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FIFTH DIVISION
October 22, 2004

No. 1-03-3437

 

This is a subrogation action involving an automobile accident. The issue before this courtis whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for an additur and a motion fora new trial. Defendant, Brenda Hervey was pulling out from a parking space when she collidedwith the right side of the vehicle driven by plaintiff, Joseph P. Bauer. Plaintiff State Farm insuredBauer. State Farm brought this subrogation action to recover sums paid for property damage toBauer's vehicle and for rental expenses incurred by Bauer. On May 8, 2003, the matter proceededto trial with a jury of six. Plaintiff's counsel informed the jury that two plaintiffs were seekingdamages in this matter: State Farm and Joseph P. Bauer. The total amount plaintiffs prayed forwas $2,909.67.

Pictures of plaintiff's damaged automobile, a repair bill for $2,751.23 (including theinsured's deductible of $250), and a rental bill for $158.44 were received in evidence and weregiven to the jury during its deliberations. Bauer testified that he paid the rental bill of $158.44;State Farm reimbursed Bauer $96 and the remaining $62.44 he paid out of his own pocket.

The jury found in favor of both plaintiffs and against defendant. Nevertheless, the juryawarded Bauer $62.44 for rental expenses, but returned a verdict of $0 for State Farm. On May8, 2003, the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict. On October 10, 2003, the trial courtdenied plaintiff's motion for additur or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. We reverseand remand.

Plaintiff contends that the verdict award for State Farm in the amount of $0 is contrary tothe manifest weight of the evidence. We agree. A verdict is considered to be against the manifestweight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings ofthe jury are unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any of the evidence. Maple v. Gustafson,151 Ill. 2d 445, 454, 603 N.E.2d 509, 512-13 (1992). In the present case, the oppositeconclusion is clearly evident and the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary and not basedupon any of the evidence.

The jury returned a verdict for both Bauer and State Farm. Yet the jury awarded nomoney damages to State Farm. The jury only awarded the money damages that Bauer prayed forat the end of the trial. This amount, $62.44, represented Bauer's out-of- pocket expenses for therental vehicle. The jury completely disregarded the remainder of the rental bill paid by StateFarm. The jury completely disregarded the property damage amount as paid by State Farm. " ' "Ithas been the long-followed rule in Illinois that a paid automobile repair bill is admissible inevidence without other foundation as prima facie evidence of the necessity and reasonableness ofsuch repairs." ' [Citations.]" Merrill v. Hill, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1007, 783 N.E.2d 152 (2002). Moreover, a new trial on damages may be ordered only where: " ' "(1) the jury's verdict on thequestion of liability is amply supported by the evidence; (2) the questions of damages and liabilityare so separate and distinct that a trial limited to the question of damages is not unfair to thedefendant; and (3) the record suggests neither that the jury reached a compromise verdict, northat, in some other identifiable manner, the error which resulted in the jury's awarding inadequatedamages also affected its verdict on the question of liability." ' " Hollis v. R. Latoria Construction,Inc., 108 Ill. 2d 401, 408, 485 N.E.2d 4, 7 (1985), quoting Balestri v. Terminal FreightCooperative Ass'n, 76 Ill. 2d 451, 456, 394 N.E.2d 391 (1979). The trial court here abused itsdiscretion in denying the motion for a new trial.

The present case is remarkably similar to Ross v. Cortes, 95 Ill. App. 3d 772, 420 N.E.2d846 (1981). In Ross, also a subrogation action, the jury awarded the plaintiff only the amount ofdamage she personally paid of $165, when the plaintiff was requesting fixed damages for a paidrepair bill in the amount of $3,566.64. The court expounded upon the importance of " 'a fair andefficient administration of justice.' " Ross, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 777, 420 N.E.2d at 850, quoting J.Cole, Additur - Procedural Boon Or Constitutional Calamity, 17 DePaul L. Rev. 175, 193(1967). Thus, the court did not automatically remand the case to the trial court, but insteadordered that if the defendants did not file their consent to an additur within 30 days, the causewould be remanded for a new trial on damages. Ross, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 778, 420 N.E.2d at 851. In the instant case, however, defendant has stated in her reply brief that she does not consent toadditur.

In accordance with the foregoing, we reverse the trial court's orders of May 8, 2003, andOctober 10, 2003. We remand this matter to the trial court for a new trial on damages only, orfor an additur in the amount of $2,847.23, if consented to by defendant.

Reversed and remanded.

CAMPBELL, P.J., and NEVILLE, J., concur.