Village of Oak Park v. Illinois Department of Employment Security
Case Date: 06/28/2002
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-01-3113 Rel
THIRD DIVISION No. 1-01-3113
JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court: This appeal arises from an Illinois Department of EmploymentSecurity Board of Review (Board of Review) finding that CraigWeber is eligible to receive unemployment benefits. We concludehe is not. FACTS Oak Park's Board of Fire and Police Commissioners (BFPC)discharged Weber after it held a hearing and issued writtenfindings. The BFPC concluded in its findings Weber violatedseveral statutes and department rules by, among other things,conducting background checks without proper authority, thenselling that information to a private detective. The circuitcourt conducted an administrative review of the BFPC's decisionand affirmed it. We affirmed the circuit court. Weber v.Village of Oak Park, No. 1-99-2754 (2001) (unpublished orderunder Supreme Court Rule 23). When Weber filed for unemployment benefits, Oak Parkchallenged him on the ground that persons terminated formisconduct are ineligible for unemployment benefits. At theBoard of Review administrative hearing, Oak Park introduced theBFPC transcript and findings. It contended the BFPC's findingswere binding on the Board of Review. Weber's appeal of theBFPC's decision was pending in this court at the time the Boardof Review made its decision on October 13, 1999. The Board of Review disagreed with Oak Park, finding OakPark did not establish misconduct by a preponderance of theevidence. Weber was eligible for unemployment benefits. OakPark appealed the Board of Review's decision by seekingadministrative review in the circuit court. After remanding thecase twice to the Board of Review for clarifications of findings,the circuit court affirmed the Board of Review's decision. Oak Park appeals, contending: 1) the doctrine of issuepreclusion required the Board of Review to accept the findings ofmisconduct issued by the BFPC, and 2) the Board of Review'sdecision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. DECISION While Oak Park's brief offers little in the way of authorityor legal reasoning, it does cite one important case -- Osborne v.Kelly, 207 Ill. App. 3d 488, 565 N.E.2d 1340 (1991), which theDepartment ignores in favor of two decisions from foreignjurisdictions. In this case, Osborne is enough. It tells usfact issues finally decided in an administrative proceeding thatis judicial in nature precludes litigation of those same factissues in a subsequent proceeding. Osborne, 207 Ill. App. 3d at491. This is a branch of res judicata referred to as collateralestoppel or, more appropriately, issue preclusion. Issue preclusion applies when: 1) a material fact issuedecided in the earlier adjudication is identical to the one inthe current proceeding; 2) there was a final judgment on themerits in the earlier adjudication; and 3) the party against whomestoppel is asserted was a party or was in privity with a partyin the earlier adjudication. Midland Hotel Corp. v. Director ofEmployment Security, 282 Ill. App. 3d 312, 315-16, 668 N.E.2d 82(1996). All requirements for the application of issue preclusionhave been met here. First, the proceeding before the BFPC wasjudicial in nature. The BFPC not only held a hearing on theissue of whether Weber violated statutes and police departmentrules, but also issued written findings. Second, the issuesdecided before the BFPC are identical to the issues decidedbefore the Board of Review -- whether Weber improperly conductedbackground checks and sold the information. Third, the BFPCreached a final decision, which was later affirmed by both thecircuit court and this court. Fourth, Weber, against whom issuepreclusion is being asserted, was a party in the earlieradjudication and was represented by counsel. He is the realinterested party in this case. Weber cannot now relitigate the issue of whether he engagedin misconduct that merited his discharge. The Board of Reviewincorrectly rejected the BFPC's findings. It improperlyconcluded that Weber was eligible for unemployment benefits. Because of our finding on issue preclusion, we need notaddress Oak Park's contention that the Board of Review's decisionwas against the manifest weight of the evidence. CONCLUSION The decision of the Board of Review is reversed. Weber isnot eligible for unemployment benefits. CERDA, and SOUTH, JJ., concur.
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