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JUSTICE SOUTH delivered the opinion of the court:

On December 29, 1995, at approximately 9 a.m., plaintiff, Raymond Smithers, went to11701 S. Central in response to a "full flow water alarm." Plaintiff was with the Alsip FireDepartment for 30 years and eventually became the deputy chief. While at the fire department,plaintiff's duties included running the Fire Prevention Bureau and the inspection department. Heconducted hundreds of commercial, industrial and residential fire inspections during hisemployment with the fire department. He was also responsible for checking the exterior of thebuildings to insure that the post indicator valves (PIVs) (sectional valves in the sprinkler linewhere the water goes into the building and allows a portion of the system to be shut downwithout closing down the entire system) were not blocked.

The address of the fire alarm, 11701 S. Central, is part of a warehouse complex whichextends from 11601 to 12001 S. Central in Alsip, Illinois. The warehouse is a large singlestructure divided into four sections, each containing a different business. Universal FurnitureIndustries, Inc. (Universal) is a tenant at 11601 S. Central; and Dart Warehouse Corporation(Dart) is a tenant at 11701 S. Central. Center Point Properties Corporation (Center Point) ownsthese two sections of the warehouse. Anixter Brothers, Inc. (Anixter) is a tenant at 11801 S.Central and Midway Realty Associates (Midway) is the owner. American Drug Stores, Inc.(American Drug) is a tenant at 12001 S. Central and American National Insurance Company(American National) is the owner.

The entire warehouse shares a common underground circulating loop-type water supplyand fire control system. There are two PIVs located behind 11601 S. Central and 11701 S.Central. The valves are connected to a line that goes into the building and are fed from thecirculating loop.

After arriving at the warehouse, plaintiff went into the warehouse at 11601 S. Central. Finding no problems within the warehouse which could have triggered the alarm, plaintiffproceeded out of the rear exit of 11701 S. Central to check the leak. As he exited the building,he observed a sheet of ice extending 60-70 feet from the building and out into the area of thePIVs. During plaintiff's deposition, he testified that he noticed an ice accumulation near thePIVs, and he observed water leaking from the PIVs on December 20, 1995. As plaintiff camewithin approximately five feet of the PIVs, he fell and was injured.

At the time of the accident, plaintiff was wearing his fireman's uniform, a fire jacket and rocky eliminator boots. Plaintiff testified during his deposition that these boots were purchasedby the fire department and were worn by firemen "to prevent people from slipping and falling."

Plaintiff and other members of the Alsip Fire Department had responded to other safety-related problems at this property prior to the date of the accident on December 29, 1995. Plaintiff had been out to this warehouse a total of 50 times, and had responded 10 times in theprevious year to similar types of alarms at this location. In particular, on November 24, 1995,plaintiff was notified that there was ice building up behind the two buildings in the area where helater fell. On December 4, 1995, plaintiff personally observed water coming up from the PIVs. On December 20, 1995, plaintiff called a special meeting with all of the occupants to address"life safety problems" associated with water leaking from the PIVs.

Plaintiff and his wife filed a complaint against Centerpoint, Lakeshore Associates,American National, Universal, Anixter, American Drug and Midway for injuries sustained fromthe fall. Dart was later dismissed as a party defendant. Plaintiff's wife requested damages forloss of consortium. On December 24, 1997, plaintiff filed his first amended complaint in whichhe joined defendant Commodore Environmental Services, Inc.

On February 18, 1999, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint alleging negligence bydefendants due to their failure to maintain the fire suppression system. Plaintiffs also refer toseveral covenants entered into by defendants in a 1973 easement agreement. The agreementprovides in pertinent part:

"Grant of Easement:

***The easement area shall be kept open and unobstructed for thebenefit of, and may be used in common by, all the respectiveowners and occupants present and future, of the respectivepremises above described and the several buildings erectedthereon, for ingress and egress by pedestrian and vehicular trafficto and from said lands and buildings; and each said owner shallshare in all costs and expenses of maintaining said easements,including without limitation, all cleaning and janitorial work, snowremoval, repairs and replacements, including co-surfacing, and allother functions necessary for the proper maintenance and upkeepof the easement area.

Grant of Easement for Water Tank System:

***The easements granted herein shall be for laying, operating,maintaining, replacing, in perpetuity, of eight inch (8) water mainsrunning from said water tank along the courses set out in ExhibitA, and maintaining, repairing, operating, filling and refilling ofsaid water tank; all parties shall have the right to tap such mains atlocations falling within their own premises for the purpose ofconnecting sprinkler systems to any buildings now or hereafterlocated on each party's respective premises. Said easements shallbe for the benefit of all the respective owners of each of the aforedescribed [11601 - 12001 S. Central] parcels and the occupantsthereof, present and future; and said water tank shall be operated,used and maintained by the First Party in common with all partieshereto, their heirs, successors and assigns."

On March 31, 1999, defendant American National filed a 2-619 (a)(9) motion to dismissplaintiffs' complaint based upon the "fireman's rule," which was joined by American Drug,Center Point and Universal. On April 1, 1999, defendants Anixter and Midway filed a motionfor summary judgment also based upon the "fireman's rule."

On August 2, 1999, defendants' 2-619 motion to dismiss and motion for summaryjudgment was granted pursuant to the "fireman's rule" enunciated in the Horn v. UrbanDevelopment Investments, 166 Ill. App. 3d 62, 519 N.E.2d 489 (1988), decision. On August 30,1999, plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.

For purposes of this appeal, the only remaining defendants are Center Point andUniversal, as all other defendants have been dismissed pursuant to a settlement.

The issues raised on this appeal are: (1) whether the trial court's ruling that the "fireman'srule" bars plaintiff's recovery of damages for personal injuries was proper; (2) whether thedefendant/owners waived the protection of the "fireman's rule" by voluntarily entering intocovenants to provide pedestrians and vehicles with safe means of accessing their premises; and(3) whether the "deliberate encounter exception" and the public policy requiring landowners tomaintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition for their invitees mandate abrogation ofthe "fireman's rule."

Review of a trial court's order granting a 2-619 motion to dismiss or a motion forsummary judgment is de novo. Groce v. South Chicago Community Hospital, 82 Ill. App. 3d1004, 669 N.E.2d 596 (1996) (motion for summary judgment); Weatherman v. Gary-WheatonBank of Fox Valley, N.A., 186 Ill. 2d 472, 713 N.E.2d 543 (1999) (2-619 motion to dismiss).

Plaintiffs argue that the fireman's rule not only relieves a landowner of liability for risksof apparent dangers associated with a fire but that it is a "free floating proposition immunizing alandowner or occupier of all risks associated with firefighting." They assert that the risks afireman encounters must be obvious to the firefighter or, if not obvious, ones which thefirefighter should recognize as dangers associated with a fire. As such, this rule does not apply to"latent conditions" of which the firefighter would be unaware.

Plaintiffs further argue that the Horn decision improperly expands the fireman's rule. They argue that applying the fireman's rule to any activity which is related to fire fighting ingeneral, but which is not related to fighting an actual fire, permits the rule to be expanded into ageneral immunity for landowners against claims brought by firefighters.

Defendants argue that the fireman's rule precludes plaintiffs' cause of action becausepursuant to Horn, a landowner is immune from liability to a fireman, who in the performance ofhis official duties is injured after coming upon the premises in response to a false alarm. Horn,166 Ill. App. 3d at 67, 519 N.E.2d at 492. They urge the fireman's rule is not a generalproposition immunizing landowners from all liability to a fireman, but that the rule applies incases where a plaintiff's injuries occurs in the furtherance of his duties as a firefighter.

Under common law, a fireman was considered a licensee to whom a landowner owed noduty, except to refrain from willful or wanton misconduct. As time progressed, exceptions to thegeneral rule were carved out and cases began to classify firemen as "invitees" or "businessinvitees." In Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960), however, our supremecourt avoided these labels and ruled that landowners owed firemen a duty of reasonable care tokeep their premises safe. Although Illinois' interpretation of the fireman's rule, starting with Diniand proceeding through to our present cases, has varied, the underlying premise has remained intact. Cases subsequent to Dini have refined the rule and have generally concluded that when afireman enters a landowners property to fight a fire, he assumes the risks associated with fightingthat fire, but not those risks which are unrelated to the fire. We have consistently limitedrecovery to those instances where the landowner/occupier breached his duty of care by failing tokeep the premises safe so as to prevent injury to firemen resulting from causes independent of thefire. McShane, 235 Ill. App. 3d 860, 864, 601 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (1992). We have found noliability, however, where the defects on the landowner's premises were obvious or already knownto the firefighter, even if they did not result from the fire itself. See Coglianese v. Mark TwainLimited Partnership, 171 Ill. App. 3d 1, 524 N.E.2d 1031 (1988) (we affirmed the dismissal ofplaintiff firefighter's complaint which alleged that he was overcome by soot, smoke and noxiousgases emitted by the burning building's interior walls which were constructed with materialswhich were not fire retardant because injuries were not caused by circumstances independent ofthe fire, but normally associated with the firefighting profession); Luetje v. Corsini, 126 Ill. App.3d 74, 466 N.E.2d 1304 (1984) (firefighter injured when part of the chimney fell from thebuilding because of the fire could not recover because this was not caused by circumstancesindependent of the fire).

The fireman's rule has also been interpreted in situations, such as the situation in thiscase, where a firefighter is injured on a landowners premises while responding to a "false alarm." See Briones v. Mobil Oil Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 41, 501 N.E.2d 821 (1986) (summary judgmentaffirmed on appeal where firefighter responding to an alarm at a building that had beendemolished was warned about a hole that had been cut in the floor, that he fell into, which wasthere prior to the emergency). Once again, holding onto the underlying theory in Dini, wecontinue to hold that liability is limited to situations in which the fireman was injured by causesindependent of the emergency that brought him to the premises, or situations in which the dangeris readily apparent if it is not independent of the emergency. See Hedberg v. Mendino, 218 Ill.App. 3d 1087, 579 N.E.2d 398 (1991) (the court found that a cause of action had been statedbecause the complaint alleged that the officer was injured by a cause independent of theemergency he was investigating).

In Horn, a firefighter brought a cause of action against Brooks Fashion Stores, Inc., theoperator of a retail clothing store in Oak Brook, and the Urban Investment and Development Co.,a part owner of the premises where the store was located. Plaintiff's complaint alleged damagesdue to personal injuries he sustained when he slipped and fell while on defendants' premises toinvestigate the source of a false alarm. Horn, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 64, 519 N.E.2d at 490. At thetime of the incident, plaintiff was wearing a protective coat, a hat, and fire boots with rubbersoles. Horn, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 64, 519 N.E.2d at 490. After plaintiff arrived at the store, one ofthe clerks there informed him that there was water in the back storage room where the fire alarmpanel was located. He, and other firemen, went to the storage room to check the panel first, sincethis was normal procedure. Horn, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 64, 519 N.E.2d at 490.

In the storage room they observed water dripping from different locations in the ceilingand some of the ceiling was suspended where tiles had fallen out. Attempting to investigate thesource of the alarm, plaintiff took a step ladder and placed it beneath the area of the ceiling fromwhere the water was dripping. Horn, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 64, 519 N.E.2d at 490. Plaintiffascended the ladder and used his flash light to try and determine where the leak was comingfrom, but could not find the source. He descended the ladder and attempted to move it to anotherlocation in the storage room. As he moved backwards with the ladder, he slipped on the wetfloor and sustained injuries to his left knee. Horn, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 65, 519 N.E.2d at 490.

Defendants subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment based upon the fireman'srule, which was granted by the trial court. We affirmed. Horn, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 65, 519N.E.2d at 490.

The specific issue in Horn, was "*** whether a fireman is in the performance of hisofficial duty when he is looking for and investigating the source of an alarm which was notactivated by fire and, therefore, would be considered a 'false alarm.'" Horn, 166 Ill. App. 3d at67, 519 N.E.2d at 492. It was held that although it is true that a landowner has a duty ofreasonable care to keep his premises safe, this duty does not extend to obvious dangerousconditions or conditions which a firefighter would be expected to discover and avoid on his own. It was held that "when a fire fighter is injured while pursuing an activity on alandowner/occupier's premises which is reasonably related to responding to and investigating thesource of an alarm, albeit false or possibly false, such pursuit is not an 'undue risk' of theprofession of a firefighter." Horn, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 68, 519 N.E.2d at 492.

Where the landowner's premises contains unreasonably defective conditions, of which thefirefighter is unaware, and which they are not expected to encounter in their duties as afirefighter, the landowner should not be immune from liability. Similar to an invitee, afirefighter assumes risks associated with known or obvious conditions.

In this case, the record indicates that plaintiff had been a firefighter for 30 years and hadworked his way up to a position of deputy chief. His specific duties as a fireman were to inspectcommercial, industrial and residential buildings, and to check the exterior of these buildings tomake sure that their PIVs were operating effectively.

The record indicates that plaintiff was responsible for inspecting the warehouse where hefell. He had responded to many alarms at this location in the past and had responded to firealarms 10 times in 1995 alone. During his inspections of the warehouse, not only had hepersonally observed ice forming around the PIVs on November 24, 1995, and water coming upfrom the PIVs on December 4, 1995, he had also called a special meeting to address these issueson December 20, 1995.

More specifically, on the date of the accident, plaintiff went to defendants' premises inresponse to a "full flow water alarm." After he determined that there was no fire, he furtherinvestigated the source of the alarm which included investigating the PIVs. Plaintiff testified thatthat investigation was related to his responsibilities. He further testified that he was well awareof the sheet of ice that extended from the back of the warehouse out to where the PIVs werelocated. Equipped in his firefighter rocky eliminator boots, plaintiff assumed the risk, carried outhis responsibilities, and proceeded across the ice to where the PIVs were located. As plaintifftestified during his deposition, he knew that ice and water were risks associated with the job of afirefighter.

Given these facts, the reasoning behind the fireman's rule, i.e., that a fireman assumes therisks associated with known or obvious conditions inherent in the duties of a fireman, isapplicable here. One of plaintiff's specific duties as a fireman was to inspect defendants'premises for problems associated with the PIVs, and at the time of his slip and fall he was ondefendants' premises in furtherance of those duties.

The facts indicate that plaintiff was aware of the ice upon which he fell, that this was notsomething that was uncommon in his profession or in his responsibilities as a firefighter, and thatthis injury was not independent of the emergency he was investigating. Therefore, the trialcourt's ruling that the fireman's rule bars plaintiffs' recovery was proper.

The second issue is whether defendants waived the protection of the fireman's rule byvoluntarily entering into covenants to provide pedestrians and vehicles with safe means ofaccessing the premises.

Plaintiffs argue that defendants have voluntarily assumed a duty of care, based upon theirlease agreements and a 1973 easement, to repair the fire suppression system and to provideingress and egress to the property.

Section 324A of the Restatement of Torts provides in pertinent part that:

"One who undertakes***to render services to another which heshould recognize as necessary for the protection of the thirdperson***is subject to liability to the third person for physicalharm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care toprotect his undertaking, if

(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of suchharm, or