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SIXTH DIVISION
August 16, 2002

JUSTICE O'BRIEN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Peter Schivarelli and H.D. Stands, L.L.C., also known as Demon Dogs, appeal theorder of the circuit court dismissing their complaint against defendants, CBS Broadcasting, Inc.⁽¹⁾, WBBMTelevision, and Pamela Zekman, for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, commercialmisappropriation, and commercial disparagement. Plaintiffs also appeal the order of the circuit courtdenying the City of Chicago's motion to quash a subpoena directing its inspector general to produce aninvestigative report concerning Mr. Schivarelli. Defendants cross-appeal the order of the circuit courtrequiring the redaction of all recommendations and conclusions from the inspector general's report priorto its production. We affirm the order dismissing plaintiffs' amended complaint; we dismiss the appealand cross-appeal from the order requiring the production of the inspector general's report.

This case arises from a 30-second promotional announcement broadcast in 1999 on televisionstation WBBM-TV, channel 2 in Chicago, which is owned and operated by CBS Broadcasting, Inc. Thepromotional announcement consists of nine segments. The first segment consists of music over anintroductory on-screen graphic, "PAM ZEKMAN INVESTIGATES." The second segment shows Ms.Zekman, an investigative reporter for WBBM, seated in a studio, saying, "It's an outlet for people, we..." An accompanying on-screen graphic states, "INVESTIGATIONS that get results." The third segmentshows Ms. Zekman interviewing an unidentified man. The interview is conducted at an unidentified,outdoor location in front of a white wall with blue paneling and a picnic table. The interview consists,in its entirety, of Ms. Zekman saying to the man, "Let's sum this up for a second, the evidence seems toindicate that you're cheating the city." The fourth segment shows Ms. Zekman seated in the studio,saying, "A force for people that have been frustrated by wrongdoing that they see." An accompanyingon-screen graphic states, "uncovering CORRUPTION." The fifth segment shows Ms. Zekman in anoffice asking a woman, "Would you want to eat in that restaurant with food that has been out for five...." The sixth segment again shows Ms. Zekman seated in the studio, saying, "To get things corrected by theagencies that are supposed to correct them." An accompanying on-screen graphic states, "CHANGINGthe system." The seventh segment shows Ms. Zekman walking outdoors and asking anotherunidentified man, "You're not registered under the Act. Why haven't you registered?" The eighthsegment shows Ms. Zekman in the studio, saying, "Investigative reporting is a positive thing." Anaccompanying on-screen graphic states, "exposing ABUSES." The ninth segment features a male voicestating, "Pam Zekman investigates. Only on News 2 Chicago. Take another look."

Mr. Schivarelli alleges that he is the man in the third segment and that he is the majority ownerof H.D. Stands, which operates a Fullerton Avenue hot dog stand known as "Demon Dogs." This isuncontroverted.

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against defendants. Mr. Schivarelli alleged causes ofaction for defamation per se, false light invasion of privacy, and commercial misappropriation. H.D.Stands alleged causes of action for defamation per se, defamation per quod, false light invasion ofprivacy, and commercial disparagement. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant tosections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 1992)). The trial court granted defendants' motion and dismissed the amended complaint in its entirety pursuantto section 2-615. Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal.

First, we address the dismissal of Mr. Schivarelli's claim for defamation per se. Dismissal of acause of action pursuant to section 2-615 is appropriate only when it clearly appears that no set of factscould ever be proved under the pleadings that would entitle the plaintiff to recover. Mt. Zion State Bank& Trust v. Consolidated Communications, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 110, 115 (1995). Whether a complaint statesa valid cause of action is a question of law, and our review of a dismissal pursuant to a section 2-615motion is de novo. Majumdar v. Lurie, 274 Ill. App. 3d 267, 268, (1995).

A statement is defamatory if it impeaches a person's reputation and thereby lowers that personin the estimation of the community or deters third parties from associating with that person. Kolegasv. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1992). Defamatory statements may be actionable per seor actionable per quod. Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 10. A statement is defamatory per se if it is so obviouslyand naturally harmful to the person to whom it refers that injury to his reputation may be presumed. Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 10. Illinois law recognizes five categories of statements that are considereddefamatory per se: (1) those imputing the commission of a criminal offense; (2) those imputing infectionwith a loathsome communicable disease; (3) those imputing an inability to perform or want of integrityin the discharge of duties of office or employment; (4) those that prejudice a party, or impute lack ofability, in his or her trade, profession or business; and (5) those imputing adultery or fornication. VanHorne v. Muller, 185 Ill. 2d 299, 307 (1998).

Statements are defamatory per quod under two circumstances: (1) where the defamatorycharacter of the statement is not apparent on its face and resort to extrinsic circumstances is necessaryto demonstrate its injurious meaning; and (2) where the statement is defamatory on its face, but does notfall within one of the limited categories of statements that are actionable per se. Bryson v. News AmericaPublications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 103 (1996). Unlike a defamation per se action, plaintiff must plead andprove special damages to recover for defamation per quod. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 103.

Mr. Schivarelli argued that Ms. Zekman's statement to him, "Let's sum this up for a second, theevidence seems to indicate that you're cheating the city," constituted defamation per se, as it imputed:(1) the commission of a criminal offense; (2) a want of integrity in the discharge of duties of office oremployment; and (3) a lack of ability in his profession or business. Mr. Schivarelli also argued that Ms.Zekman's statement must be considered in the context of the entire 30-second promotionalannouncement, which trumpets Ms. Zekman's ability to dig up hidden corruption, abuse and unethicalor illegal conduct. The trial court dismissed Mr. Schivarelli's claim of defamation per se, ruling that Ms.Zekman's statement constituted a constitutionally protected opinion.

Prior to 1990, the Illinois Supreme Court perceived a fundamental distinction betweenstatements of fact and statements of opinion for first amendment purposes. The court held thatstatements of opinion were protected by the first amendment and not actionable in a defamation action. Owen v. Carr, 113 Ill. 2d 273 (1986); Mittelman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220 (1989). The court's holdingwas grounded primarily on dictum contained in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 41L. Ed. 2d 789, 805, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3006-07 (1974): "Under the First Amendment there is no such thingas a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on theconscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."

However, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1, 18, 110 S. Ct. 2695,2706 (1990), the United States Supreme Court reexamined the law of defamation within the context ofthe first amendment and held that a false assertion of fact can be libelous even though couched in termsof an opinion. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 17-18, 110 S. Ct. at 2705-06 (simplycouching the statement "Jones is a liar" in terms of opinion--"In my opinion Jones is a liar"--does notdispel the factual implications contained in the statement). Under Milkovich, a statement of opinionis constitutionally protected under the first amendment only if it cannot be reasonably interpreted asstating actual facts. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 19, 110 S. Ct. at 2706. Whether astatement qualifies as constitutionally protected speech under the first amendment is a matter of law forthe court to decide. Dubinsky v. United Airlines Master Executive Council, 303 Ill. App. 3d 317, 324(1999).

The Illinois Supreme Court has adopted the Milkovich test. See, e.g., Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d 1; Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d 77. The emphasis in the Milkovich test is on whether the allegedly defamatorystatement contains an objectively verifiable assertion. Wynne v. Loyola University, 318 Ill. App. 3d 443,452 (2000).

Mr. Schivarelli argues that Ms. Zekman's statement to him, "Let's sum this up for a second, theevidence seems to indicate that you're cheating the city," is objectively verifiable and, thus, actionable. Dubinsky and Hopewell v. Vitullo, 299 Ill. App. 3d 513 (1998), are on point. In Dubinsky, plaintiffsbrought an action for defamation and false light invasion of privacy arising from several statements madeby defendants (members of a commercial pilots' labor union). Dubinsky, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 321-22. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants falsely accused them of criminal conduct related to the employeepurchase of United Airlines under an employee stock ownership plan. Dubinsky, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 321. Specifically, plaintiff Dubinsky alleged that defendant Richards defamed him by calling him a crook infront of about 30 or 40 United Airlines pilots and their wives. Dubinsky, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 329. Thetrial court upheld Dubinsky's defamation count, ruling that Richards' statement accused Dubinsky ofcriminal conduct. Dubinsky, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 329. The appellate court reversed, holding:

"Richards' statement that Dubinsky was a 'crook' was not actionable because it was notmade in any specific factual context. One cannot rely on an assumption that those who heardthe statement were completely apprised of all the developments in the *** controversy so as tocreate a definitive factual context for the use of the word 'crook.' Based on the totality of thecircumstances, we conclude that this general statement, in the absence of factual context, is astatement of opinion, not objectively verifiable and devoid of factual content." Dubinsky, 303Ill. App. 3d at 329-30.

In Hopewell, the plaintiff was hired in February 1992 and paid $7,000 per month to be treasurerand chief financial officer of the Carol Moseley Braun for U.S. Senate Committee (the Committee). Hopewell, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 515. In March 1996, Senator Braun (the defendant) informed plaintiff that,from that point on, he would be working on a volunteer basis. Hopewell, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 515. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Senator and the Committee for breach of contract, retaliatorydischarge, and violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (820 ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West1996)). Hopewell, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 515.

Upon filing the complaint, plaintiff commented to the press regarding the Senator's campaignfinances. Hopewell, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 516. In response, defendant told the Chicago Tribune thatplaintiff "was fired because of incompetence." Hopewell, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 516. Plaintiff then filed alawsuit against defendant for defamation. Hopewell, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 516.

The trial court dismissed plaintiff's defamation action. Hopewell, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 515. Theappellate court affirmed, holding that the phrase "fired because of incompetence" was a nonactionableopinion because it was not made in any specific factual context and thus lacked a precise and readilyunderstood meaning. Hopewell, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 519-20. The court further noted that readers easilycould conclude defendant's statement was an effort at "posturing" before plaintiff's ensuing legal battlewith the Senator. Hopewell, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 520. Finally, the court held that defendant's statementwas "too broad, conclusory, and subjective to be objectively verifiable." Hopewell, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 520.

Similarly, here, Ms. Zekman's statement to Mr. Schivarelli, "Let's sum this up for a second, theevidence seems to indicate that you're cheating the city," was not made in any specific factual context. Ms. Zekman did not explain the evidence that she was referring to, nor did she state why she thoughtMr. Schivarelli was cheating the city, how he was cheating the city, or even what she meant by the term"cheating." See El Paso Times, Inc. v. Kerr, 706 S.W.2d 797, 798-99 (Tex. App. Ct. 1986)("Cheating hasno unique definition. It may, in some instances, imply criminal acts; it also serves to accuse one of unfairdealings. It is not a word which has a precise meaning. It means different things to different people atdifferent times and in different situations").

Nor did the remainder of the 30-second promotional announcement provide any context for Ms.Zekman's statement to Mr. Schivarelli; rather, the remainder of the promotional announcement featuredMs. Zekman interviewing other persons and making general comments about her job, while on-screengraphics touted her performance as an investigative reporter. In the absence of any factual context, Ms.Zekman's statement to Mr. Schivarelli was a nonactionable opinion, as it was too broad, conclusory, andsubjective to be objectively verifiable.

Mr. Schivarelli argues that Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1(1992), andKumaran v. Brotman, 247 Ill. App. 3d 216 (1993), compel a different result. In Kolegas, the plaintiffbrought a defamation per se action against two radio disc-jockeys and their broadcasting corporation. The plaintiff was promoting and producing classic cartoon festivals in order to raise money and increasethe public awareness of neurofibromatosis, also known as Elephant Man's disease. Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2dat 6. The plaintiff called the radio station at one point, introduced himself as Anthony Kolegas, anddiscussed the festival on the air. Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 6-7. Suddenly, the radio personalities hung upon him and stated that Kolegas was "not for real," that he was just "scamming" them, and that there was"no such show as the classic cartoon festival." Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 7. Our supreme court affirmed theappellate court and held that the word "scamming" could be found to be defamatory per se because itimputed a lack of integrity in the discharge of employment duties and prejudiced the plaintiff in hisbusiness by implying that he was lying and trying to deceive the defendants and the public at large. Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 12.

In Kumaran, the plaintiff was a school teacher, and the defendant's newspaper article accusedhim of "working a scam" by being engaged in the full-time occupation of filing "unwarranted suits forsettlement money." Kumaran, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 219-20, 225-27. The appellate court held that theseremarks could be found to be defamatory per se because they essentially accused the teacher of being a"swindler" and therefore prejudiced him in his profession as a schoolteacher and presented him assomeone who would not be an acceptable role model for young students. Kumaran, 247 Ill. App. 3d at226-27.

Mr. Schivarelli argues that Ms. Zekman's statement to him, that "the evidence seems to indicatethat you're cheating the city," is similar to the "scamming" statements in Kolegas and Kumaran. Wedisagree. The defendants in Kolegas and Kumaran did not simply state that the plaintiffs were engagedin a "scam"; they also explained the factual basis behind their statements, i.e., that Kolegas was deceivingthe public regarding a cartoon festival, and that Kumaran was filing unwarranted lawsuits for thesettlement money. By contrast, Ms. Zekman gave no similar factual context for her statement that Mr.Schivarelli was "cheating" the city; accordingly, Kolegas and Kumaran are inapposite.

Mr. Schivarelli also cites Moriarty v. Greene, 315 Ill. App. 3d 225 (2000). In Moriarty, defendantBob Greene, a columnist for the Chicago Tribune, wrote several columns regarding a particular childcustody dispute that was resolved in a 1995 opinion of our supreme court granting custody to thebiological father "forthwith." The child had been in the care and custody of adoptive parents for fouryears, until the supreme court granted custody to the biological father in January 1995. Plaintiff, alicensed clinical psychologist, coordinated a team of mental health professionals assembled at the father'srequest to implement the supreme court order awarding custody. Moriarty, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 228.

One of Greene's columns stated that plaintiff has "readily admitted that she sees her job as doingwhatever the natural parents instruct her to do." Moriarty, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 228. The appellate courtfound that this statement was defamatory per se, as it imputed that plaintiff lacked the ability andintegrity to discharge the duties of her employment. Moriarty, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 231-33. The appellatecourt specifically noted that the statement was a "factual assertion, capable of being proven true or false." Moriarty, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 233.

Unlike Moriarty, Ms. Zekman's statement was not objectively verifiable (see our discussionabove); accordingly, Moriarty is inapposite.

Next, we address the dismissal of Mr. Schivarelli's claim for false light invasion of privacy. Thefalse light tort protects a person's interest in being free from false publicity. Lovgren v. Citizens FirstNational Bank of Princeton, 126 Ill. 2d 411, 418 (1989). To state a claim for a false light invasion ofprivacy, a plaintiff must allege the defendant's actions placed the plaintiff in a false light before thepublic, that the false light would be highly offensive to the reasonable person, and that the defendantacted with actual malice. Lovgren, 126 Ill. 2d at 419-20. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a falselight claim will not be granted unless no set of facts can be proven to entitle the plaintiff to relief. Lovgren, 126 Ill. 2d at 419.

As in defamation actions, statements that are expressions of opinion devoid of any factual contentare not actionable as false light claims. Moriarty, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 237; Dubinsky, 303 Ill. App. 3d at332. As discussed, Ms. Zekman's statement was an expression of opinion devoid of any factual content;accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing Mr. Schivarelli's false light claim.

Next, we address the dismissal of Mr. Schivarelli's claim for commercial misappropriationpursuant to the Right of Publicity Act (Act) (765 ILCS 1075/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Section 30 of the Actprovides, "A person may not use an individual's identity for commercial purposes during the individual'slifetime without having obtained previous written consent ***." 765 ILCS 1075/30(a) (West 1998). However, section 35 provides, "This Act does not apply to *** use of an individual's identity fornoncommercial purposes, including any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or anypolitical campaign; *** [or] promotional materials, advertisements, or commercial announcements for[such] a use." (Emphasis added.) 765 ILCS 1075/35 (b)(2),(b)(4) (West 1998).

Mr. Schivarelli claims that defendants misappropriated his "likeness" for commercial purposesin violation of section 30 of the Act. We disagree. The promotional announcement featuring Mr.Schivarelli was broadcast, not for commercial purposes, but for the noncommercial purpose of promotingMs. Zekman's news reports on WBBM channel 2. As such, Mr. Schivarelli's claim for commercialmisappropriation is precluded by section 35 of the Act. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Mr.Schivarelli's commercial misappropriation claim.

Mr. Schivarelli argues that Ainsworth v. Century Supply Co., 295 Ill. App. 3d 644 (1998),compels a different result. In Ainsworth, the appellate court held that the plaintiff stated a cause ofaction for commercial misappropriation where defendant made commercial use of plaintiff's likeness byincluding it in an advertisement that defendant had been commissioned to create. Ainsworth, 295 Ill.App. 3d at 648-49. Ainsworth is inapposite because, as discussed, Mr. Schivarelli's "likeness" or identitywas used, not for commercial purposes, but for the noncommercial purpose of promoting Ms. Zekman'snews reports on WBBM, channel 2.

Next, we address the dismissal of H.D. Stands' (a/k/a Demon Dogs') claims of defamation perse, defamation per quod, and false light invasion of privacy. H.D. Stands alleged that it was defamedand that its privacy was invaded by the promotional announcement featuring Ms. Zekman's interviewof Mr. Schivarelli, in which she accused him of "cheating" the city, followed by the depiction of Ms.Zekman asking another woman about spoiled food.

An essential element of a defamation per se or defamation per quod claim is that the challengedstatement be "of and concerning the plaintiff" (Aroonsakul v. Shannon, 279 Ill. App. 3d 345, 350 (1996)),i.e., that the alleged defamatory statement be identifiably about the plaintiff. The requirement in adefamation case that the statement be "of and concerning the plaintiff" is equally applicable to a falselight claim. Aroonsakul, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 350.

Here, the allegedly defamatory statements are not "of and concerning" H.D. Stands or DemonDogs. Neither H.D. Stands nor Demon Dogs is mentioned anywhere in the audio portion of thepromotional announcement. Further, the promotional announcement contains nothing to suggest thatthe outdoor location in which Ms. Zekman interviewed Mr. Schivarelli has anything to do with H.D.Stands or Demon Dogs, nor is there any link between H.D. Stands/Demon Dogs and the excerptconcerning unsanitary conditions at unnamed restaurants. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of H.D.Stands'/Demon Dogs' claims for defamation per se, defamation per quod, and false light invasion ofprivacy.

H.D. Stands/Demon Dogs argues that Desnick v. American Broadcasting Cos., 44 F.3d 1345(7th Cir. 1995), and Boese v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 952 F. Supp. 550 (N.D. Ill. 1996), compel adifferent result. In Desnick, ABC broadcast a report about allegedly wrongful practices at an eye clinic,which included footage of two of the clinic's doctors. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1348. Part of the reportconcerned the clinic's auto-refractor (or glare machine), which tests whether the patient suffers from anyglare problems. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1348. The report alleged that the clinic tampered with the glaremachine in order to deceive patients into thinking that they needed cataract surgery. Desnick, 44 F.3dat 1348-49.

The reference to tampering followed footage of the two doctors themselves, which depicted themasking patients about glare. Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1349. The court held that the two doctors had beensufficiently linked to the allegedly defamatory statement (about tampering with the glare machine) suchthat the statement reasonably could be understood to be of and concerning them. Desnick, 44 F.3d at1349-50.

In Boese, the television show "Hard Copy" broadcast a program containing footage of plaintifftestifying against defendant at trial; later in the program, defendant states that "everybody" involved inthe trial had "lied." Boese, 952 F. Supp. at 552. Plaintiff brought a defamation action against defendant. The court held that the defendant's statement (that "everybody" involved in the trial had lied) reasonablycould be understood to be of and concerning plaintiff, who had been depicted as testifying at the trial. Boese, 952 F. Supp. at 555.

Unlike the plaintiffs in Desnick and Boese, the promotional announcement at issue here doesnot link H.D. Stands/Demon Dogs or any aspect of its food handling with the allegedly defamatorystatements. Accordingly, Desnick and Boese are inapposite.

Next, we address the dismissal of H.D. Stands'/Demon Dogs' claim for commercialdisparagement. Currently, it is disputed as to whether a cause of action for commercial disparagementremains viable in Illinois. See Barry Harlem Corp. v. Kraff, 273 Ill. App. 3d 388, 396 (1995), citingAppraisers Coalition v. Appraisal Institute, 845 F. Supp. 592, 610 (N.D. Ill. 1994). Even assuming,arguendo, that such a cause of action exists, H.D. Stands/Demon Dogs has failed to state such a claim. To state a cause of action, H.D. Stands/Demon Dogs must show that defendants made false anddemeaning statements regarding the quality of H.D. Stands'/Demon Dogs' goods and services. BarryHarlem Corp., 273 Ill. App. 3d at 396. As discussed, the statements at issue do not relate to H.D.Stands/Demon Dogs or to the quality of its goods and services; accordingly, we affirm the dismissal ofH.D. Stands'/Demon Dogs' commercial disparagement claim.

Finally, we address an order of the trial court denying the City of Chicago's motion to quash asubpoena directing its inspector general to produce an investigative report about Mr. Schivarelli.

During discovery in this case, defendants served a subpoena on the City of Chicago (City),seeking a report relating to a 1997 investigation of Mr. Schivarelli by the City's inspector general. Defendants sought the inspector general's investigative report because the report supposedlydemonstrated the truth of Ms. Zekman's allegedly defamatory statements about Mr. Schivarelli. The Citymoved to quash the subpoena. On August 16, 2001, the trial court denied the motion to quash andordered the City to produce a redacted portion of the investigative report. Plaintiffs appeal the August16, 2001, order, arguing that the trial court erred in denying the City's motion to quash; defendants cross-appeal the August 16, 2001, order, arguing that the trial court erred in requiring the City to redact certainportions of the inspector general's report.

The trial court ordered the City to produce the investigative report because the court determinedthat the report potentially contained "factual information *** pertinent" to plaintiffs' defamation, falselight, commercial misappropriation, and commercial disparagement claims. Since we are affirming thetrial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' defamation, false light, commercial misappropriation, and commercialdisparagement claims, any judgment on the issue of the inspector general's report would have nopractical legal effect on any existing controversy. Consequently, plaintiffs' appeal and defendants' cross-appeal from the trial court's August 16, 2001, order are dismissed as moot. See Mount Carmel HighSchool v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 279 Ill. App. 3d 122, 124 (1996) (A case is moot when it seeks ajudgment upon some matter that, when rendered, has no practical legal effect on an existingcontroversy).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court dismissing plaintiffs' amendedcomplaint; we dismiss the plaintiffs' appeal and the defendants' cross-appeal from the circuit court'sAugust 16, 2001, order requiring the City to produce the inspector general's report.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part.

GALLAGHER, P.J., and BUCKLEY, J., concur.

1. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., is incorrectly identified in the complaint as "CBS Inc."