Find Legal Information

SECOND DIVISION
September 30, 2004

JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

In their depositions three witnesses denied makingstatements about actual notice relied on by the plaintiff'slawyer at an arbitration hearing and as trial approached. Thechanges resulted in the trial court's sanctions against theplaintiff and dismissal of his lawsuit. We are asked todetermine whether the sanctions went too far and whetherdismissal was justified. We reverse and remand with directions.

FACTS

Plaintiff's complaint alleged that on July 9, 2000,plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk adjacent to 2300 NorthHamlin Avenue in Chicago, north of Belden Avenue. He tripped andfell on a depression in the sidewalk, causing injuries. Plaintiff alleged the City had notice of the defective sidewalkand permitted the defect to remain, failed to repair the defect,and failed to warn people of the defect.

The City asserted as affirmative defenses: immunity undersection 3-102 of the Local Government and Local GovernmentalEmployees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act), 745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 2002), based on lack of actual or constructivenotice of the defect; contributory negligence; and comparativenegligence. In August 2000, plaintiff's counsel, Mark L. Karno &Associates, retained private investigator J. DeJesus Rico toinvestigate plaintiff's fall. Rico interviewed and took witnessstatements from three witnesses who lived near the accidentscene--Petra Solorzano, Teresa Mendoza, and Claudia Mendoza.⁽¹⁾

The witness statements are on preprinted forms withhandwritten answers next to the questions. The witnesses signeda "verification by certification" at the bottom of the form. Allof the witnesses indicated they did not witness the accident buthad seen the defective sidewalk.

Teresa Mendoza's statement is dated August 12, 2000. Heranswers indicate the broken sidewalk had been there for the lastsix years she lived there. It said she notified her alderman'soffice of the broken sidewalk a month earlier. She had neverseen City of Chicago employees in the vicinity of the brokensidewalk. An additional comment on the form states, "Mygrandchildren play outside and have to avoid it constantly. I'vealso have complaint to the elderman [sic] but noone has everlisten."

Solorzano's statement is not dated. It indicates shetripped about a year ago in the same spot. She described thecondition of the sidewalk as "very bad and getting worse withtime." The broken sidewalk was there in 1998 when she moved in. The statement says Solorzano notified her alderman once or twicea year about the broken sidewalk. She had not seen any Cityemployees near the sidewalk. She said her three children hadsometimes fallen and hurt themselves.

Claudia Mendoza's statement is not dated. It shows thesidewalk had been broken since she lived there two years ago. Her eldest child, Maria, had fallen and tripped because of thehole in the ground. The form says she had notified heralderman's office two years ago when her son Tony fell. She hadnot seen any City workers near the hole "since we have beencomplaining."

On September 17, 2001, plaintiff and his counsel signedanswers to interrogatories including copies of the witnessstatements and stating the witnesses would testify they hadcomplained about the sidewalk to their alderman.

On July 25, 2002, the City took discovery depositions ofTeresa Mendoza and Solorzano. Plaintiff's counsel Mark L. Karnowas present at the depositions. Teresa testified she had livedat 3806 West Belden from about 1992 to 2002. She first saw thehole in the sidewalk in 1998. Neither she nor anyone in herfamily had ever tripped on the hole. She never called the Cityto report the hole. A well-dressed man who spoke Spanish toldher he was "from the people that fix stuff from the City." Shesigned the statement because a man told her the City would cometo fix the sidewalk if she signed. He didn't tell her what thestatement said, and she couldn't read the statement. Teresa saidshe had seen garbage workers from the City on the block with thebroken sidewalk. She said she thought the hole was fixedsometime in 1999.

Solorzano testified she first noticed the hole in thesidewalk in 1998. She never called anyone from the City toreport the hole. The sidewalk was fixed sometime in 2000 or2001. A man told her he worked for the City and she should signa statement if she wanted the sidewalk fixed. He asked herquestions and wrote down her answers. Then she signed thestatement. She said she previously had tripped on the hole andtwisted her leg. She didn't remember seeing any City employeesnear the sidewalk. Her children had fallen on the sidewalk, butshe didn't know where. She said she understood English but shedid not read the statement before she signed it.

On December 6, 2002, plaintiff filed his Rule 90(c)disclosure, including the original witness statements andphotographs of the sidewalk. At the mandatory arbitration onJanuary 7, 2003, plaintiff submitted the witness statements tothe arbitration panel and argued the City had actual notice ofthe defective sidewalk. The City did not offer the depositions.Judgment was awarded in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of$27,000 plus costs. On January 29, 2003, the City filed a noticeof rejection of the arbitration award.

On March 26, 2003, plaintiff's counsel signed answers tointerrogatories stating the witnesses would testify to thecondition of the sidewalk, how long the condition existed, andthat they had reported the sidewalk defect to the City.

On August 7, 2003, the City filed a motion for sanctionspursuant to Supreme Court Rules 91(b) (145 Ill. 2d R. 91(b)),219(d) (166 Ill. 2d R. 219(d)), and 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137). The City contended plaintiff failed to participate in thearbitration in good faith under Rule 91(b) by submitting falsewitness statements procured under false pretenses. The City saidplaintiff violated Rule 137 by filing the 90(c) packagecontaining information known to be false by plaintiff's counsel. It asked for sanctions in the form of dismissing plaintiff's caseor barring the witnesses from testifying at trial.

In its motion, the City referred to Solorzano's and Teresa'sdepositions. The City said it contacted Claudia Mendoza andlearned that her statement also contained false information andwas coerced.

In an affidavit, Assistant Corporation Counsel BarrettRubens said she asked plaintiff's counsel Scott DeSalvo beforethe arbitration hearing to remove the false witness statementsfrom his 90(c) package. She told DeSalvo that Karno was presentat the two depositions where the witnesses refuted much of theirearlier statements and discussed how the private investigatorheld himself out as a City employee. DeSalvo refused to removethe statements and submitted them to the arbitration panel asproof of actual notice.

Plaintiff filed a written response to the motion, attachingaffidavits by Rico and DeSalvo. In his affidavit, Rico said thewitnesses answered his questions in Spanish, and he wrote downtheir answers in English. The witnesses then signed thestatements. He did not have the witnesses review the statementsbecause he was under the impression that none of them spoke orread English. Rico said the witnesses told him exactly what wascontained in the statements, and he did not write down anythingother than what they told him.

In his affidavit, DeSalvo said he was assigned to the casethe day before the arbitration. He asked Rubens for copies ofthe depositions, but she did not have them. He asked her why shedid not bring a motion prior to the arbitration if she believedthe 90(c) contents were inadmissible, and she responded that itwas an oversight.

The City filed a reply, attaching Claudia Mendoza'sdeposition transcript, taken on August 11, 2003. DeSalvo waspresent during the deposition. Claudia testified she lived withher mother-in-law at 3806 West Belden from about 1995 to 1997 andvisited there constantly after she moved. The condition of thesidewalk was very bad in 2000. She never reported the sidewalk tothe City or her alderman's office nor, did she tell theinvestigator she reported the sidewalk. She said a man who saidhe worked for the City told her to sign the statement if shewanted the sidewalk fixed. The man spoke to her in English. Shesigned the statement, then he filled in the answers. She toldhim her son, Tony, had fallen on the hole in the sidewalk twoyears before. She did not review the statement. She had neverseen City workers in the area until the sidewalk was fixedsometime after 2000.

The trial court heard oral arguments on August 28, 2003. Judge John Laurie asked DeSalvo what other evidence he had ofnotice to the City, besides the four witnesses. DeSalvo repliedthey would have to rely on photographs of the defect taken closein time to the accident to show the condition had existed for along time. DeSalvo argued the defect in the photographs showedwear and was not a fresh break. The judge viewed thephotographs. Following arguments, the trial judge ruled:

"Based on 137 violation, I think it's clear that theonly appropriate sanction is bar these statements. Taking one step further, I believe under thecircumstances having barred the only witnessesavailable to you and you having shown to me the onlyother evidence you have, I clearly do not believe thatfalls within the area of potential for constructivenotice. Based on the merits, the case is dismissed."

DeSalvo requested permission to brief the issue, but thecourt denied the request.

The trial court's order states:

"This matter coming to be heard on defendant's Motionfor Sanctions, due notice given, both partiesrepresented by counsel, the court fully advised withwritten and oral argument:

It is hereby ordered:

1) Defendant's Motion for Sanctions is granted.

2) Plaintiff's witnesses, Petra Solorzano, TeresaMendoza, & Claudia Mendoza are barred pursuant to S.Ct. Rule 137.

3) Based on counsel for plaintiff conceding thatplaintiff's only evidence of notice, other than thebarred witnesses, is photographs, the court havingreviewed the photographs and finding that they do notestablish constructive notice, this case is dismissedbased on the court's finding of no notice."

DECISION

I. Finding of a Rule 137 Violation

The purpose of Rule 137 is to prevent the filing of falseand frivolous lawsuits. Whitmer v. Munson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 501,514, 781 N.E.2d 618 (2002). Yet, "the rule is not intended topenalize litigants and their attorneys merely because they werezealous, yet unsuccessful." Peterson v. Randhava, 313 Ill. App.3d 1, 6-7, 719 N.E.2d 75 (2000). The rule is penal in nature andmust be strictly construed. Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 7.

Supreme Court Rule 137 provides, in part:

"Every pleading, motion and other paper of a partyrepresented by an attorney shall be signed by at leastone attorney of record in his individual name, whoseaddress shall be stated. *** The signature of anattorney or party constitutes a certificate by him thathe has read the pleading, motion or other paper; thatto the best of his knowledge, information, and beliefformed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded infact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faithargument for the extension, modification, or reversalof existing law, and that it is not interposed for anyimproper purpose, such as to harass or to causeunnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost oflitigation. *** If a pleading, motion, or other paperis signed in violation of this rule, the court, uponmotion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon theperson who signed it, a represented party, or both, anappropriate sanction, which may include an order to payto the other party or parties the amount of reasonableexpenses incurred because of the filing of thepleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonableattorney fee." (Emphasis added.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.

Courts should use an objective standard in determining whatwas reasonable under the circumstances as they existed at thetime of filing. Whitmer, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 514. An appellatecourt should base its review of the trial court's decision onthree factors: (1) whether the court's ruling was an informedone; (2) whether the ruling was based on valid reasons which fitthe case; and (3) whether the ruling followed logically from thestated reasons to the particular circumstances of the case. Wagener v. Papie, 242 Ill. App. 3d 354, 364, 609 N.E.2d 951(1993). Whether Rule 137 has been violated is reviewed under themanifest weight of the evidence standard. Nissenson v. Bradley,316 Ill. App. 3d 1035, 1040, 738 N.E.2d 586 (2000).

Plaintiff contends the witness statements in his 90(c)packet contained relevant and true information, such as theidentity and location of witnesses and their knowledge of thedefect in the sidewalk. He contends he had a reasonable, good-faith basis for submitting the witness statements because Ricosaid he took down the witnesses' exact statements, includingtheir statements that they had reported the defect to the City. At their depositions, the witnesses testified consistently withtheir statements, other than the fact that they called theiralderman's office. Relying on Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 15,plaintiff contends sanctions are not appropriate where theevidence is merely conflicting. Plaintiff says the City failedto call a single witness or introduce any evidence at arbitrationto challenge the witnesses' statements. He points out that theCity waited until seven months after the arbitration and untilthe eve of trial to bring its motion for sanctions, suggestingthe City used it as a tactical maneuver to bar evidence at trial.

In response, the City contends plaintiff's counsel lackedreasonable grounds to rely on the witness statements after thewitnesses had repudiated them, and counsel's own investigatoradmitted the witnesses signed the statements without being ableto read or understand them. The City says plaintiff could notproperly represent that the statements constituted proof ofactual notice to the City where a reasonable inquiry would haveshown the witness statements were unreliable. The failure tomake any reasonable inquiry after being placed on notice from thedepositions of Teresa and Solorzano was sanctionable. As to thetiming of its motion for sanctions, the City says it waited forplaintiff's counsel to remedy its own mistake, and the City movedfor sanctions only when it became apparent plaintiff intended tointroduce the false witness statements at trial.

We find the court did not abuse its discretion in finding aRule 137 violation. In Whitmer, the record showed the plaintifffiled a verified complaint containing allegations which, uponmaking a reasonable inquiry, the plaintiff should have known wereuntrue and which, in all likelihood, he knew to be untrue. Whitmer, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 515. Even if the plaintiff"honestly believed" his or her case was well grounded in fact orlaw, it is objectively unreasonable to file a pleading if areasonable inquiry would have uncovered the falsity. Whitmer,335 Ill. App. 3d at 516. Here, based on the nature of thewitness statements and the fact that the investigator admittedthe witnesses did not read the statements before they signedthem, plaintiff should have made a reasonable inquiry into thetruth of the statements.

After the depositions where two of the witnesses testifiedthey never reported the sidewalk defect to the City, plaintiff'slawyer was at least put on notice that the witness statementswere not reliable. At worst, it appeared the investigatorfalsified the statements or coerced the witnesses into signingthe statements by impersonating a City employee. Notwithstandingthe serious doubt cast on the statements, the lawyer submittedthe witness statements at arbitration and later indicated hewould use the statements at trial. He gave no indication thewitnesses had ever refuted their statements. Plaintiff's lawyerhad a duty to notify the arbitration panel of the fact that thewitnesses had refuted part of their statements. His conduct wasmarked by a noticeable lack of candor--to the arbitrators and tothe trial court.

In Nissenson, the trial court imposed a Rule 137 sanctionbased on a false medical report attached to the complaint. Thecourt found plaintiff's counsel was on notice that the medicalreport was, at minimum, inaccurate, and he had a duty to notifythe court about problems with the report. He did nothing tocorrect its inaccuracy or notify the court, so his failure towithdraw the report was sanctionable. Nissenson, 316 Ill. App.3d at 1039. This was so even though the attorney did not filethe original pleadings containing the false report, because "asuccessor attorney cannot hide behind his predecessor." Nissenson, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 1041.

Here, it is irrelevant that the attorney who attended thearbitration was not the same attorney who attended thedepositions. As the City points out, both attorneys were fromthe same firm, and the knowledge of one member of a law firm isimputed to the other members. People v. Dace, 153 Ill. App. 3d891, 896, 506 N.E.2d 332 (1987).

The evidence in this case was not merely conflicting. Threeof the witnesses testified the investigator told them he was aCity employee, that they should sign the statement if they wantedthe sidewalk fixed. They testified they never reported thesidewalk to the City and never told anyone they did so, eventhough the statements said they did. None of the witnesses readthe statement before signing it. Rule 137 requires anobjectively reasonable inquiry into the veracity of pleadings. It is clear plaintiff's counsel did not conduct such an inquirynor did he inform the arbitration panel or the court of theproblems with the witness statements.

At the same time, we are troubled by the fact that the Cityfailed to bring the depositions to the attention of thearbitration panel and waited seven months, until the eve oftrial, to bring its motion for sanctions.

II. Barring of Witnesses as a Rule 137 Sanction

In deciding to bar the witnesses as a Rule 137 sanction, thetrial judge stated:

"I believe it's a clear violation of 137 for him to go into the arbitration knowing what he knew. I believe,as counsel pointed out, whether or not the ages, names,the addresses were correct is totally irrelevant. Theonly thing critical about those affidavits was thespecific issue of the notice. He knew about it. Ifthere was any question in his mind, he had anobligation to come forward himself and ask that therebe some clarification so he would not be facing whetheror not it was a perjured document. He knew that thesetwo people, the husband and wife, didn't even speakEnglish, read or write English. There had to be anumber of questions apparent to him he should haveasked.

Based on 137 violation, I think it's clear theonly appropriate sanction is bar these statements."

Plaintiff contends Rule 137 limits available sanctions to amonetary award of attorney's fees, costs, or both, in the court'sdiscretion. The language in the rule indicates otherwise. Itallows for "an appropriate sanction, which may include an orderto pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonableexpenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motionor other paper, including a reasonable attorney fee." (Emphasisadded.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.

Although most Rule 137 sanctions involve attorney fees, itis clear the rule allows other sanctions besides attorney fees,provided they are "appropriate." In In re Marriage of Ahmad, 198Ill. App. 3d 15, 21, 555 N.E.2d 439 (1990), the court held apublic reprimand was a proper sanction under section 2-611 of theCode of Civil Procedure, the predecessor to Rule 137. Section 2-611 contained substantially similar language to Rule 137,including the provision allowing for an "appropriate sanction,which may include an order to pay" attorney fees. Ahmad, 198Ill. App. 3d at 21, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par.2-611. Ahmad is of dubious value because the Illinois SupremeCourt has exclusive and plenary jurisdiction over matters relatedto attorney discipline. Lustig v. Horn, 315 Ill. App. 3d 319,328, 732 N.E.2d 613 (2000).

The parties have cited no cases in which a court barredwitnesses as a sanction under Rule 137. The closest our courthas come to determining whether barring a witness is anappropriate sanction is Dolido v. Zenith Radio Corp., 194 Ill.App. 3d 268, 550 N.E.2d 1225 (1990). There, the trial judgefound that section 2-611, as it existed after amendment in 1987,was violated when the plaintiff filed a frivolous pleading. As asanction, the judge dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice. Wereversed the dismissal, finding that "[n]owhere in section 2-611is dismissal of the pleading a permissible penalty." Dolido, 194Ill. App. 3d at 271.

The problem we have with Dolido is the court's failure toconsider or mention the statute's use of the term "an appropriatesanction," the same phrase contained in Supreme Court Rule 137. Instead, the court described the permissible penalty as "an orderto pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonableexpenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motionor other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Dolido,194 Ill. App. 3d at 271. We do not believe we are free to read"an appropriate sanction" out of the statute or to ignore itspresence in Rule 137. For that reason, we do not rely on Dolido.

Plaintiff contends barring the witnesses was too harsh apenalty, comparing this case to Smith v. City of Chicago, 299Ill. App. 3d 1048, 702 N.E.2d 274 (1998). In Smith, not a Rule137 case, the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendantsas a sanction for the plaintiff's attorney having informed theexpert witness of the testimony of two other witnesses. Smith,299 Ill. App. 3d at 1051-52. No order excluding witnesses wasever requested or entered. Smith, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 1054. This court held the trial court abused its discretion in enteringthe sanction because it was not "reasonable in light of theattendant facts and circumstances of the case." Smith, 299 Ill.App. 3d at 1054.

"[S]uch a drastic sanction, being the antithesis of adetermination of a cause on its merits, should beemployed only as a last resort after all otherenforcement powers at the court's disposal fail. When,as in this case, sanctions are visited upon a party asvicarious punishment for the acts of her counsel, caremust be taken in fashioning a sanction which bothadequately addresses the offending conduct and, to theextent possible, preserves the right of the party to beheard on the merits of her case." Smith, 299 Ill. App.3d at 1055.

We agree with the plaintiff. While barring the witnesseswas not quite a dismissal, it had the effect of devastating theplaintiff's case. Rule 137's penal nature requires us tostrictly construe the rule against the movant. Gershak v. Feign,317 Ill. App. 3d 14, 22, 738 N.E.2d 600 (2000). The sanctiondamaged the plaintiff out of proportion to any misconductcommitted by his attorney. At their depositions, the witnessestestified to their awareness of the damaged sidewalk and pastoccurrences of people falling on the hole. Most of theirtestimony was consistent with the witness statements. The trialjudge should not have barred these witnesses completely wheremuch of their testimony was unrefuted and necessary to theplaintiff's case. Under the facts of this case, barring thewitnesses was not an appropriate penalty for Rule 137 violations.

We find support for our holding in a Tenth Circuit casedealing with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Hand, 763 F.2d 1184 (10th Cir. 1985). The predecessor to Rule 137, section 2-611 of the Illinois Codeof Civil Procedure, was "[m]odeled largely after *** Rule 11 ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P. 11)." Inre Mitan, 119 Ill. 2d 229, 242, 518 N.E.2d 1000 (1987). InChevron, the court affirmed the imposition of attorney's fees asa sanction against the movant for filing a frivolous motion. Thecourt stated:

"Rule 11 directs that the sanction should fall upon theindividual responsible for the filing of the offendingdocument. In a given case this could be the attorney,the client, or both. In this case the evidence wassufficient to support the district court's implicitassumption that [the client] was the catalyst behindthis frivolous motion. The sanction therefore properlyfalls on her." Chevron, 763 F.2d at 1187.

Here, the plaintiff's attorneys signed the 90(c) disclosureand the answers to interrogatories. It is inappropriate topunish the plaintiff by barring the witnesses from testifyingwhere plaintiff's attorneys committed the misconduct. Theweightiest sanction should fall on the attorneys who submittedthe documents without informing the arbitration panel or thecourt of the witnesses' refutation of their statements. Thetrial court also was free to consider testimonial sanctions, suchas taking the issue of actual notice out of the case.

III. Dismissal of Case in Absence of Summary Judgment Motion

Because we decide the barring of witnesses was not aproperly imposed sanction, we need not reach the issue ofdismissal in the absence of a motion by defendant. But we docomment on the sua sponte dismissal because this case will bereturned to the trial court.

The City contends the court dismissed the case as part ofits Rule 137 sanction. We disagree. In the hearing transcript,the judge stated, "[b]ased on the merits, this case isdismissed." The language of the written order, "based on thecourt's finding of no notice," also supports our conclusion thatthe judge dismissed the case through summary judgment and not asa sanction. We believe the judge overreached.

We find the analysis in Peterson v. Randhava, 313 Ill. App.3d 1, 729 N.E.2d 75 (2000), instructive. In Peterson, thedefendants filed a motion for a Rule 137 sanction, based on theplaintiff's allegedly false allegation of fact in his complaint. The trial court denied defendants' motion for sanctions butdecided to grant summary judgment sua sponte in favor ofdefendants although no motion for summary judgment was pending atthat time. Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 5-6. This court heldthe trial court erred in taking the motion for sanctions as amotion for summary judgment. Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 9. ARule 137 motion addresses only the allegations on the face of thepleadings, while a summary judgment motion is the proceduralequivalent of a trial and is an adjudication of the claim on themerits. Rule 137 specifically authorizes a trial court to imposesanctions sua sponte, but nowhere in section 2-1005 is the courtauthorized to dispose of the case on summary judgment absent arequest by one of the parties. Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 10,citing 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998).

In Peterson, discovery was stayed as to all issues exceptthe narrow issue involved in the motion for sanctions. Theplaintiff was not given the opportunity to demonstrate thefactual basis for his complaint or establish any genuine issuesof material fact. Moreover, the trial court granted summaryjudgment without adequate notice or allowing the plaintiff anopportunity to respond, in violation of Rule 2.1(e) of thecircuit court of Cook County and section 2-1005 of the Code ofCivil Procedure. Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 11-12. See alsoSilverstein v. Brander, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1005-06, 740N.E.2d 357 (2000) (following Peterson, where defendants' motionin limine to bar a witness was, in effect, a summary judgmentmotion, and trial court abused its discretion by excusingdefendants' failure to comply with procedural requirements forsummary judgment motions).

Following the reasoning in Peterson, we find the trial courtabused its discretion in granting summary judgment for the Citywithout giving the plaintiff notice or an opportunity to respondin writing. Contrary to the City's assertion, plaintiff wasprejudiced by the court's failure to follow summary judgmentprocedures. Plaintiff had no adequate opportunity to present hisevidence on the issue of notice or to demonstrate a genuine issueof material fact foreclosing summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

We find plaintiff's counsel's conduct was sanctionable, andthe court did not abuse its discretion in finding a Rule 137violation. However, we find the barring of the witnesses to beoverly broad and harsh. We reverse the dismissal of the case andremand for the court to assess a more appropriate sanction on theperson or persons responsible for the Rule 137 violation.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

HALL, and GARCIA, JJ., concur.

1. Petra Solorzano's and Teresa Mendoza's names arealternatively spelled "Petro Solorzano" and "Theresa Mendosa" inthe record.