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"The rent claimed by plaintiff on its 5-day notice includes charges for telephone service, shared secretarial service,xerox copying, facsimile machine services, certain parking fees, interest, late charges and other miscellaneous feeswhich are not rent but are added to plaintiff's claimed total."

Cannon admitted he and Pickelsimer signed guarantees, but claimed they were made in reference to "an oral year-to-yearlease" so that the 5-day notice was defective. Cannon also claimed he and Pickelsimer were not proper parties to a forcibleentry and detainer action because AMT is a registered corporation.

On July 14, 1993, TIC served a new 5-day notice on AMT. TIC then amended its complaint on July 20, 1993, adding AMTas a party defendant. In this complaint TIC alleged in count I that AMT was unlawfully withholding possession of officespace #104 at 1840 Oak Avenue, Evanston, Illinois, after a demand was made for "$13,188.84 representing rents over sixmonths in default." In count II, TIC added a claim against Pickelsimer and Cannon for rent and services based on theirpersonal guarantees.

After a hearing, count II against Pickelsimer and Cannon was dismissed without prejudice on October 18, 1993. The claimagainst AMT was set for trial.

On January 14, 1994, TIC filed a Second Amended Complaint. In this complaint, TIC re-pled count I from the previouscomplaint. A new count II was pled in the alternative. In count II, TIC alleged 30 days had elapsed since "defendant wasgiven notice of the termination of its tenancy of the aforesaid space pursuant to the statute thereto pertaining in the IllinoisCompiled Statutes, Section 835, 9-207 (sic), on or about December 1, 1993." In count III, TIC brought an action for rentsand charges against AMT.

Cannon, acting as legal counsel for AMT, moved to dismiss the second amended complaint. With regard to count II,Cannon alleged the 30-day notice was defective because he, as registered agent for AMT, had not received the notice oftermination until December 3, 1993. He further alleged the letter of termination dated December 1, 1993, was deposited inAMT's mailbox without a postmark.

TIC responded to this motion. One argument advanced by TIC was that no notice to quit was required to bestowjurisdiction because AMT was a tenant at sufferance (see 735 ILCS 5/9-213 (West 1992)) and because AMT was more than18 months in arrears (see 735 ILCS 5/9-204 (West 1992)). Several exhibits were attached to the response, including lettersto AMT, dated as far back as November 1992, notifying AMT of its failure to meet its obligation to pay rent and expenses.Exhibit E to the response consisted of a copy of the letter of termination of tenancy dated December 1, 1993, and acertification, signed by James S. Currie, TIC's managing director, stating that Currie had deposited the termination letter inAMT's corporate pigeonhole mailbox on December 2, 1993.

The second amended complaint was dismissed on March 21, 1994, for lack of jurisdiction⁽¹⁾.

On April 20, 1994, defendants filed a petition for sanctions against TIC and Murray pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137.Defendants also sought costs as provided by statute. (See 735 ILCS 5/9-114 (West 1992)). A supplemental petition forsanctions was filed on July 18, 1994, listing additional costs and fees.

On May 11, 1995, the trial court dismissed defendants' petitions for sanctions. Defendants appealed and we disposed of theappeal (see Technology Innovation Center, Inc. v. Advanced Multiuser Technologies, No. 1-95-2025, filed June 24, 1996),by summary order issued pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(2). Without suggesting any particular outcome, weremanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration because we were unable to ascertain from the record whether thetrial court had given serious consideration to the issues raised in the Rule 137 petition.

After remand, defendants filed a Second Supplemental Petition for Sanctions in the trial court on January 14, 1997.Defendants asked the court to fine TIC and Murray $1,842,000 for alleged misconduct. This amount was in addition to thealleged $67,808.09 in costs and expenses defendants sought in their sanctions petition.

On February 6, 1997, TIC and Murray moved to strike and dismiss defendant's petition for sanctions and all supplements tothe petition. On February 25, 1997, the trial court denied the motions to dismiss and reopened discovery.

After taking depositions and obtaining answers to interrogatories, defendants sought leave on August 27, 1997, to file aFirst Amended Petition for Sanctions. In this amended petition defendants added a new claim of misconduct against TICand Murray. Defendants also sought to supplement the First Amended Petition with additional "time, fee, and costcalculations."

Concurrent with their motion to amend the petition for sanctions, defendants filed two related motions: (1) a September 5,1997, Motion for Hearing to Determine the Appropriate Action for Contempt Against Respondents and Other Parties,directed against TIC and Murray and based on their alleged failure to produce certain documents in discovery; and (2) anOctober 22, 1997, Motion for a Finding of Direct Criminal Contempt, directed against the attorneys then representing TICand Murray, based on their alleged misrepresentations of fact. Both of these motions were denied on February 24, 1998.Also on this date, the trial court denied defendants' request for leave to file the first amendment to their sanctions petition.

On March 26, 1998, defendants moved to file a Revised First Amendment to Petition for Sanctions. Murray and TIC movedto strike this motion on April 23, 1998, and April 27, 1998, respectively.

On June 17, 1998, the trial court held a hearing. The court dismissed with prejudice defendants' Revised Amendment andall other petitions for sanctions. The trial court then granted Cannon leave to make an oral motion to reconsider and set thematter for hearing on July 28, 1998.

On July 22, 1998, the court issued an order stating: "All such matters to be heard and motions pertaining thereto arecontinued to and shall be heard on September 3, 1998."

On September 3, 1998, defendants filed a written Motion to Clarify And/Or Reinstate attached to 147 pages of exhibits.Exhibit E (116 pages) contained five offers of proof. On the same date, the court accepted these submissions to be takenunder advisement and continued the matter.

On November 18, 1998, the trial court heard oral argument on defendants' offers of proof. In addition, the court alloweddefendants to file, on December 2, 1998, additional written offers of proof and an Abstract of Evidence.

At a hearing on December 18, 1998, the trial court again dismissed defendants' Revised First Amendment and all othersanction petitions with prejudice. Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal on January 19, 1999.

Decision

Defendants ask this court to review the dismissal of their petitions for Rule 137 sanctions, the dismissal of their motions forcontempt, and the dismissal of their request for statutory costs. Defendants contend the trial court improperly dismissed thelong-standing petition for sanctions at a time when the only matter before the court was the defendants' ability to add a newclaim in the Revised Amendment to the Petition for Sanctions. Defendants also claim the trial court failed to fully complywith the appellate court mandate.

Dismissal of Rule 137 Petition

Defendants call for de novo review of the dismissal of their Rule 137 sanctions petitions. Defendants contend de novoreview is proper because TIC and Murray, in opposing the Rule 137 petition for sanctions, filed motions to dismiss undersection 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1992)) and the trial court dismissed the petitionswhen ruling on these motions.

We disagree with defendants' assessment of the posture of this case. A Rule 137 petition is part of the underlying action andnot a separate action, though it might be viewed as a "claim" which is separate from the main relief. Hager-Freeman v.Spircoff, 229 Ill. App. 3d 262, 273, 593 N.E.2d 821 (1992). Despite the labeling of the motions by TIC and Murray, theonly matter before the trial court was whether Rule 137 sanctions could properly be imposed under the facts of this case.We see no reason to limit our review to technical rules of pleading where it is clear the trial judge was basing his judgmenton the entire record.

When a party asks that Rule 137 sanctions be imposed, that party bears the burden of proof. Yassin v. Certified Grocers ofIllinois, 133 Ill. 2d 458, 467, 551 N.E.2d 1319 (1990). The party petitioning for sanctions must show the opposing partymade untrue and false allegations without reasonable cause. In re Estate of Wernick, 127 Ill. 2d 61, 77, 535 N.E.2d 876(1989). The trial court must then decide whether the allegations in the underlying complaint were warranted by existing lawor a good-faith argument for a change in existing law, or whether the allegations were merely meant to harrass or undulydelay the proceedings. Casey v. Jerry Yusim Nissan, 296 Ill. App. 3d 102, 107, 694 N.E.2d 206 (1998). The attorney'sconduct must be assessed by an objective standard; subjective good faith is not sufficient. Burrows v. Pick, 306 Ill. App. 3d1048, 1051, 715 N.E.2d 792 (1999).

The decision to grant or deny sanctions under Rule 137 is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, to beoverturned only when it appears from the record the court abused its discretion. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d460, 693 N.E.2d 358 (1998); Fischer v. Brombolich, 246 Ill. App. 3d 660, 664, 616 N.E.2d 743 (1993). A trial court'sdetermination is afforded considerable deference, but it does not preclude a reviewing court from independently reviewingthe record and finding an abuse of discretion if the facts warrant. Pritzker v. Drake Tower Apartments, Inc., 283 Ill. App. 3d587, 670 N.E.2d 328 (1996).

A trial court abuses its discretion when its finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence (In re Estate of J.M., 287Ill. App. 3d 110, 678 N.E.2d 15 (1997), or if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by it (Fremarek v. JohnHancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 651 N.E.2d 601 (1995)).

Because Rule 137 is penal in nature, it must be strictly construed, with each element of a violation specifically proved. In reEstate of J.M., 287 Ill. App. 3d 110, 116, 678 N.E.2d 15 (1997). When reviewing a decision on a motion for sanctions, theprimary consideration is whether the trial court's decision was informed, based on valid reasoning, and follows logicallyfrom the facts. Thomas Hake Enterprises, Inc. v. Betk, 301 Ill. App. 3d 176, 182, 703 N.E.2d 114 (1999).

The allegations of sanctionable conduct we are asked to review were first presented in defendants' petition for sanctions onApril 20, 1994. They are as follows: (1) false pleading -- TIC alleged AMT had entered into a written lease when no writtenlease existed; (2) false pleading -- TIC and Murray falsely pled in the Second Amended Complaint, filed on January 14,1994, that AMT was given a 30-day notice to vacate premises pursuant to section 9-207 (735 ILCS 5/9-207 (West 1992)),when they knew the letter notice dated December 1, 1993, was not delivered until December 2, 1993, and, consequently,there was no jurisdiction; (3) no reasonable inquiry into facts or existing law -- by filing suit against Pickelsimer andCannon instead of the AMT corporation and by relying on personal guarantees, Murray failed to make a reasonable inquiryinto the facts and the law concerning forcible entry and detainer actions; and (4) misrepresentation -- an account ledger(referred to as the "AMT ledger") which was submitted as an exhibit to show the amount of rent owed by AMT, was not abusiness record kept in the normal course of business, but, instead, an accounting prepared by Murray which mis-allocatedpayments to support TIC's claim that back rent was owed.

After reviewing the many volumes of record, we conclude only one of these allegations merits our consideration -- theallegation that Murray averred in the second amended complaint that a 30-day notice to vacate had been given AMT inaccord with section 9-207 of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, knowing the notice was deficient because the December1, 1993, letter to vacate as of December 31, 1993, was not delivered until December 2, 1993.

Though both TIC and Murray deny their conduct was sanctionable, neither party attempts to offer a sensible reason forfiling this pleading when it was apparent the jurisdictional notice was deficient. Murray had to know, or should haveknown, that a notice to vacate on the 31^st day of the month delivered on the 2^nd day of the month does not afford thenecessary 30-days notice and, consequently, fails to furnish the court with jurisdiction.

The closest thing we could find to an explanation was Murray's affidavit, filed June 13, 1994, in opposition to the petitionfor sanctions. In this affidavit Murray stated the allegation in the second amended complaint that notice had been given "onor about December 1, 1993," was not a deliberate attempt to deceive or mislead the court, but "an error occasioned byinadvertence or editing oversight." He also said it was clear he was not trying to mislead the court since Currie's affidavit,submitted in opposition to AMT's motion to dismiss, clearly showed notice was delivered on December 2, 1993.

Though it may be true that, subjectively, TIC and Murray did not act in bad faith, the standard by which a court mustmeasure an attorney's conduct is an objective one. It is of little consequence "that an attorney 'honestly believed' his or hercase was well grounded in fact or law." Fremarek v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d at 1074. Thus, itseems clear that count II of the second amended complaint was a false or erroneous pleading. The question remains,however, whether sanctions should be awarded due to the filing of this pleading. The trial court, when deciding to deny thepetition for sanctions, did not address each allegation of misconduct individually to determine whether defendants had mettheir burden of proving false pleadings or misrepresentations. Instead, the court spoke in generalities about whethersanctions were warranted.

On June 17, 1998, the trial court said: