Wilson v. State Employee's Retirement System

Case Date: 12/19/2002
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-02-0083 Rel

SIXTH DIVISION

December 20, 2002






No. 1-02-0083

 

STEVEN WILSON, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
                          Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County
)
        v. )
)
STATE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ) Honorable
ILLINOIS and EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ) Stephen A. Schiller,
STATE EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ) Judge Presiding.
ILLINOIS, )
)
                         Defendants-Appellants. )
 

 

JUSTICE O'MARA FROSSARD delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendants the State Employees' Retirement System of Illinois (SERS) and the ExecutiveCommittee of SERS appeal from an order of the circuit court on administrative review whichreversed a decision by the Board of Trustees of SERS (Board) finding that SERS overpaid plaintiffSteven Wilson occupational disability benefits. Defendants contend on appeal that the Board wasthe administrative agency which rendered the final decision that SERS overpaid plaintiff and thatplaintiff's failure to name the Board as a defendant in his complaint for administrative reviewrequired the circuit court to dismiss his complaint. Defendants alternatively contend that the Board'sdecision that SERS overpaid occupational disability benefits to plaintiff was not against the manifestweight of the evidence and was consistent with sound public policy. We hold that the circuit courtwas required to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for administrative review based on his failure to namethe Board, and accordingly, we vacate the circuit court's order reversing the Board's decision, remandthe case, and direct the circuit court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint.

Plaintiff, a correctional officer with the Illinois Department of Corrections (Department),claimed that he fell and was injured in February 1997 while working at one of the Department'scorrectional facilities. He applied for workers' compensation benefits from the Department, whichdenied his claim on the ground that his injury was not work-related. Plaintiff contested theDepartment's denial by filing a claim with the Industrial Commission. In January 1998, while hisclaim with the Industrial Commission was pending, plaintiff applied for temporary disability benefitsfrom SERS. In February 1998, SERS approved his application, and plaintiff received temporarydisability benefits for approximately seven months.

In March 1999, plaintiff and the Department settled his workers' compensation claim whichwas pending in the Industrial Commission. The settlement awarded plaintiff $26,333.16,representing 70.5 weeks of permanent partial disability. The following year, in March 2000, RobertHicks, supervisor of SERS's disability section, wrote plaintiff a letter informing him that SERS hadoverpaid him $2,472.84 in benefits. The letter initially noted that SERS had paid plaintiff temporarydisability benefits based on the Department's denial of plaintiff's claim for workers' compensationbenefits. The letter then explained that after receiving information regarding plaintiff's settlementwith the Department, SERS determined it overpaid plaintiff benefits. In a letter responding to Hicks'letter, plaintiff asserted he was not liable for any overpayment of benefits by SERS and requestedan administrative hearing on the matter.

The Executive Committee, which conducted the hearing requested by plaintiff, found thatSERS overpaid him benefits in the amount of $2,472.84 and recommended to the Board thatplaintiff's appeal be denied. Patrick Cummings, manager of SERS's claims division, wrote plaintiffa letter dated June 21, 2000, informing him that the Executive Committee reviewed and denied hisappeal at its June 8, 2000, meeting based upon a nine-page "Recommendation." The letter attachedthe "Recommendation," which concluded that "there has been an overpayment of occupationaldisability benefits to [plaintiff], and, therefore, [plaintiff] is required to repay that overpayment ofbenefits to the System." The final sentence of the "Recommendation" stated "[t]he Committeerecommends that the appeal of [plaintiff] be denied."

On July 6, 2000, the Board ratified the Executive Committee's recommendation thatplaintiff's appeal be denied, and on July 10, 2000, Cummings wrote plaintiff a letter notifying himof the Board's decision. The letter specified "[t]his constitutes a final decision on adminstrativereview of your appeal by the State Employees' Retirement System (SERS)."

In August 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit courtseeking reversal of SERS's decision. Plaintiff named SERS and the Executive Committee of SERSas defendants in his complaint, but he did not name the Board as a defendant. Following a hearingat which counsel presented arguments, the circuit court granted the relief requested in plaintiff'scomplaint for administrative review.

Defendants contend that the circuit court was required to dismiss plaintiff's complaint foradministrative review because plaintiff failed to name the Board as a defendant in his complaint. Whether plaintiff's failure to name the Board warranted dismissal of his complaint is a question oflaw, and accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. Veazey v. Baker, 322 Ill. App. 3d 599, 602(2001); ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26, 29 (2000).

There is no constitutional right to appeal decisions of administrative agencies. ESG Watts,Inc., 191 Ill. 2d at 29. Instead, the appellate and circuit courts have only those powers to reviewadministrative actions "as provided by law." ESG Watts, Inc., 191 Ill. 2d at 29; Ill. Const. 1970, art.VI,