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PRESIDING JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

This dispute⁽¹⁾ arises out of a declaratory judgment actionfiled by plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee, West AmericanInsurance Company (West American), against defendant-appellee andcross-appellant, J.R. Construction Company. The declaratoryjudgment complaint was brought against J.R. Construction as aresult of a lawsuit filed against J.R. Construction by an injuredemployee of All Estimating, Inc. (All Estimating), a subcontractorof Altra Steel (Altra), also a subcontractor of J.R. Construction. J.R. Construction tendered the defense of that suit to WestAmerican and it denied coverage. On a motion for partial summaryjudgment, the trial court found in favor of J.R. Construction onthe issue of coverage and further found that West American wasestopped from asserting any policy defenses. The court also deniedJ.R. Construction's request for damages under section 155 of theIllinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 1998)).

The issues raised on appeal are: (1) whether the trial courtproperly granted summary judgment in favor of J.R. Construction onWest American's duty to defend; (2) whether West American wasbarred from denying coverage on the ground of estoppel; and (3)whether J.R. Construction was entitled to damages from WestAmerican under section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS5/155 (West 1998)). We state the following background facts.

West American issued a general liability insurance policy,number BKW (97)52109160, to Altra, a steel fabricationsubcontractor, for the period December 31, 1996, to December 31,1997. J.R. Construction, the general contractor, contracted withAltra to supply and install steel components for a building beingconstructed for the Fuchs Lubricants Company in Harvey, Illinois. Altra subcontracted with All Estimating to assist with some of theironwork on the project. The record shows that a term of theagreement between Altra and J.R. Construction required that J.R.Construction be added as an insured on the policy issued to Altraby West American. Joseph Ramacci, president of J.R. Construction,stated in an affidavit that Altra orally agreed to obtain thisinsurance for his company. He further said that it was thecorporate practice of J.R. Construction to require subcontractorsto include J.R. Construction as an additional insured on theirpolicies.

On July 29, 1997, the Braman Agency, West American's agent,issued a certificate of insurance listing J.R. Construction as anadditional insured on the policy at issue. The certificate stated:

"THIS CERTIFICATE WAS ISSUED AS A MATTER OFINFORMATION ONLY AND CONFERS NO RIGHTS UPONTHE CERTIFICATE HOLDER. THIS CERTIFICATE DOESNOT AMEND, EXTEND OR ALTER THE COVERAGEAFFORDED BY THE POLICIES BELOW."

On October 10, 1997, Charles Masunas, an employee of Altra'ssubcontractor, All Estimating, was injured at the Fuchs jobsite. Masunas filed a lawsuit (the underlying suit) against J.R.Construction, "by and through its agents, servants and employees,"for failure to supervise, inspect, and prevent unsafe conditions atthe jobsite. Specifically, the underlying complaint alleged thatJ.R. Construction was negligent in that it:

"(a) Failed to make a reasonable inspection ofthe premises and the work being donethereon, when the Defendant knew, or inthe exercise of ordinary care should haveknown, that said inspection was necessaryto prevent injury to the Plaintiff;

(b) Improperly operated, managed, maintainedand controlled the aforesaid premises, sothat as a direct and proximate resultthereof, the plaintiff was injured ***."

On October 23, 1997, J.R. Construction tendered the underlyingsuit to West American. J.R. Construction also tendered the defenseto All Estimating's insurer, Agora Syndicate, Inc. (Agora), whichhad listed J.R. Construction as an additional insured on thatpolicy. Agora agreed to defend J.R. Construction and continued todo so until it became insolvent.

In a letter dated November 14, 1997, West Americanacknowledged J.R. Construction's tender by stating, "[t]his willconfirm that J.R. Construction Company is listed as an additionalinsured under Altra Steel's policy." The letter further stated,"[a]ny coverage provided here under shall be excess over any othervalid or collectable insurance available to the additional insuredwhether primary, excess, contingent or on any other basis unlessthe contract specifically requires that this insurance be primaryor you request that it apply on a primary basis." The recordreveals that this language only appears in paragraph 4b of theblanket additional insured endorsement to the West American policy. The letter concluded by stating: "It is our position that anypotential coverage available to the additional insured, J.R.Construction [C]ompany[,] would be excess coverage."

On March 4, 1998, an internal memorandum revealed that WestAmerican considered J.R. Construction an additional named insuredunder its policy, but determined its policy was excess over apolicy issued to All Estimating by Agora, which also named J.R.Construction as an additional insured. The memorandum stated thatWest American was "holding the file open," to see if Altra wasnamed in the underlying suit. In another internal memorandum datedMay, 1997, West American indicated an awareness that it "may bethird partied into" the underlying litigation, and diaried the fileahead "to see if Agora tries to have [it] contribute to the claim." In a third internal memorandum, dated January 21, 1998, WestAmerican indicated that it might receive a third-party complaint orthat Altra may be named as a direct defendant in the underlyingsuit.

In a letter of April 12, 1999, West American contacted Agoraand stated that it was considering a tender by J.R. Constructionwith regard to the underlying suit. In the same letter, WestAmerican informed Agora that, should the tender be accepted, it was"certain the defense and indemnity obligations could be apportionedfairly." On August 25, 1999, West American filed the instantdeclaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it had noduty to defend J.R. Construction. On August 27, 1999, WestAmerican wrote to J.R. Construction and said that it was denyingcoverage on the grounds that there was no written contract betweenJ.R. Construction and Altra requiring J.R. Construction to be namedan additional insured and the underlying complaint did not seekdamages from J.R. Construction for liability arising out of thework of Altra. In the same letter, and for the first time, itnotified J.R. Construction that it reserved the right to bring adeclaratory judgment action.

In the proceedings below, J.R. Construction moved for partialsummary judgment on West American's duty to defend under thepolicy. West American filed a cross-motion for summary judgmentseeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend. On August 28,2000, the trial court concluded that J.R. Construction was aninsured under the West American policy and that West American oweda primary duty to defend J.R. Construction in the underlying suit. Without stating any reasons, however, the court also found thatJ.R. Construction was not entitled to damages under section 155 ofthe Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 1998)). West American hasappealed the trial court's ruling on the duty to defend and J.R.Construction has cross-appealed the finding in regard to damagesunder section 155 of the Insurance Code.

I. Duty to Defend

We first address whether West American owed J.R. Constructiona duty to defend under the instant policy. In all cases involvingsummary judgment, we review the evidence in the record de novo. Inre Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d 402, 411, 615 N.E.2d 736 (1993). "The construction of an insurance policy and a determination of therights and obligations thereunder are questions of law for thecourt and appropriate subjects for disposition by summary judgment.[Citation.]" Konami (America), Inc. v. Hartford Insurance Co. ofIllinois, 326 Ill. App. 3d 874, 877, 761 N.E.2d 1277 (2002). Thetrial court determined that J.R. Construction was an insured underWest American's policy on the grounds that Braman issued acertificate of insurance designating J.R. Construction as anadditional insured and that West American's letter dated November14, 1997, also confirmed that J.R. Construction was an insuredunder the policy.

On appeal, West American argues that J.R. Construction'scoverage, if any, arises because of a blanket endorsement provisioncontained in the insurance policy. Part of that blanket provisionprovides:

"WHO IS AN INSURED (Section II) isamended to include as an insured any person ororganization who you are required to name asan additional insured on this policy under awritten contract or agreement."

West American contends that, because a written contract wasrequired to confer status upon J.R. Construction as an additionalinsured under the blanket provision, and because no writtencontract was executed in this case, J.R. Construction was not aninsured and therefore was not entitled to a defense in theunderlying suit. J.R. Construction responds that coverage arisesnot because of the endorsement, but because of the certificate ofinsurance, the oral agreement between J.R. Construction and Altra,and other writings executed by the insurer, all of which indicatethat J.R. Construction was an additional insured under the instantpolicy. We agree with J.R. Construction that the blanketendorsement is not what determines coverage under the instantpolicy, but, rather, coverage is determined by a number ofundisputed facts and a series of documents which we will review.

Before that review, we point out that, in Zannini v. RelianceInsurance Co. of Illinois, Inc., 147 Ill. 2d 437, 454, 590 N.E.2d457 (1992), the supreme court held: "A contract of insurance isestablished ' "if one of the parties to such a contract proposes tobe insured and the other party agrees to insure, and the subject,the amount, and the rate of insurance are ascertained or understoodand the premium paid if demanded." ' [Citation.]" The court alsofound that such a contract may be oral. Zannini, 147 Ill. 2d at455. Finally, the court recognized that: "The words of arepresentative who speaks to a potential insured are '"those of theinsurer," ' and the insurer is bound by [those] words. [Citation.]" Zannini, 147 Ill. 2d at 456.

Here, we find that J.R. Construction was a named additionalinsured under the policy based upon the following facts. First,the certificate of insurance issued to J.R. Construction by Braman(West American's agent) specifically identified J.R. Constructionas an "ADDN. INS" on the Altra policy We interpret "ADDN. INS." tomean an additional insured. Second, in his affidavit, Ramaccistated that Altra orally agreed to add J.R. Construction as anadditional insured on the West American policy, and J.R.Construction was added to that policy by way of the certificate theday the contract between Altra and J.R. Construction was executed. Third, the fact that Altra orally agreed to add J.R. Constructionas an additional insured was never refuted by Bruce Stevens,president of Altra, in his affidavit. Fourth, Ramacci stated inhis affidavit that J.R. Construction relied upon the certificate asproof that it was named an additional insured under the WestAmerican policy. Next, in a letter to J.R. Construction datedNovember 14, 1997, West American confirmed that "J.R. Constructioncompany [was] listed as an additional insured under Altra Steel's policy." Finally, several memoranda prepared by West American,outlined above, also indicate that West American considered J.R.Construction an insured. Based upon the foregoing, we concludethat J.R. Construction was an additional insured under the policy.

West American claims that Illinois law has not squarelyaddressed the issue of whether a written contract is required underthese circumstances. Thus, it relies upon two cases from foreignjurisdictions. The authority cited by West American isdistinguishable. In Franklin v. General Electric Co., No. CIV. A.95-1079 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 2, 1997), a subcontractor neverreceived a contract from the general contractor that contained anindemnification clause requiring the subcontractor to indemnify thegeneral contractor for the damages or injuries caused by thesubcontractor. The general contractor and its insurer submitted asevidence an unsigned form agreement between the contractor andgeneral contractor that contained the indemnity provision. In asworn statement, the subcontractor claimed that it had no expressknowledge, oral or written, of the indemnity provisions containedin the form agreement. The court found that the general contractorand its insurer failed to offer any proof, oral or written, that anexpress contract to indemnify was executed by the parties. Franklin, slip op. at 4.

Franklin is distinguishable on its facts. Here, the evidenceshowed an intent by the parties that J.R. Construction was to beadded as an additional insured under the West American policy.Ramacci testified that Altra orally agreed to add J.R. Constructionas an additional insured. Further, the certificate of insuranceand the letter dated November 14, 1997, confirmed that WestAmerican acknowledged J.R. Construction as an additional insuredunder the policy. The exact language of the letter states: "Thisis to confirm that J.R. Construction Company is listed as anadditional insured under Altra Steel's policy." In Franklin, therewas no evidence of an agreement between the general contractor andsubcontractor. Here, the evidence indicates the opposite. Moreover, we are not bound by the foreign, unreported decision inFranklin, which is of no precedential value.

Next, West American relies upon Metric Constructors, Inc. v.Industrial Risk Insurers, 102 N.C. App. 59, 401 S.E.2d 126 (1991). In Metric, the plaintiff alleged that the failure to list it as anadditional insured under the policy at issue was an oversight. Theplaintiff provided extrinsic evidence to establish coverage and didnot rely on the language of the policy that defined who was aninsured. The plaintiff was not listed as an insured under thepolicy. On that basis, the Court of Appeals of North Carolinaconcluded that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that it was aninsured under the required policy language. Metric, 102 N.C. App.at 62-63, 401 S.E.2d at 128.

Metric is distinguishable because the evidence in this caseindicates an acknowledgment by West American that J.R. Constructionwas an additional insured under its policy. Further, Metric is notcontrolling in this jurisdiction.

West American also relies on United States Fire Insurance Co.v. Hartford Insurance Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 153, 156, 726 N.E.2d126 (2000), for the proposition that oral contracts areinsufficient in Illinois when the insurance policy calls for awritten contract. We agree with the holding in United States Fire,which established that when an insuring agreement requires acontract in writing to provide coverage to an additional insured,an oral contract is insufficient. United States Fire, 312 Ill.App. 3d at 156. However, United States Fire is alsodistinguishable on its facts.

In United States Fire, the general contractor alleged that thesubcontractor orally agreed to name it as an additional insured onthe subcontractor's policy. However, the subcontractor denied thatinsurance coverage was a part of the oral agreement. Moreover, thegeneral contractor was not provided with a certificate of insuranceat the time one of the subcontractor's employee was injured on thejobsite. Two days after the accident, the general contractorrequested and received a certificate of insurance naming it as anadditional insured on the subcontractor's insurance policy.

In the instant case, both parties agreed that it was standardindustry practice for the general contractor, J.R. Construction, tobe listed as an additional insured under the subcontractor'spolicy. Here, written documents existed that evidenced Altra'sintention to include J.R. Construction as an additional insuredwhich, among other things, included the certificate of insuranceand the letter of November 14, 1997. As a result, this case isunlike United States Fire where the only evidence of an agreementbetween the parties was a certificate of insurance issued after theinjury alleged in the underlying suit. The United States Firecourt did not rely on the certificate of insurance to reach itsdecision, because it was issued after the date of the injury. Instead, it reviewed only the policy and a blanket provision inthat policy, which is similar to the one here. Under the blanketprovision, the court held that an oral agreement would not suffice,and because no written agreement between the parties was in placeat the time of the injury, there was no coverage. We thus findUnited States Fire distinguishable on its facts.

Finally, we address Pekin Insurance Co. v. American CountryInsurance Co., 213 Ill. App. 3d 543, 572 N.E.2d 1112 (1991). InPekin, the subcontract required a roofing subcontractor to providethe general contractor with a certificate of insurance naming thegeneral contractor as an additional insured. The generalcontractor was named an additional insured on the subcontractor'spolicy. A disclaimer in the certificate contained the followinglanguage:

"THIS CERTIFICATE IS ISSUED AS A MATTER OFINFORMATION ONLY AND CONFERS NO RIGHTS UPONTHE CERTIFICATE HOLDER. THIS CERTIFICATE DOESNOT AMEND, EXTEND OR ALTER THE COVERAGEAFFORDED BY THE POLICIES BELOW." Pekin, 213Ill. App. 3d at 546-47.

A second statement in the certificate provided:

"THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT POLICIES OF INSURANCELISTED BELOW HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO THE INSUREDNAMED ABOVE FOR THE POLICY PERIOD INDICATED. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY REQUIREMENT, TERM ORCONDITION OF ANY CONTRACT OR OTHER DOCUMENTWITH RESPECT TO WHICH THIS CERTIFICATE MAY BEISSUED OR MAY PERTAIN, THE INSURANCE AFFORDEDBY THE POLICIES DESCRIBED HEREIN IS SUBJECT TOALL OF THE TERMS, EXCLUSIONS AND CONDITIONS OFSUCH POLICES." Pekin, 213 Ill. App. 3d at547.

The insurance policy, itself, contained the following exclusion: " 'This insurance does not apply to "bodily injury" arising out of' " *** " 'roofing-construction residential or commercial.' "Pekin, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 545.

The employee of a roofing subcontractor was injured on thejobsite and filed a suit against the general contractor regardinghis injuries. The general contractor tendered the defense to thesubcontractor's insurer. The insurer denied coverage on the basisthat the policy represented by the certificate contained a policyexclusion that barred coverage.

The plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action seekingcoverage based on the fact that the certificate of insuranceidentified the general contractor as an additional insured underthe policy. The plaintiff further argued that, because the termsof the policy conflicted with the plain meaning of the certificateand plaintiff was never provided a copy of the policy exclusion,the coverage afforded by the certificate should prevail. The trialcourt granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by thesubcontractor's insurer. On review, the appellate court found thatthe certificate only served to inform the general contractor thatit had the same insurance coverage as the primary insured for theproject, subject to the terms and exclusions within that policy. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no conflict betweenthe certificate and the insurance policy. Pekin, 213 Ill. App. 3dat 548.

The first disclaimer in Pekin, set forth above, is identicalto the one in the instant case. West American relies upon Pekinfor the proposition that when a certificate of insurance containssuch a disclaimer, it generally confers no rights on the holder. West American further argues that J.R. Construction was notconferred any right to coverage as an additional insured absent awritten agreement required by the policy itself. We find thatPekin is distinguishable from the instant case. In Pekin, theissue was whether the policy and the certificate of insuranceconflicted in terms of the coverage promised to the additionalinsured, not whether the additional insured was an insured underthe policy. While the Pekin court held that the certificate onlyprovided the additional insured with information, the additionalinsured was still entitled to the same coverage as the primaryinsured under the policy. Thus, while Pekin involved theconsistency in coverage between the certificate and the policy,this case concerns whether the certificate provided coverage toJ.R. Construction as an additional insured under the policy. Thus,Pekin and the instant case are distinguishable.

We acknowledge West American's argument that the certificateof insurance states that it is for information only and does notconfer rights on the holder or amend coverage set forth in thepolicy. However, in the event the certificate alone did not conferstatus upon J.R. Construction as an insured under the policy, thecertificate and the policy together granted J.R. Constructioncoverage. Moreover, all of the documents prepared by West Americanincluding the letter from West American on November 14, 1997,confirm that J.R. Construction was an additional insured. Thus,based upon the certificate and the policy specifically describedtherein, together with the confirmation made in the November 14,1997, letter, and West American's own internal documents, weconclude, as a matter of law, that J.R. Construction was a namedadditional insured under the instant policy.

Therefore, because J.R. Construction was an insured under thepolicy, we find, as the trial court did, that the blanketadditional insured endorsement and its exclusions do not apply. Asa result, no written agreement needed to be executed by the partiesunder these facts.

Relying on the same blanket provision, West American alsoclaims that, even if J.R. Construction were an additional insured,it would not be covered in the underlying suit because the actiondid not arise out of Altra's work. Because we have alreadyconcluded the blanket endorsement is not what provides J.R.Construction coverage, we reject West American's argument on thisground. Thus, we conclude that J.R. Construction has the samecoverage as the primary policyholder, in this case, Altra.

Once it has been determined that an insured is covered by apolicy, an insurer's duty to defend is triggered:

"when a filed complaint alleges factswhich are within, or potentially within, thecoverage of the policy, without regard towhether the allegations are groundless, false,or even fraudulent. [Citation.] Even if onlyone of the theories of recovery stated in thecomplaint comes within the scope of coverageunder the policy, the insurer has a duty todefend. [Citations.]" Waitzman v. ClassicSyndicate, Inc., 271 Ill. App. 3d 246, 253,648 N.E.2d 104 (1995).

"Pursuant to these principles, two requirements must besatisfied before an insurer's duty to defend arises: (1) the actionmust be brought against an insured, and (2) the allegations of thecomplaint must disclose the potential of policy coverage.[Citation.]" Federal Insurance Co. v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co.,189 Ill. App. 3d 732, 735, 545 N.E.2d 541 (1989). As we notedabove, the underlying complaint alleged that J.R. Construction,"its agents, servants, and employees," were negligent in that they,among other things:

"(a) Failed to make a reasonable inspection ofthe premises and the work being donethereon, when the Defendant knew, or inthe exercise of ordinary care should haveknown, that said inspection was necessaryto prevent injury to the Plaintiff;

(b) Improperly operated, managed, maintainedand controlled the aforesaid premises, sothat as a direct and proximate resultthereof, the plaintiff was injured ***."

Having examined these allegations, the instant policy, and theentire Masunas complaint, we conclude there was a duty to defendbecause (1) the action was brought against a named additionalinsured, J.R. Construction, and (2) the allegations of thecomplaint disclose the potential for policy coverage. Federal, 189Ill. App. 3d at 735.

II. Estoppel

Even if the exclusions under the blanket endorsement applied,we would still conclude, under these facts, that West American isestopped from raising these policy defenses to coverage as a matterof law. The supreme court has stated:

"The general rule of estoppel providesthat an insurer which takes the position thata complaint potentially alleging coverage isnot covered under a policy that includes aduty to defend may not simply refuse to defendthe insured." Employers Insurance of Wausauv. Ehlco Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127,150, 708 N.E.2d 1122 (1999).

Further:

"Where an insurer is uncertain as to theextent its policy provides coverage, it hastwo options. The insurer must defend under areservation of rights; otherwise, the insurermust secure a declaratory judgment as to itsrights and obligations before trial orsettlement of the underlying action." CentralMutual Insurance Co. v. Kammerling, 212 Ill.App. 3d 744, 748, 571 N.E.2d 806 (1991).

In Ehlco, the supreme court additionally held:

"Once the insurer breaches its duty todefend, however, the estoppel doctrine hasbroad application and operates to bar theinsurer from raising policy defenses tocoverage, even those defenses that may havebeen successful had the insurer not breachedits duty to defend." Ehlco, 186 Ill. 2d at151-52.

We begin by reiterating that West American had a duty todefend J.R. Construction because it was a named additional insuredunder the policy and because the allegations on the underlyingcomplaint were within or potentially within the policy's coverage. Waitzman, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 253. Further, the duty to defend wasbreached because West American waited 21.5 months from the time thedefense was tendered until the time it filed its declaratoryjudgment action. "[T]he insurer must take some action toadjudicate the issue of coverage or undertake to defend the insuredunder a reservation of rights, and it must take that action withina reasonable time of a demand by the insured." Korte ConstructionCo. v. American States Insurance, 322 Ill. App. 3d 451, 458, 750N.E.2d 764 (2001). In dealing with an estoppel claim in Korte, theinsurer argued that there was a bona fide dispute concerning thescope and application of insurance coverage; specifically, whetherthe insurer was an excess provider and whether the insured'sliability arose out of the acts performed by another party. Rejecting that argument, the reviewing court concluded that theinsurer should have raised these disputes in a declaratory judgmentaction or defend under a reservation of rights, instead of simplydenying its duty to defend. Korte, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 461.

In its letter of November 24, 1997, West American agreed thatJ.R. Construction was an insured, but stated that its policy wasexcess. It indicated that another insurance company, Agora, hadassumed the defense. Then almost two years later, it filed theinstant declaratory judgment action. An insurance company cannot"simply stand on the sidelines" because another insurance companyperforms its own contractual duties. Kammerling, 212 Ill. App. 3dat 749. West American's failure to take the necessary action for21.5 months from the time the defense was tendered was unreasonableas a matter of law. As a result, West American is estopped fromraising the policy defenses under the blanket additional insuredendorsement and its exclusionary language. In Kammerling, theappellate court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment orderfinding estoppel where the insurance carrier waited 10 months tofile a declaratory judgment action after receiving tender from itsinsured. Kammerling, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 750. We find the instantcase to be more compelling than Kammerling because West American,after representing to J.R. Construction that it was an additionalinsured under the policy, denied coverage for almost 22 months. Moreover, the initial denial was based upon its claim that thepolicy was excess to any other policy. In the interim, J.R.Construction was forced to defend the underlying lawsuit to itsdetriment.

We are not persuaded by the authority relied upon by WestAmerican on this question. Travelers Insurance Co. v. FreightlinerCorp., 256 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1055, 628 N.E.2d 325 (1993), is alsodistinguishable. The appellate court never addressed the estoppelargument in Travelers because it affirmed the trial court'sdetermination that Freightliner was not an additional insured underthe policies in that case.

For the reasons above, we conclude that West American isestopped as a matter of law from raising policy defenses tocoverage. Because of our findings that J.R. Construction was anamed additional insured under the policy and that the estoppeldoctrine applies to West American, we need not consider thereformation and waiver arguments raised by J.R. Construction.

III. Section 155 Damages

We next address the issue on cross-appeal whether the trialcourt erred in denying J.R. Construction damages under section 155of the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 1998)). As apreliminary matter, we find that this court has jurisdiction toreview this question upon review of the trial court's order datedMay 14, 2001. The order specifically denied "J.R. Construction'sclaim for Section 155 damages." The order further provides thatthere is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the orderunder Supreme Court Rule 304(a)(155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). WestAmerican claims that while the trial court's summary judgmentruling was appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(a), its denialof J.R. Construction's claim for sanctions under section 155 wasnot. In our view, the denial of the claim for sanctions undersection 155 was final and appealable under the express language ofSupreme Court Rule 304(a), which allows an appeal to be taken as toone or more claims if the trial court "has made an express writtenfinding that there is no just reason for delaying eitherenforcement or appeal or both." 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). As aresult, we conclude that this court has jurisdiction to review thequestion.

Next, West American argues that an abuse of discretionstandard is the applicable standard when reviewing a section 155claim. We disagree. It is well settled the proper standard ofreview applied to an award under section 155 pursuant to a summaryjudgment is a de novo standard. Ehlco, 186 Ill. 2d at 160; Korte,322 Ill. App. 3d at 460; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,288 Ill. App. 3d 743, 681 N.E.2d 552 (1997).

Section 155 of the Insurance Code allows an award of attorneyfees and other costs in cases where the insurer caused "anunreasonable delay in settling a claim, and it appears to the courtthat such action or delay is vexatious and unreasonable." 215 ILCS5/155 (West 1998); Mobil Oil Corp., 288 Ill. App. 3d at 751. "Thedetermination of whether an insurer's actions are vexatious andunreasonable must be determined after examining the totality of[the] circumstances." Mobil Oil Corp., 288 Ill. App. 3d at 752. The Mobil court further held:

"To be considered are the insurer's attitude,whether the insured was forced to file suit torecover, and whether the insured was deprivedof the use of its property. If a bona fidedispute existed regarding the scope of theinsurance coverage, an insurer's delay insettling the claim may not violate section155." Mobil Oil Corp., 288 Ill. App. 3d at752.

In the present case, West American issued a certificate ofinsurance to J.R. Construction on July 31, 1997, informing J.R.Construction that it was an additional insured under Altra'spolicy. J.R. tendered its defense to West American on October 23,1997. On the same date, J.R. Construction also tendered itsdefense to Agora. Agora accepted the tender and defended J.R.Construction. The record indicates Agora later became insolvent. In the letter of November 14, 1997, West American confirmed J.R.Construction was listed as an additional insured under the policy. On August 27, 1999, West American denied coverage on two grounds:that there was no written contract between J.R. Construction andAltra requiring J.R. be named an additional insured on the WestAmerican policy; and that the underlying complaint did not seekdamages that arose out of Altra's work.

J.R. Construction argues that West American's delay inproviding coverage was unreasonable and vexatious because it waited21.5 months before filing a coverage action despite the fact thatJ.R. Construction was an additional insured under the policy. Insupport of its argument, J.R. Construction relies upon Ehlco, wherethe supreme court held that an insurer's refusal to defend for overone year after it first received notice of the underlying suit wasunreasonable and vexatious as matter of law. Ehlco, 186 Ill. 2d at160. It further relies upon Richardson v. Illinois Power Co., 217Ill. App. 3d 708, 713, 577 N.E.2d 823 (1991), where the court foundthat the record supported the circuit court's finding that theinsurer's refusal to defend was vexatious and unreasonable.

In our view, this question should be remanded to the trialcourt. In the order of May 14, 2001, the trial court denied J.R.Construction's claim for section 155 damages. However, it did notprovide any basis for that decision. Based upon the facts alreadydiscussed and the trial court's finding that estoppel would bar theraising of any policy defenses, we cannot conclude that a denial ofthese damages was proper as a matter of law. We therefore vacatethe trial court's ruling with respect to section 155 damages in theorder of May 14, 2001, and remand this matter for furtherproceedings consistent with this order.

Affirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded for furtherproceedings.

GORDON and CAHILL, JJ., concur.

1. After the original appeal and cross-appeal had been filedby the parties, appellate case number 1-00-3341 was remanded tothe trial court because two issues on the question of damages hadnot yet been resolved. The trial court amended its August 28,2000, order and the parties then filed a new appeal and cross-appeal in appellate case number 1-01-2068. On November 14, 2001,this court consolidated the cases.