts implicitly authorize attorneys to reduce theiropinions to writing and attest to the accuracy of the interrogatory answer. However, we need notso hold in this case because Dr. Meyer specifically testified that he gave the opinion recorded inthe Rule 213(g) answer to the attorney and that it was recorded accurately, thereby laying aproper foundation for the introduction of that opinion as conceded by Dr. El-Ganzouri at oralargument. Therefore, no error occurred when Dr. York's counsel impeached Dr. Meyer with theRule 213(g) answer based on the answer being typed and sworn to by counsel.

Dr. El-Ganzouri, however, also claims that, as Dr. Meyer explained the change in hisposition from his Rule 213(g) disclosure at his deposition, and because his deposition testimonywas consistent with his trial testimony, impeachment with the interrogatory answer wasnevertheless improper; he cites to the Fifth District case of Buehler v. Whalen, 41 Ill. App. 3d446, 355 N.E.2d 99 (1976), in support of his position. We disagree. First, we find Buehlerinapposite to the present case. The Buehler court did not address the changing opinion of anexpert between his interrogatory answers and his deposition and trial testimony and the effect thatwould have on the credibility of the most recent opinion. Rather, Buehler dealt with a party'sattempt to use a defendant's interrogatory answer denying the existence of an adverse study, whenit later admitted the study's existence and produced the study before trial, to shame the defendantin the eyes of the jury for its initial discovery violation. Buehler, 41 Ill. App. 3d at 457, 355N.E.2d at 108-09 ("Nor was the statement used to impeach any witness as it may have properlybeen used. The plaintiffs' purpose in reading the interrogatory as substantive evidence, wasclearly designed to show that Ford was not truthful in its answer"). Second, "the fact thatdefendant has an explanation for the [prior] statement does not work to remove the facialinconsistency." People v. Davis, 106 Ill. App. 3d 260, 264, 435 N.E.2d 838, 842 (1982). Substantial, material prior inconsistent statements should be presented to the jury because theyimpact the credibility of the witness, and credibility determinations are the province of the jury. See Oldham v. Kubinski, 37 Ill. App. 2d 65, 78, 185 N.E.2d 270, 275 (1962). Just as a witness'sprior inconsistent statement does not render his subsequent testimony inadmissible (Oldham, 37Ill. App. 2d at 78, 185 N.E.2d at 275), his explanation for that inconsistency does not barintroduction of the earlier statement (see La Salle National Bank v. 53rd-Ellis CurrencyExchange, Inc., 249 Ill. App. 3d 415, 434, 618 N.E.2d 1103, 1117 (1993) ("[s]tatements andassertions which may have been superseded for one legal purpose may still be used to impeach awitness' credibility"); see also Palumbo v. Kuiken, 201 Ill. App. 3d 785, 790, 559 N.E.2d 206,209 (1990) (permitting superceded or withdrawn interrogatory answers to be used forimpeachment)).

All the existence of an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement demands under thelaw is an opportunity to present that explanation. As Professor Wigmore explained:

"The contradictory statement indicates on its face that the witness has beenof two minds on the subject, and therefore that there has been some defectof intelligence, honesty, or impartiality on his part; and it is conceivablethat the inconsistency of the statements themselves may turn out to besuperficial only, or that the error may have been based not on dishonesty orpoor memory but upon a temporary misunderstanding. To this end it isboth logical and just that the explanatory circumstances, if any, should bereceived ***." 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence