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                                                                                       FIRST DIVISION

                                                                                       November 21, 2005

No. 1-04-3393

            JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

            This case is before us for a second time. On March 9, 2004,we reversed the circuit court's order granting defendant LakewoodElectric Corporation (Lakewood) a new trial and ordered the trialcourt to enter judgment on the jury verdict in favor of plaintiffHenry Schultz. Schultz v. Lakewood Electric Corp., No. 1-03-0395(March 9, 2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Lakewood now appeals from an order of the circuit court enteringstatutory interest on the judgment at the rate of 9% pursuant tosection 2-1303 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2004)). On appeal, Lakewood contends thatsection 2-1303 is unconstitutional because it violates due processand equal protection of the law. For the reasons set forth below,we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

            On January 26, 1998, plaintiff was injured as a result ofcoming into contact with a live 277-volt wire while working as anelectrician for construction of a Carmax, located in Tinley Park,Illinois. The general contractor for the project was OsmanConstruction Corporation (Osman). Osman employed Lakewood as theprime electrical contractor. In turn, Lakewood employed AdvancedSystems Technology (Advanced) as a subcontractor on the project toperform low voltage electrical work. Plaintiff was employed byAdvanced.

            On May 13, plaintiff filed a complaint against Osman andLakewood, alleging negligence. Thereafter, Lakewood and Osmanfiled a third-party complaint against Advanced. Prior to a trial,plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with Osman for$17,500. The matter then proceeded to trial in July 2002 againstLakewood only. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffagainst Lakewood in the amount of $1,110,400 and in favor ofLakewood against Advanced. The jury apportioned fault as follows:plaintiff 20%; Lakewood 75%; and Advanced 5%. On August 3, thetrial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict, awardingplaintiff $870,820 against Lakewood after the setoff for Osman'ssettlement and the amount representing plaintiff's comparativenegligence.

            Thereafter, Lakewood filed a posttrial motion, asking thecourt to vacate the judgment entered against it and sustain itspreviously made, but reserved for ruling, motion for a mistrial or,in the alternative, grant it a new trial or enter judgmentnotwithstanding the verdict. On February 26, 2003, the trial courtgranted Lakewood's motion for a new trial. Plaintiff filed anotice of appeal from this order and, as noted above, we reversedthe trial court's order granting a new trial and remanded thiscause, ordering the trial court to enter judgment in favor ofplaintiff on the jury verdict.

            On April 26, 2004, Lakewood tendered a draft to plaintiff inthe amount of $870,820. Thereafter, on May 21, it tendered anotherdraft to plaintiff in the amount of $14,171.80, the amount ofstatutory interest it believed would accrue upon reentry ofjudgment. On July 9, the case was reinstated in the circuit court. On July 13, plaintiff filed a motion for costs in the amount of$9,555.31. On July 27, Lakewood filed a motion to strike certaincosts, although admitting it owed $585.40. On August 12, plaintifffiled his reply in support of his motion for costs and, on August13, he filed a motion for entry of judgment on the jury verdict andfor computation of statutory interest. Plaintiff sought interestfrom the date of the jury verdict.

            On September 14, Lakewood filed its response to plaintiff'smotion for entry of judgment and interest, alleging that interestshould begin to accrue from the date the circuit court reentersjudgment on the jury verdict, not from the date of the originaljury verdict. Thereafter, Lakewood filed its notice of claim ofunconstitutionality of section 2-1303 as violative of due processand equal protection.

            On October 27, the trial court held a hearing on plaintiff'smotion for interest. At this time, the trial court indicated thatit did not agree with Lakewood's argument that the interest statutewas unconstitutional and noted that the rate of interest was up tothe legislature to set. The court further indicated that interestaccrued from the date of the original jury verdict. Accordingly,the trial court entered an order entering judgment on the juryverdict in favor of plaintiff for $870,820. The order furtherprovided that interest began to run as of August 3, 2002, and that,to date, the amount of interest was $126,297.39, which wouldcontinue to accrue at the rate of $30.40 per day until Lakewoodpaid the entire amount. The court also awarded plaintiff $675.40in costs. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

            Lakewood asks this court to declare section 2-1303 of the Codeunconstitutional as violative of due process and equal protectionunder Article I, sections 2 (due process and equal protectionclauses) and 12 (access to courts clause) of the IllinoisConstitution and the fourteenth amendment (due process and equalprotection clauses) to the United States Constitution. Accordingto Lakewood, the 9% rate has been in effect since 1980 and, becausetimes have changed, there is no longer any reasonable objective inhaving an inflexible rate of interest.

            Section 2-1303 of the Code provides:

"Judgments recovered in any court shalldraw interest at the rate of 9% per annum fromthe date of the judgment until satisfied or 6%per annum when the judgment debtor is a unitof local government ***. The judgment debtormay by tender of payment of judgment, costsand interest accrued to the date of tender,stop the further accrual of interest on suchjudgment notwithstanding the prosecution of anappeal, or other steps to reverse, vacate ormodify the judgment." 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West2004).

            In addressing a challenge to the constitutionality of astatute, we begin with the presumption that it is constitutional. In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289, 310, 827 N.E.2d 466 (2005). Ifreasonably possible, a reviewing court must construe the statute soas to uphold its constitutionality and validity. In re D.W., 214Ill. 2d at 310. The party challenging the constitutionality of astatute bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. Peoplev. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418, 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000). Whethera statute is constitutional presents a question of law that wereview de novo. In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d at 309. When a statute ischallenged as unconstitutional under substantive due process orequal protection, our analysis is essentially the same.

I. Due Process

            Under substantive due process, if the statute does not affecta fundamental constitutional right, the rational basis test appliesto determine whether the statute comports with due process. Peoplev. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 203, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004). "Therational basis test is satisfied where the challenged statute bearsa rational relationship to the purpose the legislature intended toachieve in enacting the statute." Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d at 203-04. Under the rational basis test, we give high deference to thejudgments made by the legislature. Village of Lake Villa v.Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106, 125, 810 N.E.2d 13 (2004). "Thus, weare not concerned with the wisdom of the statute or with whether itis the best means to achieve the desired result." Village of LakeVilla, 211 Ill. 2d at 125-26. "So long as there is a conceivablebasis for finding the statute rationally related to a legitimatestate interest, the law must be upheld." Village of Lake Villa,211 Ill. 2d at 126. Conversely, "where the right infringed upon isamong those rights considered 'fundamental' constitutional rights,the challenged statute is subject to strict scrutiny analysis." Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d at 204. "To survive strict scrutiny, themeans employed by the legislature must be necessary to achieve acompelling state interest, and the statute must be narrowlytailored to accomplish this goal, i.e., the legislature must employthe least restrictive means consistent with the attainment of theintended goal." Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d at 204.

            Lakewood contends that section 2-1303 of the Code violatessubstantive due process because it contravenes the right of accessto the courts under section 12 of the Illinois Constitution and thefourteenth amendment since the fixed 9% interest rate is arbitraryand has no relationship to present economic conditions andpenalizes it for appealing, thus hampering its access to thecourts. According to Lakewood, it was either required to tenderthe entire judgment amount to plaintiff, who was no longer ajudgment creditor since the trial court awarded Lakewood a newtrial, or abandon its appeal rights. Although Lakewood notes thateither a strict scrutiny or rational basis test applies to dueprocess challenges, it does not present any cohesive, reasoned, orwell-developed argument as to which standard applies here. Lakewood maintains that the purpose of section 2-1303 is to make aplaintiff whole and, as applied here, the provision isunconstitutional since current economic factors do not warrant a 9%rate of interest because it gives plaintiffs a bonus or windfallbeyond the yield most sophisticated investors receive on theirinvestments. Lakewood further maintains that the statutory rate isan arbitrary taking of property without a hearing because there wasno examination of the relationship between the amount awarded asinterest and the amount necessary to make plaintiff whole.

            Plaintiff contends that Lakewood has not demonstrated that itsclaim is subject to strict scrutiny and, under the rational basistest, section 2-1303 withstands constitutional analysis. Accordingto plaintiff, Lakewood has not demonstrated that access to thecourts under section 12 is a fundamental right and, has not evenshown, how this right is hampered by section 2-1303 since section12 relates to filing fees, costs, etc. Moreover, plaintiff arguesthat Lakewood does not, by promptly paying the judgment, forfeitits right to contest the validity of the judgment and, if it wereto win on appeal, it would be entitled to reimbursement fromplaintiff. Specifically, plaintiff maintains that Lakewood'sresponsibility for interest has no relation to whether it choosesto appeal and, therefore, it is unclear how the imposition ofinterest penalizes it for asserting its appeal rights.

            Lakewood's challenge here is an as applied challenge. Withrespect to Lakewood's procedural due process challenge, thatsection 2-1303 violates due process because there was no hearing onthe relationship between the amount of interest and what isnecessary to make plaintiff whole, we decline to address this. "Bare contentions in the absence of argument or citation ofauthority do not merit consideration on appeal and are deemedwaived." Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682, 624 N.E.2d928 (1993). We are entitled to have the issues clearly definedwith citation to pertinent authority. Obert, 253 Ill. App. 3d at682. Lakewood's argument is conclusory, without argument, andwithout citation to authority. Accordingly, Lakewood has waivedthis challenge for review.

            Additionally, with respect to Lakewood's challenge that thestatutory scheme should employ a flexible interest rate, not afixed rate, based on current market conditions, we find this is amatter for the legislature, not this court. This policyconsideration, based on changing trends or the market, is not abasis upon which we should find section 2-1303 unconstitutional. In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253, 272, 817 N.E.2d 500(2004). Lakewood simply disagrees with the wisdom of the currentstatutory scheme. "[W]here objections 'pose what are essentiallyquestions of policy[,] [they] are more appropriately directed tothe legislature than to this court.' [Citation.]" In re Parentageof John M., 212 Ill. 2d at 272. "When assessing theconstitutionality of a statute ' "we do not sit as asuperlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decidewhether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare."' [Citations.]" In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d at 272-73. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 394, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113,129, 91 S. Ct. 780, 794 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (statingthat neither the due process nor equal protection clauses"justifies judges in trying to make our Constitution fit thetimes"). See also Eskay Plastics, Ltd. v. Chappell, 34 Wash. App.210, 213, 660 P. 2d 764, 766 (1983) (noting that, although theplaintiffs' argument that the public would better be served by ahigher postjudgment interest rate (current rate was 10% and hadbeen since 1899) may be true, this was a matter for thelegislature, not the court, since the "role of the court does notinclude a duty to review the wisdom of otherwise lawful legislativeacts").

            With respect to Lakewood's core argument, that section 2-1303 violates due process because it hampers its access to the appellatereview process, as plaintiff argues, it is questionable whether theimposition of statutory interest even falls within the rationaleunderlying the access to court principles of either section 12 orfederal constitutional due process law. Section 12 provides that"[e]very person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for allinjuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy,property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely,completely, and promptly." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §12. Section12 relates to costs, fees, and charges for access to the courtsystem. See Rose v. Pucinski, 321 Ill. App. 3d 92, 94, 746 N.E.2d800 (2001) (compulsory fee required upon filing of lawsuit to fundmandatory arbitration program); Mellon v. Coffelt, 313 Ill. App. 3d619, 624, 730 N.E.2d 102 (2000) (same); Zamarron v. Pucinski, 282Ill. App. 3d 354, 359-60, 668 N.E.2d 186 (1996) (increased courtfiling fees and surcharge for court automation). See also Lee v.Pucinski, 267 Ill. App. 3d 489, 494-95, 642 N.E.2d 769 (1994)(reproduction fees charged by the circuit court for copies ofdocuments "are not filing fees that are required before a litigantcan gain access to the courts" and they "do not cause a chillingeffect on those who may want to file a lawsuit" and, thus, they donot violate section 12 or due process).

            Lakewood relies on Boddie in support of its argument thataccess to the courts cannot be hampered under the fourteenthamendment. This case does not support Lakewood, but, rather, goesagainst it. In Boddie, the plaintiffs were welfare recipients whowished to obtain divorces, but were not able to afford the filingcosts and fees charged by the court for institution of the suit. They challenged the fees and costs, including process servicecosts, as unconstitutional since they restricted the plaintiffs’access to the court. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 372, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 115,91 S. Ct. at 783. The Court, in addressing the issue before it,noted that just as a denial of notice or an opportunity to be heardmay violate due process, "so too a cost requirement, valid on itsface, may offend due process because it operates to foreclose aparticular party’s opportunity to be heard." Boddie, 401 U.S. at380, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 120, 91 S. Ct. at 787. The Boddie Courtconcluded that

"the State’s refusal to admit these appellantsto its courts, the sole means in Connecticutfor obtaining a divorce, must be regarded asthe equivalent of denying them an opportunityto be heard upon their claimed right to adissolution of their marriages, and, in theabsence of a sufficient countervailingjustification for the State’s action, a denialof due process." Boddie, 401 U.S. at 380-81,28 L. Ed. 2d at 120-21, 91 S. Ct. at 787.

The Court then detailed the state's justification for the fees,"the prevention of frivolous litigation," which it found to be asubstantial interest. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 381, 28 L. Ed. 2d at121, 91 S. Ct. at 788. However, the Court determined that thestate's interest was not sufficient to override the plaintiffs'right of "having access to the only avenue open" for dissolution oftheir marriages. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 381, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 121, 91S. Ct. at 788. Specifically, the Boddie Court found that theapplication of the statute at issue "operate[d] to cut off entirelyaccess to the courts." Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382, 28 L. Ed. 2d at121, 91 S. Ct. at 788. With respect to its holding, the Courtstated:

"[W]e wish to re-emphasize that we go nofurther than necessary to dispose of the casebefore us ***. We do not decide that accessfor all individuals to the courts is a rightthat is, in all circumstances, guaranteed bythe Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment so that its exercise may not beplaced beyond the reach of any individual,for, as we have already noted, in the casebefore us this right is the exclusiveprecondition to the adjustment of afundamental human relationship." Boddie, 401U.S. at 382-83, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 122, 91 S. Ct.at 788.

            Clearly, based upon the above cases, the focus of access tothe courts, either under section 12 or due process, are fees foraccess to the courts, i.e., those required to file or maintain alawsuit in order to vindicate one's rights. As in Lee, the alleged"fee" here, statutory interest, is not a cost or charge requiredfor access to the courts, nor was Lakewood required to pay this"fee" in order to maintain an appeal. Similarly, Lakewood was notrequired to pay the "fee" as in Boddie or be foreclosed from itsopportunity to be heard in the appellate court. More specifically,the "fee" did not operate to "cut off entirely access to thecourts." Boddie, 401 U.S. at 382, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 121, 91 S. Ct.at 788. As the Rose court stated: "The United States Supreme Courthas invalidated only state fees that have made it impossible forlitigants seeking to vindicate fundamental rights to utilize thecourt system." Rose, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 102. Clearly, statutoryinterest is not the type of fee contemplated to fall under thepenumbra of section 12, nor due process principles. As such, theunderlying basis for Lakewood's challenge appears to be lacking.

            In any event, we find Lakewood's challenge to section 2-1303as violative of due process unpersuasive. Lakewood apparentlymaintains that section 12 creates a fundamental right to appellatereview, which cannot be hampered in any manner and that byrequiring it to either pay the full amount of the judgment awardedto plaintiff (whom it states was not entitled to the money) orappeal and, if it loses, pay statutory interest, denies it dueprocess.

            As has been repeatedly stated, section 12 does not create aconstitutional right to a certain remedy, or mandate that a certainremedy be provided in any specific form; rather, it merelyexpresses a general statement of philosophy. Unzicker v. KraftFood Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64, 83, 783 N.E.2d 1024 (2002);Segers v. Industrial Comm'n, 191 Ill. 2d 421, 435, 732 N.E.2d 488(2000); Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 458-59, 689N.E.2d 1057 (1997); DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, 147 Ill. 2d57, 75, 588 N.E.2d 1139 (1992). Stated differently, section 12"traditionally has been construed as a goal as opposed to arequirement of a specific remedy." Healy v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,359 Ill. App. 3d 186, 197, 833 N.E.2d 906 (2005). This section"only requires there be some remedy for an alleged wrong." Martinez v. Department of Public Aid, 348 Ill. App. 3d 788, 794,810 N.E.2d 608 (2004). Accordingly, it has been held that section12 does not create fundamental rights in the interests listed inthat provision. Gavery v. Lake County, 160 Ill. App. 3d 761, 767,513 N.E.2d 1127 (1987). "The free access clause protects litigantsfrom the imposition of unreasonable fees that interfere with theirright to a remedy in the law or impede with the due administrationof justice." Rose, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 99. Similarly, it has beenheld that federal due process is violated only if a person isdeprived of all existing remedies to enforce an existing right. Brinkerhoff Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 682,74 L. Ed. 1107, 1114, 50 S. Ct. 451, 454-55 (1930).

            Lakewood cites Cotting v. Godard, 183 U.S. 79, 46 L. Ed 92, 22S. Ct. 30 (1901), in support of its position that access to thecourts is a fundamental due process right. Cotting does notsupport Lakewood's argument. First, Cotting does not address anyquestion with respect to the adequacy of access to the courts, nordoes it interpret anything else with respect to access. Moreover,Cotting involved an equal protection challenge, not a due processchallenge, and, in this regard, the Court made the followinggeneral statement: " 'The 14^th Amendment *** undoubtedly intended,not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life orliberty, *** but that equal protection and security should be givento all under like circumstances [including] *** that they shouldhave like access to the courts of the country for the protection oftheir persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs***.' [Citation.]" (Emphasis added.) Cotting, 183 U.S. at 106,46 L. Ed. at 107, 22 S. Ct. at 41. Clearly, this statement doesnot define what necessary access to the courts must entail, northat the alleged access in the instant case is a fundamental right. We do not find this case controlling on the question of whetherLakewood’s access to appellate review is a fundamental right undersection 12.

            More instructive is Gavery, which clearly held that theinterests identified in section 12 are not fundamental rights. Moreover, none of the cases since Gavery interpreting section 12 oraddressing the constitutionality of a certain provision under thatsection have held that strict scrutiny applies. The cases haveutilized the rational basis test. See, e.g., Rose, 321 Ill. App.3d at 102-03; Mellon, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 624-25; Zamarron, 282Ill. App. 3d at 359-60. Accordingly, we find that Lakewood’schallenge is not subject to the strict scrutiny test; rather, therational basis test applies.

            Thus, we must determine whether section 2-1303 bears arational relationship to the purpose sought to be achieved by thelegislature in enacting the provision. Lakewood states that thepurpose of section 2-1303 is to make a plaintiff whole. We notethat there is no legislative pronouncement as to the purpose ofsection 2-1303, nor any history on the purpose. Only appellatecourt decisions have detailed what they believe to be the purposesought to be achieved by the legislature in enacting section 2-1303. In this regard, courts have stated that the rationale behindsection 2-1303 is to make the judgment creditor whole by requiringthe judgment debtor to give up the use of the money, therebyallowing the judgment creditor to use the funds to earn interestwhile the underlying matter is pending on appeal. Kramer v. MountCarmel Shelter Care Facility, 322 Ill. App. 3d 389, 393, 750 N.E.2d757 (2001). Stated differently, the money is paid to make theplaintiff whole because prior to payment he is denied access tofunds that were owed to him. Overlin v. Windmere Cove Partners,Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 75, 78, 756 N.E.2d 926 (2001). Morespecifically, section 2-1303 is aimed at fully compensating a partywhen his money has been wrongfully withheld. McKenzie Dredging Co.v. Deneen River Co., 249 Ill. App. 3d 694, 698, 619 N.E.2d 188(1993). Absent direct legislative intent on the purpose of section2-1303, we will presume these are the purposes underlying thissection.

            Lakewood has cited no case, either from Illinois or elsewhere,that has held that a postjudgment statutory interest rate violatesdue process. However, our independent research has disclosed onesuch case to the contrary. In Zintek v. Perchik, 163 Wis. 2d 439,471 N.W.2d 522 (App. Ct. 1991), the defendants challenged the awardof postjudgment interest to the plaintiff at the rate of 12% on thegrounds that it was "unfair, usurious and in violation ofsubstantive due process." Zintek, 163 Wis. 2d at 477, 471 N.W.2dat 537. Specifically, the defendants argued that the rate wasusurious "because prevailing market rates of return on investments[were] currently well below 12%, thus effectively causing thestatutory rate to operate as overcompensation to [the plaintiff]and as a penalty against the [defendants]." Zintek, 163 Wis. 2d at478, 471 N.W.2d at 537. More specifically, the defendants arguedthat "the legislature's choice of 12% as the rate of interest onverdicts is 'arbitrary and unreasonable' because it 'bears norational relationship to the interest a plaintiff might actuallyearn on a judgment, and it is contrary to [the compensatory]purpose" of the act. Zintek, 163 Wis. 2d at 478, 471 N.W.2d at537. The Zintek court disagreed, noting that "[i]t does notnecessarily follow that the only 'rational' interest rate is onewhich is in virtual lock-step with every fluctuation in marketconditions." Zintek, 163 Wis. 2d at 479, 471 N.W.2d at 538. TheZintek court noted that the purpose justifying an award of interest"is to compensate plaintiff for the forbearance of the income-producing ability of the money due." Zintek, 163 Wis. 2d at 479,471 N.W.2d at 538. According to the court, the "award of intereston the verdict in this case clearly serves this purpose." Zintek,163 Wis. 2d at 479, 471 N.W.2d at 538. The court further notedthat the accumulation of interest may also serve to motivate thedebtor to pay and that this "is not punishment," but "incentive." Zintek, 163 Wis. 2d at 479, 471 N.W.2d at 538. The court concludedthat a "non-usurious interest rate above the prevailing market rateis a rational means of providing such an incentive." Zintek, 163Wis. 2d at 479, 471 N.W.2d at 538. Accordingly, the court heldthat the provision affording postjudgment interest did not violatedue process.

            Lakewood's arguments are essentially the same as those inZintek, i.e., there is no rational relationship between the 9%interest rate because it overcompensates plaintiff and penalizesLakewood. We find Lakewood's argument, as in Zintek, unpersuasive. As plaintiff points out, the legislature, when it enacted the 9%interest rate, clearly was aware that market rates change (thisapparently was the basis for its change in 1980). However, thelegislature enacted a fixed rate. Simply because market conditionshave changed today and may bear a lesser rate of return does notmean that the 9% rate does not serve the purpose of compensating aplaintiff for the lack of use of funds owed to it. Clearly, anaward of interest serves what is deemed as the legislative purposein enacting the statute. We also find that the imposition ofinterest does not penalize Lakewood for appealing. Clearly,Lakewood could have paid the judgment to plaintiff and avoidedinterest entirely. Although Lakewood argues that if it did do so,plaintiff could have dissipated the money and, in the eventLakewood was ultimately successful, there would be nothing toreturn to it, we do not find this argument convincing. WhileLakewood's argument may be true, again, this is a policyconsideration for the legislature and is not a basis upon which wecan find section 12 unconstitutional. Accordingly, we find thatsection 2-1303 does not violate due process as it bears a rationalrelationship to the purpose sought to be achieved by thelegislature.

II. Equal Protection

            With respect to plaintiff's equal protection argument, therules stated above are similar and well settled, i.e.,

"[i]n conducting an equal protection analysis,we apply the same standards under both theUnited States Constitution and the IllinoisConstitution. [Citation.] The guarantee ofequal protection requires the government totreat similarly situated individuals in asimilar fashion. [Citation.] It does notprevent the government from drawingdistinctions between different categories ofpeople in enacting legislation, but it doesprohibit the government from doing so on thebasis of criteria wholly unrelated to thelegislation's purpose. [Citation.] Wherelegislation does not affect a fundamentalright or involve a suspect or quasi-suspectclassification, the appropriate level ofscrutiny is the rational basis test.[Citation.] Under the rational basis test, acourt's review of a classification is limitedand deferential. [Citation.] The courtsimply inquires whether the means the statuteemploys to achieve its purpose are rationallyrelated to that purpose. [Citation.] If anyset of facts can reasonably be conceived tojustify the classification, it will not beconstrued as violating the equal protectionguarantee. [Citation.]" Wauconda FireProtection District v. Stonewall Orchards,LLP, 214 Ill. 2d 417, 434, 828 N.E.2d 216(2005).

            Lakewood contends that the entire scheme of section 2-1303violates equal protection of both the federal and stateconstitutions because the provision creates disparate treatmentbetween judgment debtors and (1) judgment creditors and (2) allother parties to civil litigation. Again, Lakewood sets forth thetwo relevant tests, but fails to argue which one applies. Lakewoodmaintains, assuming 9% is an appropriate interest rate, that itdiscriminates against judgment debtors. Specifically, Lakewoodargues that if it had paid plaintiff the judgment amount, plaintiffwould not be required to post any security, plaintiff coulddissipate the money and, assuming the money was still in existence,if plaintiff were required to repay the money to it, plaintiffwould not be required to pay Lakewood interest. Because of this,Lakewood maintains that section 2-1310 does not protect judgmentcreditors and judgment debtors equally. Lakewood also maintainsthat section 2-1303 treats judgment debtors differently than otherparties to civil litigation where a money judgment is not involved,i.e., declaratory actions, because these parties are not requiredto pay interest.

            The rational basis test applies to Lakewood's equal protectionchallenge. Robles v. Chicago Transit Authority, 235 Ill. App. 3d121, 142, 601 N.E.2d 869 (1992) ("rational basis test applies indetermining the constitutionality [of section 2-1303] of theclassification since neither a fundamental right nor a suspectclass is involved"). Thus, the question is whether section 2-1303places similarly situated persons into different classificationsfor reasons wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation. Wefind that it does not. First, Lakewood has not demonstrated howthe two categories it relies upon are similarly situated to it. With respect to judgment creditors, they are not similarly situatedto judgment debtors. There has been no judgment entered against ajudgment creditor, implicating section 2-1303. If Lakewood meantto refer to plaintiffs, as it appears to since it argues that, ifit paid plaintiff the amount of the judgment and it ultimately won,plaintiff would not have to repay the money to it with interest,this argument is unpersuasive. From a plain reading of thestatute, section 2-1303 would, in Lakewood's hypotheticalsituation, apply to plaintiff. Specifically, if Lakewood had paidplaintiff the $870,820 judgment at the time it was originallyentered, appealed and was successful, and a new trial resulted ina verdict in favor of it, and plaintiff's subsequent appeal wasunsuccessful (all assumptions), then ultimately a judgment would beentered against plaintiff in favor of Lakewood, which necessarilywould require plaintiff to return the $870,820 to Lakewood. Atthis time, plaintiff would become the judgment debtor and section2-1303 would be invoked. Accordingly, plaintiff would be liable toLakewood for interest on the $870,820 until it paid the amount infull. Section 2-1303 does not use the terms plaintiff anddefendant; rather, it utilizes the term judgment debtor. As such,Lakewood's argument that plaintiff would not be required to payinterest appears to be erroneous. Accordingly, we find thatsection 2-1303 does not treat Lakewood differently than it treatsplaintiff, assuming the scenario Lakewood proposes occurred.

            With respect to other nonmonetary judgment debtors, Lakewoodhas offered no argument as to how or why such parties are similarlysituated to monetary judgment debtors, like itself. Again, we are"entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authoritycited and cohesive arguments presented" and we are not a"repository in to which an appellant may foist the burden ofargument and research." Obert, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 682. BecauseLakewood has not provided any argument on this question, we find itwaived.

            Based on the foregoing, we find that section 2-1303 does notviolate equal protection of law.

CONCLUSION

            For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuitcourt of Cook County.

            Affirmed.

            CAHILL, P.J., and GORDON, J., concur.