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FIFTH DIVISION
June 15, 2001

Frankie Swoope (Frankie) appeals from an order of the circuitcourt which, on administrative review, affirmed the decision of theRetirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of theCity of Chicago (Board) denying her a widow's compensation annuityunder section 5-144 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/5-144 (West 1998)). She argues that the Board's decision was againstthe manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law. Frankie didreceive a widow's annuity of $1,223.70 a month and now argues that sheis entitled to interest, pursuant to section 2 of the Interest Act(815 ILCS 205/2 (West 1998)), on the difference between the annuityawarded to her and the widow's compensation annuity to which she isentitled. For the following reasons, we affirm and remand to theBoard with directions.

The facts are undisputed. Thomas Swoope (Thomas) was a Chicagopolice officer, appointed on February 1, 1983. On April 24, 1990,Thomas was injured in a car accident when he swerved to avoid apedestrian while responding to a call of a disturbance in the area. He sustained cervical injuries with complaints of neck pain andheadaches. After the accident, Thomas applied for duty disabilitybenefits. The Board denied his claim, finding that his injuries werenot the result of the performance of an act of duty and awarded himonly ordinary disability benefits. On administrative review, thecircuit court reversed the finding of the Board, found that Thomas wason duty when the accident occurred, and remanded the case back to theBoard for an award of duty disability. Once he received dutydisability benefits, Thomas was examined several times by a Boardphysician, pursuant to section 5-156 of the Code, to determine thestatus of his disability and whether he could return to work. 40 ILCS5/5-156 (West 1998). Thomas did not return to work as a policemanafter the accident and continued to receive duty disability paymentsuntil his death from a heart attack on March 5, 1998.

After Thomas' death, Frankie received a widow's annuity of$1,223.70 per month and death benefits of $10,400. Frankie thenapplied for a widow's compensation annuity pursuant to section 5-144of the Code, which would entitle her to $3,276.75 a month and anadditional $1,600 in death benefits. 40 ILCS 5/5-144 (West 1998). The Board held an evidentiary hearing on her request for acompensation annuity where it considered several medical reportsregarding Thomas' disability and his death certificate along withFrankie's testimony. These doctor's reports, from November 1991through June 1996, found Thomas to have headaches, neck pain, anddegenerative disc disease in his spine, aggravated by arthritis. Thereports described him as disabled and "unable to perform unrestrictedpolice duty." The last report in June 1996 found his conditionunchanged, meaning that he remained disabled and was unable to performthe duties for which he had been originally hired by the policedepartment. Frankie testified at the hearing that she was Thomas'widow, they had one daughter and lived in Chicago at the time ofThomas' death. She did not offer medical testimony or evidenceconcerning Thomas' physical condition or ability to return to workafter June 1996.

In its decision, the Board stated that "[t]he Board is aware,many officers who after receiving a disability benefit for anextensive period have ultimately returned to work with the [ChicagoPolice Department]." The Board found that Frankie had the burden ofproof under section 5-144 to establish her entitlement to a widow'scompensation annuity and she failed to meet that burden. The Boardthen denied Frankie a widow's compensation annuity. Frankie filed apetition for administrative review in the circuit court. After ahearing, the circuit court affirmed the Board's decision. Frankiethen filed this timely appeal.

An administrative agency's findings of fact are deemed primafacie true and correct. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State LaborRelations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 204, 692 N.E.2d 295, 302 (1998); 735ILCS 5/3-110 (West 1998). Determinations as to weight of the evidenceand credibility of witnesses are matters left to the agency and willnot be disturbed on review unless they are against the manifest weightof the evidence. Terrano v. Retirement Board of the Policemen'sAnnuity & Benefit Fund, 315 Ill. App. 3d 270, 274, 733 N.E.2d 905, 908(2000). A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidenceonly if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Abrahamson v.Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88,606 N.E.2d 1111, 1117 (1992). If the record contains any evidence tosupport the agency's decision, it should be affirmed. Abrahamson, 153Ill. 2d at 88, 606 N.E.2d at 1117.

An administrative agency's conclusions of law, however, areafforded less deference and are reviewed on a de novo basis. City ofBelvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205, 692 N.E.2d at 302. When the agency'sdetermination involves a mixed question of fact and law, theapplicable standard of review is the clearly erroneous standard, whichfalls between a manifest weight of the evidence standard and de novoreview, so as to give some deference to the agency's experience andexpertise. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205, 692 N.E.2d at 302. An agency is presumed to make informed judgments based on itsexperience and expertise and, thus, substantial deference is given toits interpretation of a statute. Stillo v. State Retirement Systems,305 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1007, 714 N.E.2d 11, 14-15 (1999). We reviewthe administrative agency's decision, not the decision of the circuitcourt. Waliczek v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity &Benefit Fund, 318 Ill. App. 3d 32, 35, 741 N.E.2d 272, 275 (2000).

Frankie first argues that the Board's decision was against themanifest weight of the evidence and its interpretation of the statuteat issue was contrary to law. The statute governing widow'scompensation and supplemental annuities details the amount and lengthof these annuities and also states: "(c) Neither compensation norsupplemental annuity shall be paid unless the death of the policemanwas a direct result of the injury [occurring in the performance of anact of duty], or the injury was of such character as to prevent himfrom subsequently resuming service as a policeman ***." 40 ILCS 5/5-144(c) (West 1998).

Both parties agree that Frankie must establish either of the twoconditions listed in section 5-144(c) in order to receive acompensation annuity. Further, it is undisputed that Thomas' deathwas not a direct result of the injury he sustained in the performanceof an act of duty. The dispute, therefore, involves theinterpretation of the second phrase, "the injury was of such characteras to prevent him from subsequently resuming service as a policeman." Neither party has cited, nor could we find, any cases addressing thisexact issue.

Frankie argues that, when a police officer dies while receivingduty disability benefits and has not returned to work since theinjury, the widow is automatically entitled to a compensation annuity. In that situation, Frankie contends, the fact that the police officerwas disabled at the time of his death proves that his injuries were ofsuch a character as to prevent him from subsequently resuming serviceas a policeman. She asserts that the widow's burden of proof as tosection 5-144(c) is automatically satisfied when the officer dieswhile receiving disability benefits.

The Board responds that Frankie's interpretation would render theterm "subsequently" meaningless and lead to an absurd result. Therefore, the Board interprets the phrase to mean that, when anofficer's death is from an injury other than that received in theperformance of an act of duty, the widow must show that, absent death,the officer would not have been able to subsequently resume service asa police officer.

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain andeffectuate the legislature's intent. Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455,466, 739 N.E.2d 521, 527 (2000). The best evidence of legislativeintent is the language in the statute itself, which must be given itsplain and ordinary meaning. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d at 466, 739 N.E.2d at527. To do so, words and phrases should not be construed inisolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevantprovisions of the statute. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County ofCook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504, 732 N.E.2d 528, 535 (2000). See alsoGlynn v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund,263 Ill. App. 3d 590, 593, 635 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1994).

In interpreting section 5-144(c), we first construe that sectionwithin the context of the other provisions in the Code. At least 17provisions exclusively concern the determination and amount of widows'annuities based on age, length of service or retirement of theofficer, etc. Through these provisions, the Code specificallyprovides for, and intends to benefit, widows. 40 ILCS 5/5-101 (West1998). Section 5-144 is entitled, in part, "[d]eath from injury inthe performance of acts of duty" and creates additional annuities,compensation and supplemental, for widows of officers seriouslyinjured or killed in the line of duty. 40 ILCS 5/5-144 (West 1998). This section is intended to provide extra compensation, above theregular annuity determined in the previous sections, to this selectgroup of widows.

Moreover, section 5-144(a) specifically refers to widows ofpolicemen whose death "results from injury incurred in the performanceof an act or acts of duty" and those whose death "occurs *** due toinjury incurred in the performance of an act of duty." 40 ILCS 5-144(a) (West 1998). From the title and the language in section 5-144(a), we find that the legislature clearly intended only widowswhose husbands died as a direct result of injuries sustained in theperformance of acts of duty to benefit from compensation andsupplemental annuities. Section 5-144(c), then, is a narrow expansionof this section, allowing widows of officers whose injuries were ofsuch character as to prevent them from subsequently resuming serviceas policemen to also receive this extra compensation.

When interpreting the phrase at issue, we look to the plain andordinary meaning of the terms. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d at 466, 739 N.E.2dat 527. The plain and ordinary meaning of the term "subsequently" is"following in time: coming or being later than something else." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2278 (1986). Thus, theprovision refers to an injury incurred in the performance of an act ofduty which prevents the officer from resuming service as a policemansubsequent to, or following, that injury. If, at anytime after theinjury, the officer can or could possibly resume his duties as apoliceman, his widow is excluded from receiving compensation orsupplemental annuities. Because the statute does not define an endingpoint to this time period, we interpret the phrase to mean that theinjury was so severe, and of such a character, as to prevent theofficer from ever resuming service as a policeman. Thus, it is theofficer's injury, and not his death, which establishes whether theofficer would be able to subsequently, and at some point, resume hisduties with the police department. We therefore reject Frankie'sinterpretation of the statute.⁽¹⁾

Therefore, we hold that, under the second condition of section 5-144(c), a widow must establish with medical evidence and testimonythat her husband's injury, but for his death, would have prevented himfrom subsequently, or ever, resuming service with the policedepartment. We remand this case to the Board to allow Frankie anevidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's orderaffirming the Board's decision, but remand this case to the Board.

Affirmed and remanded with directions.

QUINN, P.J., and GREIMAN, J., concur.

1. While Frankie further argues that this case is similarto a previous case before the Board concerning another widow, we have noinformation in the record regarding that case and therefore cannot addressFrankie's argument.