Find Legal Information

FIRST DIVISION

November 27, 2002

JUSTICE GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff James P. Whitmer (Whitmer) filed a verified complaint and requested injunctiverelief against his neighbors, defendants Lester and Judith Munson (the Munsons), alleging thatthe Munsons intentionally interfered with his contract to reconstruct a seawall and create a boathoist and platform near his residence. The Munsons responded with a counterclaim and motionfor preliminary injunction alleging that Whitmer's construction violated the covenants of thetownhouse association to which they both belonged. After extensive litigation, the trial courtdetermined that the Munsons were entitled to a preliminary injunction enjoining Whitmer fromresuming construction. Whitmer subsequently dismissed his complaint alleging contractinterference against the Munsons. The Munsons then moved for a permanent injunction toprohibit continued construction on Whitmer's property and also moved for a mandatoryinjunction requiring removal of the improvements made to Whitmer's property. The trial courtgranted the motion for a permanent injunction without opposition from Whitmer, but denied theMunsons' motion for a mandatory injunction requiring removal. The Munsons then filed amotion for sanctions against Whitmer pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137 (134 Ill. 2d R. 137),which was denied by the trial court. The Munsons now appeal the trial court's order denying theirmotion for sanctions. On appeal, they contend that the trial court erred in failing to apply anobjective standard in evaluating their sanctions motion and that the trial court failed to recognizethat the litigation was caused by "baseless" allegations made by Whitmer. For the foregoingreasons, we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case, primarily gleaned from the lower court's findings, show thatWhitmer purchased a townhouse in the development known as the River Cottages, located on thebank of the Chicago River, in September 1988. Whitmer was the first purchaser of property inthe development. Prior to Whitmer's purchase, the developer/seller of the property created"proposed" restrictive covenants to govern the actions of the townhouse owners. Whitmerrequested and the developer/seller agreed to modify the "proposed" covenants to allow Whitmerto erect a boat hoist along the seawall of his property without the consent of the other homeowners, provided that approvals were obtained from authorities having jurisdiction over theChicago River. Further, the restrictive covenants, as altered to accommodate Whitmer, containeddrawings that depicted the type of hoist Whitmer had permission to build, and the drawingsfurther specified that the hoist should be "low-profile." Finally, the restrictive covenantsprovided that developer/seller could modify the restrictions "for any *** reasons deemed byDeveloper to be in the best interest of property owners."

In December 1989, the Munsons purchased their River Cottage relying on the restrictivecovenants as they existed in 1988, as modified to accommodate Whitmer. In that same month,the restrictive covenants were further amended (the 1989 Amendment) pursuant to thedeveloper's determination that the modification was "in the best interests of property owners." The new amendment provided in relevant part:

"No wall or fences of any height shall be constructed on any lot until after the height, type, design and approximate locationtherefor shall have been approved in writing by the Committee [the unit owners]."

The parties do not dispute that construction of the boat hoist, seawall and platform in questionwas governed by this later amendment, which superceded the earlier modification made in 1988.

In October 1993, Whitmer entered into a contract to reconstruct the seawall on hisproperty and to construct a new boat hoist and platform. The plans submitted with theapplications for permits, however, did not include the boat hoist. Consequently, Whitmer did notobtain the requisite permits to build the boat hoist from "authorities having jurisdiction over theChicago River waterway" as was required by the restrictive covenants. Whitmer also did not tellthe contractors building the seawall and boat hoist that such permits were required under thecontrolling restrictive covenants. Moreover, he did not disclose his plans for the boat hoist to hisneighbors, the Munsons, and did not receive any approval from the townhouse association"committee" as was required by the later, 1989 Amendment.

In 1994, the Munsons began contacting various agencies, such as the City of Chicagodepartment of buildings, the mayor's office and the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, aswell as their River Cottage neighbors, attempting to halt Whitmer's construction on the groundsthat he did not have the requisite permits and was in violation of the restrictive covenants. InApril 1994, in response to the Munsons' conduct, Whitmer filed a verified complaint seeking toenjoin the Munsons from intentionally interfering with his construction contract.

In his verified complaint, Whitmer alleged that he obtained permits for reconstruction ofthe seawall and for the boat hoist from the City of Chicago, Illinois Department of Transportationand the Army Corps of Engineers. He also alleged that drawings specifically outlining the workto be done were submitted to the agencies. In addition, Whitmer pled that the work contemplatedwas authorized by the restrictive covenants.

Upon the filing of Whitmer's complaint, the Munsons filed a verified counterclaimseeking to preliminarily and permanently enjoin Whitmer from further construction on thegrounds that his construction project was proceeding without the requisite permits and that "theboat hoist and appurtenant structures" being built did not comport with the guidelines set forth inthe controlling restrictive covenants. The Munsons also asked the court to order Whitmer toremove all structural components of the boat hoist, which included vertical supports, a concreteplatform and a 14-foot portion of sea wall. The Munsons also contemporaneously filed a motionwhich, in addition to seeking a preliminary injunction to halt construction of the seawall and boathoist, asked for a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the issues in court.

In May 1994, Whitmer filed a response to the Munsons' motion for preliminaryinjunction, which he designated as his "Verified Answer to Motion for Preliminary Injunction." In his response, Whitmer admitted that he was bound by the restrictive covenants, denied theallegation that he did not have permits to build the boat hoist, and then admitted that he wascurrently seeking permits from various government agencies to construct the boat hoist. In thatverified response, Whitmer also advanced the affirmative defense of laches, asserting that theMunsons were aware of the construction and alleged cause of action for more than six weeksbefore filing their motion for a preliminary injunction. Whitmer also filed his opposition to theMunsons' request for a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the preliminaryinjunction motion. The trial court thereupon entered the temporary restraining order prohibitingcontinued construction on Whitmer's property pending a hearing to determine the request forpreliminary injunction.

In June 1994, Whitmer filed a motion requesting that the court deny the Munsons' motionfor a preliminary injunction or, in the alternative, that the hearing in progress be stayed pendingsubmission of a revised permit application, on the grounds that the basis for injunctive relief nolonger existed. In support of this motion, Whitmer stated that, although he was not concedingthat the boat hoist he planned to install violated the restrictive covenants, he would voluntarilyremove the main pole of the boat hoist installed on his property. Whitmer also volunteered toprovide the Munsons with "copies of the amended application for a boat hoist and committ[ed]not to permit any construction of the boat joist [sic] without permits."

The Munsons countered by filing a response to Whitmer's motion, and also moved forsanctions against Whitmer pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137. 134 Ill. 2d R. 137. In thatresponse, the Munsons contended that Whitmer's motion impliedly demonstrated that he did notpossess the requisite permits as he pled in his original complaint and that his election to removethe boat hoist constituted an admission by conduct that the boat hoist was violative of therestrictive covenants. The Munsons urged that sanctions should be imposed upon Whitmerbecause his pleadings were not well grounded in fact or law insofar as Whitmer filed a complaintagainst the Munsons alleging that he had the requisite permits and that his construction projectdid not violate the restrictive covenants when he knew that: (a) the permit applications submittedto authorities omitted the boat hoist; (b) his contractors were unaware that permits were requiredunder the restrictive covenants; (c) the Munsons were unaware of the plans for the boat hoist; (d)work was stopped on his construction project because he did not have the requisite permits; and(e) he filed applications for permits after commencing the cause of action against the Munsons.

In addition, the Munsons contended that Whitmer was aware that his boat hoist violatedthe restrictive covenants because Whitmer prepared a document in his own defense, for signatureby a River Cottage neighbor, which stated on its face that the hoist, in fact, violated the restrictivecovenants. The document stated: "I approve and have no objection to James Whitmer/365 N.Canal installing a Levitator boat hoist behind his home. I understand it deviates from thedrawings in the restrictive covenants of the River Cottages." Whitmer thereupon withdrew hismotion to deny the preliminary injunction, in which he volunteered to remove the boat hoist, andthe trial court took the Munsons' motion for sanctions under advisement.

Thereafter, the Munsons were granted leave to amend their counterclaim. In theiramended counterclaim, the Munsons realleged that Whitmer commenced construction of the boathoist without the requisite permits and that construction of the boat hoist violated the restrictivecovenants insofar as it did not comply with the permit requirements or the drawings depicting anallowable boat hoist. The Munsons then alleged (for the first time) that construction of theconcrete seawall and platform on Whitmer's property was also violative of the 1989 amendmentto the restrictive covenants because the construction proceeded without written approval from thecommittee.

Whitmer thereupon filed a response entitled "Amended Verified Answer to Motion forPreliminary Injunction." In that response, Whitmer purported to raise the affirmative defenses ofwaiver and unclean hands.⁽¹⁾

Whitmer, thereafter, filed his "Answer to First Amended Verified Counterclaim." In thatanswer, Whitmer responded to the Munsons' allegation that he did not obtain the requisitepermits by stating that "he obtained permits from the licensing authorities that his architect andengineer advised him were necessary." Whitmer also denied that the construction projectviolated the restrictive covenants as amended in 1989. In his answer to the amendedcounterclaim, Whitmer advanced an affirmative defense⁽²⁾ that the "purported Amendment" to therestrictive covenants discussed in the Munsons' amended counterclaim "was never served,delivered, or otherwise made known to Whitmer prior to the Munson's [sic] service of theirmotion for leave to file the Amended Counterclaim which was received on October 28, 1994." Thus, Whitmer argued that the "purported amendment" was not binding upon him. Whitmer thenrealleged the affirmative defense of unclean hands, as well as several other defenses not relevantto this appeal.

Whitmer then amended his original verified complaint against the Munsons realleging:

"5. Whitmer obtained permits from the City of Chicago, the Illinois Department of Transportation and the Army Corps ofEngineers before beginning work on the project.

6. All of the work contemplated in the project and allowed by the permits was specifically authorized in the Reservations andRestrictive covenantsassociated with the property."

Whitmer also sought declaratory relief with respect to the boat hoist and asked the courtto find that, but for the issuance of permits, the boat hoist in question did not violate thereservations and restrictive covenants. Whitmer also asked the court to declare that the 1989amendment to the restrictive covenants was not binding upon him because he did not receivenotice of amendment.

After conducting a hearing with respect to the Munsons' motion for preliminaryinjunction, the court entered a written order granting the preliminary injunction containing thefollowing findings: (1) that Whitmer did not have the permits required by the restrictivecovenants to initiate construction; and (2) that Whitmer withheld information regarding therestrictive covenants from his contractor, and purposely deleted any reference to the boat hoistfrom the construction plans submitted by his contractors, for purposes of facilitating the grantingof general construction permits. Specifically, the court stated:

"Whitmer contends that he relied upon his contractors to obtain the necessary permits, yet *** [the contractor] who handledthe permit process for Whitmer *** did not even see the Restrictive covenants until after the work was stopped on March 29,1994. *** Whitmer's architect testified that the [boat] hoist had been part of the project from the beginning, yet Whitmerrequested the hoist be left out of the plans ***. [The contractor representative] testified that Whitmer instructed him to leavethe boat hoist off the plans because 'it wasn't determined what it was; and we didn't want to put something down that wouldmake it more difficult to get a permit for the whole project.'"

The trial court also concluded that Whitmer was bound by the 1989 Amendment to therestrictive covenants based on evidence which established that four different mailings were sentto Whitmer to advise him of the amendment.

"Although Whitmer claims he never received any of the four mailed letters, this Court finds it more probable than not that atleast one notification was received. Whitmer's arguments that his mail delivery was not always reliable *** is not convincing.*** [E]ven if the mail was somewhat unreliable, it is more likely than not that one out of four notices would have reachedWhitmer."

Finally, the trial court found that the defenses of laches, waiver and unclean hands filed byWhitmer lacked merit. Based on these findings, the trial court entered an order granting theMunsons' motion for a preliminary injunction. On that same day, Whitmer moved to voluntarilydismiss his complaint against the Munsons and his motion was granted.

The litigation between Whitmer and the Munsons continued for several years with respectto the Munsons' motion to enjoin further construction and to mandate removal of the boat hoistand appurtenant structures from Whitmer's property. In December 1999, Whitmer conceded inopen court that the preliminary injunction previously granted to the Munsons should be madepermanent to halt any further construction, but he opposed the Munsons' request for a mandatoryinjunction requiring Whitmer to remove all improvements made to his property prior to the onsetof this litigation. The matter was set for trial, and at the close of evidence, the trial court grantedthe Munsons' motion for a permanent injunction prohibiting further construction of the boat hoistand other structures on Whitmer's property. The court then denied the Munsons' motion for amandatory injunction, ruling that the structures already in place would be allowed to remain.

The Munsons subsequently filed an amended motion for Rule 137 sanctions contendingthat the allegations in Whitmer's verified complaint "were not well grounded in fact." TheMunsons' motion contended that Whitmer made the following false allegations: (1) that he was inpossession of permits for the boat hoist when he did not have them; (2) that he relied upon hiscontractor to obtain the permits even though they were not made aware of the restrictivecovenants; (3) that the Munsons had been given his plans prior to the commencement ofconstruction even though the boat hoist was omitted from the plans at Whitmer's direction; (4)that he was not violating the restrictive covenants even though he prepared and submitted to thecourt a document signed by another River Cottage owner stating that the boat hoist Whitmerwished to install "deviates from the drawings in the restrictive covenants"; (5) that he continuedto claim that he possessed permits even after evidence to the contrary was presented in court; and(6) that he denied receiving mailings concerning the 1989 Amendment to the restrictivecovenants.⁽³⁾ The Munsons further alleged that Whitmer should be sanctioned because he fileddefenses that were not well grounded in fact or law. Finally, after highlighting the specificinstances in which Whitmer proceeded in the trial court with allegations not based in fact or law,the Munsons alleged that they incurred over $125,000 in attorney fees and costs because ofWhitmer's actions.

The court acknowledged that the foregoing representations were false in its order grantingthe Munsons' motion for preliminary injunction. As noted above, in that order, the court statedthat Whitmer was bound by the terms of the restrictive covenants, including the 1989Amendment, despite his representations that he did not receive notice of it. The court also foundthat Whitmer violated those covenants by failing to obtain the necessary permits to build the boathoist and that he knew the permits had not been obtained because he directed his contractor not toinclude the boat hoist in the plans submitted to the permitting authorities. In addition, the trialcourt found that Whitmer was aware that the boat hoist he intended to build did not comply withthe restrictive covenants. The court noted that the covenants "were altered for his [Whitmer's]benefit," that the developer did not intend to give Whitmer "free rein" on the type of hoist hecould build as evidenced by the drawings attached to the covenants and that Whitmer, "a self-proclaimed 'boat enthusiast,'" should have been aware that the hoist he was building did notcomply with the guidelines set forth in the restrictive covenants. Notwithstanding these prioracknowledgments, the court denied the Munsons' motion for sanctions. In doing so, the courtstated:

"I must comment on the fact that in a situation where a plaintiff sues a defendant and a defendant is placed solely on thedefensive and must come forward to defend themselves, perhaps the attitude of the Court should be somewhat different than asituation where the defendant literally becomes the plaintiff and actually, that's what happened in this case.

***

I can't help but think that the Munsons are really asking me to punish -- I use the word 'punish' advisedly -- are really askingme to punish Mr. Whitmer; and I'm afraid that if I enter sanctions against Mr. Whitmer here, I'm really allowing myself tobecome a tool of the vengeance with which the Munsons would like to invoke upon Mr. Whitmer. Perhaps in my own mind Ican't countenance Mr. Whitmer's actions. *** But the next question is can I sit here and whip him because of the fact that heundertook litiga-tion in a fashion which actually turned out against him.

***

I don't think the lawsuit was brought to harass the Munsons. I think it was brought because Mr. Whitmer wanted to availhimself of the benefit of having a residence along the river. I can't forget the fact that he was the first one to live on thesepremises. I think that the reasonable decision here is to leave these parties where I have found them and not to invoke sanctions against either."The Munsons now appeal the trial court's judgment.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Munsons contend that the trial court failed to apply an objective standardin evaluating their motion for Rule 137 sanctions and that the court ignored the fact that Whitmerincluded "baseless" allegations in the complaint which started the litigation. The Munsonsspecifically contend that the trial court gave no consideration to whether Whitmer had a factualbasis for filing the verified complaints in this case and ignored the fact that Whitmer filed theseverified complaints knowing that he not only lacked the requisite permits to build a boat hoist, butalso that the boat hoist violated the restrictive covenants.

In response, Whitmer first asserts that the Munsons have failed to provide an adequaterecord to support their claims on appeal and, therefore, consideration of these claims is barred. Alternatively, Whitmer contends that the trial court's denial of sanctions was a proper exercise ofits discretion because the Munsons' motion for sanctions was both facially and substantivelydefective. Finally, Whitmer argues that sanctions should not have been granted because it wasthe Munsons, rather than Whitmer, who prolonged litigation of the case in the trial court.

Before addressing the substantive merits of the parties' contentions, we first address theprocedural issues raised by Whitmer. Whitmer first argues that the Munsons failed to supply thiscourt with a report of proceedings on the preliminary injunction hearing, and as a result, we mustpresume that the trial court's decision to deny sanctions was correct. We find that this claim lacksmerit.

It is well settled that the appellant carries the burden of presenting a sufficiently completerecord of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such a recordon appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with lawand had a sufficient factual basis. Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E. 2d 958,959 (1984). Any doubts that may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolvedagainst the appellant. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392, 459 N.E. 2d at 959.

In this case, the Munsons failed to provide a report of proceedings regarding the hearingon the motion for preliminary injunction as Whitmer alleges. However, the record does containthe relevant pleadings submitted by both parties with respect to the preliminary injunction, aswell as an extensively detailed, 44-page, typewritten document prepared by the trial court entitled"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." These findings detailed the relevant testimony of thewitnesses and the parties at the preliminary injunction hearing as effectively as any bystandersreport. In addition, the record contains the trial court's written decision concerning thepreliminary injunction which sets forth the facts, applicable case law and the trial court's analysisof the issues. We thus conclude that there are sufficient documents included in the record whichadequately apprise this court of the evidence presented to the trial court when the decision to denysanctions was made. See Department of Transportation ex rel. People v. Interstate Brands Corp.,251 Ill. App. 3d 785, 787, 623 N.E. 2d 771, 773 (1993) (court determined record was sufficienton appeal where appeal was based on dismissal of counterclaim and the dismissed pleading wasnot included in trial record because enough documents were included to apprise the court of thecircumstances presented in the lower court); DeVries v. Bankers Life Co., 128 Ill. App. 3d 647,651, 471 N.E. 2d 230, 233 (1984) (where report of proceedings was not included in appellaterecord, court determined that the record contained the "relevant facts" and "it [was] thus notnecessary to resort to specific arguments advanced by counsel and the hearing on the motion"). While Whitmer makes several citations to authority in support of his contention that the record isinsufficient, we note that none of the cases cited are persuasive or on point to the argument heraises here. Rather, those cases deal with issues such as the failure to make record citations (seeGeneva Hospital Supply, Inc. v. Sanberg, 172 Ill. App. 3d 960, 527 N.E. 2d 611 (1988)) and thefailure to include information, such as the trial court's findings and the specific testimony ofwitnesses, which made it impossible for the court to review the relevant issues on appeal. SeeThomas Hake Enterprises, Inc. v. Betke, 301 Ill. App. 3d 176, 703 N.E. 2d 114 (1998); In reMarriage of Blinderman, 283 Ill. App. 3d 26, 669 N.E. 2d 687 (1996); Such is not the case here. Accordingly, we conclude that the record provided by the Munsons in this case is sufficient.

We now turn to Whitmer's claim that the Munsons' motion for sanctions was facially andsubstantively deficient. Specifically, Whitmer alleges that the sanctions motion failed to: (1)identify the specific allegations to which it was directed; (2) specify the grounds on which theMunsons relied in arguing that Whitmer's allegations were sanctionable; (3) point to the prooffrom which it could be concluded that Whitmer's allegations were sanctionable; and (4) specifythe fees/expenses incurred. Whitmer further argues that the allegations which the Munsons'claimed were untrue, and thus sanctionable, were not either found by the trial court to have beenuntrue or a dispute existed relative to their truthfulness.

It is well settled that "[a] motion for sanctions must meet minimum requirements ofspecificity so that a responding party has an opportunity to challenge and defend against theallegations made and so that fees and costs may be fairly apportioned." Cmarko v. Fisher, 208 Ill.App. 3d 440, 445, 567 N.E. 2d 352, 354 (1990). Furthermore, with respect to apportionment offees, the sanctions motion must specifically allege which statements were false and what feeswere incurred as a result of those false statements. Heritage Pullman Bank & Trust Co. v. Carr,283 Ill. App. 3d 472, 477, 670 N.E. 2d 814, 817 (1996).

As outlined above, the sanctions motion filed by the Munsons set forth, with specificity,the allegations in Whitmer's complaints and the affirmative defenses advanced by Whitmer thatthe Munsons believed were untrue. In addition, the motion set forth facts established during thecourse of the litigation which tended to prove that the statements complained of were untrue. Specifically, in bulleted paragraphs, the Munsons pled the specific dates and pleadings in whichWhitmer alleged that he had permits when the facts demonstrated that he did not apply forpermits until after the construction was halted; that he relied upon his contractor and engineer toget the permits even though they were not aware that permits were required by the restrictivecovenants; and that he tendered a document from a neighbor stating that the neighbor did notobject to the boat hoist even though it violated the restrictive covenants after Whitmer claimed hewas unaware of the covenant violation. The Munsons' motion also set forth allegations related tothe affirmative defenses advanced by Whitmer and the reasons the Munsons' believed theaffirmative defenses were baseless. The motion further outlined the various motions andpleadings the Munsons filed to defend against Whitmer's claims, as well as the steps they took tohave Whitmer's construction enjoined, and also stated the amount of attorney fees and costs thatwere incurred as a result of the litigation. Thus, we conclude that the Munsons' motion forsanctions sufficiently set forth the statements that were falsely made and the fees incurredtherefrom such that Whitmer was given ample opportunity to defend against the claims. SeeCmarko, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 445, 567 N.E. 2d at 354 (where sanctions motion was held to havealleged "ample facts" to allow a defense against the allegations charged). Accordingly, we rejectWhitmer's claims in this regard.

Having addressed Whitmer's procedural challenges to the instant claims for relief, we nowaddress the Munsons' claim that the trial court failed to apply an objective standard in evaluatingtheir motion for sanctions and further failed to consider Whitmer's "baseless" allegations.

Pursuant to Rule 137, the trial court may impose sanctions against a party or his counselfor filing a motion or pleading that is not well grounded in fact, not supported by existing law, orlacks a good-faith basis for modification, reversal, or extension of the law, or is interposed forany improper purpose. Peterson v. Randhava, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6-7, 729 N.E. 2d 75, 79 (2000).As the Peterson court explained, "[t]he purpose of Rule 137 is to prevent the filing of frivolousand false lawsuits." Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 7, 729 N.E. 2d at 79. Yet, "the rule is notintended to penalize litigants and their attorneys merely because they were zealous, yetunsuccessful." Peterson, 313 Ill .App. 3d at 7, 729 N.E. 2d at 79. Because the rule is penal innature, it must be strictly construed. Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 7, 729 N.E. 2d at 79.

The rule clearly provides that the signature of a litigant on a pleading constitutes acertification that the signing party read the pleading and made "reasonable inquiry" into the factsalleged. Pritzker v. Drake Tower Apartments, Inc., 283 Ill. App. 3d 587, 590, 670 N.E. 2d 328,330 (1996). Courts are instructed to use an objective standard in evaluating what was reasonableunder the circumstances as they existed at the time of filing. Baker v. Daniel S. Berger, Ltd. 323Ill. App. 3d 956, 963, 753 N.E. 2d 463, 469 (2001). It is not sufficient that the signing party

"' honestly believed' his or her case was well grounded in fact or law." Fremarek v. John HancockMutual Life Insurance Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1074-75, 651 N.E. 2d 601, 607 (1995).

When called upon to determine whether sanctions were appropriate in a given case, weemploy an abuse of discretion standard of review. Baker, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 963, 753 N.E. 2d at469. A trial court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person could take the view it adopted. Technology Innovation Center, Inc. v. Advanced Multiuser Technologies Corp., 315 Ill. App. 3d238, 244, 732 N.E. 2d 1129, 1134 (2000). "When reviewing a decision on a motion for sanctions,the primary consideration is whether the trial court's decision was informed, based on validreasoning, and follows logically from the facts." Technology Innovation Center, Inc., 315 Ill. App.3d at 244, 732 N.E. 2d at 1134.

In this case, the record demonstrates that Whitmer filed a verified complaint against theMunsons that contained allegations which, upon making reasonable inquiry, Whitmer shouldhave known were untrue and which, in all likelihood, he knew to be untrue. Specifically,Whitmer alleged in his "Verified Complaint" and in his "Amended Verified Complaint" that heobtained permits for reconstructing a retaining wall and building a new boat hoist on his property,that the permit applications "specifically outlin[ed] the work to be done and that "the permit andsupplemental drawings were made available for public notice." However, the evidence in thiscase demonstrated that Whitmer had not even applied for permits relating to the boat hoist whenthe complaint was filed and that he specifically told his contractors not to include the boat hoist inthe plans detailing the project. Whitmer continued to assert that he possessed the requisitepermits in his "Verified Answer to Motion for Preliminary Injunction," where he denied that hedid not have the requisite permits, and in the same document, indicated that he was currentlyseeking permits from the requisite government agencies to continue work on the boat hoist.

After being continually challenged regarding his representation that he did not possess therequisite permits, Whitmer changed his facts alleging in his response to the Munsons' amendedcounterclaim that he obtained permits "that his architect and engineer advised him werenecessary." However, as found by the trial court, the facts show that this allegation was untrue,given that the contractors were never made aware of the restrictive covenants and knew nothingabout the permit requirements.

In addition, Whitmer alleged in his verified complaint and amended verified complaintthat "[a]ll of the work contemplated in the project and allowed by the permits was specificallyauthorized in the Reservations and Restrictive covenants associated with the property owned byWhitmer and LESTER and JUDY MUNSON." Whitmer continued to assert that the boat hoistdid not violate the restrictive covenants in his response to the Munsons' amended

countercomplaint. However, the record amply demonstrates, and Whitmer himself virtuallyconceded by withdrawing his opposition to the permanent injunction, that construction of the boathoist violated the original covenants insofar as the hoist did not comport with the drawings addedto the covenants as a guideline depicting the type of hoist allowed. Further, the evidencedemonstrates that Whitmer prepared a document for signature by a River Cottage neighbor whichindicated that the neighbor was aware that the boat hoist violated the restrictive covenants. As theauthor of that document, Whitmer too was aware that his construction project violated thecovenants.

In addition, as the trial court found, it is highly unlikely that Whitmer was not aware ofthese violations, even when filing his original complaint, because, as a "boating enthusiast" andthe person who requested that the specifications for the hoist be added to the restrictive covenants,he was familiar with the type of hoist he was allowed to build. The fact that he omitted the boathoist from his construction plans also indicates that he knew the hoist did not comply with thecovenants.

Further, the construction project initiated by Whitmer likewise violated the 1989Amendment insofar as Whitmer failed to obtain the consent of the committee (his neighbors)before commencing construction. Whitmer attempted to explain this misrepresentation byclaiming in his response to the Munsons' amended counterclaim that he was unaware of theamendment. Whitmer maintained that he did not receive notice of the amendment even though itwas undisputed that notice of the amendment was sent to him on four separate occasions. Moreover, the trial court confirmed in its finding that Whitmer received notice of the amendment,that it was unlikely he did not know of its existence and that he was bound by the amendment'sprovisions. As discussed above, the court was fully cognizant of each false contention containedin Whitmer's pleadings and of the strong likelihood that Whitmer was fully aware of their falsityat the time the pleadings were filed. As previously demonstrated, the court recognized that itwould be irrational to conclude otherwise.

Despite this evidence demonstrating that Whitmer knew or, upon reasonable inquiry,would have known that the material allegations of fact which he pled were false, the trial courtnevertheless determined that Rule 137 sanctions were inappropriate in this case. The courtpurported to base its decision on several factors, including: (1) the fact that Whitmer became thedefendant in the case after the Munsons counterclaimed and Whitmer withdrew his complaintagainst them; (2) the court's belief that the Munsons were asking that Whitmer be "punished"; (3)the court's fear of becoming "a tool of vengeance" on behalf of the Munsons; (4) the court's beliefthat Whitmer did not file suit to "harass" the Munsons, but was motivated by his desire to "availhimself" of his river-front residence; and (5) the fact that Whitmer lived in the River Cottagesfirst.

While we understand the trial court's reluctance to employ Rule 137 as a punishmentagainst an unsuccessful litigant, we find that the court's reluctance was misplaced in the case atbar. As previously noted, the purpose of Rule 137 is to avoid frivolous and false lawsuits, andcourts are called upon to use an objective standard in evaluating what was reasonable at the timeof filing. See Baker, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 963, 753 N.E. 2d at 469. We have held that, even wherethe initiating party "' honestly believed' his or her case was well grounded in fact or law," it is stillunreasonable to file the suit if its falsity could have been uncovered through reasonable inquiry. Fremarek, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 1074-75, 651 N.E. 2d at 601. In this case, Whitmer initiated alawsuit based on facts that he had to have known were false. If it could be unreasonable to file asuit based on an "honest belief,", then it certainly would be unreasonable to file a suit with provenknowledge that the allegations pled are false. Litigants may not deploy the use of legal processfrivolously or falsely as a weapon in a feud between neighbors or otherwise.

The facts showing that Whitmer owned his cottage first, that he was anxious to availhimself of the benefits of the property or that he eventually became the defendant in the case donot alter the unreasonableness or frivolousness of his actions, nor do they warrant this courtturning a blind eye to the fact that Whitmer filed a complaint that clearly set forth a fraudulent,false or misleading version of the truth. Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in relying on these factors to deny the Munsons' motion for sanctions and that areasonable person, relying on the language and guidance of Rule 137, could not have reached thecourt's conclusion. In reaching this finding, we need not address the Munsons' further contentionthat sanctions are appropriate by reason of the affirmative defenses filed in Whitmer's verifiedanswer and amended verified answer to the Munsons' motion for preliminary injunction.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the trial court's denial of the Munsons' motionfor sanctions and remand the cause to the trial court for a determination as to the proper amount ofsanctions.

Reversed and remanded.

COUSINS and COHEN, JJ., concur.

1. Whitmer also asserted the defense of necessity with respect to the construction of theconcrete platform. This defense is not referenced in the Munsons' motion for sanctions.

2. The affirmative defenses filed in this answer are independent from those discussed inWhitmer's "Amended Verified Answer to Motion for Preliminary Injunction."

3. The Munsons also alleged that Whitmer submitted plans to the city for a second hoistwithout obtaining the proper permits; however, we will not consider this allegation because itdoes not relate to a false pleading.