Find Legal Information

PRESIDING JUSTICE COUSINS delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal concerns a medical malpractice action brought on behalf ofplaintiff, Diana Suttle, a minor, by and through the Central Trust Bank. Therein, plaintiff sought recovery from defendant, Lake Forest Hospital, forsevere and permanent damages allegedly sustained at or around the time of herbirth due to the negligence of hospital personnel. Following trial, a juryreturned a general verdict in plaintiff's favor and awarded damages in theamount of $10,944,000. The award was subsequently reduced nunc pro tunc to$9,644,000 as a result of a settlement agreement entered into between plaintiffand prior defendants. Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment nonobstante veredicto (n.o.v.) upon defendant's posttrial motion, finding thatplaintiff failed to prove the existence of proximate cause as to any of hercounts alleging negligence. The trial court further granted defendant'salternate motion for a new trial, finding that unfair prejudice would justify anew trial in the event this court reversed, set aside or vacated theaforementioned ruling. Plaintiff appeals, contending that the trial courterred: (1) in entering judgment n.o.v. in favor of the defendant hospital; and(2) in finding reversible prejudicial error that would, in the alternative,compel a new trial on liability and damages. Defendant, in its "conditional"cross-appeal, contends that if the trial court had not properly enteredjudgment n.o.v., or, in the alternative, ordered a new trial, a remittitur ofthe judgment would be compelled.

For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court and reinstate thejudgment for plaintiff.

BACKGROUND

Cynthia Suttle was admitted as a patient to Lake Forest Hospital for thebirth of her first baby on August 28, 1986. Ms. Suttle's obstetrician, Dr.Anthony Greis, examined Ms. Suttle at or around 9:17 a.m., observing bright redvaginal bleeding. He immediately ordered a cesarean section, as he knew thatthere was fetal distress and he suspected that Ms. Suttle was bleeding as aresult of a placental abruption, which is the premature detachment of anormally situated placenta. At or around 9:35 a.m., Diana Suttle was born. After delivery, Dr. Greis removed the placenta and looked at it for an inherentblood clot and evidence of abruption. Finding neither, he sent the placenta tothe hospital's pathology laboratory for analysis without giving a descriptionof the placenta to any hospital personnel.

The pathology report, which was reduced to typewritten form and placed inDiana's medical record two days after her birth, showed that there was avelamentous insertion of the umbilical cord into the placenta; meaning, theumbilical cord had inserted itself into the membranes of the placenta ratherthan directly into the placenta itself. The report further indicated thatthere had been a fetal bleed, or rupture, of one of the blood vessels involvedin the velamentously inserted umbilical cord. There was no indication of anabruption or any other abnormalities of the placenta; therefore, thepathologist indicated it was reasonable to conclude that the vaginal bleedingobserved by Dr. Greis prior to Diana's birth was Diana's blood, as opposed toMs. Suttle's.

Pediatrician Dr. Edwin Salter and nurse Kimberly Mills provided theinitial treatment to Diana in the operating room after her birth. Neither wasaware of the abnormality of the placenta. Diana's Apgar scores were normal,but since she was having continued difficulty breathing, at or around 9:45 a.m.nurse Mills took Diana to the hospital's intermediate, or level 2, perinatalcare nursery for diagnosis and continued treatment. Dr. Salter consulted withtransport team personnel at Evanston Hospital's intensive, or level 3,perinatal care nursery and gave the transport team all of the information hehad available to him concerning Diana, who was diagnosed as suffering fromrespiratory distress syndrome.

Dr. Salter called Evanston Hospital to request a transfer for Dianasometime between 10:40 a.m. and 11 a.m. Evanston Hospital's transport teamarrived between 1:30 p.m. and 1:45 p.m. At no time prior to the transportteam's arrival was a blood pressure for Diana ordered or taken. Rather, thetransport team first took Diana's blood pressure after arriving to Lake ForestHospital, finding it to be below normal. As a result of Diana's blood pressurereadings, the transport team immediately started a blood transfusion.

Diana was transported to Evanston Hospital's level 3 nursery, where sheremained until September 16, 1986. While at Evanston Hospital, Diana wastreated for circulatory, liver and kidney problems resulting from thesubstantial blood loss that occurred before her delivery and until the firstblood transfusion. The nursery personnel at Evanston Hospital further notedthat Diana exhibited problems with her tone, sucking reflex and lack of headcircumference growth.

Plaintiff filed her original medical malpractice action on January 3,1989. The initial complaint was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff after thecircuit court of Cook County transferred the action to Lake County. Plaintiffthen refiled her action in Cook County on July 6, 1990. The circuit court ofCook County granted motions for summary judgment as to the refiled action onFebruary 24, 1997, as a settlement agreement had been entered into betweenplaintiff and the named defendants, except Lake Forest Hospital. Plaintifffiled her second amended complaint on October 29, 1996, against the hospitalonly. The allegations of that complaint were repeated in a reordered thirdamended complaint filed on March 25, 1997. It is this third amended complaintfrom which the present action arises.

The two-count third amended complaint alleged that, at the time of herbirth, Diana was suffering from hypovolemic shock caused by a reduction involume of blood that was neither diagnosed nor treated by Diana's treatingphysician or the nurses at Lake Forest Hospital. More specifically, count Ialleged that, because the hospital failed to record a description of Diana'splacenta in her medical chart in violation of section 250.1830(h)(2)(B) of theIllinois Administrative Code (77 Ill. Adm. Code