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SECOND DIVISION
June 28, 2005

JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial of the plaintiffs' medicalmalpractice action, the jury found in favor of defendant RichardMruz, M.D.⁽¹⁾ The plaintiffs appeal the trial court's denial oftheir motion to bar the defendant's expert witness fromtestifying. They contend the court abused its discretion inallowing the witness to testify where the witness was notproduced for a deposition until trial had commenced. We affirm.

FACTS

The plaintiffs filed their complaint on August 4, 2000,alleging defendants failed to properly treat and diagnose PamelaSpurgeon, resulting in the death of 24-week-old Jenna Spurgeonshortly after delivery.

The cause was set for trial June 6, 2003. On May 20, 2003,defendant filed a motion to continue trial date based on aconflict in his attorney's trial schedule. The trial wascontinued to August 15, 2003.

On August 1, 2003, the defendant filed an agreed motion tocontinue trial date based on the parties' inability to coordinateexpert discovery of the defendant, and the fact that plaintiffs'counsel's wife was due to deliver a baby on the date of trial. Anew trial date was set for December 12, 2003.

On October 24, 2003, defendant first disclosed his Rule 213expert witness, Fred DuBoe, M.D. In the disclosure, defendantdescribed the opinions he expected Dr. DuBoe to express in histestimony. He attached Dr. DuBoe's curriculum vitae. Adeposition of Dr. DuBoe was scheduled for November 26, 2003, butdefendant cancelled the deposition on November 25th.

On November 18, 2003, defendant filed a motion to continuetrial date based on defendant's counsel's conflicts with twoother cases set for trial. The case was set for trial onFebruary 10, 2003. The order was marked "final trial date," anddefendant's expert witness was ordered to be deposed by January20, 2004.

Plaintiffs' counsel informed defendant he would be out ofthe country from January 6, 2004, until January 15, 2004, anddemanded a date for the deposition of Dr. DuBoe to accommodatehis absence. Defense counsel informed plaintiffs' counsel theonly date Dr. DuBoe was available for a deposition was on January16, 2004. On January 15 or 16, 2004, defendant's counselcancelled the deposition without giving an explanation.

Defense counsel scheduled the deposition of Dr. DuBoe forSunday evening, February 8, 2004. Plaintiffs' counsel informeddefense counsel he would not be taking the deposition on thatdate and would seek to bar Dr. Duboe from testifying. Plaintiffs' counsel declined defense counsel's offer to schedulethe deposition on February 9, 2004, one day prior to trial.

On February 10, 2004, plaintiffs filed a motion to bar Dr.DuBoe.⁽²⁾ The court denied the motion. During a hearing on themotion, the trial judge offered to schedule the deposition at anytime convenient to the plaintiffs at defendant's expense. Thefirst witnesses in the case were due to be called on February 13,2004, following jury selection. Plaintiffs' counsel declined theoffer, telling the judge it would compromise his case because heneeded time to prepare for trial. The judge then suggestedplaintiffs' counsel make a list of information he needed for hiscross-examination of Dr. Duboe, and defendant would supply theanswers in writing. Plaintiffs' counsel told the court he wouldmake the list and give it to defense counsel, but he did not doso.

At trial, Dr. DuBoe testified as an expert witness for thedefendant. Plaintiffs' counsel did not renew his objection whenDr. DuBoe was called to testify. He cross-examined Dr. DuBoeregarding his affiliation with the defendant, evident from hiscurriculum vitae. Counsel did not cross-examine Dr. DuBoe on anyof his substantive testimony. In his closing argument, defensecounsel argued plaintiffs' counsel must have agreed with Dr.DuBoe's testimony because there was no cross-examination on thesubstance of his testimony. The jury returned a verdict for thedefendant.

Plaintiffs filed a post-trial motion, contending they wereprejudiced by not having an opportunity to depose Dr. DuBoebefore trial, and the court abused its discretion by refusing tobar his testimony. The court denied the motion. Plaintiffsappeal.

DECISION

The issue in this case is whether the defendant's expertwitness should have been allowed to testify. At the outset, theplaintiffs waived the issue by failing to renew their objectionwhen Dr. DuBoe was called to testify. A party must make a timelyobjection to preserve an issue for appellate review. Timelinessrequires that objections to evidence be made at the time theevidence is offered or as soon as grounds for the objectionbecome apparent. Sinclair v. Berlin, 325 Ill. App. 3d 458, 467,758 N.E.2d 442 (2001). A party who, prior to trial,unsuccessfully moves to bar certain evidence, must object againto the evidence when it is offered. Scassifero v. Glaser, 333Ill. App. 3d 846, 855-56, 776 N.E.2d 859 (2002). Although theplaintiffs filed a motion in limine to bar Dr. DuBoe's testimony,they did not renew their objection when he was called to thestand to testify. The plaintiffs made several Rule 213objections to specific portions of the witness's testimony, butthey failed to object to the witness testifying at all. Therefore, plaintiffs have waived consideration of this issue onappeal.

Even if the issue were not waived, the court did not abuseits discretion by refusing to bar the expert's testimony.Plaintiffs contend the defendant violated Rule 213, and contendthe court erred in failing to impose the sanction of barring thewitness's testimony.

Rule 213 requires a party, in response to writteninterrogatory, to disclose the identity of the party's retainedexpert witness, as well as: (1) the subject matter of his or hertestimony, (2) any opinions or conclusions and their bases, (3)the witness's qualifications, and (4) any reports prepared by thewitness. Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 17, 2002),R. 213(f)(3), eff. July 1, 2002. Information disclosed inresponse to a Rule 213(f) interrogatory, or at deposition, limitsthe testimony that can be given be given by a witness on directexamination. Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 8 (April 17,2002), R. 213(g), eff. July 1, 2002.

The Rule 213 disclosure requirements are mandatory andsubject to strict compliance by the parties. Seef v. IngallsMemorial Hospital, 311 Ill. App. 3d 7, 21, 724 N.E.2d 115 (1999). The admission of such evidence is within the trial court'sdiscretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of thatdiscretion. Scassifero, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 855.

In support of their contention, plaintiffs rely on cases inwhich the trial court erroneously allowed witnesses to testifywith new opinions not previously disclosed pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 213, resulting in reversal and remand. Seef, 311 Ill.App. 3d at 21; Department of Transportation v. Crull, 294 Ill.App. 3d 531, 534, 690 N.E.2d 143 (1998). They also cite cases inwhich a party failed to disclose an expert witness in response tointerrogatories under Supreme Court Rule 201, 166 Ill. 2d R. 201,Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville v. Martin, 155 Ill. 2d 305,314, 614 N.E.2d 1194 (1993), or failed to disclose an expertwitness until 11 days before trial, Warrender v. Millsop, 304Ill. App. 3d 260, 266, 710 N.E.2d 512 (1999). None of thesesituations is present in this case.

The defendant disclosed Dr. DuBoe as an expert witness morethan three months prior to trial. Plaintiffs chose to proceedwith trial and did not request a continuance in order to deposethe witness. Furthermore, the trial court offered to schedulethe deposition at any time and place convenient to theplaintiffs, at defendant's expense. Plaintiffs refused theoffer. Plaintiffs also refused the trial court's suggestion ofsubmitting to the defendant a list of information needed forcross-examination.

Plaintiffs refer to Dr. DuBoe's testimony as "new opiniontestimony" which "had never been disclosed nor tested duringdeposition." Nowhere do they contend, however, that Dr. DuBoetestified to opinions that were not previously disclosed in theRule 213(f) disclosure filed three months prior to trial. Plaintiffs make no showing of surprise or prejudice. SeeBoatmen's, 155 Ill. 2d at 315-16. They offer no specific exampleof trial testimony that was not included in Dr. DuBoe's Rule213(f) responses.

In their reply brief, the plaintiffs point us to thelanguage of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 218(c): "***and thecompletion of discovery shall be chosen to ensure that discoverywill be completed not later than 60 days before the date on whichthe trial court reasonably anticipates the trial will commence." 166 Ill. 2d R. 218(c). Plaintiffs made no such argument in theiropening brief. Further, Rule 218(c) refers to the contents of acase management order, "unless modified." It has nothing to dowith the requirements of Rule 213. This last-minute contentionhas no merit.

The plaintiffs have cited no authority holding that theunavailability of a witness for a deposition violates SupremeCourt Rule 213. The trial court did not abuse its discretion inrefusing to bar testimony of Dr. DuBoe where there was no showingof a violation of Supreme Court rules.

We affirm the rulings and judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

BURKE, P.J., and GARCIA, J., concur.

1. Defendant Timothy Albion, M.D. was granted summary judgmenton March 7, 2001, and is not a party to this appeal.

2. Plaintiffs also sought to bar defense expert RobinSteinhorn, M.D. Defendant later withdrew Dr. Steinhorn as awitness.