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SIXTH DIVISION
October 19, 2001

This action was brought by plaintiff, John Villarreal, seeking an order ofmandamus requiring defendants, the Village of Schaumburg, village manager KennethFritz and director of human resources Darold Pitzer, to provide plaintiff with healthinsurance coverage at defendants' expense pursuant to the Illinois Public SafetyEmployee Benefits Act (820 ILCS 320/1 et seq. (West 1998)) (the Act), and toreimburse him for any health insurance costs and medical expenses incurred followinghis retirement due to a duty-related disability. Plaintiff now appeals an order of the trialcourt granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's motionfor summary judgment. We affirm.

Background

The relevant facts are undisputed. Plaintiff was employed as a police officer bythe Village of Schaumburg police department from July 1, 1981, until he was given adisability retirement pension on December 23, 1999. On May 28, 1989, plaintiffresponded to a call for assistance and was kicked in the knee during his arrest of asuspect. As a result, plaintiff's knee cartilage and ligaments were seriously damaged,and he also suffered a broken leg. Due to his injury, plaintiff was off work forapproximately one year, during which time he underwent surgery and physical therapy. Plaintiff returned to a light duty desk assignment and eventually returned to full duty asa police officer. Plaintiff remained on full duty for the next 10 years.

On July 9, 1999, plaintiff suffered a second injury to his knee. The second injuryresulted from plaintiff's response to a report of home invasion and his pursuit of thesuspect. During the pursuit, plaintiff jumped down a drop of approximately four feet andfelt his knee give out. Plaintiff again underwent surgery and physical therapy. Ultimately, however, as a result of his 1999 injury, the village police pension board (theBoard) concluded that plaintiff was fully disabled from serving on the police departmentso as to qualify him for retirement from service. On December 23, 1999, the Boardgranted plaintiff a duty-related disability pension of 65% of his salary. Plaintiff iscurrently self-employed and owns a small contracting business, Villarreal Construction.

On December 30, 1999, plaintiff wrote a letter to defendant Pitzer requesting freehealth insurance coverage for himself and his family pursuant to the Act. Pitzer deniedthe request based upon his conclusion that plaintiff was not eligible for the benefitsbecause his injury was not a "catastrophic injury" which is required under the Act.

Analysis

I. Standard of Review

We first address our appropriate standard of review. It is well established that inorder to qualify for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, the following requirements mustbe met: a plaintiff must show a clear, affirmative right to the requested relief, a clearduty of the defendant to act, and clear authority in the defendant to comply with the writ.Noyola v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 133, 688 N.E.2d81, 88 (1997); Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 127 Ill. 2d 453, 467-68,537 N.E.2d 784 (1989); Senn Park Nursing Center v. Miller, 104 Ill. 2d 169, 182, 470N.E.2d 1029 (1984). "Where *** public officials have failed or refused to comply withrequirements imposed by statute, the courts may compel them to do so by means of awrit of mandamus, provided that the requirements for that writ have been satisfied." Noyola, 179 Ill. 2d at 132, 688 N.E.2d at 86 (1997).

Mandamus is not a writ of right but, rather, an extraordinary remedy that isawarded only in the exercise of sound judicial discretion according to legal principles.League of Women Voters v. County of Peoria, 121 Ill. 2d 236, 242, 520 N.E.2d 626,629 (1987). In view of this discretion on the part of the trial court, its decision to grantor deny mandamus generally will be reversed on appeal only when it is against themanifest weight of the evidence. See, e.g., People ex rel. Braver v. Washington, 311 Ill.App. 3d 179, 186, 724 N.E.2d 68, 73 (1999). In the instant case, however, the trialcourt's decision did not involve the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion. Rather, the procedural posture of the instant case is an appeal from a grant of summaryjudgment. The reviewing court applies a de novo standard of review to summaryjudgment orders. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90,607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992). Both parties assert, and this court agrees, that there is nodisputed issue of material fact in the present case. Where there is no genuine issue ofmaterial fact, the sole function of a reviewing court is to determine whether the trialcourt's judgment was correct as a matter of law. Cates v. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d 76, 78, 619N.E.2d 715, 716 (1993). Moreover, as we shall discuss further, this case involvesconstruction of a statute. It is well established that statutory construction is a questionof law to be decided by the reviewing court without deference to the judgment of thetrial court. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 12, 678 N.E.2d 1009, 1015(1996). The de novo standard of review is proper in this case. Lucas v. Lakin, 175 Ill.2d 166, 170, 676 N.E.2d 637, 640 (1997). That is the standard of review that this courtshall use, but we believe it would be useful to further address our rationale for applyinga de novo standard of review.

In support of the applicability of a de novo standard, defendants cite Overend v.Guard, 98 Ill. App. 3d 441, 443-44, 424 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1981). But the Overend courtmerely explained that a trial court's misinterpretation of a statute or constitutionalprovision under which a petitioner seeks mandamus is not an "act of discretion to whichcourts of review will defer." Overend, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 443-44, 424 N.E.2d at 733; seealso Mid-America Television Co. v. Peoria Housing Authority, 93 Ill. App. 3d 314, 319,417 N.E.2d 210, 214 (1981) (explaining that "[w]here the order of the trial court is basedon a misinterpretation of the applicable law, it must be concluded that the denial of awrit of mandamus *** was not based on a sound exercise of judicial discretion"). Whilewe agree with the Overend and Mid-America courts that a misinterpretation of a statuteis not an act of sound judicial discretion, we believe that a more exact statement of thelaw is that any interpretation of a statute or constitutional provision under which apetitioner seeks mandamus is not an act of discretion to which courts of review willdefer. Indeed, a conclusion that a trial court has misinterpreted a statute or, for thatmatter, correctly interpreted a statute, necessarily involves a prefatorial statutoryconstruction by the reviewing court. In such instances, the usual deferential standardapplied in mandamus cases is extraneous and no recourse to it is required. Therefore,where a trial court's decision to deny or grant a petition for mandamus turns solely onthe construction of a statute, which is a question of law, review is de novo. Cf. Peoplev. Studio 20, Inc., 314 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1004-05 733 N.E.2d 451, 454 (2000) (notingthat although, generally, courts review the propriety of the trial court's grant of apreliminary injunction under an abuse of discretion standard, to the extent that theruling was based on the trial court's construction of a statute, a reviewing court mayresolve the issue as a matter of law using a de novo standard of review); TimThompson, Inc. v. Village of Hinsdale, 247 Ill. App. 3d 863, 871, 617 N.E.2d 1227,1234 (1993) ("where the nonmoving party is under no obligation to prove its case, itlogically follows that the standard of proof cannot be operative"); see also Medina v.Air-Mite Devices, Inc., 161 Ill. App. 3d 502, 509, 515 N.E.2d 770, 774 (1987) (notingthat manifest weight of the evidence is supportive of a determination that has beenmade by the trier of fact, but it has no bearing on court's review of summary judgment).

II. The Public Safety Employee Benefits Act

We now consider whether plaintiff is clearly entitled to the continuation of healthinsurance coverage for himself and his family at the expense of defendant Village ofSchaumburg, pursuant to the Act. Our analysis necessarily begins with the language ofthe statute. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 210, 752 N.E.2d 1030, 1047 (2001). Therelevant section of the Act provides as follows:

"