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JUSTICE REID delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Joseph Yates, brought suit against thedefendants, Nancy Shackelford, Becker Transportation, Inc.(Becker), John Junkins, Green Oak Farms, Inc. (Green Oak), andBrown Transport, Inc. (Brown Transport), seeking damages forinjuries he received during an automobile accident. The trialcourt granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Yatessubsequently moved the court to reconsider and the motion wasdenied.

On appeal, Yates contends the trial court committed errorwhen it denied his motion to reconsider because genuine issues ofmaterial fact exist as to whether: (1) Shackelford's act ofparking her semi-tractor trailer truck on the left shoulder ofthe highway, in violation of section 11-1303(a)(1)(k) of theIllinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-1303(a)(1)(k)(West 1996)),proximately caused the accident in which Yates collided into therear of her trailer as she was attempting to merge back intotraffic, and (2) Junkins applied his brakes in a timely fashionand took proper evasive maneuvers to avoid colliding into Yates'vehicle. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trialcourt's decision.

BACKGROUND

During a discovery deposition, Shackelford testified that onNovember 20, 1996, she was driving a semi-tractor trailer truck(semi), which was owned by Becker, westbound on Interstate 80 (I-80), when she was informed by radio that the rear taillights ofher trailer were not functioning. In response, Shackelfordpulled over onto the left shoulder of the highway to check theelectrical connection to the trailer. After reconnecting thelights, Shackelford reentered her vehicle and began driving onthe shoulder in an attempt to gain speed before merging into theleft lane.

Shackelford said that she checked her passenger side mirrorfor oncoming vehicles in the left lane. After seeing that thelane was clear, she activated her turn signal and began to mergeinto the left lane from the shoulder. The speed limit on I-80 is55 miles per hour. As she was merging from the shoulder to theleft lane, Shackelford estimated that she was traveling 50 milesper hour.

Shackelford testified that as she was merging, she saw Yatesswitch lanes from the center lane to the left lane. Prior toYates switching lanes, Shackelford's view of Yates' car wasobstructed because Yates was driving behind a semi in the middlelane. She estimated that Yates was 500 feet behind her but couldnot approximate how fast he was driving. Shackelford said thatYates never slowed down prior to hitting the back of her trailer. Shackelford said that her trailer was fully in the left lanebefore the accident occurred. The front end of Yates' vehiclecollided into the middle of the rear of her trailer. At the timeof impact, Shackelford estimated that she was traveling 55 milesper hour.

During a deposition, Junkins testified that prior to theaccident, he was under dispatch with Brown Transport and wasdriving a semi owned by Green Oak westbound on I-80 in the centerlane. Earlier, Junkins was informed by radio that a semi wasparked ahead on the left shoulder of the highway. Junkins saidthat he made visual contact with Shackelford's semi when he wasapproximately a half mile away. Junkins could clearly see thesemi and its lights. Junkins thought that the semi was moving onthe shoulder.

When Junkins was approximately a quarter mile fromShackelford's semi, he could see that it was moving along theshoulder with its right turn signal activated. Junkins lookedinto his driver's side mirror and saw that the left lane wasclear of traffic.

When Junkins was approximately 500 feet from Shackelford'ssemi, he saw Yates' car pass him in the left lane. Junkins saidthat he was driving 55 miles per hour and estimated that Yateswas traveling 85 miles per hour. Junkins testified that therewas a car in front of him in the middle lane as well. Heestimated the car to be a truck length ahead.

Junkins said that he let his foot off the gas pedal whenYates passed him because of the situation developing ahead.Junkins testified that he could see that Yates would not have alot of room to maneuver in the left lane because Shackelford'ssemi was coming off the shoulder, and there was also the car infront of Junkins in the middle lane as well. Junkins wanted tocreate some space in case Yates needed to switch from the leftlane to the middle lane.

Junkins estimated that he started to apply his brakes whenhe was approximately 500 to 250 feet from Shackelford's semi. When Junkins was approximately 250 feet from Shackelford's semi,he estimated that 50% to 75% of the left lane was occupied by thetruck. He estimated that she was traveling between 30 to 40miles per hour.

At this point, Junkins thought that Yates was attempting topass in front of the car that was ahead in the middle lane. Although Yates did not have a turn signal on, Junkins was underthis belief because of the speed that Yates was traveling. Junkins then saw Yates' vehicle drift toward the right side ofthe left lane as it neared Shackelford's truck. Just as Yates'car was overcoming the car in front of Junkins, Yates slammed onthe brakes and hit Shackelford's right rear trailer tires.Junkins said that the car in front of him never braked. Junkinsthought that the driver of the car never knew of Yates' presence.

At this point, Junkins was braking hard and skidding. AfterYates hit the back of Shackelford's trailer, Yates' vehiclequarter turned counterclockwise into the middle lane. Junkinsthen hit Yates' car in the driver's side. At the time of impact,Junkins estimated that he was traveling between 40 to 45 milesper hour.

Junkins estimated that a small portion of the trailer wasstill on the shoulder when the accident occurred. Junkinsestimated that Yates was traveling "well above the speed limit"because he did not brake prior to hitting the rear ofShackelford's trailer. Junkins said that Shackelford's semicompletely entered the left lane just after the accident. Junkins said that Shackelford was traveling "in the neighborhoodof 40 miles an hour" when the accident occurred. Junkinstestified that the weather was clear and that the pavement wasdry.

Yates has no recollection of the accident and consequentlywas unable to testify about the sequence of events that led up tothe accident.

On January 22, 1997, Yates filed his initial complaint wherehe sought damages against Shackelford and her employer, Becker. On January 15, 1998, Yates filed his second amended complaintseeking damages against Shackelford, Becker, Junkins, Green Oakand Brown Transport.

On March 13, 2000, Junkins, Brown Transport and Green Oaksfiled a motion for summary judgment. On March 20, 2000,Shackelford and Becker filed their motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the defendants on July20, 2000. Yates' motions to reconsider were denied on October24, 2000, and November 6, 2000. Yates filed his notice of appealon December 5, 2000, and his amended notice of appeal on December6, 2000.

ANALYSISI

The appellees initially argue that the trial courtimproperly refused to consider evidence of Yates' intoxicationwhen it ruled on their motions for summary judgment.

As part of their motions for summary judgment, the appelleessubmitted evidence of Yates' intoxication. The appelleessubmitted the affidavit of their expert, Daniel Brown. Afterexamining Yates' hospital records, Brown opined that Yates waslegally intoxicated at the time of the accident. However, thetrial court struck Brown's affidavit and refused to consider theintoxication evidence.

In response, Yates argues that the appellees have waivedthis issue because they failed to appeal the trial court's orderwhich struck Brown's affidavit. We agree.

"It is well settled that issues not raised in the trialcourt are deemed waived and may not be raised for the first timeon appeal." Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 536(1996). The appellees failed to appeal the order that struckBrown's affidavit and, as such, have waived review of this issue. However, the disposition of this matter will not be affected byour decision here.

II

Yates contends the trial court erred when it denied hismotion to reconsider its orders that granted summary judgment tothe appellees. Yates maintains a genuine issue of material factexists as to whether Shackelford's act of parking on the leftshoulder of the highway was a proximate cause of the accident. Yates argues that Shackelford violated section 11-1303(a)(1) (k)when she parked on the left shoulder of the highway. Section 11-1303(a)(1)(k) states that, except when necessary to avoidconflict with other traffic, or to comply with the law or thedirections of a police officer or official traffic-controldevice, no person shall stop, stand or park a vehicle in the areabetween roadways of a divided highway, including crossovers. 625ILCS 5/11-1303(a)(1)(k)(West 1996).

It is Yates' assertion that no exceptions to section 11-1303(a)(1) (k) were present when Shackelford pulled over onto theleft shoulder. It is Yates' contention that Shackelford'smalfunctioning taillight did not justify her pulling over ontothe left shoulder in violation of section 11-1303(a)(1)(k). IfShackelford had not violated section 11-1303(a)(1)(k), Yatesclaims, she would not have merged into traffic traveling at arate of speed that was slower than the posted speed limit. Yatesargues this subsequently caused him to hit the rear ofShackelford's trailer. Yates asserts section 11-1303(a)(1)(k)was specifically created to prevent this type of accident fromoccurring.

"Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings,together with any depositions, admissions, or affidavits on filedemonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact andthat the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Coughlin v. Gustafson, 332 Ill. App. 3d 406, 411 (2002),citing 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998); Outboard Marine Corp. v.Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90 (1992). Summaryjudgment is encouraged in the interest of the prompt dispositionof lawsuits, but it is a drastic measure which should be grantedonly when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissionson file, when reviewed in the light most favorable to thenonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue as to any materialfact and that the moving party's right to judgment is clear andfree from doubt. Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 358 (1989). "The standard of review on appeal from a grant of summaryjudgment is de novo." Coughlin, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 411, citingOutboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 102.

To sustain a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiffmust establish the existence of a duty owed by the defendant tothe plaintiff, a breach of that duty and an injury to plaintiffproximately caused by the breach. Hills v. Bridgeview LittleLeague Ass'n, 195 Ill. 2d 210, 228 (2000).

Whether a duty exists depends upon whether the parties stoodin such a relationship to one another that the law imposes anobligation on the defendant to act reasonably for the protectionof the plaintiff. Ziemba v. Mierzwa, 142 Ill. 2d 42, 47 (1991). Generally, "[i]n considering whether a duty exists in aparticular case, a court must weigh the foreseeability thatdefendant's conduct will result in injury to another and thelikelihood of an injury occurring, against the burden todefendant of imposing a duty, and the consequences of imposingthis burden." Ziemba, 142 Ill. 2d at 47.

To recover damages based upon a defendant's allegedstatutory violation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he belongsto the class of persons that the statute was designed to protect;(2) his injury is of the type that the statute was designed to prevent; and (3) the violation proximately caused his injury. First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 256(1999), citing Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 144 Ill. 2d 425,434-35 (1991).

Here, Yates clearly belongs to the class of people thatsection 11-1303(a)(1)(k) was designed to protect, and his injurywas of the type that the statute was designed to prevent. When amotorist parks on the left shoulder of the highway and attemptsto merge back into traffic, a situation can be created that ishazardous to other drivers. One reason this occurs is due to themotorist's limited view of oncoming traffic.

When a motorist merges into traffic from the right shoulder,he can view oncoming traffic by utilizing his sideview andrearview mirrors. In addition, the motorist also can look overhis shoulder to view oncoming traffic. This is impossible when amotorist is attempting to merge from the left shoulder,especially if the motorist is driving a semi, as was Shackelford. It should also be noted that when a motorist merges into trafficfrom the left shoulder, he or she is attempting to merge into thelane of traffic that is generally regarded as the fastest moving.

As such, we must determine if Shackelford's violation ofsection 11-1303(a)(1)(k) proximately caused Yates' injuries.

"The term 'proximate cause' describes two distinctrequirements: cause in fact and legal cause. Lee [v. ChicagoTransit Authority], 152 Ill. 2d [432,] 455 [(1992)]. Cause infact exists where there is a reasonable certainty that adefendant's acts caused the injury or damage. Lee, 152 Ill. 2dat 455. A defendant's conduct is a cause in fact of theplaintiff's injury only if that conduct is a material element anda substantial factor in bringing about the injury. Lee, 152 Ill.2d at 455. A defendant's conduct is a material element and asubstantial factor in bringing about an injury if, absent thatconduct, the injury would not have occurred. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at455. 'Legal cause,' by contrast, is essentially a question offoreseeability. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 456. The relevant inquiryhere is whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable personwould see as a likely result of his or her conduct. Lee, 152Ill. 2d at 456." First Springfield, 188 Ill. 2d at 257-58.

Yates relies on Filipetto v. Village of Wilmette, 135 Ill.App. 3d 781 (1985), to support his contention that Shackelford'sactions proximately caused his injuries. In Filipetto thedefendant violated a village ordinance by temporarily storing anair compressor on the street. A young boy who was riding hisbicycle subsequently hit the compressor and was injured. TheFilipetto court found that the village ordinance contemplatedpossible injury when articles were left on the public way andthat the young boy hitting the air compressor was a foreseeableconsequence of the defendant violating the ordinance. The courtdetermined that the defendant's conduct as a matter of law wasnot too remote to impose liability and reversed the trial court'sgrant of summary judgment. Filipetto, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 786.

This case can be distinguished from Filipetto. InFilipetto, the accident was not caused by the unreasonableactions of the boy who was riding his bike. Our set of facts ismore similar to the facts in First Springfield.

In First Springfield, a tanker truck illegally parked atmid-block. A young girl then illegally crossed the street atmid-block in front the of tanker and was subsequently hit by anoncoming vehicle. The driver of the vehicle said that she couldnot swerve and avoid the accident by switching to the open lanebecause of the illegally parked tanker truck. The FirstSpringfield court rejected the plaintiff's assertion that theillegally parked tanker truck was the proximate cause of theaccident that led to the girl's death. The court found thatalthough the tanker was the cause in fact of the accident, it was not the legal cause of the accident. First Springfield, 188 Ill.2d at 259-60. Instead, the court held that the girl's actions ofignoring a marked crosswalk, crossing the street at mid-block,and attempting to cross a designated truck route blindly and inviolation of the law were the legal cause of the accident. FirstSpringfield, 188 Ill. 2d at 261.

Here, we must first determine whether Shackelford's act ofpulling over on the left shoulder in violation of 11-1303(a)(1)(k) was a cause in fact of Yates' injuries. In deciding whethera defendant's conduct was a material and substantial element inbringing about an injury, we ask whether, absent the defendant'sconduct, that injury still would have occurred. FirstSpringfield, 188 Ill. 2d at 260, citing Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455.

Had Shackelford not parked on the left shoulder, Yates'injuries more than likely would not have occurred. It is clearfrom the record that Yates was speeding. However, it is alsoapparent that Shackelford was doing just the opposite. Whenviewed in the light most favorable to Yates, the record showsthat Shackelford was traveling below the posted speed limit of 55miles per hour. Junkins estimated that Shackelford was travelingat 40 to 45 miles an hour at the time of impact. If Shackelfordhad not pulled over onto the left shoulder of the highway, shewould not have found herself attempting to merge into what istypically considered the fast lane at a rate of speed 10 to 15miles below the posted speed limit.

Now, we must determine whether Shackelford's violation ofsection 11-1303(a)(1)(k) was in fact the legal cause of Yates'injuries. The relevant inquiry here is whether the injury is ofa type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result ofhis or her conduct. First Springfield, 188 Ill. 2d at 260,citing Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 456. We find that Shackelford'sactions were not the legal cause of Yates' injuries.

No one in Shackelford's position could have reasonably anticipated that the act of pulling over on the left shoulderwould have resulted in the succeeding accident. Beforeattempting to merge back into the left lane, Shackelford gainedspeed while traveling on the shoulder. She checked her passengerside mirror and saw that the left lane was clear of traffic. Sheactivated her turn signal and then began to merge. At thatmoment, Yates, who was speeding, shifted into the left lane. When Yates switched lanes and passed Junkins, Shackelford's truckand its lights were plainly visible, as was evidenced by Junkins, who testified that Shackelford's truck was plainlyvisible from 500 feet.

Unexplainably, while the situation with Shackelford wasdeveloping in front of him, Yates was still attempting to passthe car ahead in the middle lane. Why did Yates not simply mergeinto the empty space between Junkins and the car ahead? As Yatesneared Shackelford's trailer, he finally realized that there wasnot enough space to pass the car in the middle lane and move tohis right. However, by this point, Yates could not avoid theimpending collision because of his excessive speed. Here, Yates'unreasonable actions were the sole proximate cause of hisinjuries and not any actions that were taken by Shackelford.

III

Lastly, Yates argues that sufficient evidence was presentedto the trial court to give rise to a genuine issue of materialfact that Junkins breached his duty of care by failing to brakeor take proper evasive action.

Illinois courts have long held that a sudden swerve into adefendant's right of way by an approaching vehicle does not giverise to negligence by the defendant. Courts will not view aparty's acts with the clarity of hindsight, but by a standard ofwhat a prudent person would have done under the samecircumstances. Wilmere v. Stibolt, 152 Ill. App. 3d 642, 647(1987). The driver of a vehicle who is faced in a suddenemergency with imminent peril is not required to possess the samecoolness and judgment as when there is no imminent peril. Turnerv. Roesner, 193 Ill. App. 3d 482, 488 (1990), citing McCulloughv. McTavish, 62 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1047 (1978).

To support his position, Yates relies on Turner, where thedecedent's car crossed the center line and collided with thedefendant's vehicle. Although the defendant was driving 10 to 15miles below the posted speed limit when the accident occurred,the court held that even this speed may have been excessiveconsidering the weather conditions at the time of the accident. Turner, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 489.

There was evidence that on the morning of the accident,there was fog and ice on the road. Also, the defendant stated,in his deposition that, prior to the accident, he did notremember braking and that he did not attempt to take evasivemaneuvers. The court took this statement to mean that thedefendant may have been driving too fast to react to theplaintiff's vehicle and subsequently avoid the accident. Turner,193 Ill. App. 3d at 489.

Turner can be distinguished. In this case, there is absolutely no evidence which suggests that weather conditionsplayed a part in the accident. After reviewing the record, wefind that Junkins' conduct played no part in causing Yates'injuries either. Prior to the accident Junkins was traveling atthe posted speed. When Yates passed him, Junkins took his footoff the accelerator because he anticipated that something mighthappen as a result of Yates' speeding. In fact, Junkins hadalready begun braking when Yates slammed on his brakes and hitthe back of Shackelford's truck. When Junkins hit Yates, he didso only because Yates' car unexpectedly turned into his laneafter hitting Shackelford's truck.

This case is more similar to Wilmere. There the decedent'svehicle crossed the double yellow line and struck the threedefendants, who were traveling in the opposite direction. TheWilmere court concluded that the defendants, who were all intheir own lanes and traveling at the posted speed limit, were notnegligent. Wilmere, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 647.

This accident was caused by Yates' unforeseeably recklessconduct. Junkins acted as a reasonably careful driver under thecircumstances and Yates failed to establish a material questionof fact as to Junkins' alleged negligence.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial courtis affirmed.

Affirmed.

Campbell, P.J. and Quinn, J., concur.