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FIRST DIVISION
June 30, 2003

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Joseph Sangirardi was discharged from his duties as a Stickney police officer bydefendants Village of Stickney (Village), Village chief of police John Zitek (Chief Zitek), VillageBoard of Fire and Police Commissioners (the Board), and board commissioners Edwin Noska,James Bernard and Fred Schimel. Plaintiff filed an action for administrative review of theBoard's decision. The circuit court of Cook County affirmed the Board, and plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that he was deprived of his due process rights, alleging thatthe Board was biased due to ex parte communications, violated the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS120/1 et seq. (West 1998)), and improperly subjected plaintiff to disciplinary action when heinvoked the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/1et seq. (West 1998)) to prevent disclosure of his psychological evaluation results. Plaintiff alsocontends that the Board's findings of fact were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Moreover, plaintiff contends that the Board's finding that cause existed to discharge him wasarbitrary, unreasonable and unrelated to the requirements of service. For the reasons that follow,we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was employed as a police officer for the Village from July 1988 until February1999. In a letter to the Board dated June 15, 1998, Chief Zitek expressed concern that plaintiff'sescalating misconduct was compromising the police department and asked the Board to considerappropriate professional counseling for plaintiff or disciplinary action. In the letter, Chief Zitekalleged that plaintiff was not understanding and considerate when handling juvenile situations;did not accept advice from superiors; displayed poor judgment in performing his duties; haddifficulty in making a good impression when dealing with the public; and violated the conflict ofinterest and fairness and impartiality provisions of the code of ethics. The letter referred theBoard to "[s]ee attachments and reference to various reports and documents."

On June 16, 1998, the Board convened, reviewed Chief Zitek's June 15 letter and sentChief Zitek a letter recommending, inter alia, that plaintiff undergo a psychological evaluationand that disciplinary action be taken pending the results of the professional evaluation.

In June, July and August of 1998, Chief Zitek ordered plaintiff to undergo apsychological evaluation to determine his fitness for duty (fitness exam) as a result of incidentsinvolving plaintiff's slamming of a police car door and actions pertaining to a juvenile. Althoughplaintiff reported for the scheduled fitness exams, the exams were not administered or completedbecause plaintiff would not sign certain forms or consent to release the results of the fitness examto Chief Zitek. On September 3, 1998, Chief Zitek again ordered plaintiff to undergo the fitnessexam rescheduled for September 15, 1998, and to release the results to Chief Zitek. Plaintiffsubmitted to that fitness exam, which was conducted by psychologist Harry E. Gunn.

On September 23, 1998, Chief Zitek wrote the Board a letter requesting review ofplaintiff's action of assisting the North Riverside police department without prior authorizationfrom his superiors. The letter also referred to "attachments" and "various reports anddocuments." The Board convened on September 25, 1998, and reviewed Chief Zitek's letter.

On Saturday, October 10, 1998, Chief Zitek issued an order noting that plaintiff hadparticipated in the fitness exam, that Dr. Gunn had issued a report of the result of that exam, andthat plaintiff refused to release that report. Chief Zitek ordered plaintiff to release that reportwithin 48 hours.

On October 15, 1998, Chief Zitek filed with the Board formal disciplinary charges againstplaintiff, alleging (1) that on October 12, 1998, plaintiff refused to obey Chief Zitek's order torelease to Chief Zitek the results of plaintiff's fitness exam (hereinafter, the insubordinationcharge); (2) that in September 1998, plaintiff assisted the North Riverside police departmentwithout prior approval from his superiors and then demonstrated disrespect to a superior officerin a letter to the North Riverside police department; (3) that on June 18, 1998, plaintiff damageda police car by closing the car door with excessive force and openly criticized Chief Zitek in thepresence of another officer; and (4) that on two separate occasions in 1997, plaintiff handcuffed ajuvenile and then made false statements regarding each incident. The Board issued a writtenorder suspending plaintiff without pay and scheduled a hearing date for the charges.

The parties stipulated that plaintiff was not notified of the Board's meetings on June 16,September 25 and October 15, 1998; plaintiff was not present at those meetings; minutes werenot taken of those meetings; and those meetings were not transcribed.

On October 23, 1998, the Board convened, appointed special counsel to the Board, andamended its October 15 order to reschedule the hearing and reinstate plaintiff's pay during hissuspension. Prior to the hearing, plaintiff requested production of the documents attached toChief Zitek's June 15 and September 23, 1998 letters; however, the attachments were notproduced prior to the final administrative decision by the Board.

On October 26, 1998, Chief Zitek filed an additional charge, alleging that on March 17,1998 (later amended to March 18, 1998), plaintiff verbally threatened a local businessman, lateridentified as Terry Cleary, with whom plaintiff was involved in litigation (hereinafter, the Clearycharge).

The Administrative Hearing

The administrative hearing commenced in November 1998 and was bifurcated to firstaddress the validity of the charges and then, if necessary, to consider the appropriate disciplinarysanction. However, in December 1998, the Board dismissed on jurisdictional grounds the threecharges pertaining to the incidents involving the North Riverside police department, the slammedcar door, and the juvenile. The Board found that those three charges were barred because theyhad been the subject of prior communications from Chief Zitek to the Board and thus constituteda filing of charges without a hearing having been commenced within 30 days of thosecommunications. Accordingly, the hearing proceeded only on two charges--the insubordinationcharge and the Cleary charge. Prior to the commencement of the evidentiary portion of thehearing, counsel to the Board advised and admonished the Board that it:

"may not and should not consider any materials, information, communications,documents or otherwise which were received by it from any source whatsoeveroutside of the formal hearing process, and this Board must conduct its hearing and[reach its] decision based solely on the evidence that is presented and thetestimony that is presented during the hearing which [the Board has] nowscheduled."

Plaintiff was represented by counsel, and over several hearing sessions the Board heardtestimony from nine witnesses and received numerous exhibits from the parties.

Terry Cleary testified that he was the chief executive officer of Suburban Fence, Inc., andin July 1997 entered a contract to build a fence at plaintiff's home. Thereafter, Cleary filed alawsuit to recover the balance due, and the trial court entered judgment for Cleary on March 17,1998. Cleary testified that plaintiff was upset by the verdict, loudly called Cleary a thief, and wasrestrained by plaintiff's own lawyer. Plaintiff and his witness, Charles Daniels, a lumbersalesman, essentially corroborated Cleary's testimony, although they characterized the conflict asverbal and nonthreatening.

Cleary also testified that on the morning of March 18, 1998, he received a telephone callat his Cicero office at 708-652-7259 and immediately recognized plaintiff's voice. Clearytestified that plaintiff threatened to use Cleary's face to play curb racquetball and that Clearycould be hit in the head with his own two-by-fours or run over by a bus. Cleary reported thetelephone call to the Cicero police department, which dispatched police officer Louis Sedlacek tothe scene. Although Cleary told Officer Sedlacek the details concerning the threats, Cleary didnot review Officer Sedlacek's report, which incorrectly indicated that Cleary's office telephonehad "Caller ID." Moreover, Officer Sedlacek's report incorrectly listed 708-383-5000, thetelephone number of Cleary's Oak Park branch office, as the telephone number of Cleary's Cicerooffice.

Cicero police officer Sedlacek testified that although Cleary told him about the threatinvolving the bus, Officer Sedlacek failed to include that threat in his report. Officer Sedlacektestified confusingly and inconsistently concerning the notation in his report that the "Caller I'D[sic] displayed phone number of 708-652-7259 to which call came from" and concerning whetherhe authored the entire police report.

Plaintiff's wife Jackie Sangirardi testified that both she and plaintiff were asleep at thetime the alleged telephone threat took place.

Plaintiff testified that he did not threaten Cleary on March 18, 1998, and was asleep whenthe alleged threat was made. Plaintiff also testified that although he complied with each orderdirecting him to report for testing, the fitness exam was not actually conducted until September15, 1998. During the attempted fitness exams, plaintiff informed the examiners that he had beenordered to sign the release and that he did not waive his rights to confidentiality of his mentalhealth records. As a result, the examiners refused to administer the exam. When plaintiffsubmitted to the fitness exam on September 15, 1998, he agreed that Dr. Gunn would releasecopies of plaintiff's fitness report to plaintiff's attorney and to Chief Zitek's attorney. Dr. Gunnprepared two reports, one shortly after the September 15 exam and the other, an update, in earlyOctober. Plaintiff's attorney and Chief Zitek's attorney received those reports by October 5,1998.

Plaintiff testified that by Thursday, October 8, 1998, he directed his attorney to informChief Zitek's attorney that plaintiff would not agree to an in camera review of his fitness reportuntil after another expert either tested plaintiff or reviewed Dr. Gunn's report. The partiesstipulated that plaintiff's attorney never moved a court to conduct an in camera review of Dr.Gunn's report, and no in camera review was ever conducted.

Plaintiff testified that, about 6 p.m. on Saturday, October 10, 1998, he received ChiefZitek's order to release the fitness exam results to Chief Zitek within 48 hours. Plaintiff alsotestified that he understood that as of 6:05 p.m. on Monday, October 12, 1998, he had officiallyrefused to obey Chief Zitek's October 10 order.

Chief Zitek testified that he was employed as the Village chief for six years, andpreviously was employed by the Chicago police department for 32 years. In ordering plaintiff toundergo the fitness exam, Chief Zitek considered a detective's reprimand of plaintiff, a letterfrom the mother of a juvenile handcuffed by plaintiff, an officer's report regarding the car doorslamming incident, and a sergeant's report regarding plaintiff's conduct during a "DUI" arrest. According to Chief Zitek, he did not seek the entire results of plaintiff's fitness exam, but soughtonly Dr. Gunn's determination of whether plaintiff was fit for duty.

Plaintiff called three witnesses to support his contention that Chief Zitek filed thedisciplinary charges based on his personal animosity toward plaintiff. Specifically, Donna Jahiritestified that Chief Zitek seemed upset in October 1998 when she suggested that plaintiff shouldbe assigned to traffic duty at the local school. Further, Mary Matis testified that she wrote a letterto the police department and the Village thanking several officers, including plaintiff, for theirefforts in locating her lost child during the summer of 1998. According to Matis, Chief Zitekcontacted her on September 11, 1998, and asked her to correct her letter to credit the particularofficer who had actually located Matis's child. In addition, Loretta Reese testified that in July1998 or later Chief Zitek spoke to her about an incident involving her arrest by plaintiff andinquired whether she had obtained a lawyer with respect to that incident. Reese, however, couldnot recollect certain events despite several attempts by plaintiff's counsel to refresh herrecollection with her affidavit.

During closing argument at the administrative hearing, plaintiff's counsel again raised theissue of plaintiff's request to Chief Zitek and the Board to produce the missing attachments toChief Zitek's June 15 and September 23 letters. Counsel to the Board stated on the record that heand Board looked for the attachments, which pertained only to the dismissed charges, and werenot able to identify or find any specific attachments from any of the records in their possession. On January 20, 1999, the Board sustained the insubordination and Cleary charges againstplaintiff and then on February 11, 1999, heard additional evidence and argument concerning theappropriate sanction.

The Final Administrative Decision

On February 17, 1999, the Board issued a final administrative decision, finding that theinsubordination and Cleary charges independently warranted plaintiff's discharge fromemployment. The Board noted that it was:

"mindful of the admonition of its counsel that prior communications to the Boardfrom [Chief Zitek] must be disregarded in the Board's consideration of the chargespresently before it, and in connection with any disciplinary sanction to beimposed. In fact, those prior communications were the basis for this Board'sdecision to dismiss all charges which were the subject of those priorcommunications."

Regarding the insubordination charge, the Board noted the public interest in assuring thatofficers have the psychological stability to properly perform all necessary duties and found thatChief Zitek had reasonable cause to order the fitness exam. The Board also found Chief Zitek'stestimony straightforward, whereas plaintiff's evidence of alleged animosity was unpersuasivebecause it consisted of incidents that occurred while plaintiff was negotiating whether and whento obey the order to take the fitness exam and release the results. The Board determined thatChief Zitek's order was lawful, direct and unequivocal and that plaintiff's continued refusal toobey that order undermined the good order and discipline of the police department.

Regarding the Cleary charge, the Board found Cleary's account of plaintiff's telephonethreats credible and supported by the evidence. Cleary was vigorously cross-examined andimpressed the Board with his demeanor, straightforward answers and candor. Moreover, Cleary'saccount of the telephone threat was supported by evidence of plaintiff's animosity toward Clearyin the courtroom on March 17 and was not impeached by Officer Sedlacek or plaintiff's wife,who acknowledged that she was asleep when the telephone threat occurred.

The Board determined that plaintiff's insubordinate conduct justified discharge whereplaintiff delayed taking the fitness exam, never complied with the order to release the examresults, and never requested additional time to attempt to comply with the order despite hisopportunity to consult his counsel. Moreover, a disciplinary sanction other than discharge wouldhave deprecated the seriousness of the Cleary offense where plaintiff's direct and specific threatsof personal violence violated the rules and regulations of the department, potentially violated theState's criminal laws, were antithetical to the position and duties of a police officer, and broughtdisrepute upon the entire police department.

The circuit court of Cook County denied plaintiff's petition for administrative review andaffirmed the Board's decision. Plaintiff appealed.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

On appeal, this court reviews the administrative agency's decision and not that of thecircuit court. Krocka v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, 327 Ill. App. 3d 36, 46 (2001). Anadministrative agency's decisions on questions of fact are entitled to deference and are reversedonly if against the manifest weight of the evidence. Launius v. Board of Fire & PoliceCommissioners, 151 Ill. 2d 419, 427 (1992). However, questions of law are not entitled to thesame deference and are reviewed de novo. XL Disposal Corp. v. Zehnder, 304 Ill. App. 3d 202,207 (1999).

I. Due Process Violation Claims

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the evidence established the Board's bias against himwhere the Board allegedly (1) engaged in ex parte communications with Chief Zitek and failed todisclose documents Chief Zitek gave the Board ex parte; (2) violated the Open Meetings Act; and(3) failed to require Chief Zitek to follow Illinois' statutory framework pertaining to thedisclosure of mental health records. We disagree.

Administrative hearings are governed by the fundamental principles and requirements ofdue process of law. Krocka, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 49. A fair hearing before an administrative entitymust include the opportunity to be heard, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, andimpartial rulings on the evidence. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of ProfessionalRegulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 95 (1992). Not all accepted requirements of due process in the trial ofa case are necessary at an administrative hearing. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc. v.Pollution Control Board, 175 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1036 (1988). Due process requirements aredetermined by balancing the weight of the individual's interest against society's interest ineffective and efficient governmental operation. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., 175 Ill. App.3d at 1037.

A. Ex Parte Communications

Plaintiff contends that the Board's review of Chief Zitek's June 15 and September 23letters and attachments constituted ex parte communications and prejudiced the Board againstplaintiff. Plaintiff also argues that the Board's failure to disclose those attachments preventedhim from learning the nature and extent of the ex parte communications and, thus, denied him ameaningful opportunity to rebut all the evidence presented to the Board.

A court will not reverse an agency's decision because of ex parte contacts with membersof that agency absent a showing that prejudice to the complaining party resulted from suchcontacts. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., 175 Ill. App. 3d at 1043. There is a presumptionthat administrative officials are objective and capable of fairly judging a particular controversy. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., 175 Ill. App. 3d at 1040. Moreover, the fact that anadministrative official has taken a public position or expressed strong views on an issue beforethe administrative agency does not overcome the presumption. Waste Management of Illinois,Inc., 175 Ill. App. 3d at 1040. Where the administrative agency operates in an adjudicatorycapacity, bias or prejudice may only be shown if a disinterested observer might conclude that theadministrative body, or its members, had in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the lawof the case in advance of hearing it. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., 175 Ill. App. 3d at1040.

Here, the Board treated Chief Zitek's June 15 and September 23 letters as the filing ofdisciplinary charges against plaintiff. Because a hearing was not commenced within 30 days,⁽¹⁾the Board dismissed the three charges that pertained to plaintiff's allegations of ex parte contacts. Furthermore, prior to the commencement of the evidentiary portion of the hearing, counsel to theBoard advised and admonished the Board that it could not consider any materials, information orcommunications received outside of the formal hearing process and must reach its decision basedsolely on the evidence and testimony presented during the formal hearing. Moreover, in the finaladministrative decision, the Board stressed that it had heeded counsel's admonishment. Inaddition, no evidence in the record suggests that the Board ever considered any of the extraneousmaterials in reaching its final decision. Counsel to the Board's simple and strongly wordedadmonishment to the Board to ignore any ex parte communications cured any prejudice resultingfrom the Board's extraneous knowledge of information concerning the dismissed charges. Diamond v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 115 Ill. App. 3d 437, 444 (1983) (a simpleand strongly worded admonition to the board to ignore the results of polygraph examserroneously included in an administrative complaint would have cured the prejudice resultingfrom the Board's extraneous knowledge of the polygraph exams).

We find unpersuasive plaintiff's contention that evidence of the Board's bias is found inits June 16 letter to Chief Zitek, where the Board recommended a psychiatric evaluation andsuggested that disciplinary action might include dismissal from the force. The statements in theBoard's June 16 letter indicate concern over the allegations raised by Chief Zitek but do notdemonstrate that the Board prejudged the facts and law concerning the insubordination andCleary charges against plaintiff. The Board made no conclusion or prediction regardingplaintiff's employment but, rather, reserved any decisions pending the presentation of evidence ata formal hearing. Moreover, the Board provided a full and complete opportunity for plaintiff tooffer evidence and refute the insubordination and Cleary charges.

Plaintiff's claims of due process violations lack merit where the record established thatthe hearing took place on 12 separate days, extended over a period of 3 months and wasbifurcated into liability and penalty phases. Plaintiff was represented by counsel and was grantedcontinuance requests when his counsel was not able to attend. Furthermore, the Boardconsidered numerous motions, arguments and briefs filed by both sides and ruled in favor ofplaintiff on various motions and objections, such as when the Board dismissed three of the fivecharges originally alleged against plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff's counsel vigorously cross-examined Cleary and Chief Zitek and presented several of plaintiff's own witnesses.

B. Opening Meetings Act

Next, plaintiff alleges that the Board deprived him of due process because the Board'sdiscussions on June 16, September 25 and October 15, 1998, constituted secret meetings whereno public notice of the meetings was given, no minutes were kept, and the Board did not act inopen session, in violation of sections 2, 2.02 and 2.06 of the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/2,2.02, 2.06 (West 1998)).

The Open Meetings Act, however, does not confer substantive rights for due processclause purposes with respect to the termination of public employees. Kyle v. Morton HighSchool, 144 F.3d 448, 452 (7th Cir 1998). Moreover, plaintiff's allegations of Open MeetingsAct violations are time barred because he did not bring a civil action in the circuit court within 60days of the meeting alleged to be in violation of the Act. 5 ILCS 120/3 (West 1998).

Notwithstanding the statute of limitations bar, the Open Meetings Act provides only thata court may declare "null and void any final action taken at a closed meeting in violation of thisAct." 5 ILCS 120/3(c) (West 1998). Here, the June 16 and September 25 meetings pertained tocharges that the Board dismissed and thus had no impact on the Board's final decision. Further,the order entered by the Board at the October 15 meeting, which suspended plaintiff without payand set a hearing date, was nullified by the Board's subsequent action suspending plaintiff withpay and rescheduling the hearing. Accordingly, no final action from any meeting that violatedthe Open Meetings Act remained to impact plaintiff.

C. Disclosure of Fitness Exam Results

Next, plaintiff contends that Chief Zitek's October 10 order that plaintiff release theresults of his fitness exam compelled plaintiff to surrender his right to confidentiality of thoserecords under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (the Act)(740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 1998)). Plaintiff argues that the resulting insubordination chargeviolated his due process rights under the Uniform Peace Officers' Disciplinary Act (50 ILCS725/1 et seq. (West 1998)), which provides that an officer cannot be subject to disciplinary actionfor invoking a statutory or constitutional right. We disagree and find that the Act was notapplicable to the situation involving the release of plaintiff's fitness exam results to Chief Zitek.

The Act provides that a therapist cannot disclose records or communications of mentalhealth services unless the recipient of those services consents to the disclosure or the disclosurefalls within certain exceptions enumerated in the Act. 740 ILCS 110/10(a) (West 1998). Mentalhealth services include but are not limited to examination, diagnosis, evaluation, treatment,training, pharmaceuticals, aftercare, habilitation or rehabilitation. 740 ILCS 110/2 (West 1998). The Act also provides that in civil, criminal, administrative or legislative proceedings, therecipient of mental health services has the privilege to refuse to disclose those records except incertain enumerated situations, provided that any party to the proceeding or other interestedperson may request an in camera review of the record or communication to be disclosed. 740ILCS 110/10(b) (West 1998). The Act, however, does not specifically address the disclosure ofpolice officers' fitness exam results to their superior officers.

Illinois law is clear that Chief Zitek had the authority to order plaintiff to submit to afitness exam. Haynes v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, 293 Ill. App. 3d 508, 512-13(1997) (discharge of officer was proper because an officer does not have the prerogative todisobey an order to take a psychological exam while the officer subjectively determines whetherthe order was lawful, valid or reasonable); Conte v. Horcher, 50 Ill. App. 3d 151, 153-54 (1977)(there is no question as to the right and power of the police commissioner to conduct physicaland mental examinations in order to determine whether patrolmen are able to perform theirduties). The authority to order fitness exams is justified by the unique, almost paramilitarynature of police departments and the critical importance of police officers to public health andsafety. By necessary implication, the police department must have access to the ultimate fitnessdetermination of such exams in order to determine whether officers are capable of performingtheir duties.

Here, the evidence established that Chief Zitek ordered the fitness exam based on reportsfrom a detective, a citizen, a police officer and a sergeant complaining about plaintiff's conduct. Because Chief Zitek's order that plaintiff submit to a fitness exam was reasonable, then logicallyChief Zitek was entitled to view the results of that exam. There is no merit to plaintiff's claimthat he could refuse to release the exam results to Chief Zitek without running the risk of asanction. Rule 12 of the Stickney police department rules and regulations requires officers toobey all orders of a superior officer. Accordingly, the Board had the right to discharge plaintifffor disobeying the order to release those results.

Plaintiff's reliance on several cases that found mental health information privileged underthe Act is misplaced because those cases did not involve the fitness exams of police officers. SeeReda v. Advocate Health Care, 199 Ill. 2d 47 (2002) (plaintiff seeking damages for neurologicalinjury in a medical malpractice case did not place his mental condition at issue); Norskog v.Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60 (2001) (defendant who participated in a court-ordered fitness-to-stand-trialexam for his murder trial did not waive Act confidentiality in a subsequent wrongful death civilaction); Mandziara v. Canulli, 299 Ill. App. 3d 593 (1998) (plaintiff in a custody case did notplace her mental health in issue); Sassali v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 296 Ill. App. 3d 80(1998) (in an involuntary commitment proceeding, the hospital could not directly release recordsto expert doctor appointed to examine plaintiff).

Plaintiff's citation to other cases where police officers' mental health records were foundconfidential is similarly unpersuasive because none of those cases involved either the Act or thedisclosure of officers' fitness exams to their superiors. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 135L. Ed. 2d 337, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996) (in a wrongful death action, common law privilegeprotected mental health records of officer who voluntarily underwent extensive counseling with alicensed clinical social worker); Caver v. City of Trenton, 192 F.R.D. 154 (D.N.J. 2000) (in acivil rights action brought by black officers, common law privilege protected the psychologicalevaluation of a white officer who did not voluntarily seek treatment and was told the evaluationwas confidential and would not be disclosed to city personnel); Williams v. District of Columbia,No. Civ. A. 96-0200-LFO (D.D.C. April 25, 1997) (in a wrongful death action, common lawprivilege protected the psychological evaluation of an officer where the fitness exam wasmandatory and the police department received only the ultimate fitness for dutyrecommendation).

Significantly, the Act and case law indicate that the recipient's expectation of privacy isdispositive in determining the disclosure of mental health information. E.g., Scott v. Edinburg,101 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (common law privilege did not protect an officer'sfitness exam results in a subsequent wrongful death action because no expectation of privacy wasestablished where the officer was informed that the results would be reviewed by the chief andmight be subpoenaed in a civil suit, and the officer refrained from making statements based onthe lack of confidentiality). Plaintiff contends that he, unlike the officer in Scott, established hisexpectation of privacy because he reported for testing but would not sign the confidentialityrelease forms and attempted to safeguard his privacy by limiting disclosure to attorneys until anin camera inspection could be conducted. However, as a police officer, plaintiff had noreasonable expectation that the results of his fitness exam would be kept confidential from ChiefZitek because fitness exams are part and parcel of the process officers must undergo in order tobe hired and retained.

We are mindful that the Act constitutes a strong statement by the General Assembly aboutthe importance of keeping mental health records confidential and that confidentiality motivatespeople to seek needed treatment and is essential to the treatment process. See Norskog, 197 Ill.2d at 71-72. The Act, however, is not applicable to the facts here, where Chief Zitek's testimonyand his order established that he did not compel the release of plaintiff's mental health records,but only the ultimate fitness for duty recommendation.

II. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

Plaintiff contends that the Board's finding that he refused to release the exam results waserror where the results were released to Chief Zitek's attorney, whom plaintiff claims agreed to anin camera inspection by the court. Plaintiff also contends that the Board's finding sustaining theCleary charge was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the Board ignored thetestimony of Officer Sedlacek and plaintiff's wife, which plaintiff claims fully exculpated him. We disagree.

Because the Board is an administrative agency, its findings of fact on review shall be heldto be prima facie true and correct. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 1998); Launius, 151 Ill. 2d at 427. The reviewing court does not resolve factual inconsistencies and does not reweigh the evidenceand then determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies. Launius, 151 Ill. 2d at 427-28. Rather, the reviewing court inquires whether the findings of the administrative agency are againstthe manifest weight of the evidence. Launius, 151 Ill. 2d at 428. Under the manifest weightstandard, we are able to overturn the Board's decision only if, after reviewing the evidence in alight most favorable to the Board, we determine that no rational trier of fact could have reachedthe conclusion reached by the Board. Krocka, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 46.

Concerning the insubordination charge, plaintiff's assertion that the parties had anagreement to attempt an in camera review of plaintiff's fitness exam results is not entirelyaccurate. Although the parties agreed that the results would be released to plaintiff's attorney andChief Zitek's attorney, the evidence at the administrative hearing established that Chief Zitek'sattorney was not at liberty to release those results to Chief Zitek. Moreover, plaintiff refused toagree to an in camera review until after an expert either tested plaintiff or reviewed Dr. Gunn'sreport. The record supports the Board's findings that plaintiff delayed in submitting to the fitnessexam from June until September 1998 and then disobeyed the October 10 order to release theresults to Chief Zitek.

Concerning the Cleary charge, the Board viewed the witnesses directly, weighed theircredibility and did not find the testimony of Officer Sedlacek sufficient to impeach Cleary. Moreover, the testimony of plaintiff's wife--that she was asleep when the telephone threats weremade--hardly exculpated plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel cross-examined Cleary extensivelyconcerning his alleged motive to fabricate his testimony, and the record indicates that OfficerSedlacek's police report concerning the telephone threats was incomplete and inaccurate.

III. Plaintiff's Discharge

Plaintiff contends that the Board's decision that cause existed to discharge plaintiff wasarbitrary, capricious and unrelated to the requirements of service and therefore must be reversed. Plaintiff reiterates his argument that the Board erred in finding that he refused to disclose theresults of his fitness exam where plaintiff invoked his right to confidentiality under the Act. Plaintiff argues that Chief Zitek should have followed the statutory protocols of the Act tocompel the disclosure of the results and waited for a court in camera inspection. We disagree.

Review of an administrative agency's decision regarding discharge requires a two-stepanalysis. Krocka, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 46. The court must determine (1) whether the agency'sfindings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and (2) whether the findings of factprovide a sufficient basis for the agency's conclusion that cause for discharge does or does notexist. The agency's decision as to cause will not be reversed unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable,or unrelated to the requirements of service. Krocka, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 46.

The Board has considerable latitude and discretion in determining what constitutes causefor discharge. Kappel v. Police Board of the City of Chicago, 220 Ill. App. 3d 580, 590 (1991). The courts have defined cause as some substantial shortcoming that renders the employee'scontinuance in his office or employment in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiencyof the service and that the law and sound public opinion recognize as good cause for his nolonger holding the position. Krocka, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 47.

Because the Board, and not the reviewing court, is in the best position to determine theeffect of an officer's conduct on the department, the reviewing court is required to give theBoard's determination of cause for terminating an officer considerable deference. Valio v. Boardof Fire & Police Commissioners, 311 Ill. App. 3d 321, 330-31 (2000). As the reviewing court,we may not consider whether we would have imposed a more lenient disciplinary sentence. Krocka, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 48.

As discussed above, Chief Zitek's order that plaintiff undergo a fitness exam and releasethe results to Chief Zitek was a proper order. Accordingly, the Board's finding that plaintiff wasinsubordinate was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence where plaintiff nevercomplied with that order. Disobedience to a proper order given by a superior officer is cause fordischarge. Panthera v. Village of Oak Lawn, No. 01 C 3059 (N.D. Ill. October 10, 2002);Haynes, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 512; Calomino v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 273 Ill.App. 3d 494, 499 (1995) (even a single violation of the police department rules authorized thedismissal of a police officer). Thus, the Board's determination that plaintiff's conduct constitutedcause for discharge was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. An officer who disobeys a properorder concerning a fitness exam and threatens a member of the public will impair the disciplineand efficiency of the police force. Plaintiff's insubordination and threatening conduct constitutedsubstantial shortcomings that rendered his continued employment as a police officer detrimentalto the discipline and efficiency of the service.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Board is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GORDON, P.J., and O'MALLEY, J., concur.

1. Section 10-2.1-17 of the Illinois Municipal Code provides that no police officer shall beremoved or discharged except for cause, upon written charges, and after an opportunity to beheard in his own defense. The Board shall conduct a fair and impartial hearing of the charges, tobe commenced within 30 days of the filing thereof, which hearing may be continued from time totime. 65 ILCS 5/10-2.1-17 (West 1998).