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Plaintiff William J. Sullivan (Sullivan) brought suit against the defendants, the Board ofCommissioners of the Oak Lawn Park District (Park District) and its officers. Sullivan protestedthe use of funds collected by the Park District under a museum tax levy and sought the refund ofthe part of his real estate tax that was used for the tax levy; however, he did not protest the tax. Sullivan then brought a motion for class certification seeking to represent all similarly situatedtaxpayers in Oak Lawn. In denying this motion, the trial court found that Sullivan was aninadequate representative. The Park District then brought a motion for summary judgment whichthe trial court granted. Ultimately, it found that plaintiff failed to protest the use of the funds andthat he was guilty of laches. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

This action focuses on the imposition and collection of a tax from plaintiff Sullivan bythe defendant Park District. From 1977 until the present day, the Park District has imposed a taxon the bills sent to plaintiff in the amount of .03% of the assessed valuation of the property. Theauthority upon which defendants rely in imposing this tax is the Park District Aquarium andMuseum Act (Act) (70 ILCS 1290/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)), which provides in pertinent part:

"The corporate authorities of cities and park districts having the control orsupervision of any public park or parks, are hereby authorized to * * * permit thedirectors or trustees of any corporation or society organized for the construction ormaintenance and operation of an aquarium or museum as hereinabove describedto erect, enlarge, ornament, build, rebuild, rehabilitate, improve, maintain andoperate its aquarium or museum or museums within any public park now orhereafter under the control or supervision of any city or park district * * *."

70 ILCS 1290/1 (West 1998).

Furthermore, the Act allows for levies for the purposes limited solely to establishing, acquiring,completing, erecting, rehabilitating, improving, operating, maintaining and caring for suchaquariums and museums and the building and grounds thereof. Any funds collected pursuant tothe levy are required to be kept separate from the general operating funds of the district andvillage. 70 ILCS 1290/2 (West 1998).

Sullivan testified that in approximately 1980 he began to suspect that the funds beingcollected under the Park District levy were not being properly used and that they were beingspent for purposes other than those for which the Act provides. In addition, Sullivan claims thathe began to question the validity of the tax levy at board meetings with Park District counsel andwas always reassured that the tax was validly imposed and that the Park District needed toaccumulate money to buy a museum building.

During the time frame of this litigation, Sullivan held various positions, including a timewhere he was president of the Oak Lawn Historical Society--an Illinois nonprofit organization. The Historical Society is not a museum, and plaintiff claims that it is not affiliated with OakLawn or the Park District in any manner. Occasionally, the Historical Society was hired by theVillage of Oak Lawn to assist in community activities and to perform some work for the ParkDistrict. At one point, the Historical Society prepared a feasibility study on the possible use ofschools as museums. However, plaintiff asserts that at no time did he ever receive any paymentdirectly from nor did he ever bill the Park District. All of Sullivan's salary and expense paymentscame from the Historical Society, which at one time amounted to approximately 20% of hisincome. Although the Historical Society did receive some donations, the majority of its fundscame from the Park District.

Defendants note that after the plaintiff prepared the feasibility studies on the use of twodifferent schools as possible museum sites and authoring various memoranda regarding siteselection and budget framework, he concluded that the Clark grammar school could be used as amuseum. Plaintiff also performed other tasks for the Park District on behalf of the HistoricalSociety. This included preparing the history of the Park District, working on the WabashCentennial Project, and working on the old-fashioned Christmas program. At one point,plaintiff admitted that he had received funds from the Park District's museum fund and that heagreed to assist the Park District with its plans concerning a museum.

Plaintiff also testified that the money paid to the Historical Society from the Park Districtwas deposited in the operating account of the Historical Society. And, when plaintiff was askedwhether there were records reflecting the exact amount of money he received from the ParkDistrict and from any other sources, he replied, "I hope so." However, plaintiff never retrievedthe records.

In May of 1994, Sullivan brought this action seeking various forms of relief. He allegedthat no museum was created pursuant to the Act and the funds for the levy were not beingproperly spent. Initially, he sought an injunction that would stop the Park District fromimproperly using the funds as well as return the funds already improperly used. Defendants fileda motion to dismiss and alleged that they had a museum and that plaintiff's claims were barred bythe "voluntary payment doctrine." Defendants' motion was denied.

On May 26, 1998, plaintiff filed his motion for class certification. The trial court heardvarious discovery-related motions pertaining to this class certification and entered and continuedthe motion for class certification. During this phase of the litigation, the cause was transferred toanother judge, who completed the class certification discovery. Plaintiff notes, in particular, thathe filed a motion to strike conclusory affidavits which defendants offered in opposition of classcertification. The newly assigned judge denied the motion and held a hearing on classcertification on July 21, 1999.

At the hearing, defendants opposed class certification and argued that plaintiff's claimwas barred by the voluntary payment doctrine and that plaintiff was an inadequate representativebecause the Historical Society did, in fact, work for the Park District. The trial court denied themotion for class certification, reasoning that plaintiff had waited to long to bring it and that hewas "guilty of laches, and therefore, an inadequate individual to represent the class."

Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that the voluntarypayment doctrine and laches barred plaintiff's claim. Defendants did not, however, contest thePark District's inappropriate use of the museum funds, nor did they argue that a properly createdmuseum or aquarium had been created. On September 15, 1999, the trial court conducted ahearing on the summary judgment motion and held that all of plaintiff's claims were barred bylaches and his failure to protest when he made his payments of his property tax bills. Plaintiffnow appeals.

As this court noted in Abrams v. State Farm Fire & Casualty. Co., 306 Ill. App. 3d 545,548 (1999), our review of the trial court's decision is de novo:

"Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions,admissions, and affidavits, when taken together and in the light most favorable tothe nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that themovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2--1005(c) (West1996); Majca v. Beekil, 183 Ill. 2d 407, 416, 701 N.E.2d 1084 (1998). We reviewthe trial court's granting of a summary judgment de novo. In re Estate of Rennick,181 Ill. 2d 395, 401, 692 N.E.2d 1150 (1998)."

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the pleadings, depositions,and affidavits strictly against the movant and in favor of the opposing party. Dowd & Dowd,Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 483 (1998). Where reasonable persons could draw divergentinferences from the undisputed material facts or where reasonable minds could differ as to amaterial fact, summary judgment should be denied and the issue decided by the trier of fact. Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 114 (1995).

We are mindful that a trial court's ruling on a class certification issue will not bedisturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Brown v. Murphy, 278 Ill. App. 3d 981, 990 (1996);Purcell & Wardrope Chartered v. Hertz Corp., 175 Ill. App. 3d 1069, 1074 (1988). However, anappellate court may affirm a trial court's grant of summary judgment on any grounds thatproperly appear in the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied on them. InternationalInsurance Co. v. Rollprint Packaging Products, Inc., 312 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1007 (2000), citingArthur v. Lutheran General Hospital Inc., 295 Ill. App. 3d 818, 823 (1998). Because we affirmthe trial court's entry of summary judgment on the voluntary payment doctrine, we need notdiscuss the class certification and laches issues or effectuate their standards of review.

Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in applying the voluntary payment doctrine andin finding that plaintiff was required to protest his property tax payment where the purpose of thetax levy has failed. This court recently set out the essence of the voluntary payment doctrine inDreyfus v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 298 Ill. App. 3d 933, 938 (1998):

"Under the voluntary payment doctrine, 'money voluntarily paid under aclaim of right to the payment, and with knowledge of the facts by the personmaking the payment, cannot be recovered by the payor solely because the claimwas illegal.' Smith v. Prime Cable, 276 Ill. App. 3d 843, 847 (1995). A paymentis involuntary if (1) the payor lacked knowledge of the facts upon which to protestthe payment at the time of payment, or (2) the payor paid under duress. Getto v.City of Chicago, 86 Ill. 2d 39, 48-49 (1981). In other words, to negate theapplicability of the doctrine, plaintiff must 'not only show that the claim assertedwas unlawful but also that payment was not voluntary, that there was somenecessity which amounted to compulsion. [Citations.]' Smith, 276 Ill. App. 3d at848."

This court in Dreyfus also outlined what is required of a plaintiff to show that his payment wasmade under compulsion:

"[T]oday, the nature of the duress sufficient to establish compulsion hasbroadened and * * * recovery of a voluntary payment made under a claim of rightcan occur ' ' "[w]here a person, to prevent injury to himself, his business orproperty, is compelled to make payment of money which the party demanding hasno right to receive and no adequate opportunity is afforded the payor to effectivelyresist such demand." ' [Citations.] Protest may also serve as evidence ofcompulsion and an unwillingness to pay; however, it does not conclusivelyestablish compulsion where compulsion is disproved by other circumstances. Smith, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 849." Dreyfus, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 938.

While conceding the existence of the doctrine, plaintiff maintains that the use of it in the presentcase is improper given the character of the levy. Therefore, he asserts, no protest should berequired.

Plaintiff first argues that Illinois law provides different treatment for taxes levied forgeneral purposes and those designed for specific, special purposes. For this, he referencesBradford v. City of Chicago, 25 Ill. 349 (1861). In summarizing the trial court's reasoning in thatcase, the Illinois Supreme Court noted:

"The [trial] court then remarks upon the difference between taxes andassessments, the first being laid for ordinary revenue purposes, and assessmentsexclusively for benefits. In the case of assessments, the court says: the moneyraised by them is held in trust by the public, to be devoted to the particularpurpose of benefit intended. It does not become a part of the general revenue, andmay not be diverted from the improvement in view, and an injunction would lie ina proper case, to prevent a misapplication of the fund." (Emphasis in original.) Bradford, 411 Ill. at 351-52.

In other words, with regard to an assessment:

"The rule is established in England, that a plaintiff having paid his money forshares in a concern which never came into existence, or a scheme which wasabandoned before it was carried into execution, has paid it on a considerationwhich has failed, and may recover it back as money had and received to his use,unless he can be shown to have consented to, or acquiesced in the application ofthe money which the directors may have made. Nockels v. Crosby et al., 3Barnswall & Cresswell, 814; Kempson v. Sanders, 13 Eng. C. L. 321; Walstab v.Spotteswoode, 15 Meeson & Welsby, 515." Bradford, 25 Ill. at 360.

Plaintiff also cites similar language in Cohon v. Oscar L. Paris Co., 17 Ill. App. 2d 21 (1958). There, this court also summarized the trial court's reasoning in that case:

"'Even where a tax is legally levied and voluntarily paid, if the purpose of the taxfails or the object is lawfully abandoned, the money which is held in trust to bedevoted to the particular purpose may be recovered back in an action for moneyhad and received. Bradford v. City of Chicago, 25 Ill. 349.'" Cohon, 17 Ill. App.2d at 26.

Since plaintiff is questioning whether the purpose of the levy has been abandoned rather thanwhether the levy itself is proper, he argues that an action to recover the funds is appropriate andthat the voluntary payment doctrine, with all its trappings, is inapplicable. Consequently, becausedefendants offered no evidence to support the appropriate use of the levy or even the existence ofa museum, plaintiff argues that defendants' motion for summary judgment should have beendenied.

Defendants' response is to reiterate what is required of a plaintiff in Illinois if he choosesto challenge the propriety of a tax. Namely, defendants cite In re Rosewell, 236 Ill. App. 3d 165(1992), for setting forth the specific procedure:

"The requirements are essentially (1) the tax must be paid in full and underprotest; and (2) the taxpayer must appear and file an objection in the circuit courtat the time the collector makes application for a judgment." Rosewell, 236 Ill.App. 3d at 169-70.

Defendants then relate the statute which was in effect at the time plaintiff's cause of actionallegedly arose in 1980:

"