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FOURTH DIVISION
June 5, 2003

Plaintiff, Sheldon Wernikoff, filed a three-count class-action complaint against thedefendants RCN Telecom Services and RCN Corporation (collectively, defendants or RCN). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2000)), on the grounds that exclusive subject matter jurisdiction laywith the Illinois Commerce Commission (the Commission) because plaintiff's claim was actuallyone for reparations under sections 9-250 and 9-252.1 of the Public Utilities Act (Act) (220 ILCS5/9-250, 252.1 (West 2000)). Plaintiff filed a response, asserting that the Commission did nothave jurisdiction to decide the complaint's allegations. Ultimately, the court denied thedefendants' motion but decided, sua sponte, that the issue was appropriate for an immediate appealunder Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). Thereafter, the trial court entered an ordercertifying the following question for appeal: "Whether the Illinois Commerce Commissionmaintains exclusive jurisdiction over claims for reparations by customers of telecommunicationscarriers that provide competitive telecommunications services[.]" On September 30, 2002, wegranted defendants' application for leave to appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308. For thereasons that follow, we answer that certified question in the negative.

Defendants offer competitive telephone, cable television, and high speed Internet servicesacross the country, including markets in Washington, D.C., Boston, New York, Philadelphia, SanFrancisco, and Chicago. In Illinois, the RCN is considered a "telecommunications carrier," asdefined in the Act, and has been granted a certificate of service authority by the Commissionaccording to the Act. Accordingly, the rates, terms and conditions governing RCN's provision oftelecommunications services to its customers in Illinois are contained in tariffs filed by RCN withthe Commission.

This appeal arises from a complaint filed January 31, 2002, regarding overcharges withRCN's local telephone service. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants chargedhigher rates than those listed with the Commission in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud andDeceptive Business Practices Act (the Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2000))(count I); breach of contract (count II); and unjust enrichment (count III). On a somewhatdifferent note, the plaintiff also alleges overcharging for state and local taxes. In the end, thecomplaint, which was brought individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated RCNcustomers, sought damages, an injunction against further unlawful conduct, and an award ofattorneys fees and expenses.

On May 2, 2002, RCN filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss. It argued that exclusivesubject matter jurisdiction lay with the Commission because, despite its appearance, plaintiff'sclaim was actually one for reparations under sections 9-250 and 9-252.1 of the Act. And becausethis court has determined that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over reparations claimsbrought under the Act, plaintiff's complaint was improperly filed with the circuit court of CookCounty.

On June 10, 2002, the plaintiff filed a response to defendants' motion, asserting that theCommission did not have any jurisdiction to decide the allegations in the complaint becausetelecommunications consumers simply cannot bring a claim of excess rates before theCommission. After the trial court heard arguments on the motion on July 14, 2002, it denied themotion. Nevertheless, the court admitted that it was an extremely close question as to whether thelegislature, in passing the Universal Telephone Service Protection Law of 1985(Telecommunications Article) (220 ILCS 5/13-101 et seq. (West 2000)), intended to retain theCommission's exclusive jurisdiction over consumer complaints regarding the rates, terms, andcondition of services as provided by telecommunications companies such as RCN. As such, itentered an order certifying the question for appeal.

In reaching its decision, the court found:

"In this court's opinion, there is one issue *** that decides the case. And that is theanswer to the inquiry of whether by creating this new statutory scheme thelegislature was retaining the established principle that review of billing practiceswas peculiarly within the province of the Illinois Commerce Commission, as thecourts of Illinois have uniformly decided."

The court also found that "this case is solely about reparations for overcharges, overcharges inrates for certain billing items, improper calculation of taxes, [and] charges for items not disclosedbut found in the tariff." In addition, the court found that "the focus for the court in these cases isnot on the name attached to the remedy or the type of the remedy but the essence of the claim."

Since its inception in 1921 through 1985, the Act defined "public utilities" as companiesthat provided heat, cold, power, electricity, water, light, sewage disposal, gas, or "the transmissionof telegraph or telephone messages." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 111 2/3, par. 10.3. During the timethe statute was enacted, all of those were services traditionally provided by monopolistic entities,and the Act empowered the Commission to regulate almost every aspect of the companiesproviding those services. Therefore, as RCN admits, prior to 1985, the Act empowered theCommission with complete control over the prices these entities could charge for their services. Moreover, it provided a specific provision that addressed the situation when a utility was allegedto be charging more than its stated rates, and the courts uniformly held that the statutory claimunder the Act provided the exclusive remedy for such claims.

In the early 1980s, however, a competitive market developed for certain telephoneservices, signaling to the General Assembly that it needed to change the regulatory function of theCommission. Accordingly, the General Assembly passed the Telecommunications Article of1985, which substituted competition for regulation where there was a competitive market fortelecommunications services. In fact, the 1985 Telecommunications Article stated the publicpolicy of Illinois as:

"[C]onsistent with the protection of consumers of telecommunicationsservices and the furtherance of other public interest goals, competition should bepermitted to function as a substitute for certain aspects of regulation in determiningthe variety, quality and price of telecommunications services and that the economicburdens of regulation should be reduced to the extent possible consistent withprotection of the public interest[.]" Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111 2/3, par. 13-103(b).

The Telecommunications Article effectuated its changes by first removingtelecommunications companies from the Act's definition of "public utility." Compare Ill. Rev.Stat. 1983, ch. 111 2/3, par. 10.3, with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111 2/3, par. 3-105 (now 220 ILCS5/3-105 (West 2000)). This meant that the Act was no longer generally applicable to telephonecompanies. However, the General Assembly did not get rid of all regulation of telephonecompanies, and it selectively chose which provisions of the Act would still be applicable, as notedin section 13-101 (220 ILCS 5/13-101 (West 2000)).

The legislature also split telephone companies into two categories: competitive andnoncompetitive. Accordingly, section 13-101 has two lists: one list of provisions applicable tononcompetitive telephone companies and one list for competitive telephone companies. Fornoncompetitive companies, section 13-101 makes almost all of the Act applicable, basicallyleaving the regulatory scheme unchanged for such companies. However, for competitivecompanies, section 13-101 rendered significant portions of the Act inapplicable. Put another way,the deregulation of competitive telephone companies essentially was accomplished by not makingmany sections of the Act applicable to such companies.

The largest omission was that nearly all of Article IX of the Act, which deals with rates,was not made applicable. For example, section 9-101 (220 ILCS 5/9-101 (West 2000)), whichempowers the Commission to determine whether a utility's rates are "just and reasonable," doesnot apply to competitive telephone companies. Likewise, section 9-201 (220 ILCS 5/9-201 (West2000)), which requires Commission approval for all rate changes, is also inapplicable tocompetitive phone companies. By not applying provisions such as these to competitive telephonecompanies, the legislature took away the Commission's power to regulate the rates of thoseentities. Thus, a competitive phone company may charge whatever rate it chooses, subject only tothe requirement that it files that rate with the Commission. 220 ILCS 5/13-501 (West 2000).

In addition, subsequent amendments to the sections of the Act that apply to telephonecompanies seem to have expanded the General Assembly's policy of deregulating competitivetelephone companies. For example, the policy statement in the 1985 Telecommunications Articlestated that "competition should be permitted to function as a substitute for certain aspects ofregulation." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 111 2/3, par. 13-103 (b). However, thepolicy statement adopted in 1997 appears to be much more expansive:

"[C]onsistent with the protection of consumers of telecommunicationsservices and the furtherance of other public interest goals, competition in alltelecommunications service markets should be pursued as a substitute forregulation in determining the variety, quality and price of telecommunicationsservices and that the economic burdens of regulation should be reduced to theextent possible consistent with the furtherance of market competition andprotection of the public interest[.]" (Emphasis added.) 220 ILCS 5/13-103(b)(West 2000).

Accordingly, the only issue in this case is to determine whether the General Assembly'srate deregulation impacted the Commission's jurisdiction over consumer claims relating to therates charged by competitive telephone companies. The trial court, indeed, found that thederegulation legislation of 1985 removed the review of billing matters for competitive companiesfrom the Commission's jurisdiction:

"To me, the second sentence in 13-101 is key to the court's inquiry. Did thelegislature intentionally omit the language, the sections of this act pertaining topublic utilities, public utility rates and services and regulations thereof indiscussing their application to competitive telecommunications services[?] Theyclearly omitted this language. I must conclude that the legislature intended whatthey meant."

By way of background, we note that the Act is quite explicit on the scope of consumercomplaints the Commission has jurisdiction to hear:

"Complaint may be made by the Commission, of its own motion or by anyperson or corporation *** setting forth any act or things done or omitted to be donein violation, or claimed to be in violation, of any provision of this Act, or of anyorder or rule of the Commission." 220 ILCS 5/10-108 (West 2000).

Thus, consumers can file complaints with the Commission only if there is a violation of the Act orof an order or rule of the Commission. However, the Commission has no jurisdiction overconsumer complaints that involve common law claims of violations of statutes other than the Act.

Interestingly, therefore, the general rule is that the Commission's jurisdiction is non-exclusive. In fact, section 5-201 provides, in pertinent part, that consumers can bring damage suitsagainst utilities in court, even when their claims involve violations of the Act:

"In case any public utility shall do, cause to be done or permit to be doneany act, matter or thing prohibited, forbidden or declared to be unlawful, or shallomit to do any act, matter or thing required to be done either by any provisions ofthis Act or any rule, regulation, order or decision of the Commission, issued underauthority of this Act, the public utility shall be liable to the persons or corporationsaffected thereby for all loss, damages or injury caused thereby or resultingtherefrom, and if the court shall find that the act or omission was wilful, the courtmay in addition to the actual damages, award damages for the sake of example andby the way of punishment. An action to recover for such loss, damage or injurymay be brought in the circuit court by any person or corporation." (Emphasisadded.) 220 ILCS 5/5-201 (West 2000).

While section 5-201 is the only provision in the Act that speaks to jurisdiction, it saysnothing about the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction, which is a court-made doctrine. Essentially, the doctrine developed because Illinois courts felt that if the Act provided a specificcause of action and remedy for rate reparation claims, the statutory claim superseded any commonlaw claim based on the same facts. And since the statutory claim had to be brought before theCommission, the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over that matter. See Terminal R.R.Ass'n of St. Louis v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 304 Ill. 312, 317 (1922):

"The evident intent and purpose of the legislature in providing a method by whichreparation may be recovered and in requiring that an application therefor shall befirst made to the commission, precludes an action at law for such reparation untilthe commission has heard a claim therefor. *** Moreover, it cannot be doubted thatthe Public Utilities [A]ct supercedes the common law liability of the carrier so faras rates and unreasonable discrimination are concerned."

Accord Cummings v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 64 Ill. App. 2d 320, 323-24 (1965) ("It is wellestablished that the common law right to recover reparations for unreasonable charges by publicutilities has been superseded by the Public Utilities Act"). Accordingly, the decisive issue in thiscase is, simply, whether the plaintiff has a reparations claim under the Act.

Defendants' only argument on appeal is that the Commission maintains exclusivejurisdiction over claims for reparations by customers of telecommunications carriers that providecompetitive telecommunications services based upon: (1) the plain language of the Act; (2) theintent of the General Assembly when amending the Act as made evident by statutory construction;and (3) public interest. As the supreme court has stated:

"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, subject to de novoreview. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001). The fundamentalprinciple of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the intent of thelegislature. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 331 (2000). The best means ofdetermining legislative intent is through the statutory language. In re Applicationof the County Collector of Du Page County for Judgment for Delinquent Taxes forthe Year 1992, 181 Ill. 2d 237, 244 (1998). When the meaning of a statute is notclearly expressed in the statutory language, a court may look beyond the languageemployed and consider the purpose behind the law and the evils the law wasdesigned to remedy. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center ofChicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (1994). When the language of an enactment isclear, it will be given effect without resort to other interpretative aids. MichiganAvenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000); Davis v.Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999); Epstein v.Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 375-76 (1997), quoting Barnett v.Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 389 (1996)." Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d439, 444-45 (2002).

In other words, if the statutory language is unambiguous, it is inappropriate to resort to other aidsof statutory construction in interpreting the statute at issue. Page v. Hibbard, 119 Ill. 2d 41, 46(1987). Statutory language will only be considered to be ambiguous when it " is capable of beingunderstood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses." Advincula v.United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (1996). RCN first argues that the plain language of the Act demonstrates that the GeneralAssembly intended for the Commission to retain exclusive jurisdiction to address the claimspresented in this appeal. For this, it notes that while section 13-101 of the Act renders mostprovisions of the Act inapplicable to providers of competitive telecommunications services,section 13-101 explicitly stated that sections 9-250 and 9-252.1 were to apply. In turn, RCNargues that, "[a]s a result of the full application of these provisions, the Commission retainsexclusive jurisdiction over the types of claims raised by the plaintiff."

Section 9-250 of the Act provides in pertinent part:

"Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion orupon complaint, shall find that the rates or other charges, or classifications, or anyof them, demanded, observed, charged or collected by any public utility for anyservice or product or commodity, or in connection therewith, or that the rules,regulations, contracts, or practices or any of them, affecting such rates or othercharges, or classifications, or any of them, are unjust, unreasonable, discriminatoryor preferential, or in any way in violation of any provisions of law, or that suchrates or other charges or classifications are insufficient, the Commission shalldetermine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates or other charges, classifications,rules, regulations, contracts or practices to be thereafter observed and in force, andshall fix the same by order as hereinafter provided." 220 ILCS 5/9-250 (West2000).

Because section 9-250 gives the Commission the authority to address complaints regarding thecharges or practices of providers of competitive telecommunications services, RCN argues that theCommission has retained exclusive authority to address the plaintiff's complaint regardingreparations for overcharges, overcharges in rates for certain billing times, and allegationsregarding the imposition of charges that were not included in the defendants' filed rates.

Thereafter, section 9-252.1 provides:

"When a customer pays a bill as submitted by a public utility and the billingis later found to be incorrect due to an error either in charging more than thepublished rate or in measuring the quantity or volume of service provided, theutility shall refund the overcharge with interest from the date of overpayment at thelegal rate or at a rate prescribed by rule of the Commission. Refunds and interestfor such overcharges may be paid by the utility without the need for a hearing andorder of the Commission. Any complaint relating to an incorrect billing must befiled with the Commission no more than 2 years after the date the customer firsthas knowledge of the incorrect billing." 220 ILCS 5/9-252.1 (West 2000).

Likewise, RCN notes, section 9-252.1 of the Act provides a remedy to a consumer in the eventthat a provider of competitive telecommunications overcharges its customer "due to an error eitherin charging more than the published rate or in measuring the quantity or volume of serviceprovided." 220 ILCS 5/9-252.1 (West 2000). Therefore, RCN argues, the Commission also hasthe exclusive authority to address the plaintiff's complaint regarding the defendants' billingpractices where the plaintiff alleged that he was improperly billed for calls at different times of theday and that discounts, taxes, and other charges were improperly measured, calculated, or added toits bills.

Ultimately, RCN concludes that since sections 9-250 and 9-252.1 of the Act apply toproviders of competitive telecommunications services, and since the trial court properly concludedthat plaintiff's claim is essentially a claim for reparations under the Act, the Commission mustnecessarily retain its exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim.

Thereafter, the defendants preemptively address concerns regarding the GeneralAssembly's choice not to apply sections 9-240 and 9-243 of the Act (220 ILCS 5/9-240, 9-243(West 2000)) to competitive telecommunications service prices. Section 9-240 provides inpertinent part:

"Except as in this Act otherwise provided, no public utility shall charge,demand, collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for anyproduct, or commodity furnished or to be furnished, or for any service rendered orto be rendered, than the rates or other charges applicable to such product orcommodity or service as specified in its schedules on file and in effect at the time,except as provided in Section 9-104, nor shall any such public utility refund orremit, directly or indirectly, in any manner or by any device, any portion of the ratesor other charges so specified, nor extend to any corporation or person any form ofcontract or agreement or any rule or regulation or any facility or privilege exceptsuch as are regularly and uniformly extended to all corporations and persons." 220ILCS 5/9-240 (West 2000).

Section 9-243 states:

"No public utility, or any officer or agent thereof, or any person acting for oremployed by it, shall directly or indirectly, by any device or means whatsoever,suffer or permit any corporation or person to obtain any service, commodity, orproduct at less than the rate or other charge then established and in force as shownby the schedules filed and in effect at the time. No person or corporation shall,directly or indirectly, by any device or means whatsoever, whether with or withoutthe consent or connivance of a public utility or any of its officers, or employees,seek to obtain or obtain any service, commodity, or product at less than the rate orother charge then established and in force therefor. If prior to June 30, 1913, anyreal estate or other tangible property shall have been sold or transferred to anypublic utility or public service corporation, or, if before that date, any obligation ofany public utility or public service corporation created in consideration of thetransfer to it of any real estate or other tangible property, shall have been releasedor cancelled, upon consideration in whole or in part of an agreement by such publicutility or public service corporation expressed in writing to render any service, orfurnish any commodity or product in the future to the party or parties making suchconveyance or transfer or owning such obligation, nothing in this Act containedshall be construed to in any way affect such agreement or to prevent theperformance or enforcement thereof according to its terms, or to authorize theCommission to interfere with such performance or enforcement." 220 ILCS 5/9-243 (West 2000).

RCN notes that prior to the enactment of the Telecommunications Article,telecommunications providers were prohibited from changing their rates without providing noticeto and receiving approval from the Commission. As noted, however, with the enactment of theTelecommunications Article, the General Assembly determined that providers of competitivetelecommunications services need not submit increases or decreases to the Commission forapproval, as the market would eventually bear out the appropriateness of those prices. Thus, RCNargues that in looking at both sections 9-240 and 9-243 -both of which apply to the rates ofcarriers- it makes sense that neither section would apply. Moreover, RCN notes, if the GeneralAssembly had intended to totally restrict the Commission's authority to address complaints againstproviders of competitive telecommunications services, the General Assembly similarly wouldhave made sections 9-250 and 9-252.1 of the Act inapplicable to providers of competitivetelecommunications service.

To summarize, RCN asserts that in looking at the plain language of theTelecommunications Article, this court should determine that nothing in section 13-101 of the Actremoves the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission to address complaints regarding reparationfrom customers of providers of competitive telecommunication carriers. Consequently, RCNprays for a reversal of the trial court's decision and a grant of the defendants' motion to dismiss.

In response to RCN's arguments concerning section 9-250, plaintiff asserts that RCN'sanalysis misses the fact that this section only describes what remedies the Commission canprovide after a hearing or "upon complaint." Thus, plaintiff argues, section 9-250 is only triggeredif the consumer has filed a complaint. And in order to file a complaint, the consumer must allegea violation of the Act. See 220 ILCS 5/10-108 (West 2000). However, because section 9-240does not apply to competitive telephone companies, there can be no violation of the Act for theconsumers to allege if they are charged more than the contractually permitted rates. Moreover,plaintiff asserts, the plain language of section 9-250 shows that it does not create a statutory causeof action because it does not make any conduct unlawful. Rather, it only defines the remedies theCommission can order if there has been a complaint showing a violation of the Act. In short,plaintiff claims that the Act's statutory scheme is that section 9-240 and other similar sectionsproscribe certain conduct, and that section 9-250 and other sections similar to it provide theremedies available to the Commission if a complaint has demonstrated a violation of one of theother sections.

Plaintiff also answers RCN's argument that the legislature intentionally retained theCommission's exclusive jurisdiction by leaving section 9-250 available to competitivetelecommunications companies. Plaintiff asserts that "[t]he answer lies in the fact that section 9-250 addresses, in addition to certain rate matters (which are still relevant as to all other utilities),claims involving issues of classification: 'Wherever the Commission, after a hearing *** inconnection therewith *** rates or other charges or classifications ***.' 220 ILCS 5/9-250 (West2000)."

As recognized by the defendants, the legislature created a different regulatory schemes forcompetitive and noncompetitive telephone companies, i.e., the ability to be "classified" ascompetitive means that a company no longer needs rate approval from the Commission. Andwhile telephone companies can make their own decisions on classification, the Commissionultimately determines whether such classifications are correct. 220 ILCS 5/13-502 (West 2000). Moreover, a finding by the Commission that a company has incorrectly classified itself couldresult in a refund of overcharges to customers. See 220 ILCS 5/13-502(e) (West 2000). Therefore, plaintiff concludes, the legislature had to make section 9-250 applicable to competitivetelecommunications companies, at the very least, to insure that the Commission could order theappropriate remedy in a wrongful classification case. For example, in Illinois Bell Telephone Co.v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 282 Ill. App. 3d 672 (1996), this court affirmed the Commission'sorder providing a refund where Ameritech had raised its rates after improperly classifying some ofits services as competitive).

Likewise, plaintiff continues, section 9-252.1 also does not create a cause of action, as acustomer who is a victim of over charging cannot file a complaint alleging a violation of section 9-252.1. Rather, section 9-252.1 deals with the ability of a utility to make a voluntary errorcorrecting refund without the need for a hearing or order of the Commission. 220 ILCS 5/9-252.1(West 2000). According to the language of that section, it specifically addresses the limitedsituation in which a customer has paid a bill that the utility "later found to be incorrect." Underthose circumstances, the utility is then to refund the overcharge with interest, and there is no needfor a hearing or order of the Commission to authorize such a refund. However, plaintiff argues,section 9-252.1 has no application to a dispute between a customer and the company over whetheran overcharge has occurred. Therefore, plaintiff concludes, "it defies logic to argue, as RCN does,that the Commission obtains jurisdiction over certain claims under a statutory provision thatspecifically addresses what actions can be taken "without the need for a hearing and order of theCommission."

Initially, we think that the only way the plaintiff could have ever pursued a reparationsclaim against a competitive telecommunications company under the Act would have been throughsection 9-240, as that section specifically proscribes:

"[C]harg[ing], demand[ing], collect[ing] or receiv[ing] a greater or less ordifferent compensation for any product, or commodity furnished or to be furnished,or for any service rendered or to be rendered, than the rates or other chargesapplicable to such product or commodity or service as specified in its schedules onfile and in effect at the time***." 220 ILCS 5/9-240 (West 2000).

However, in specifically excluding that section from applying to competitive telecommunicationscompanies, we think that the legislature intended to prevent claims of overcharging againstcompetitive telecommunications companies from remaining exclusively before the Commission. Otherwise, it would have simply made section 9-240 applicable to those companies.

While the defendants suggest that the deregulation of the industry necessarily prompted thelegislature's decision to render sections 9-240 and 9-243 inapplicable to competitive companies (asboth sections deal with the Commission's supervision of rates), the fact also remains that section9-240 still proscribes a utility's charging more than its filed rates. Even though competitivecompanies no longer need to obtain Commission approval for their rates, they still potentiallycould be subject to section 9-240's requirement that the companies must still charge what they file. Therefore, we think that if the legislature wanted the Commission to handle rate claims involvingcompetitive carriers, it logically would have made section 9-240 applicable to them, as that sectionaddresses the only remaining restriction on what they can charge. Because the legislature did notdo so, its intent seems clear: to remove all rate claims involving rate claims involving competitivecompanies from the Commission's jurisdiction. As the trial court held, the legislature "clearlyomitted" section 9-240 from section 13-101's list of sections applicable to competitivetelecommunications companies and one "must conclude that the legislature intended what theymeant."

Based upon the plain language of sections 9-250 and 9-252.1, we also agree with theplaintiff that neither section provides a potential plaintiff with a cause of action for a reparationsclaim under the Act. While RCN claims that section 9-250 provides the Commission with theability to "entertain complaints regarding the 'rates, contracts, or practices' of a provider ofcompetitive telecommunication services," the fact remains that stated purpose of section 9-250 isto permit the Commission to determine "the just, reasonable or sufficient rates or other charges,classifications, rules, regulations, contracts or practices to be thereafter observed and in force," andthat the Commission may do so only "after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint." (Emphasis added.) 220 ILCS 5/9-250 (West 2000). Similarly, the stated purpose of section 9-252.1 is to allow a utility to make a refund when it has "later found [a billing] to be incorrect." 220 ILCS 5/9-252.1 (West 2000). Both sections, therefore, serve only to provide the remediesavailable to the Commission and a public utility, respectively, if a utility's charged rates aredemonstrated to be incorrect or the utility otherwise violates the law. Accordingly, even if wewere to agree with the trial court's determination that "this case is solely about reparations,"plaintiff is still unable to proceed under either section 9-250 or 9-252.1 as a way of establishing acause of action under the Act.

Moreover, as plaintiff suggests, even if we were to read RCN's interpretation of sections 9-250 and 9-252.1 as also making it a violation of the Act to charge more than a utility's contractualrate, those sections would duplicate section 9-240, thereby rendering it superfluous. Such aninterpretation would violate the basic rule of construction that a statute should be read so as togive meaning to all of its parts. See Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001)("We must construe the statute so that each word, clause, and sentence, if possible, is given areasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous").

Bolstering our determination is the language from section 5-201, which states that "[a]naction to recover for such loss, damage or injury [caused by a public utility's 'prohibited,forbidden' or 'unlawful' act] may be brought in the circuit court by any person or corporation." 220 ILCS 5/5-201 (West 2000). RCN suggests that section 5-201 is inapplicable to cases, such ashere, where a plaintiff is seeking reparations, as those actions belong under the exclusivejurisdiction of the Commission. As previously noted, however, a plaintiff seeking reparationsagainst a competitive telecommunications company has no statutory cause of action under the Act. And because nothing in section 5-201 indicates that the legislature intended to exclude reparationsfrom the circuit court's jurisdiction over causes of actions involving a customer's "loss," we findthat all claims of loss against competitive telecommunications companies -including reparations-may properly be brought before the circuit court.

Because we find the language of the relevant sections of the Act to be clear, we are to giveit effect without resort to other interpretative aids. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d at 444-45. Accordingly,we need not address defendants' additional arguments that the statutory construction of the Act'samendments, as well as the concept of the general public interest, evidence the intent of theGeneral Assembly.

For the reasons stated above, we answer the trial court's certified question in the negative.

Certified question answered.

HARTMAN and KARNEZIS, JJ., concur.