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FIFTH DIVISION

September 27, 2002

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, the Village of Riverdale, filed a complaint forinjunctive relief against defendants, Allied WasteTransportation, Inc., Suburban Warehouse, Inc., and Frank M.Ward, Sr., seeking to enjoin defendants from continuing tooperate their waste disposal, storage and recycling facility. Thecomplaint alleged defendants were operating the facility withoutobtaining the requisite permits and license pursuant toapplicable statutes and ordinances. A temporary restraining orderwas entered on January 26, 2001. Following an evidentiaryhearing, a preliminary injunction was entered on August 27, 2001. Defendants now appeal that order.

On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court improperly granted a preliminary injunction where plaintiff has an adequateremedy at law.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants, Allied Waste Transportation, Inc., SuburbanWarehouse, Inc., and Frank M. Ward, Sr. are the lessors/operatesof a waste disposal, storage and recycling facility at 13050South State Street, Riverdale, Illinois. Defendants' activitiesat the facility included the acceptance, separation, shredding,storage and processing of large quantities of wood, paper, metal,demolition and general debris.

On January 26, 2001, plaintiff, the Village of Riverdale(Village), filed a complaint for injunctive relief and abatementof nuisance, along with an emergency motion for a temporaryrestraining order. The Village alleged that defendants haveengaged in the above-mentioned activities since at least October1998. The complaint alleged that two fires, one on August 25,2000, and one on October 21, 2000, commenced on defendants'property in piles of waste. Defendants agreed to cease thereceipt of waste and all operations at the facility on October23, 2000. However, on January 22, 2001, defendants advisedplaintiff by letter that they intended to begin accepting loadsof "wood waste and other recyclable materials for processing andstorage."

The Village's complaint alleged that defendants had notobtained a permit from the Illinois Environmental ProtectionAgency to operate a waste disposal and storage facility on theproperty as required by statute. Defendants also allegedlyfailed to obtain local siting approval from the Village foroperating a pollution control facility or a conditional usepermit for operating a wood recycling, solid waste disposal orsolid waste storage operation as required by statute. Both thecomplaint and the emergency motion alleged that defendants'operations represent a continuing fire hazard. The Village'sbrief on appeal alleged that the wood A-frame structure ondefendants' property contains no sprinkler or fire suppressionsystem.

The trial court granted the Village's motion for a temporaryrestraining order on January 26, 2001. On July 24, 2001, ahearing was held on the Village's motion seeking a preliminaryinjunction. James Stock, director of building and zoning in theVillage, testified that in early 2000 he toured defendants'property. Stock testified that defendants' activities on theproperty constituted the operation of a recycling and wastetransfer facility. These activities are considered conditionaluses under the Village's zoning code. Stock also testified as tothe conditions on the property, including piles of separated andmixed materials, fuel containers not protected, questionableelectric wiring and dilapidated buildings. Stock also testifiedthat fires occurred on defendants' property in July 2000, inAugust 2000 and on October 21, 2000.

Tyrone Jarrett, fire chief for the Village, testified to thegeneral safety and public health concerns present on defendants'property. Jarret testified that upon viewing defendants' propertyhe had a major concern with the capabilities to suppress fires inthe area because the entrances and exits to the area are limitedand the water resources are limited. Jarret testified that theOctober 21, 2000, fire on defendants' property lasted betweenfour and six days.

Rudolph Rinas, assistant fire chief for the Village, alsotestified that the limited water, the limited means of egress,the tremendous exposures to the A-frame building, the propanetanks, the aboveground storage tanks, the large wood chip pileand the past fires all represented serious fire safety concerns. Jeffrey Diver, special environmental counsel to the Village, alsotestified to the fire hazards and general health and safetyissues present on defendants' property.

Zenovia Evans, mayor of the Village, testified that theVillage had not issued defendants a business license for the year2001 because defendants were not in compliance with the Villagecode, safety requirements, or statutory requirements for theState of Illinois. Evans testified that if a business tried tooperate without a business license, police and buildinginspectors would be sent to shut it down and tag the building.

Paul Howe, district manager of Allied Waste, testified thatfollowing the October fire, defendants "agreed to certainrestrictions on inbound material and how we would conduct ourbusiness activities during the cleanup of the fire that occurredin October." Howe testified that he memorialized this agreementto voluntarily cut back operations in a letter to the Village'sattorney. Howe also testified that defendants were not issued abusiness license for the year 2001.

Following the hearing, on August 27, 2001, the trial judgeordered that the temporary restraining order continue as apreliminary injunction. Specifically, the court held:

"I think that a preliminary injunction is appropriate. I think a preliminary injunction couched in the terms'until such time as the court is satisfied that theactivity enjoined has been licensed and/or therespondent Allied, Suburban, in whatever persona theyintend to proceed, exhausts its remedy in challengingthe licensing decision made by the Village ofRiverdale.'"

Defendants now appeal that order.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that the trial court erred in granting apreliminary injunction in this case. The bulk of defendants'argument is centered upon the allegation that the injunction wasimproper where the Village had an adequate remedy at law. Namely, defendants maintain that because they were not granted abusiness license for the year 2001, they were unable to operatetheir facility and an injunction was unnecessary.

A reviewing court will reverse a trial court's ordergranting a preliminary injunction only when it constitutes anabuse of discretion. Franz v. Calaco Development Corp., 322 Ill.App. 3d 941, 946 (2001). As a general rule, a preliminaryinjunction will only be granted where the plaintiff shows it: (1)has a clearly ascertainable right that needs protection; (2) willsuffer irreparable harm without the protection; (3) has noadequate remedy at law; and (4) is likely to succeed on themerits. Prairie Eye Center, Ltd. v. Butler, 305 Ill. App. 3d442, 445 (1999). Where, however, an injunction is sought by apublic official or body pursuant to express authorization of astatute, the requirements of the statute control rather thanthose traditional matters to which we have referred. People exrel. Hartigan v. Stianos, 131 Ill. App. 3d 575, 580 (1985);People ex rel. Edgar v. Miller, 110 Ill. App. 3d 264, 269 (1982);People ex rel. Carpentier v. Goers, 20 Ill. 2d 272, 276 (1960);People v. Keeven, 68 Ill. App. 3d 91, 96-97 (1979); City ofHighland Park v. County of Cook, 37 Ill. App. 3d 15, 20 (1975).

When seeking injunctive relief that is expressly providedfor by statute, a plaintiff is not required to plead or proveirreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law. City ofChicago v. Piotrowski, 215 Ill. App. 3d 829, 834-35 (1991). TheState or agency need only show that the statute was violated andthat the statute relied upon specifically allows injunctiverelief. Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 104 Ill. 2d 105, 110-12(1984). The principle underlying the willingness of the courtsto issue statutory injunctions to public bodies to restrainviolations of a statute is that harm to the public at large canbe presumed from the statutory violation alone. People v. Keeven,68 Ill. App. 3d 91, 96.

Section 11-13-15 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS5/11-13-15 (West 2000)) provides:

"In case any building or structure, includingfixtures, is constructed, reconstructed, altered,repaired, converted, or maintained, or any building,including fixtures, or land, is used in violation of anordinance or ordinances adopted under Division 13, 31or 31.1 of the Illinois Municipal Code, or of anyordinance or other regulation made under the authorityconferred thereby, the proper local authorities of themunicipality *** may institute any appropriate actionor proceeding (1) to prevent the unlawful construction,reconstruction, alteration, repair, conversion,maintenance, or use, (2) to prevent the occupancy ofthe building, structure, or land, (3) to prevent anyillegal act, conduct, business, or use in or about thepremises, or (4) to restrain, correct, or abate theviolation.***

In any action or proceeding for a purposementioned in this section, the court with jurisdictionof such action or proceeding has the power and in itsdiscretion may issue a restraining order, or apreliminary injunction, as well as a permanentinjunction, upon such terms and under such conditionsas will do justice and enforce the purposes set forthabove." 65 ILCS 5/11-13-15 (West 2000).

The Village sought to enjoin defendants from the operation oftheir facility pursuant to the statutory authorization in section11-13-15 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/11-13-15 (West2000)). The Village need only show that the statute was violatedand that the statute relied upon specifically allows injunctiverelief. Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 104 Ill. 2d at 110-12.

In the present case, the record clearly established thatdefendants' activities on the property in question constitutedthe operation of a wood recycling, waste storage, or wastedisposal facility. James Stock testified that defendants'activities on the property constituted the operation of arecycling and waste transfer facility. These activities areconsidered conditional uses under the Village's zoning code. Defendants never obtained a conditional use permit for suchactivity. Zenovia Evans, the mayor of the Village of Riverdale,testified that defendants were not issued a business license forthe year 2001 because defendants were not in compliance withVillage codes, fire safety regulations and safety regulations. Evans testified that defendants cannot operate their facilitywithout a business license.

Defendants' reliance on Sadat v. American Motors Corp., 104Ill. 2d 105, is unavailing. In Sadat, the sole question presentedwas whether a complaint for a mandatory injunction that does notallege the traditional prerequisites for equitable relief maynevertheless state a cause of action under the Magnuson-MossWarranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Act) (15U.S.C.