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                                     FIRST DIVISION
                                     December 5, 2005

No. 1-04-2094

JUSTICE GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff-appellant, Rosalind M. Stift, brought suit against defendant-appellee RosemaryLizzadro, for injuries from an automobile collision allegedly caused by Lizzadro's negligence. Lizzadro denied any negligence and alleged that Stift's injuries were caused by her ownnegligence. The case was tried before a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Stift andawarded $40,000 for pain and suffering, $0 for loss of normal life experienced, $0 for loss ofnormal life reasonably certain to be experienced in the future, $26,646.96 for medical expenses,and $0 for disfigurement. However, the jury also found that Stift was 35% contributorilynegligent and her award was decreased by that percentage. Stift raises three issues on appeal:whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit an instruction to the jury regarding future painand suffering, whether the trial court's denial of her motion for a new trial on the issue of damageswas an abuse of discretion, and whether the jury's determination that she was 35% at fault wasagainst the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. BACKGROUND

There is no dispute that on May 21, 2000, a collision between an automobile driven byStift and one driven by Lizzadro occurred in Oak Brook, Illinois. Stift was traveling east in theleft-most lane of the three eastbound lanes of 22nd Street near Jorie Boulevard. Lizzadro wastraveling north on Jorie Boulevard, turned right onto eastbound 22nd Street, and then crossedthrough the middle lane and into the left lane where the collision occurred.

At trial, Lizzadro testified that she came to a complete stop at a red light at theintersection of Jorie Boulevard and 22nd Street, that she looked left, did not see any oncomingtraffic, and then proceeded to make a right turn onto 22nd Street. She further stated that afterentering the right lane of 22nd Street she did not see any traffic and then crossed through thecenter lane and into the left lane. She then stated that she was going straight in the left lane whenshe heard and felt three successive impacts near the back of her car. Lizzadro then looked backand saw a car rolling over the median.

Stift testified that she was traveling in the left lane of 22nd Street, that as she approachedthe intersection with Jorie Boulevard the traffic light facing her was red and she took her foot offthe accelerator, that before she got to the intersection her light turned green, and that she thenbegan to accelerate through the intersection, reaching a speed of approximately 40 miles per hour. Stift further stated that she did not think Lizzadro stopped at the intersection of Jorie Boulevardand 22nd Street and that Lizzadro accelerated across two lanes into her lane. Stift also statedthat the rear left side of Lizzadro's car collided with the front of her car. Stift next testified thatshe did not apply her breaks until after the impact, when her car ran into the raised median andstarted to roll.

Officer Mark Kozlowski testified that he came upon the scene of the accident after seeingthe lights of Stift's car facing eastbound on westbound 22nd Street. He stated that there wasextensive damage to Stift's car and that there was damages to the rear and left corner side ofLizzadro's car. According to Kozlowski, he spoke with Lizzadro and she was unable to tell himthe color of the light on Jorie Boulevard before she turned onto 22nd Street. Officer Kozlowskifurther testified that he observed skid marks which he concluded to be from Stift's automobile inthe left lane of eastbound 22nd Street 20 to 40 feet east of the intersection running continuouslyfor 40 to 60 feet. He concluded that Lizzadro, as the northbound driver stopped on JorieBoulevard at the intersection with 22nd Street, could have seen 22nd Street to the left for morethan 100 feet. He also stated that the speed limit on 22nd Street is 40 miles per hour and that theintersection with Jorie Boulevard is on the crest of a small hill.

Mildred Mesi testified that she was a passenger in Lizzadro's car at the time of theaccident. She stated that she was seated in the back of the vehicle behind the driver's seat, andthat Lizzadro stopped at the red light at Jorie Boulevard before turning onto 22nd Street. Mesifurther stated that she looked to the left at the intersection and did not see any traffic coming fromthe west. Mesi next testified that after Lizzadro turned right onto 22nd Street and proceeded intothe left lane, she felt three "thumps" coming from the rear left of the automobile.

With regard to her injuries, Stift testified that she had no physical problems prior to theaccident and that she had previously participated in sports and exercise. She further stated thatshe immediately had pain in her neck and left shoulder after her car came to a stop following thecollision. She was brought to the emergency room by ambulance but was released the same day. Stift later saw Dr. Mawaha, who prescribed muscle relaxants that she said "really didn't help thatmuch."

Stift next saw Dr. Fortier at a rehabilitation clinic in Addison, Illinois, where she wasgiven hot and cold treatments, as well as chiropractic, massage, and other therapies. She statedthat she received no permanent relief from Dr. Fortier's treatments. Stift stopped seeing Dr.Fortier after three to four months.

Stift then testified that at the recommendation of her lawyer, she next saw Dr. Beatty withregard to her continuing pain. According to Stift, Dr. Beatty ran numerous tests on her includinga CT scan, multiple MRIs, a bone scan and a myelogram. Dr. Beatty performed surgery on amuscle in her neck on January 11, 2002. The surgery left a scar on her neck which was publishedto the jury. The scar is not described in the record or by the parties other than the fact that it ison her neck and is permanent. Stift did not testify that the scar bothered her in any way. Stifttestified that the surgery relieved some of her pain, but that she had "lots of tingling" around theincision and in her shoulder, and still had "back problems" when getting out of bed. Stift alsotestified as to her ongoing pain as of the date of the trial:

"I still get migraines. I still have a lot of back pain in my upper area anddepending on what kind of things I do, activities I have really depends on theamount of pain it is. My shoulder pain is gone. I don't have tingling that runsdown my arm anymore but a lot of neck pain and migraines."

Stift further stated that she avoided sports and exercise after the collision because she "ha[d]trouble doing them" and they "[didn't] agree with [her] back." Additionally, she stated that shehad difficulty taking deep breaths "here and there," and that she avoided "activities" that wouldforce her to take deep breaths. However, during Lizaddro's cross-examination of Stift, sheadmitted that she worked as a pool attendant during the summer of 2001, between the time of herfirst appointment with Dr. Beatty and the January 2002 surgery.

Dr. Beatty testified that he first saw Stift on May 10, 2001, and that she told him she hadmissed one day of work due to her injuries. He performed an examination and also reviewed Xrays and an MRI scan that Stift brought with her. Dr. Beatty stated that Stift had a straighteningof the normal curve of the neck which is usually caused by a muscle spasm. He also observed thatthe movements in her neck were painful. On May 15, 2001, Dr. Beatty directed Stift to undergofurther X rays, a CT scan and a myleogram. On June 5, 2001, Dr. Beatty had Stift submit to anadditional MRI. On June 13, 2001, Dr. Beatty had Stift undergo a bone scan, the results of whichruled out the possibility of a tumor or infection.

On December 20, 2001, Dr. Beatty again saw Stift. He diagnosed her symptoms to be theresult of an injury to her scaling muscle and recommended surgery. Dr. Beatty described thescaling muscle as an accessory muscle of respiration that helps raise the chest cavity and increasethe volume inside the lungs. Dr. Beatty stated that the scaling muscle is used by people who needa lot of air in their activities such as mountain climbers and marathon runners. Dr. Beatty alsosaid that at the December 20, 2001, appointment, Stift reported having neck pain and tingling inher left arm.

Dr. Beatty further testified that he successfully performed surgery on Stift's scaling muscleon January 11, 2001. He stated that the surgery did not impair her resumption of normalactivities but that her scaling muscle is no longer able to fully expand her lungs during rigorousactivities and that, during those conditions, she could experience a shortness of breath. Dr.Beatty advised Stift to restrict her activities for a few weeks after the surgery but told her that shecould then return to normal activities. On January 24, 2002, Dr. Beatty saw Stift for a follow-upvisit and he stated that she complained of no further symptoms but merely related that thenumbness in her hand was gone. Dr. Beatty also testified that he next saw Stift on June 3, 2002,that he was unsure why she came to see him that day, that she told him that her symptoms werebetter, that she had no numbness in her hand, but that she did have some numbness around theincision from the surgery. Dr. Beatty said the numbness was a normal consequence of thesurgery. Dr. Beatty further testified that Stift did not complain about any neck stiffness or neckpain on June 3, 2002, and that he did not prescribe any treatment. Dr. Beatty saw Stift again onMay 19, 2003, and she said she had no arm or shoulder pain but that she was having migraineheadaches and some neck stiffness. Dr. Beatty also testified that, in his opinion, all of thesymptoms for which he treated Stift were the result of the scaling muscle injury caused by theMay 21, 2000, collision. Finally, Dr. Beatty testified that he could not state with a reasonabledegree of medical and surgical certainty that Stift would experience ongoing neck stiffness as aresult of the collision in the future.

At the instructions conference after the close of the parties' cases, the plaintiff submitted,among others, the following pattern jury instruction:

"If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you must then fixthe amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate her for any ofthe following elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted fromthe negligence of the defendant, taking into consideration the nature, extent andduration of the injury.

1. The pain and suffering experienced and reasonably certain to beexperienced in the future as a result of the injuries.

***

Whether any of these elements of damages has been proved by theevidence is for you to determine." Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, Nos.30.01, 30.05 (2000).

The defense counsel objected to the instruction on the grounds that there was no testimony, andparticularly no medical testimony, stating that Stift would have pain and suffering in the future. Plaintiff's counsel argued that Stift had testified to ongoing pain and also that Dr. Beatty testifiedto the permanent disability with regard to the scaling muscle. The court noted that Stiftcomplained of ongoing migraine headaches and back pain depending on her activities, but itrefused the tendered instruction noting that the points argued by plaintiff's counsel could fit underthe "loss of normal life" instruction.

The jury was given three verdict forms. Verdict form A was a finding against defendantwith an itemization of the damages that could be awarded, which included the pain and sufferingexperienced, the loss of normal life experienced, the loss of normal life reasonably to beexperienced in the future, the reasonable expense of necessary medical care, treatment, andservices received, and the disfigurement resulting from the injury. Verdict form B was also afinding against defendant with an identical itemization of damages, but additionally allowed thejury to find contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. Verdict form C was a finding fordefendant. As noted, the jury used verdict form B, finding Stift 35% contributorily negligent andawarding $40,000 for pain and suffering experienced, $0 for loss of normal life experienced, $0for loss of normal life reasonably certain to be experienced in the future, $26,646.96 for medicalexpenses and $0 for disfigurement.

1. ANALYSIS

Stift first contends that the trial court erred in rejecting the jury instruction regardingfuture pain and suffering. The standard of review applicable to this issue has been described asfollows:

"[T]he determination of proper jury instructions lies within the sound discretion ofthe trial court; a reviewing court will not disturb the determination of the trialcourt absent a clear abuse of that discretion. [Citation.] A new trial will begranted based on a trial court's refusal to give a tendered instruction only when therefusal amounts to a serious prejudice to a party's right to a fair trial. [Citation.]" Linn v. Damilano, 303 Ill. App. 3d 600, 606-07, 708 N.E.2d 533, 538 (1999).

The general rule is that a party is entitled to a jury instruction on a certain theory ofrecovery if there is "some evidence" in the record to support it. Maddox v. Rozek, 265 Ill. App.3d 1007, 1009, 639 N.E.2d 164, 166 (1994); Lundquist v. Nickels, 238 Ill. App. 3d 410, 605N.E.2d 1373, 1388 (1992); Onion v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co., 191 Ill. App. 3d 318,320, 547 N.E.2d 721, 724 (1989); Neyzelman v. Treitman, 273 Ill. App. 3d 511, 518, 652 N.E.2d1300, 1305 (1995). "Evidence of future pain and suffering requires a showing that it isreasonably certain to occur in the future." Maddox, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 1009, 639 N.E.2d at 166. Several Illinois cases have held that the evidence required to support a jury instruction on futurepain and suffering can be established by either expert or lay testimony. See, e.g., A.O. SmithCorp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Ill. 2d 240, 245, 371 N.E.2d 607, 609 (1977) ("the general rule isthat direct expert evidence is not essential to establish the permanency or future effects of aninjury"); Onion, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 320, 547 N.E.2d at 723 (" '[s]ome evidence' *** from eitheran expert or a lay person warrants the giving of a jury instruction"); Ross v. Aryan International,Inc., 219 Ill. App. 3d 634, 648, 580 N.E.2d 937, 946 (1991); Pourchot v. Commonwealth EdisonCo., 224 Ill. App. 3d 634, 637, 587 N.E.2d 589, 592 (1992).

However, lay testimony will only suffice to warrant a jury instruction on future pain andsuffering when the existence of the plaintiff's ongoing pain and suffering would be readilyapparent to a lay jury from the nature of the injury. See Maddox, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 1010-11,639 N.E.2d at 167. In Maddox, the court effectively articulated and analyzed this rule asfollows:

"Where future pain and suffering can be objectively determined from thenature of an injury, the jury may be instructed on future pain and suffering basedon lay testimony alone or even in the absence of any testimony on the subject. Where future pain and suffering is not apparent from the injury itself, or issubjective, the plaintiff must present expert testimony that pain and suffering isreasonably certain to occur in the future to justify the instruction." Maddox, 265Ill. App. 3d at 1011, 639 N.E.2d at 167.

The court in Maddox found no objective evidence of future pain and suffering under its factswhen the plaintiff, who was allegedly injured in an automobile accident, merely complained ofback and shoulder pain but was not noticeably in pain at trial. Maddox, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 1011,639 N.E.2d at 167.

In contrast, the court in Neyzelman, on which Stift relies, albeit in a different context,applied the same principles to a different result in finding that the plaintiff did provide objectiveevidence of ongoing pain and suffering. Neyzelman, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 518, 652 N.E.2d at 1305. In that case, a child was injured in an automobile accident and subsequently suffered from post-traumatic stress syndrome that manifested itself in a permanent condition of stuttering. Neyzelman, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 513, 652 N.E.2d at 1302. The court found that the fact that thechild stuttered while testifying constituted objective evidence such that the trial court's juryinstruction regarding future pain and suffering was proper. Neyzelman, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 518,652 N.E.2d at 1305.

Stift first contends that "some evidence" of future pain and suffering was established byher own testimony. Specifically, Stift points to her testimony that she has ongoing neck pain andmigraine headaches as well as discomfort during certain activities. However, Stift's contentionsuffers the same impediment as that suffered in Maddox. Like the plaintiff in that case, Stiftcomplained of ongoing pain, but no symptoms were readily apparent to the lay jury. Stift did notdisplay any objective manifestation of her pain like the stuttering plaintiff Neyzelman. Therefore,the lay jury could not gauge her alleged ongoing pain for purposes of awarding damages withoutthe assistance of expert testimony. Consequently, Stift's testimony did not entitle her to a juryaward on pain and suffering.

Stift further contends, however, that the expert testimony of Dr. Beatty was sufficient towarrant a future pain and suffering jury instruction. We disagree. During Stift's directexamination of Dr. Beatty, the following colloquy took place:

"Q. I'm just going to ask you, might or could Miss Stift experienceongoing neck stiffness as a result of the motor vehicle accident?

A. Yes, she could.

Q. Is that to a reasonable degree of medical and surgical certainty?

A. No, it isn't. I can't - it's one of those questions where I'm not sure whather future's going to be with her neck."

Moreover, although Dr. Beatty testified that Stift's scaling muscle was permanentlyimpaired and that she could potentially feel the effect of the loss of that muscle anytime sheengaged in rigorous activity, Stift did not ask Dr. Beatty whether the impairment would engenderfuture pain and suffering. The testimony that Dr. Beatty gave does not compel the conclusionthat any residual impairment resulting from that injury would engender future pain and sufferingas opposed to a mere reduction of the scaling muscle's capacity to fully expand the lungs duringrigorous activity. Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court's failure to give instructions onfuture pain and suffering was an abuse of discretion. As to the testimony of Dr. Beatty regardingthe diminished capacity of the scaling muscle, the jury was free, if it gave credence to thattestimony, to reflect that injury in assessing an award for future loss of normal life as contained inverdict forms A and B.

Stift next contends that the trial court erred in denying her posttrial motion for a new trialon the issue of damages. In this regard, Stift contends that the jury disregarded the evidence byawarding $0 for the loss of normal life, $0 for the loss of normal life reasonably certain to beexperienced in the future, and $0 for the disfigurement resulting from the injury. The standard ofreview applicable to this issue was discussed by the supreme court in Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill.2d 445, 455-56, 603 N.E.2d 508, 513 (1992):

"A court's ruling on a motion for a new trial will not be reversed except in thoseinstances where it is affirmatively shown that it clearly abused its discretion.[Citations.] In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, thereviewing court should consider whether the jury's verdict was supported by theevidence and whether the losing party was denied a fair trial. [Citation.]Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that ' "[t]he presiding judge in passingupon the motion for a new trial has the benefit of his previous observation of theappearance of the witnesses, their manner in testifying, and of the circumstancesaiding in the determination of credibility." ' [Citation.] If the trial judge, in theexercise of his discretion, finds that the verdict is against the manifest weight of theevidence, he should grant a new trial ***."

The Maple court further described that " '[a] verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidencewhere the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury areunreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any evidence.' [Citations.]" Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 454,603 N.E.2d at 512-13.

Furthermore, the determination of damages is a question of fact for the jury which will notbe upset by a reviewing court " 'unless a proven element of damages was ignored, the verdictresulted from passion or prejudice, or the award bears no reasonable relationship to the losssuffered.' " Snover v. McGraw, 172 Ill. 2d 438, 447, 667 N.E.2d 1310, 1315 (1996), quoting Gillv. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 315, 626 N.E.2d 190 (1993). With regard specifically to damages forpast and future loss of normal life, we first note that the term "loss of normal life" has beendescribed as "a component of disability which compensates for a change in the plaintiff's lifestyle." Jones v. Chicago Osteopathic Hospital, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1135, 738 N.E.2d 542, 554(2000), citing Holsten v. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, 247 Ill. App. 3d 985, 1005,618 N.E.2d 334 (1993); Martin v. Cain, 219 Ill. App. 3d 110, 115, 578 N.E.2d 1161 (1991);Sands v. Glass, 267 Ill. App. 3d 45, 50, 640 N.E.2d 996 (1994).

Stift contends that the jury's finding of zero damages for past and future loss of normal lifewas against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was uncontroverted testimony thatshe had ongoing pain, avoided sports and exercise due to pain and shortness of breath, and had apermanent impairment of the scaling muscle. We disagree. Where evidence is contradicted, orwhere it is merely based on the subjective testimony of the plaintiff, a jury is free to disbelieve it. See Snover, 172 Ill. 2d at 449, 667 N.E.2d at 1316 ("In cases in which a plaintiff's evidence ofinjury is primarily subjective in nature and not accompanied by objective symptoms, the jury maychoose to disbelieve the plaintiff's testimony as to pain. In such a circumstance, the jury mayreasonably find the plaintiff's evidence of pain and suffering to be unconvincing"); Maple, 151 Ill.2d at 452, 603 N.E.2d at 511-12 ("Unquestionably, it is the province of the jury to resolveconflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and to decide what weightshould be given to the witnesses' testimony").

The evidence Stift relies on as establishing loss of normal life was neither definitive noruncontradicted. As noted, Stift provided only her own subjective testimony regarding herongoing pain. In that regard, Dr. Beatty testified that Stift had no complaints of any pain at herfirst two post-surgery visits, and that Stift did not report that she was experiencing migraineheadaches and neck stiffness until her third visit, over two years after the surgery. With respectto shortness of breath, Dr. Beatty merely testified that Stift could experience a shortness of breathwhen engaging in rigorous activities, but he stated that the impairment would not affect hernormal activities Furthermore, he did not tell her to avoid engaging in rigorous activities. Moreoverridingly, Dr. Beatty averred that Stift never complained to him in any of her post-surgeryvisits that she actually experienced any shortness of breath, and, at trial, Stift merely testified toexperiencing it "here and there." These factors, coupled with the fact that Stift only missed asingle day of work and was able to work as a pool attendant prior to the surgery, lead us toconclude that the jury's findings with regard to past and future loss of normal life were notunreasonable.

Stift asks us to follow Obszanski v. Foster Wheeler Construction, Inc., 328 Ill. App. 3d550, 765 N.E.2d 1193 (2002). However, the facts of Obszanski are distinguishable. InObszanski, the plaintiff injured his back when he slipped and fell while working as an ironworkerat a construction site. Obszanski, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 552, 765 N.E.2d at 1195. The plaintifftestified that he immediately felt pain in his back but was able to return to work after stretching. Obszanski, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 552, 765 N.E.2d at 1195. The plaintiff first sought medicalattention the next week and eventually had surgery requiring an overnight stay in the hospital. Obszanski, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 556, 765 N.E.2d at 1198. He was not able to return to work untilnearly six months later. Obszanski, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 556, 765 N.E.2d at 1198. The majority ofthe court stated, over a vigorous dissent, that there was uncontroverted evidence that the plaintiffwas disabled, and that the jury's failure to award damages for the disability⁽¹⁾ was not supported bythe evidence and could not stand. Obszanski, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 556, 765 N.E.2d at 1198. Weare inclined to reject Obszanski insofar as the plaintiff's symptoms of disability were whollysubjective and apparently predicated solely upon his testimony, as they are here. See Snover, 172Ill. 2d at 449, 667 N.E.2d 1316 (noting that a jury may disbelieve a plaintiff's subjective evidenceas to pain); Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 452, 603 N.E.2d at 511-12. However, we need not reject themajority opinion in Obszanski to uphold the jury's verdict in this case since the majority inObszanski appeared to agree that if evidence is controverted a jury can choose to disregard theplaintiff's testimony. See Obszanski, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 556, 765 N.E.2d at 1198. The Obszanski majority, however, maintained that the evidence in that case was uncontroverted. Obszanski, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 556, 765 N.E.2d at 1198. In contrast, for the reasons pointed out,Stift's testimony is inconsistent with the testimony of Dr. Beatty in that she did not complain ofpain or shortness of breath, she only missed a single day of work, and she was able to work as apool attendant. Furthermore, there was nothing in Dr. Beatty's testimony to suggest that Stift'sinjury would involve ongoing pain or a loss of normal life. Consequently, consistent with both themajority and the dissent in Obszanski, we find that the failure to award damages for past andfuture loss of normal life was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and the trial court,therefore, did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial.

Next, the jury's determination that Stift was entitled to no compensation for disfigurementwas also not so clearly unreasonable that the trial court's denial of her motion for a new trialwould constitute an abuse of discretion. Disfigurement has been defined as that " 'which impairsor injures the beauty, symmetry, or appearance.' " Rapp v. Kennedy, 101 Ill. App. 2d 82, 84, 242N.E.2d 11, 13 (1968), quoting Superior Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 309 Ill. 339, 340(1923). Although the fact that Stift incurred a permanent scar as a result of the surgery on herneck is not disputed, she did not testify that it caused her any embarrassment or grief and neitherdid any witness testify that the scar was noticeable. See Zuder v. Gibson, 288 Ill. App. 3d 329,336, 680 N.E.2d 483, 489 (1997) (holding that where no testimony was given regardingembarrassment, grief, or noticeability of a scar, the jury was free to determine whether scaramounted to a disfigurement). Thus, the jury's determination that Stift did not suffer acompensable disfigurement was based on the only evidence it had on the subject, namely, itsfirsthand observation of the scar itself, which, as previously noted, is not described ordocumented by any photo in the record. Thus, for all we know, the jury could have determinedthat it was not noticeable or that it did not impair her "beauty, symmetry, or appearance." Rapp,101 Ill. App. 2d at 84, 242 N.E.2d at 13; Zuder, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 336, 680 N.E.2d at 489(Where a jury could reasonably conclude that damages are minimal, a jury's failure to awarddamages for disfigurement after surgery should not be set aside); citing Simon v. Van Steenlandt,278 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1021, 664 N.E.2d 231 (1996). As previously noted, since the scar is notdescribed in the record other than the fact that it is on the neck, we are in no position to secondguess the jury's determination that there was no disfigurement; nor for that matter can we say thatthe trial judge, who was also able to observe the scar firsthand (see Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 456, 603N.E.2d at 513), abused his discretion in denying the motion for a new trial on the issue ofdisfigurement.

Stift finally contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her a new trial becausethe jury's finding that she was 35% contributorily negligent was against the manifest weight of theevidence. Stift, however, cites no authority to support her contention other than to cite thestandard of review. Instead, Stift merely contends that she had the right of way, that she was nottraveling in excess of the speed limit and that Lizzadro negligently caused the collision. The jurycould reasonably have concluded that Stift was contributorily negligent for any number of reasonsbased on the facts in the record, including that she failed to apply her brakes prior to the collision,that she failed to keep a proper lookout, or that she failed to reduce her speed when crossing anintersection. Thus, because the jury's determination of contributory negligence is not against themanifest weight of the evidence, the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial was not an abuse ofdiscretion.

1. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed.

CAHILL, P.J., and Burke, J., concur.

1. We note that "disability" implicates many of the same factors as "loss of normal life" and,under certain circumstances, the terms can be used interchangeably. See Jones, 316 Ill. App. 3dat 1135, 738 N.E.2d at 554; Smith v. City of Evanston, 260 Ill. App. 3d 925, 631 N.E.2d 1269(1994); Torres v. Irving Press, Inc., 303 Ill. App. 3d 151, 707 N.E.2d 248 (1999); Turner v.Williams, 326 Ill. App. 3d 541, 762 N.E.2d 70 (2001).