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FIRST DIVISION
May 10, 2004

The plaintiffs, a group of taxpayers, contend that CookCounty violated the Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS 200/1-1 etseq. (West 2000)) by transferring to the City of Chicago, for nocash, properties the County acquired through no-cash bids inscavenger sales. The trial court held that the plaintiffs lackedstanding to raise the claims stated in the complaint. Plaintiffsappeal. We affirm because we find that plaintiffs have notstated facts showing any violation of the Code.

In their four-count amended complaint, filed in April 2001, plaintiffs Lucius Swilley and 12 other named individuals allegethat they are "taxpayers and members of African-American andother minority groups residing in the city of Chicago." GenevaBell and seven other named individual plaintiffs allege thattheir property "has been taken or is [in] jeopardy of being takenpursuant to the unlawful no-cash bid program." The individual plaintiffs and two not-for-profit corporations, also plaintiffs,allege that the city asked the county to file no-cash bids formore than 5,000 properties offered for sale at the tax scavengersales held in 1997 and 1999. The county acquired the propertiesand transferred them to the city for no monetary consideration. Plaintiffs allege that the transfer violated the Code. Accordingto the complaint, the properties acquired by no-cash bids "arepredominantly located in minority communities, and *** thedelinquent taxpayers, occupants or persons interested therein arepredominantly black, Hispanic and other disadvantagedminorities." The complaint further alleges that "thepreponderance of contractors who provide services to and obtaincompensation from the City for implementation of the no-cash bidprogram are white."

In count I plaintiffs seek to enjoin the county from theallegedly illegal practice of acquiring properties through no-cash bids and transferring them to the city for no cash. Incount II Bell and other plaintiffs who own property request justcompensation from the defendants for their properties if the cityacquires them through the illegal program involving no-cash bids. All plaintiffs allege in count III that the illegal program forno-cash bids has disparate impact upon racial minorities, therebyviolating regulations of the Department of Housing and UrbanDevelopment. Finally, plaintiffs allege in count IV that theillegal program confers benefits on white contractors, and thebenefits prove that the city and the county intend racialdiscrimination.

Defendants moved to dismiss counts III and IV assubstantially insufficient and because plaintiffs lackedstanding. Plaintiffs initially moved to dismiss counts III andIV voluntarily, but withdrew that motion when defendants opposedit. Plaintiffs explained in their response to the motion todismiss:

"Counts 3 and 4, the race discrimination counts, relyon the same factual and legal allegations as counts 1and 2, that defendants' actions violate the Tax Code,and allege further that defendants' scheme is raciallydiscriminatory.

Since the racial discrimination counts (3 and 4)derive from the alleged illegality of defendants'actions as the complaint is presently drawn, plaintiffs' ability to proceed with the discriminationcounts depends on whether they have standing to proceedwith the counts (1 and 2) charging statutoryviolations. Recognizing that fact, plaintiffs chose todismiss voluntarily counts 3 and 4, the racediscrimination counts, with the intention of re-filingthem should there be a favorable resolution, at thetrial or appellate level, of the threshold standing andstatutory violation issues raised by counts 1 and 2."

Defendants also moved to dismiss the entire complaintbecause plaintiffs lacked standing. The court dismissed countsI, III and IV with prejudice, but gave plaintiffs leave toreplead count II. Plaintiffs elected to stand on the complaint. The court then dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

Because the court dismissed the complaint on the pleadings,we review the judgment de novo. Malanowski v. Jabamoni, 293 Ill.App. 3d 720, 725-26 (1997). We must determine whether theallegations of the complaint, interpreted in the light mostfavorable to plaintiffs, suffice to establish a cause of action. Ward v. Mid-American Energy Co., 313 Ill. App. 3d 258, 260(2000). Even if the trial court reasoned erroneously, this courtmay affirm the judgment on any basis supported by the record. Rome v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 81 Ill. App. 3d 776, 779 (1980). For purposes of this appeal we assume that plaintiffs havestanding to raise the claim that the county violated the Code.

Plaintiffs base their complaint on the central claim thatthe county violates sections 21-90 and 21-260 of the Code (35ILCS 200/21-90, 21-260 (West 2000)) by making no-cash bids forproperties at the city's behest, and by transferring theproperties so acquired to the city for no monetary consideration. Section 21-90 provides:

"When any property is delinquent, or is forfeitedfor each of 2 or more years, and is offered for saleunder any of the provisions of this Code, the CountyBoard of the County in which the property is located,in its discretion, may bid, or, in the case offorfeited property, may apply to purchase it, in thename of the County as trustee for all taxing districtshaving an interest in the property's taxes or specialassessments for the nonpayment of which the property issold. *** The County shall apply on the bid or purchasethe unpaid taxes and special assessments due upon theproperty. No cash need be paid. The County shall takeall steps necessary to acquire title to the propertyand may manage and operate the property. ***

The County may sell or assign the property soacquired, or the certificate of purchase to it, to anyparty, including taxing districts. The proceeds of thatsale or assignment, less all costs of the countyincurred in the acquisition and sale or assignment ofthe property, shall be distributed to the taxingdistricts in proportion to their respective intereststherein." 35 ILCS 200/21-90 (West 2000).

Plaintiffs argue that the transfers to the city leave no moneyfor distribution to other taxing districts, like the ChicagoBoard of Education and the Cook County Forest Preserve District,and those taxing districts needed to impose higher taxes on plaintiffs to compensate for the revenue lost. In their openingbrief plaintiffs argue that under the statute the county, astrustee for the taxing districts, must obtain cash considerationsufficient to cover costs and allow for some distribution to thetaxing districts.

The Code expressly gives the county the option of eitherselling or assigning the property, and the city, as a taxingdistrict, is expressly made a possible assignee. If we construethe statute to require a sale, the provision for assignmentappears to be superfluous. We must construe statutes, wherepossible, to make every term meaningful. Eads v. HeritageEnterprises, Inc., 204 Ill. 2d 92, 105 (2003). The statute doesnot mandate any sale. Weitzman v. Cook County, 133 Ill. App. 3d1013, 1017 (1985). The statute requires only apportionment ofamounts received, if the county receives any amount for theproperties acquired by no-cash bids. Weitzman, 133 Ill. App. 3dat 1017. Section 21-90 expressly authorizes the no-cash bids andthe assignments to the city alleged in the complaint. Thecomplaint does not state a cause of action for violation ofsection 21-90.

Section 21-260 of the Code provides that when a propertyowner fails to pay property taxes for two or more years (see 35ILCS 200/21-145 (West 2000)), the County Collector shall sell theproperty at a scavenger sale to the highest bidder, even if thebid is less than the full amount of taxes, penalties and costsdue on the property. Subsection g says:

"Any taxing district may bid at a scavenger sale.The county board of the county in which propertiesoffered for sale under this Section are located may bidas trustee for all taxing districts having an interestin the taxes for the nonpayment of which the parcelsare offered. The County shall apply on the bid theunpaid taxes due upon the property and no cash need bepaid. The County or other taxing district acquiring atax sale certificate shall take all steps necessary toacquire title to the property and may manage andoperate the property so acquired.

*** The County may sell the properties soacquired, or the certificate of purchase thereto, andthe proceeds of the sale shall be distributed to thetaxing districts in proportion to their respectiveinterests therein." 35 ILCS 200/21-260(g) (West 2000).

Plaintiffs, in their reply brief, raise the novel argumentthat this section restricts the options available to the county. While section 21-90 expressly grants the county the power toassign properties to taxing districts, section 21-260 does notmention assignment. The county may manage and operate theproperties, or the county may sell the properties, under theexpress terms of section 21-260. Plaintiffs ask this court toinfer from the failure to mention assignment that the legislatureintended to forbid assignment for no compensation of propertiesthe county acquires for no-cash bids at scavenger sales.

Plaintiffs' construction of the statute conflicts with theexplicit language of section 21-90. That section establishesthat it applies to any "sale under any of the provisions of thisCode." 35 ILCS 200/21-90 (West 2000). The scavenger saleprovisions in section 21-260 remain in the Code. Under section21-90 the county has the power to make no-cash bids at any taxsale, including scavenger tax sales, and "The County may sell orassign the property so acquired *** to any party, includingtaxing districts." 35 ILCS 200/21-90 (West 2000). Nothing insection 21-260 removes the power expressly granted in section 21-90 or in any other way conflicts with the provision allowingassignment of properties to taxing districts, including the city.

Moreover, plaintiffs' interpretation of section 21-260disserves the purposes of that section. The tax scavenger saleprovisions of section 21-260 apply only to properties "at risk offorfeiture to the State as a result of nonpayment of propertytaxes." People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 60 (1994). Usuallytaxing bodies recover unpaid taxes through the annual tax saleconducted under procedures set forth in sections 21-190 through21-255 of the Code. 35 ILCS 200/21-190 through 21-255 (West2000); People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 75 Ill. 2d 479, 486(1979). But many properties fail to attract bidders at theannual sale, especially when the outstanding tax bills for theproperties exceed their market prices. Chicago Title, 75 Ill. 2dat 486-87; People ex rel. Larson v. Rosewell, 88 Ill. App. 3d272, 274 (1980). For these properties our legislature allowedmore drastic measures to return the properties to the active taxrolls. In re Application of Rosewell, 97 Ill. 2d 434, 442-43(1983) (Levin). The collector may sell these properties for lessthan the amount of unpaid taxes and extinguish the tax liens tofacilitate restoration of the properties. Levin, 97 Ill. 2d at 443.

The legislature also accommodated the possibility that anassignment of property for no cash might benefit the public morethan a sale. In re Application of Rosewell, 236 Ill. App. 3d 473(1992) (Koktapeh), involved such a situation. In that case aneighborhood redevelopment group proposed to build a culturalcomplex on a property delinquent in taxes. Although the cityapproved the planned development, the county treasurer sold theproperty to a private individual at a scavenger tax sale. Thetreasurer and the purchaser moved for confirmation of the sale. The city and the neighborhood redevelopment group intervened andopposed the sale. The trial court ordered the treasurer torefund the purchase price to the purchaser so the city couldacquire the property through the no-cash bid procedure, forassignment to the redevelopment group. This court affirmed thetrial court's decision, noting that the "plans for redevelopmentof the property at issue promise not only a higher tax base andthus increased revenue for the city, but also 700 new jobs." Koktapeh, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 478.

The legislature granted the county the power to acquireproperty through no-cash bids especially "to clean up a hopelessand difficult tax delinquency situation and place taxableproperty on the tax rolls again." Dupuy v. Morse, 337 Ill. App.1, 6 (1949). The statute expressly allows the county theflexibility to decide, in its discretion, whether to sell theproperty, or to assign the property to a private party (like theredevelopment group in Koktapeh, 236 Ill. App. 3d 473), or toassign the property to a taxing district, or to retain and managethe property. Under plaintiffs' construction of the statute, theproperties most desperately in need of drastic measures, theproperties available at scavenger sales, would not benefit fromthe flexibility the legislature granted the county. Thestatutory language and purposes do not permit the construction plaintiffs ask us to impose on it. The power of assignmentgranted in section 21-90 applies to all properties the countyacquires under the Code, especially those not sold through theusual tax sales, which are the properties available at scavengertax sales. The actions described in the complaint do not violatesection 21-260 of the Code.

We agree with plaintiffs that counts III and IV of thecomplaint depend on their allegation that the county violated theCode by making no-cash bids and subsequently transferringproperties to the city for no cash. Because we find that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of the Code incounts I and II, we also affirm dismissal of counts III and IV.

Section 21-90 of the Code applies to all sales under theCode, including scavenger tax sales. That section permits thecounty to acquire property at tax sales for no-cash bids, and toassign the properties, for no cash consideration, to taxingdistricts, including the city. Because the no-cash bid programdescribed in the complaint does not violate the Code, thecomplaint fails to state a cause of action. Accordingly, weaffirm the trial court's decision to dismiss the complaint.

Affirmed.

GORDON and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.