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JUSTICE CERDA delivered the opinion of the court:

This action was brought by plaintiffs, Samantha Wrobel andKim Borias, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained asresult of an automobile accident occurring on a state highwaymaintained by defendant, the City of Chicago. The accident inquestion was allegedly caused when a third-party, who is not aparty to this appeal, lost control of his vehicle after strikinga pothole in the roadway, and the vehicle veered into oncomingtraffic in which plaintiffs were traveling. Plaintiffs appealthe order of the circuit court entering summary judgment in favorof the City on the ground that it was immunized from liabilitypursuant to the Local Government and Governmental Employees TortImmunity Act (Act) (745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1998). For thefollowing reasons, we affirm.

Plaintiffs were injured on January 14, 1997, when thevehicle that Wrobel was operating and in which Borias was apassenger collided with a vehicle being operated by Joseph Boshon the 7300 block of South Kedzie Avenue in the Chicago. Immediately before the accident, plaintiffs were traveling southon Kedzie, while Bosh was traveling north. Bosh claimed theaccident occurred when his vehicle careened out of control intooncoming traffic after striking a pothole in the road. Bosh didnot see the pothole in question before the crash, but uponreturning to the immediate area of the accident at some laterunspecified date, he observed a four-foot by six-foot depressionin the road, which had been patched over. Bosh identified thisdepression to be the pothole that caused his vehicle to veer outof control.

The 7300 block of South Kedzie is a state highway owned bythe State of Illinois. Pursuant to a formal agreement with theState, the City receives state funds to perform maintenance work,including pothole repair, on the area of Kedzie involved in thiscase, as well as numerous other stretches of state highwayswithin its limits. The record materials show that City workershad repaired potholes in the 7300 block of South Kedzie onJanuary 10, 1997, four days before the accident. City worksheetsreveal that the crew conducting repairs on January 10 was headedby foreman Michael Colianne.

During the winter months, crews are deployed by the City tocanvass roadways under the City's maintenance and fill potholesin need of repair. These crews generally consist of a foreman, araker, a roller, and two laborers. A supervisor with the asphaltdivision of the City's Department of Transportation coordinatesthe crew foremen and specifies the roadway areas where each crewwill conduct pothole repairs. Each foreman then plans the routethe crew will undertake through the daily grid and supervises thecrew members during their work. The foreman is typically notinvolved in the physical work involved in repairing any pothole.

The particular asphalt mixture used by the City to repairpotholes depends on the time of the year during which the repairefforts are undertaken. In warmer weather, the City fillspotholes with a "hot mix." As was explained by various Cityworkers, a hot mixture forms a durable and a relatively longlasting patch. In colder weather, however, the City uses a "coldmix", which is not as durable and dependable as a hot mixture. Depending on a number of various extraneous factors occurringafter its application, such as the weather, traffic patterns andfrequency of plowing, a cold mix patch may fail quite rapidly. The record testimony of several foremen and crew workersdemonstrates that the City elects to utilize a cold mixtureinstead of a hot mix in winter weather because a hot mixture willtypically settle during transportation due to the lowtemperatures and, as a consequence, are generally unusable. Dueto this situation, the City employs cold mixtures in the winteras a temporary fix, and then later uses the more durable hot mixwhen the weather permits.

The manner in which the cold mixture is applied in winterdiffers among the various repair crews. In particular part, thecrews do not follow any uniform approach of handling asphaltdebris and water within a pothole to be repaired. Some crewsmake no attempt to remove loose asphalt and moisture,particularly water, from a pothole before a cold mixture isapplied, while other crews undertake such efforts. For instance,Michael Colianne stated the workers under his supervisionspecifically attempt to remove residual asphalt, snow, ice, andwater from a pothole "as much as possible" before applying a coldmixture. Colianne explained the presence of loose asphalt andmoisture will adversely affect the adhesive quality of the patch,and stated that such removal efforts are necessary to ensure adurable repair.

The affidavit of Boris Dragunsky, a licensed engineer with adoctorate degree in construction materials technology, wassubmitted by plaintiffs to show that Colianne's practice is theproper method of pothole repair. According to Dragunsky,substrate preparation is essential for effective pothole repair. Dragunsky explains that the presence of moisture or water in thesubstrate will insure the rapid failure of any repair, and thatthe mixing of old asphalt aggregate with a cold mix willsimilarly contribute to a rapid deterioration of the patch. Dragunsky maintains that effective repair of a pothole with useof a cold mix requires removal of all moisture, water andresidual asphalt aggregate from the pothole.

Plaintiffs' theory of negligence against the City is notentirely clear. Plaintiffs assert that in light of the City'sdocumented repair efforts, no open and unrepaired potholes,especially one measuring four-by-six feet, presumably existed inthe 7300 block of South Kedzie at the conclusion of the work dayon January 10, 1997. Plaintiffs maintain the pothole purportedlystruck by Bosh on January 14, 1997, must then have developedwithin the four-day period preceding the accident. Plaintiffsclaim that "the rapid appearance of the condition gives rise toan inference that a prior repair failed rapidly" and "that, inturn, gives rise to an inference that the repairs were doneimproperly." According to plaintiffs, the improper repair by theworkers ensured the rapid failure of the patch, and consequentlycaused the dangerous condition confronted by Bosh.⁽¹⁾

We glean from plaintiffs' assertions two distinct theoriesof liability. First, plaintiffs seem to claim that the laborersworking under Colianne's supervision on January 10, 1997 failedto remove an adequate amount of residual asphalt and moisturefrom the pothole that was struck by Bosh before applying the coldmix compound. In an apparent alternative theory, plaintiffs seemto contend that the same workers wholly failed in the firstinstance to follow the application procedure prescribed byColianne and made no attempt to remove any loose asphalt ormoisture.

The purpose of summary judgment under section 2-1005 of theCode is to determine whether there exist any genuine issues ofmaterial fact between the parties. Hubble v. O'Connor, 291 Ill.App. 3d 974, 979, 684 N.E.2d 816, 820 (1997). Summary judgmentis appropriate only where the pleadings, depositions, andadmissions on file, together with any affidavits, present noissue of material fact and show that the moving party is entitledto judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West1998); Benamon v. Soo Line Railroad Company, 294 Ill. App. 3d 85,87, 689 N.E.2d 366, 369 (1997). Our review of an order grantingsummary judgment in favor of a party is conducted de novo(Benamon, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 88, 689 N.E.2d at 369 (1997)), andwe will construe all pleadings, depositions and affidavits in alight most favorable to the nonmoving party. Soderlund Brothers,Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 278 Ill. App. 3d 606, 614, 663 N.E.2d 1, 7(1995).

In its motion for summary judgment, the City argues, inrelevant part, it is immune from the asserted negligence of itsworkers under sections 2-201 of the Act. That provisionprovides:

"[e]xcept as otherwise provided byStatute, a public employee serving in aposition involving the determination ofpolicy or the exercise of discretion is notliable for an injury resulting from his actor omission in determining policy when actingin the exercise of such discretion eventhough abused." 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West1998).

By virtue of section 2-109 of the Act, immunity is granted to apublic entity for the acts or omissions of its employees wherethe employees are not liable. 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 1998).

As explained by our supreme court, the immunity provided bysection 2-201 extends to any employee who holds either a positioninvolving the determination of policy or a position involving theexercise of discretion. Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd.Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 341, 692 N.E.2d 1177, 1181 (1998). For immunity to attach, though, the complained of injuries musthave resulted from an act or omission by the employee indetermining policy and exercising discretion. The act oromission giving rise to the injuries must be both a determinationof policy and an exercise of discretion. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at341, 692 N.E.2d at 1181.

The term "policy" when used in relation to the decisions ofa public entity have been defined as "those decisions whichrequire the municipality to balance competing interests and tomake a judgment call as to what solution will best serve each ofthose interests." Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 342, 692 N.E.2d at1181, quoting West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 11, 588 N.E.2d 1104(1992); see also Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit SchoolDistrict No. 1, 313 Ill. App. 3d 702, 706, 730 N.E.2d 61, 65(2000) ("policy determination" is one requiring "consideredevaluation and judgment by a governmental unit, utilizing its ownparticular expertise, to formulate principles and proceduresdirected toward the achievement of common and general goals forthe community's benefit" during which "several factors, includingthe public benefit, the practicability of the plan or procedure,and the best methods to be employed considering availableresources, costs, and safety, must be considered").

Acts deemed "discretionary" have been defined as those whichare unique to a particular public office (Snyder v. CurranTownship, 167 Ill. 2d 466, 474, 657 N.E.2d 988, 993 (1995)), andinvolve the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment indeciding whether to perform a particular act, or how and in whatmanner that act should be performed. D.M. v. National School BusService, Inc., 305 Ill. App. 3d 735, 739, 713 N.E.2d 196, 200(1999); Bonnell v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 258 Ill.App. 3d 485, 489, 630 N.E.2d 547, 549 (1994).

Plaintiffs' first theory of liability focuses on theadequacy of the efforts undertaken by Colianne's workers inremoving residual asphalt and moisture from the pothole at issuein this case. Plaintiffs specifically suggest the workers failedto extract a sufficient amount of asphalt and moisture from thedepression before applying the cold mixture and, as a result,compromised the durability of the patch. Under the circumstancespresented, we find that section 201 of the Act cloaks the Citywith immunity under this theory.

Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the laborers inColianne's crew hold positions that require them to bothdetermine policy and exercise discretion. These workers aredirected by Colianne to remove "as much" loose asphalt andexisting moisture in a pothole "as possible" before applying thecold mixture. While they are obligated to undertake such measurepursuant to the express directive of their foreman, the workersenjoy discretion in determining how much asphalt and moistureshould be actually extracted and whether that amount is indeedadequate to ensure a durable patch.

The decisions of the workers in this regard can also fairlybe characterized as policy determinations. When confronted witha particular stretch of roadway, the workers must necessarily beconcerned with the efficiency in which they prepare any potholesfor repair. Specifically, the workers must allocate their timeand resources among the various potholes that will be repaired,and they must ensure that not too much time is dedicated topothole preparation. The more time and resources the workersdevote to preparing potholes for a patch, the less time andresources they have available to repair the other potholesexisting throughout their daily grid.

For the same reasons discussed above, the extent of theworkers' removal efforts represent both a determination of policyand an exercise of discretion. The degree to which a potholeshould be prepared, and specifically how much loose asphalt andmoisture will be removed, is a matter of a worker's personaljudgment, and encompassed within that judgment are the policyconsiderations of time and resource allocation during a givenworkday.

Plaintiffs strenuously argue that the physical acts of theworkers are not discretionary but rather ministerial. Onlydiscretionary acts are extended immunity under the Act, and apublic entity will not be protected for the acts of their agentsthat are ministerial in character. The classification of acts aseither discretionary or ministerial escape any preciseformulation and must be made on a case-by-case basis in light ofthe particular facts and circumstances presented. Snyder, 167Ill. 2d at 474, 657 N.E.2d at 992-93.

Despite the ad hoc nature of this determination, the lawdeems discretionary acts as those that are unique to a particularpublic office (Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 474, 657 N.E.2d at 993),and involve the making of a decision about whether or how toperform a particular act following the exercise of personaldeliberation and judgment. D.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d at 739, 713N.E.2d at 200; Bonnell, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 489, 630 N.E.2d at549.

In contrast, ministerial acts are those which a personperforms on a given state of facts in a prescribed manner, inobedience to the mandate of legal authority, and withoutreference to the official's discretion as to the propriety of theact. Snyder, 167 Ill. 2d at 474, 657 N.E.2d at 993. That is,ministerial acts are those acts that are "absolute, certain andimperative, involving merely the execution of a set task" so that"nothing remains for judgment or discretion." In re ChicagoFlood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 194, 680 N.E.2d 265, 272(1997), quoting City of Chicago v. Seben, 165 Ill. 371, 377-78,46 N.E. 244 (1897).

The acts and omissions complained of by plaintiffs cannot beclassified as ministerial under the facts and circumstances ofthis case. As discussed above, the workers enjoy the discretionto determine how much residual asphalt and moisture to removefrom potholes. The plaintiffs' correctly note that the workershave no discretion to decide whether or not to follow thepreparation approach adopted by Colianne, and are under theobligation to attempt to remove as much asphalt and moisture aspossible. However, the amount of asphalt and moisture actuallyremoved and determined to be sufficient is left to the personaljudgment of the workers. As noted by our supreme court,depending on the circumstances of the particular case, an actthat might be considered a repair can be a discretionary matter. Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 195, 680 N.E.2d at 273. Plaintiffs' assertion would find stronger support if Coliannedirected his workers to remove all loose asphalt and existingmoisture from a pothole. But that is not the situation presentedby the record. Rather, by virtue of the actual directive givenby Colianne, the workers retained a degree of discretion inperforming their duties. It is this fact that primarilydistinguishes the instant matter from that presented in Herman v.Will Township, 284 Ill. App. 3d 53, 671 N.E.2d 1141 (1996), uponwhich plaintiffs place heavy reliance.

Plaintiffs' alternative theory of liability similarlyconcerns the omissions of the workers, and focuses on the workersinitial efforts to undertake the measures prescribed by Colianne. According to this theory, the workers under Colianne'ssupervision did not make any attempt to remove residual asphaltand moisture from the pothole at issue. As plaintiffs claim,section 2-201 of the Act does not afford the City immunity underthis theory since the workers had no discretion in followingColianne's prescribed method of preparing potholes for repair. Once Colianne exercised his discretion and determined thatresidual asphalt and moisture should be removed, to the extentpossible, the workers's initial effort to undertake such measuresbecame ministerial and they were under the obligation to followColianne's directives. However, notwithstanding the Act'sinapplicability to plaintiffs' alternative theory, we believesummary judgment in favor of the City is nonetheless properbecause plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence that wouldentitle them to a finding in their favor.

To prevail on their negligence claim, plaintiffs arerequired to prove the existence of duty on the part of the City,the City's breach of that duty, and injury proximately resultingfrom that breach. Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge, 209 Ill. App.3d 290, 293, 568 N.E.2d 144, 145 (1991). Even though plaintiffs,as the nonmovants, were not required to prove their case at thesummary judgment stage, they had the burden of presenting somefactual basis that would arguably entitle them to a judgment. Geraghty v. Continental Western Life Ins. Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d669, 678, 667 N.E.2d 510, 516 (1996). If from the materials inthe record a plaintiff fails to establish an element of her causeof action, summary judgment is proper. Geraghty, 281 Ill. App.3d at 678, 667 N.E.2d at 516. Thus, for plaintiffs to survivesummary judgment, they had to present some evidence showing abreach on the part of the City, namely that the workers inColianne's crew wholly failed to make any attempt to removeresidual asphalt and moisture from the pothole identified byBosh. While the question of whether the City breached its dutyto the plaintiffs is normally a factual one, it may properly beresolved by this court as a legal matter when the evidence, suchas in this case, presents no genuine issue of material factregarding that subject. Nowak v. Coghill, 296 Ill. App. 3d 886,892, 695 N.E.2d 532, 537 (1998).

Plaintiffs concede the record is devoid of any directevidence establishing that the workers did not undertake therequired repair measures. Rather, plaintiffs seek to establishthe requisite breach circumstantially. The law is wellestablished that a party may establish a defendant's negligencethrough the use of circumstantial evidence. Nowak, 296 Ill. App.3d at 896, 695 N.E.2d at 539. Circumstantial evidence is theproof of certain facts and circumstances from which a fact findermay infer other connected facts that usually and reasonablyfollow according to the common experience of mankind. Parker v.Masonic Warren Barr Pavilion, 299 Ill. App. 3d 495, 500, 701N.E.2d 190, 193 (1998). Circumstantial evidence may be used toestablish facts necessary to a claim, but is sufficient only whenits shows the probability of the existence of the fact. Thecircumstantial facts must be of such a nature and so related asto make the conclusion reached the more probable, as opposed topossible, one. Block v. Lohan Associates, Inc., 269 Ill. App. 3d745, 757, 645 N.E.2d 207, 215 (1993); Stonitsch v. LaredoConstruction Co., 221 Ill. App. 3d 902, 905, 583 N.E.2d 49, 52(1991).

Here, plaintiffs have not presented sufficientcircumstantial evidence to establish that Colianne's workersfailed in the first instance to remove loose asphalt and moisturefrom the pothole in question and apply a cold mix patch. Therecord materials, including the affidavit of Dragunsky, do notdemonstrate the probability of the inference plaintiffs seek todraw. While it may be reasonable to infer that the pothole inquestion was repaired by the workers on January 10, 1997 by useof a cold mix patch, and that this patch failed before or onJanuary 14, the record does not show that it is more probablethan not that this patch broke down as a result of the workers'failure to make efforts to remove residual asphalt and moisture. For that matter, assuming section 2-201 of the Act isinapplicable to plaintiffs' first theory of liability, the recordlikewise is insufficient to show the probability of the profferedinference that the workers failed to remove an adequate amount ofasphalt and moisture from the pothole. These inference may bepossible, but they are not probable and thus are insufficient asa matter of law.

Further, the inferences sought by plaintiffs are missing acritical link. To raise a reasonable inference that the workerseither failed to make efforts to remove asphalt and moisture fromthe pothole or undertook such efforts but performed theminadequately, plaintiffs must have presented circumstantialevidence showing that it is more probable than not that thepothole at issue broke down due to the presence of asphalt andmoisture. As explained by Dragunsky, the presence of asphalt andmoisture may cause the failure of a cold mix patch. Yet, therecord also demonstrates that a cold mix patch may break down forvarious other reasons, including traffic patterns and weatherconditions. The evidence in the record merely establishes thepossibility that the presence of residual asphalt and moisturecaused the failure of the pothole's repair in this case. Infact, the record is devoid of any evidence establishing, orraising a reasonable inference, that the pothole in questioncontained loose asphalt and/or moisture on January 10, 1997.

For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's entry ofsummary judgment in favor of the City and against plaintiffs isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

HALL, P.J., and BURKE, J., concur.

1. Plaintiffs originally alleged the City was negligentby: (1) failing to inspect the 7300 block of South Kedzie for theexistence of the pothole which Bosh's vehicle struck; (2) to theextent such an inspection was made, failing to conduct saidinspection in a careful and reasonable manner so as to discoverthe pothole; (3) failing to repair or remedy the pothole; and (4)failing to warn motorists traveling on Kedzie of the pothole'spresence. Plaintiffs acknowledge certain City crews weredeployed during January 1997 to search out potholes for repairand that crews on January 10, 1997, specifically discovered thepothole at issue in this case. By their acknowledgments,plaintiffs have conceded that the City could not have breachedthe first two duties claimed in the complaint. Plaintiffsfurther conceded in the circuit court that the City had no dutyto warn under the circumstances.