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JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

On November 25, 1992, Howard G. Rub, Jr. (Rub), was killed when a train owned and operated by defendant-appellee ConsolidatedRail Corporation (Conrail) collided with his vehicle. The accidentoccurred at the intersection of Morris Road and the Conrail tracksin Dwight, Illinois. Leann Rub (plaintiff), widow of Rub, filed awrongful death action against Conrail in her individual capacityand on behalf of the estate of Howard G. Rub, Jr. Among otherallegations, Leann Rub alleged in her second amended complaint thatthe Morris Road crossing was improperly maintained by Conrail, thatConrail failed to provide adequate warning of approaching trains atthe crossing, and that the operators of the train at issue werenegligent by failing to slow the train to avoid a collision withRub's vehicle. Conrail responded by contending that Rub wascontributorily negligent in causing the collision that resulted inhis death. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Conrail, and thetrial court entered a judgment on the verdict against Leann Rub andthe estate of Howard G. Rub, Jr., on November 27, 1997. Plaintifffiled a post trial motion, which was denied by the trial court onMay 28, 1999. Plaintiff now appeals.

Several questions are raised on appeal. First, whether thetrial court erred during voir dire when it allowed counsel fordefendant to question prospective jurors on facts not yet inevidence. The second, third, fourth, and issues are discussed inthe non published portion of this opinion. Second, whether thetrial court erred by giving certain jury instructions. Third,whether the trial court erred by excluding evidence as to theextrahazardous nature of the Morris Road crossing. Fourth, whetherthe trial court gave the jury improper limiting instructions thatwere prejudicial to plaintiff. Fifth, whether the cumulativeeffect of the errors denied plaintiff the right to a fair trial. We state the following background facts.

On the evening of the accident, Rub was driving southbound onMorris Road at approximately 55 miles per hour. The Conrail traintracks run east to west and cross Morris Road at a perpendicularangle. The evening was overcast and the blacktop pavement was wet. Approximately 390 feet north of the intersection, a circularadvance warning sign with a yellow background was posted displayinga black X and a black RR, indicating to approaching motorists thata railroad crossing was ahead. At the crossing itself, a crossbuck sign was posted. A cross buck sign is a cross on a woodenpost that indicates the presence of a railroad crossing. Therewere no flashing lights at the intersection, no gates, and nolights designed to illuminate the grade crossing. The grade waselevated at the intersection.

As Rub approached the intersection, a westbound Conrail trainconsisting of two engines and 44 freight cars was advancing on thesame crossing at 40 miles per hour. James Grimes, the train'sengineer, testified the trains lights were on. He also stated that he saw Rub's vehicle approaching the intersection at the samedistance and the same rate of speed. He said that he becameconcerned because it did not appear that Rub was going to stop. Grimes stated that Rub did not seem to respond to a whistlesequence he had blown in order to warn him of the approachingtrain. He further testified that he began a series of short blastson the whistle up to the impact with Rub's vehicle. Also prior toimpact, Grimes said that he threw the emergency brake on the trainbefore Rub reached the cross bucks at the intersection. The record revealed that Grimes and the train's conductor, Charles Rice, werereluctant to put the train into emergency because they fearedderailment of the train, their safety, and the safety of the publicin the surrounding area. Rice testified that it was unsafe toactivate the emergency brake and risk putting the train intoemergency when Rub had plenty of time to stop.

The record reveals that Rub continued to proceed to theintersection. His vehicle was hit broadside by the locomotive andthe collision resulted in his death. The evidence showed noindication of braking marks or skid marks anywhere in theintersection.

In plaintiff's case in chief, Daryl Holt, then president ofthe Village of Dwight, testified that he became involved innegotiating the cleanup of overgrown brush at the intersectionwhich made the crossing difficult to see. He also stated thatheadlights of trains were difficult to see because they blendedinto the background lighting in the area. Holt said that Conrailhad not remedied these problems prior to Rub's accident.

Two Dwight residents who lived in close proximity to theintersection testified that they never heard the train's whistleblow.

In addition, Tony Montgomery, a former employee of Rub,testified that he was driving in another car closely behind Rub'sauto at the time of the accident. He said that he neither saw norheard the train approaching until it struck Rub's vehicle.

John Edward Baerwald, one of plaintiff's expert witnesses,testified that the surrounding sources of light from homes andother public lights camouflaged the headlights of the on-comingtrain. He also characterized the crossing as extrahazardous asdefined by railroad engineers. Baerwald further stated that, atminimum, the crossing should have had two alternately flashing redlights "or [,] more desirably [,] flashing lights plus *** shortarm gates *** that drop down and close off the approach lanes."

Henry Lowell Lazara, a specialist in forensic lighting, alsotestified for plaintiff. He stated that he inspected theintersection at Morris Road and determined it to be an "unlightedarea."

Michael Massie, plaintiff's railroading expert, testified thatGrimes and Rice were negligent in their failure to apply thetrain's brakes. He specifically stated that Grimes could haveslowed the train down to 35 miles per hour in the distance to thecrossing, which would have allowed Rub's vehicle to clear thetrack.

To the contrary, Conrail's expert witness, Thomas Burnes, anengineer, stated that he had inspected the intersection on fourseparate occasions. He said that the headlamps of locomotives heobserved were clear and distinctly different from any of thebackground lights. He further testified that, in his opinion,there were no material obstructions to visibility that would haveprevented a motorist from seeing and identifying an approachingtrain. Thus, he concluded that a motorist would have had anopportunity to observe the train and to take evasive action ifnecessary. Burnes said that there are certain factors that make anintersection extrahazardous, specifically, where the hazard is sointense or unusual that it exceeds the capability of a motorist,driving in due care, to appreciate the risk involved and toexercise the appropriate level of caution. He further stated thathe did not characterize this intersection as extrahazardous becausecrossing it was not beyond the capabilities of motorists that wereoperating their vehicles in due care.

William Egan, a Conrail employee in charge of the engineertraining school at the company, said that Grimes and Ricemaintained a proper lookout prior to the accident, properlyimplemented the warning devices on the locomotive, andappropriately put the train into emergency. He further stated that"you never put a train into emergency unless you know you're goingto hit something."

After all the evidence had been presented, the jury returneda verdict in favor of Conrail. Plaintiff does not allege that thejury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, butshe claims that numerous errors made by the judge below warrant anew trial.

The first issue raised on appeal is whether the trial courtconducted a proper voir dire. We have stated:

"The purpose of voir dire is to assurethe selection of an impartial jury, free frombias or prejudice. [Citation.] The trialjudge has the primary responsibility forinitiating and conducting voir dire, and thescope and extent of voir dire are within hissound discretion. [Citation.] Upon review,an abuse of discretion will be found only ifthe trial judge's conduct prevented theselection of an impartial jury." Dixson v.University of Chicago Hospitals & Clinics, 190Ill. App. 3d 369, 376, 546 N.E.2d 774 (1989).

Also, it may be error for the court to fail to curtail voirdire that becomes an attempt to indoctrinate or preeducate jurorsor to obtain a pledge as to how they would decide under a given setof facts or determine which party they would favor in litigation. Gasiorowski v. Homer, 47 Ill. App. 3d 989, 992, 365 N.E.2d 43(1977).

Plaintiff argues that the trial judge improperly permitted Conrail to discuss facts not yet in evidence with prospectivejurors. Specifically, plaintiff complains of defense counsel'sreference to the cross bucks at the Morris Road intersection andsubsequent attempts to solicit the venire persons' views on theprotection cross bucks afford to motorists. Plaintiff alsocontends that the voir dire conducted by Conrail provided jurorswith an incomplete and misleading characterization of the law as itrelates to cross bucks. As a result of these errors, plaintiffargues the trial judge should have taken corrective action in theform of calling for a new venire or providing a cautionaryinstruction. According to plaintiff, the trial court's failure todo so resulted in the denial of a fair trial.

We first address plaintiff's complaint that defense counselimproperly introduced a fact, specifically the presence of crossbucks at the Morris Road crossing, that had not yet been introducedas evidence.

At the outset of voir dire, the court addressed theprospective jurors with the following overview of the case:

"So I am in a position to tell you ingeneral what the case is about, but I do notwant you to think that I am telling youevidence because I don't tell you evidence. What the lawyers say in fact is not evidence. Evidence comes from up here under oath.

* * *

Basically, a review of the type of caseis as follows: Howard Rub was operating a caron Morris Road in Dwight, Illinois. There wasa collision between his car and a Conrailtrain at a railroad crossing. As a result,Howard Rub was killed. The plaintiff allegesthis incident was a direct and a proximateresult of negligence on the part of therailroad, and the defendant railroad deniesthat any conduct on its part constitutednegligence."

A review of the record reveals that the subject of whether thecrossing was marked was first raised by prospective juror, FrancisPrather, who said:

"[MR. PRATHER]: I don't know whether Ican ask a question.

[THE COURT]: Well, you can ask meanything you want.

Q. Was it a marked or an unmarkedcrossing?

A. That I don't know yet, but we aregoing to find out that evidence as it developsunder oath from up here, but I am wonderingnot how you will decide it but whether in ageneral sense this kind of case gives you ahard time?

[MR. PRATHER]: I don't know any reasonwhy."

Before defense counsel asked any questions of Prather, plaintiff'sattorney elicited the following:

"Q. *** [S]ince this is a traincollision case, could you tell me just alittle about the incident where your mother-in-law was killed or injured?

A. This was in Montana, and she was hitat an unmarked crossing and had hipreplacement and walked with a limp for anumber of years until she passed away."

Plaintiff's attorney then continued:

"Q. When you say unmarked, are youtalking about -

A. *** It was probably the crosses butnot the - not lights.

* * *

Q. *** Do you feel that there is anythingabout that incident that would prevent youfrom being fair and impartial in this case?

A. I don't believe so, no."

In response to a question from plaintiff's counsel, the nextprospective juror, Rosevetta Stan, said:

"A. *** [T]he big guy is always guilty,and he should pay, like the railroad if thatis what it is.

Q. *** [Y]ou have a feeling that therailroad because they are big they should pay?***

A. Yeah.

Q. You are not just saying that becauseyou want to get out of here and get back toyour cosmetology business?

A. No, this is the truth."

Stan also said that crossing the train tracks every day made herafraid. After examining several other prospective jurors,plaintiff's counsel tendered the panel to defense counsel. Afterexamining several prospective jurors, defense counsel then askedPrather:

"Q. You discussed somewhat this morningthe circumstances of the railroad accidentthat involved your mother-in-law some yearsago in Montana?

A. Yes.

Q. And early on before any of thelawyers asked you any questions, when thejudge was asking you questions, you in essenceasked him a question about was this aprotected or unprotected crossing. Do youremember that?

A. Right.

Q. *** When you told us about theincident involving your mother-in-law, youindicated that had a cross bucks onlyprotection sign at the crossing, correct?

A. Right.

Q. Now, is that something that youbelieve or feel is not a protected crossing oris not sufficient or is not adequate?

* * *

Q. Okay. My question would be then if -would you consider it to be an unsafecondition at a railroad crossing if theprotection that existed there was simply across bucks instead of lights, flashers,things of that nature?

A. Not if there were -- there wassufficient vision both ways.

* * *

Q. *** Is there anything with respect tothe circumstances of your prior experience oryour general knowledge that would prevent youin this case from weighing the evidence,listening to both sides and then rendering afair and impartial verdict based upon thefacts and the evidence in the laws asinstructed to you by the court?

A. I would have no problem with that,no, not really."

Plaintiff's counsel raised no objections to these questions posedby the defense attorney.

Counsel for plaintiff then asked Prather the followingquestion:

"Q. Now in this particular case if youhear evidence that the crossing was protectedby a cross bucks only, will you give us yourassurance that you'll listen to all of theevidence and you'll make a fair determinationbased on the law that Judge Flan[a]gan givesyou the crossing was adequate in this case"?

A. Yes."

Later during voir dire, defense counsel asked Beth Larson, aprospective juror, the following question:

"Q. We talked a little bit earlierconcerning cross bucks protection railroadwith Mr. Prather, and I asked him questionsabout whether he had a problem with that basedupon the history of the accident with hismother-in-law. Do you have any feelings oneway or the other that just a crossbuck at arailroad crossing is not good enough and therehas to be something else no matter what?

A. I don't think so. I mean I certainlylike the ones that have the lights better formy sake, but, you know, I don't think -- Iguess the answer is no.

Q. What I need to know is whether youhave any preconceived notion or preconceivedbias that there has to be more protection atthe crossing than just a cross buck, and thatin and of itself means that there's a problemand something else should be there and if itisn't, then there's guilt whether it'snegligence or fault.

A. I don't think it's a question ofnegligence, no."

Plaintiff's counsel made no objections to these two questions posedby defense counsel. The panel of prospective jurors was thenaccepted by both sides, excused for the day, and instructed toreturn to the jury room the next day.

During the selection of the next four jurors, plaintiff'sattorney asked Mr. Shannon:

"Q. You heard some questions about thecross bucks or cross buck crossings, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You understand that in this case youmay have to decide whether or not in thisparticular crossing cross bucks were adequateto protect a crossing or whether the crossingneeded additional protection. Will you listento all of the evidence fairly on that beforedeciding?

A. Sure."

Plaintiff's counsel excused Mr. Stevich, a potential juror,and then examined the next prospective juror, Kathleen Kushnapor. During earlier questions posed by the court, Kushnapor revealedthat her brother had been in a car accident and had suffered acrushed pelvis. As result of the accident, she stated that herbrother always walked with a limp. Plaintiff's attorney askedKushnapor the following questions:

"Q. There were some questions askedabout railroad crossings and crossings thatdon't have flashers, they just have crossbucks. Do you remember those questions?

A. Yes.

* * *

Q. There's going to be an issue in thiscase about whether or not the railroadcrossing involved in this case had adequateprotection. Will you listen to all of theevidence on that issue and then make up yourmind after hearing all the evidence?

A. Yes.

* * *

Q. You'll give both sides a fair trial?

A. Yes."

Plaintiff's counsel indicated that he would accept the panel of Ms.Kushnapor, Ms. Lingo, Mr. Shannon, and Mrs. Spirodovich.

Defense counsel then asked Ms. Lingo a series of questionsabout a car accident in which she was injured. During plaintiff'squestioning, Lingo revealed that, as a result of the accident, shehad refused to drive since the age of 14. Defense counsel askedwhether she had any "preconceived ideas" because of the accidentand whether there was problems with any of the signals at theintersection where the accident took place. Specifically, defensecounsel asked:

"Q. Now, based upon your experience as anon-driver but being a passenger and observingtraffic and situations that develop, do youhave, again, feeling that would shape you oneway or another in terms of protection ofrailroad crossings? In other words, do youbelieve that just having a cross buck sign ata crossing where a railroad goes isn't enoughand there should be something there no matter what?

A. I think there should be gates andlights no matter what.

Q. Based on that, would you be able tobe fair in this situation where there was nota situation where there were lights and gates?

A. I would hope I could be, but Icouldn't guarantee. My belief there should begates and lights, but not having ever donethis, I don't know.

Q. So it seems to me what you are sayingis you have a preconceived notion orpreconceived notice that-

A. I have a reservation about not havinggates.

Q. And that they well might make itdifficult for you to be fair and impartialhere?

A. Possibly, yes."

Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved to dismissLingo for cause. Despite her statements above concerning aninability to be fair, plaintiff's counsel objected that she beexcused for cause. Based upon Lingo's statements that she mightnot be fair, the trial court dismissed her for cause. We also notethat up to this point, plaintiff's counsel had made no objection tothe questions posed by defense counsel concerning cross bucks.

Once the panel had been tendered to the defense, defensecounsel then asked venire person Smith and venire person Shannon ifthey had any preconceived notion or preconceived bias about theconcept of adequate protection at a railroad crossing. The samequestion was posed to venire person Kushnapor, who responded thatthe presence of only cross bucks at an intersection might possiblymake it difficult for her to be fair and impartial.

After a similar question had been asked to venire personSpirodovich, a side bar was requested by defense counsel. At theside bar, defense counsel moved to dismiss Kushnapor for cause. When the court asked for a response to the motion to excuse,plaintiff's counsel stated for the first time:

"I want to make an objection to the lineof inquiry [defense] counsel continues tofollow. I think its incorrect for him toemphasize a bit of evidence to the exclusionof everything else and try and extract fromthe jurors a commitment or some type of frameof mind as to what they are going to do."

In response, the court stated:

"It's hard to control because it allstarted with a juror postulating the questionabout whether it was a cross bucks only typeof a question. I responded to the juror alongthe lines of that he would get the evidenceeventually, and counsel having gotten thatlead in from the juror mentioned to him nowwhen the judge was speaking to you, youmentioned something about was it cross bucksonly. Would you mind telling us how thataffects your thinking which I think wasperfectly permissible. He brought it up, andI think counsel had a right to follow it up."

Plaintiff's counsel then contended that defense counsel hadbeen "brow beating" the jurors. The court immediately disagreedwith this claim and defense counsel pointed out that he was notseeking a commitment from any of the jurors. The trial judge thendenied defendant's motion to excuse Kushnapor for cause. Plaintiff's counsel asked that no further questions on the subjectof cross bucks be asked of Kushnapor. The trial judge indicatedthat he did not believe the questioning had been improper up tothat point and overruled plaintiff's request. Defense counselchose not to inquire further and then asked the trial court that Kushnapor be peremptorily excused. Immediately after thisdiscussion, the trial court dismissed Kushnapor.

After one prospective juror said that he did not think hecould be fair to the railroad, another potential juror, FrancesRogers, was examined by the court. She also indicated some concernabout serving as a juror. Specifically, she said that she neverdrove a car and that there should be lights at every railroadcrossing. Counsel for the defense then asked Rogers the followingquestion:

"Q. And if you think there should be [alight] at every crossing, if you find out inthis particular instance that there isn't one,is that going to have an impact on you in theway that you are going to view the evidenceand the facts of the case?

A. No, not really."

The defense then requested that Ms. Rogers be peremptorily excused,and the trial court granted the request.

After Janet Kohn, a prospective juror, told the court that shefelt that there should be gates at railroad crossings, defensecounsel asked her the following question:

"Q. ***, [I]f the fact is that thiscrossing that was involved in this incident isa cross buck only protected crossing, wouldyou be able to consider all of the otherfactors in conjunction with that towardsmaking your decision, or would it simply bebecause of your feeling about protection,cross bucks is it and that's the determinativefactor.

A. I think it is pretty necessary. I dothink the gates are necessary to preventanything to happen. I do feel that way."

Plaintiff's counsel did not object to this particular questionasked by defense counsel. Ultimately, defense counsel used aperemptory challenge to excuse Ms. Kohn.

Next, defense counsel asked prospective juror, Leona Harris,the following questions:

"Q. *** You have indicated that you canbe fair and impartial to both sides, I want toask you specifically if there is any issueinvolving railroad protection and situationsof crossing that presents a problem to youwith respect to cross bucks as opposed toflashers as opposed to gates; does that createa problem for you?

A. No.

Q. And the fact that in the particularcircumstances here where there was cross bucksonly as opposed to flashers or gates, thatdoesn't predispose you one way or the other?

A. Not at all.

Q. You look at the big picture, hear thefacts and here the evidence, see where itcomes down?

A. Exactly."

Plaintiff's counsel made no objection to these questions.

Moments later, plaintiff's counsel asked Harris:

"Q. My question to you is if, in fact,the evidence shows in this case that thecrossing where Mr. Rub was killed was notadequately protected, that cross bucks weren'tenough, would you have any hesitancy inreturning a verdict for the plaintiff ifthat's the case after hearing all theevidence.

A. No."

After Leona Harris was examined further, she was accepted as ajuror, and the second panel was sworn in.

During the selection process for the third panel, Anita Long,a prospective juror, asked defense counsel: "I never heard the termcross bucks. I don't know what you are talking about." Defensecounsel responded:

"Q. Cross bucks are a sign that's up ata railroad crossing that indicates - it is across on a wooden post that indicates thepresence of a railroad crossing. No flashinglights and no gates.

***, [T]here is [sic] a lot of them.

A. *** I'm not that familiar withcountry roads.

Q. *** [W]ould that impact on yourability to be fair and impartial in this case?

A. No."

At the time, plaintiff's counsel did not object to the abovequestion. Later in the proceedings, however, the followingconversation occurred between plaintiff's counsel and the trialcourt:

"MR. GOMIEN: [Plaintiff's counsel] But ifyou will recall, counsel in his voir dire kepttalking about crossbucks, and in response toone lady's question said there are many ofthem.

THE COURT: Yes. That was an unfortunatecomment."

Defense counsel then asked Darell Wiley, a prospective juror:

"Q. So as you are sitting here today andwe are having this conversation, what you aretelling me is that just because a crossing hascross bucks and not gates and flashers, youwill just take that into consideration alongwith the other factors?

A. Yes. Among other factors, yes."

Plaintiff's counsel did not object to this question.

Later in the proceedings the defense attorney asked PatrickKennedy, a prospective juror, the following questions:

"Q. You, obviously heard we are talkingabout a cross buck protected crossing asopposed to other types of protection. Is thata problem to you?

* * *

Q. *** [W]ould [the presence of onlycross bucks] impact your ability to be fairand impartial and look at all the factorsinvolved in this case and make a decision asto -

A. As far as being fair and impartial,no."

Plaintiff's counsel did not object to these questions.

Later in the proceedings, Anita Stone, a prospective juror,told the court that there should not be any rail road crossingswithout flashers. Defense counsel then asked:

"What is your specific feeling withrespect to protection at railroad crossings ingeneral? What do you think should be there?

A. I think you should have not onlyflashers, there should be guardrails devisedin a way that people can't get around them andmaybe even speakers talking to them.

* * *

Q. And would it be fair to say thatbrings you here with a pre-conceived notion orpre-conceived bias if a crossing doesn't havethat type of protection, well, then there is aproblem?

A. They should be there.

Q. So would the answer to that questionbe a yes, you have pre-conceived bias on thatissue?

A. Well, yes."

Plaintiff's counsel did not object to these questions. Based onthe answers given by Stone, the defense sought to dismiss her forcause. The trial judge dismissed her for cause.

Cheryl Utecht-Themer, another prospective juror, told thetrial court, "my preference would be that at the crossing areas *** there is protection beyond cross bucks." She was then askedthe following question by defense counsel,

"Q. At the invitation of the judge, youvolunteered your thoughts concerning crossingprotection. Could you tell me a little bitmore about that, *** what your thoughts orfeelings are about the types of protection orwhat is or is not appropriate or what youthink should or should not be there?

A. Well, obviously, if more protectionat a crossing could save a life, that's youknow, whatever it costs for those protectorsor whatever is certainly worth it.

* * *

Q. *** You understand that there is twosides to every story and it is important toweigh both sides before you start weighing theevidence?

A. Yes."

Plaintiff's counsel did not object to these questions posed bydefense counsel.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that all of the questions asked bydefense counsel above were improper because the prospective jurorsopinions concerning the presence of protection at railroadcrossings were solicited before the evidence had been presented.

We disagree for several reasons.

First, plaintiff's counsel, with the exception of oneinstance, failed to object at the time the complained-of questionswere raised by defense counsel. We note that plaintiff did make ageneral objection to the defense's line of questioning during theside bar where the defense sought to dismiss Kathleen Kushnapor forcause. " ' Preservation of a question for review requires anappropriate objection in the court below [citation], and failure toobject constitutes waiver.' [Citation.] " Kotvan v. Kirk, 321Ill. App. 3d 733, 750, 747 N.E.2d 1045 (2001). A review of theentire record reveals that plaintiff failed to specifically objectto most of the questions posed by defense counsel. Thus, plaintiffhas waived the issue.

Second, waiver aside, a review of the record reveals that thequestions asked by defense counsel were proper. The supreme courthas stated:

"The purpose of voir dire is to assurethe selection of an impartial panel of jurorswho are free from bias or prejudice.[Citations.] Under our Supreme Court Rule 234[citation] the primary responsibility forinitiating and conducting the voir direexamination lies with the trial judge[citation], and the scope and extent of theexam rests within his discretion. [citation]" Kingston v. Turner, 115 Ill. 2d 445, 464-65,505 N.E.2d 320 (1987).

177 Ill. 2d R. 234. When questioning of prospective jurors isturned over to counsel, it has been held that it is properly withinthe scope of questioning to expose any hidden bias or prejudice ofa prospective juror. Friedman v. Park District of Highland Park,151 Ill. App. 3d 374, 382, 502 N.E.2d 826 (1986).

We find that the questions posed by defense counsel wereappropriately designed to expose any latent prejudice by jurorsagainst railroad crossings where no lights, gates, or flashers werepresent. In Scully v. Otis Elevator Co., 2 Ill. App. 3d 185, 198,275 N.E.2d 905 (1971), the plaintiff's counsel used a figure of$600,000 in framing questions to prospective jurors during voirdire. On appeal, the defendant claimed that these questions wereprejudicial because the use of this figure indoctrinated the jurorsinto thinking that an award for a lesser sum would be unfair. Theappellate court found that the questions propounded by theplaintiff's counsel were appropriate because they were designed toexpose any latent prejudice among the prospective jurors againstlarge verdicts. Scully, 2 Ill. App. 3d at 198.

In our view, the questions asked by defense counsel in theinstant case were similarly designed to expose a latent prejudiceamong prospective jurors against railroad crossings where lights,gates, and flashers were not present. The record clearlydemonstrates that many prospective jurors had a preconceived biasagainst crossings where only cross bucks were present.

Further, the record reveals that the questions complained ofwere designed to explore this communicated preconceived bias amongcertain prospective jurors against the railroad. Defense counselwas entitled to inquire about any hidden bias or prejudicedemonstrated by these prospective jurors. We also conclude that the questions posed by defense counsel did not indoctrinate thejurors. Instead, the questions were appropriately designed toexpose a latent prejudice against railroad crossings only marked bycross bucks. An examination of the voir dire in its entiretydemonstrates that the prospective jurors who demonstrated apreconceived bias against crossings that lacked, lights, gates,flashers, or guardrails, and who further indicated an inability tobe fair and impartial as a result of this bias, were dismissed. Onthe other hand, jurors who communicated an ability to be fair,impartial to both sides, and to weigh all the evidence were notdismissed. We therefore conclude that the questions posed bydefense counsel served the proper purpose of voir dire and neitherindoctrinated the prospective jurors nor prejudiced plaintiff.

Third, we note that, on several occasions during voir direquestioning, plaintiff's counsel discussed the adequacy of crossbucks as the only measure for ensuring safety at the Morris Roadcrossing. As noted above, specifically in regard to questioningLeona Harris, plaintiff's counsel said:

"Q. My question to you is if, in fact,the evidence shows in this case that thecrossing where Mr. Rub was killed was notadequately protected, that cross bucks weren'tenough, would you have any hesitancy inreturning a verdict for the plaintiff ifthat's the case after hearing all the evidence[?]"

This is similar to the kind of question concerning cross bucks thatplaintiff suggests was improperly posed by defense counsel. Aplaintiff is precluded from challenging error that he injectedinto the proceedings. Ervin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 65 Ill.2d140, 144-45, 357 N.E.2d 500 (1976). Because plaintiff participatedin the line of questioning and did not object to many if not mostof the questions now complained of, plaintiff is prohibited fromchallenging the alleged error on appeal.

Plaintiff also claims that most of the prospective jurors satthroughout the entire voir dire and were likely tainted by defensecounsel who "talked endlessly about cross bucks and suggested thatanyone who did not regard cross bucks as adequate protection wasunfit to sit on the jury." As a result, the plaintiff suggeststhat the entire venire should have been excused. Based on a reviewof the entire voir dire, we disagree with plaintiff's position.

The record reveals that after the first panel of jurors wasselected, the jurors were excused and told to return the nextmorning. After the second panels was selected, those jurors were also excused from the courtroom and did not witness the remaining voir dire. Thus, plaintiff's argument that the jury was somehowtainted by exposure to defendant's questions is not persuasive.

Further, as we noted above, the tenor of the questions raisedby defense counsel focused on exposing a latent bias from jurorswho communicated a preconceived disposition against the railroad. With regard to a majority of prospective jurors, defense counselended his examination with questions concerning whether thatprospective juror could be fair and impartial. Thus, even if manyprospective jurors sat through the entire voir dire, they wouldhave observed that the jurors who were excused were those whodemonstrated that they could not be fair and impartial to bothsides. Therefore, we are not persuaded by plaintiff's argumentthat the jury was tainted and should have been excused.

Additionally, the authority relied upon by plaintiff isdistinguishable. In Christian v. New York Central R.R. Co., 28Ill. App. 2d 57, 59, 170 N.E.2d 183 (1960), a 13-year-old boy wasseverely injured when several railroad torpedoes with which he wasplaying exploded. The torpedoes were obtained by the boy's friendsfrom defendant's obsolete steam locomotives.

During voir dire, counsel for plaintiff was permitted tointerrogate several jurors upon specific points of law. Withrespect to one juror, the venireman told the court that he hadhandled railroad torpedoes, that he knew they were dangerous, andthat he would not make a very good juror. The juror was notexcused and was further questioned by the court. The questioningrevealed a statement from the juror that he might not be impartialbecause he knew the degree of care necessary for handling railroadtorpedoes. Despite more than one disqualifying statement, thecourt turned the juror over to questioning by the plaintiff'scounsel, which yielded this answer from the juror: " 'I will tellyou that the about it, I know the care of torpedoes and there mustbe neglect someplace, and I just honestly feel that I wouldn't makea good juror.'" Christian, 28 Ill. App. 2d at 66. The trial courtpermitted plaintiff's counsel to ask the following questions beforethis prospective juror was excused: " 'You feel because you haveknowledge of these things and the danger that there is in it, youknow to be in them, that is what you are saying; the way they haveto be cared for, if you got on the jury, you would be prone to beagainst these defendants because these things are involved[?]' " Christian, 28 Ill. App. 2d at 66.

The appellate court found that "counsel for plaintiff waspermitted to run rampant in the selection of this jury." Christian, 28 Ill. App. 2d at 67. Further, the court stated,"[t]he main effort of [plaintiff's] examination was toindoctrinate, to persuade and to control [the selection ofprospective jurors]." Christian, 28 Ill. App. 2d at 67. As thedefense observed the plaintiff's attempt to convert the jury panelto his beliefs, defense counsel "naturally launched upon areconversion when his time came." Christian, 28 Ill. App. 2d at67. Because of the clear abuse of voir dire examination by counselfor both parties, the court found that reversal was warranted. Christian, 28 Ill. App. 2d at 68-69.

Christian is distinguishable because the main effort of theplaintiff in that case was to indoctrinate the jury. In theinstant case, the record does not demonstrate an abuse of voir direby defense counsel. Instead, the evidence indicates an effort bydefense counsel to uncover bias among perspective jurors. We findno abuse of voir dire by defense counsel in the instant case.

In Gasiorowski, the plaintiff, a pedestrian, suffered personalinjuries when she was struck by an automobile while crossingBelmont Avenue in Chicago mid-block. The jury returned a verdictin favor of the defendant-driver, finding that the plaintiff wasguilty of contributory negligence. During voir dire, plaintiff'scounsel sought to ask prospective jurors whether they had ever seenpedestrians crossing streets in mid-block and whether they, aspedestrians, had themselves ever crossed streets in mid-block. Thetrial court did not permit counsel to ask these two questions. Theplaintiff, among other things, appealed that decision. Theappellate court found that the trial court was well within itsdiscretion to prohibit such questions because:

"Questions which tend to put prospectivejurors in the place of the parties to thelitigation open a wide range of possibilitiesfor indoctrination or pre-education of jurors,and lend themselves all too easily to attemptsto obtain some positive indication as to whichparty the jurors might favor." Gasiorowski, 47Ill. App. 3d at 994.

We find the facts in Gasiorowski are distinguishable from those inthe instant case. In Gasiorowski, the court prohibited plaintiff'scounsel from asking two questions on voir dire. Here, the courtpermitted defense counsel to ask certain questions to prospectivejurors. We conclude that these questions did not taint theselection of an impartial jury and that the trial court did notabuse its discretion in allowing the inquiry.

While the trial court itself acknowledged that it may havebeen mistaken in allowing questions by counsel for both sides onthe topic of cross bucks, it determined that such questioning wasnot prejudicial and did not deny plaintiff a fair trial. We notethat the trial court reviewed its own conclusion and evaluatedsignificant portions of the voir dire in a 24-page order thatdenied plaintiff's post trial motion. While the questioning ofdefense counsel on a few occasions arguably went beyondascertaining whether a juror was free from bias or prejudice, we donot conclude that it rose to the level of indoctrinating orpreeducating the prospective jurors. As we noted above, the thrustof the questioning sought to determine whether the prospectivejurors were free from bias or prejudice. Such is the purpose ofvoir dire. Gowler v. Ferrell-Ross Co., 206 Ill. App. 3d 194, 207,563 N.E.2d 773 (1990).

Finally, plaintiff also claims that the voir dire conducted byConrail provided prospective jurors with an incomplete andmisleading characterization of the law as it related to crossbucks. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the trial courtallowed a discussion concerning the adequacy of cross bucks, butfailed to instruct the jury that the law imposes a duty on therailroad to install additional protection devices at extrahazardouscrossings. We reject this argument for two reasons.

First, Conrail correctly points out that this argument hasbeen waived because plaintiff neither raised the specific issueduring voir dire, nor identified the alleged error in a posttrialmotion. "Failure to raise objection at trial or during post-trialproceedings results in waiver of the right to raise the issue onappeal." Limanowski v. Ashland Oil Co., 275 Ill. App. 3d 115, 118,655 N.E.2d 1049 (1995). Specifically, failure to object to analleged error during voir dire or to object at the conclusion ofjury selection results in a waiver of the issue on appeal. Kotvan,321 Ill. App. 3d at 750.

Here, the record reveals that during voir dire, plaintiff didnot object on the basis that prospective jurors had been misled interms of defendant's characterization of the law as it related tothe presence of cross bucks. Instead, plaintiff objected to the"line of questioning" raised by counsel concerning cross bucks andto the evidence of cross bucks being introduced prior to trial. Inthe objection, plaintiff's counsel did not indicate that counselfor Conrail had misled the prospective jurors by making only apartial disclosure of the law as it related to cross bucks. Thus,plaintiff did not make an objection during voir dire on thisparticular issue.

Further, the record does not include plaintiff's posttrialmotion, and we are unable to determine whether an objection to thisspecific issue was even raised by plaintiff in that motion. Due toplaintiff's failure to object to the alleged error at trial, weconclude that the issue has been waived. Limanowski, 275 Ill. App.3d at 118.

Second, as pointed out above, the record reveals that Conraildid not raise the issue of cross bucks as an adequate means ofprotecting railroad crossings. Instead, the subject was raised bya prospective juror. As a result, the presence of cross bucks atthe intersection was inquired into by both parties. We havealready found that none of defense counsel's questionsindoctrinated the jury or deprived plaintiff of a fair trial, andwe reject plaintiff's argument that the jurors should have beeninstructed during voir dire concerning a duty imposed on railroadspertaining to extrahazardous crossings.

Based upon all of the above, we conclude that the trial courtdid not err during voir dire by allowing the questions posed bydefense counsel. We further determine that plaintiff was notdenied a fair trial. [The following material is non-publishableunder Supreme Court Rule 23.]

We next consider whether the trial court erred by givingcertain jury instructions. Concerning our standard of review, thesupreme court has held:

"A litigant has the right to have thejury clearly and fairly instructed upon eachtheory which was supported by the evidence. [Citation.] However, it is error to give aninstruction not based on the evidence.[Citations.] The question of what issues havebeen raised by the evidence is within thediscretion of the trial court. The evidencemay be slight; a reviewing court may notreweigh it or determine if it should lead to aparticular conclusion. [Citation.] The testin determining the propriety of tenderedinstructions is whether the jury was fairly,fully and comprehensively informed as to therelevant principles, considering theinstructions in their entirety." Leonardi v.Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83,100, 658 N.E.2d 450 (1995).

Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred by giving two juryinstructions in addition to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,Civil, No. 73.01 (2000), which is specifically devoted to railroadcrossing cases. The instruction stated:

"73.01 Duty of Driver Crossing Tracks

A railroad crossing is a place ofdanger. If you believe from the evidence thatas the [plaintiff] [decedent] was approachingthe crossing he knew, or, in the exercise ofordinary care should have known, that a trainapproaching the crossing was so close to thecrossing that it would be likely to arrive atthe crossing at about the same time asplaintiff's vehicle, then it was the duty ofthe [plaintiff] [decedent] to yield the rightof way to the train." Illinois Pattern JuryInstructions, Civil, No. 73.01 (2000)(hereinafter IPI Civil, ).

According to plaintiff, IPI Civil No. 73.01 was the onlyinstruction which should have been given to the jury. Instead, thetrial court, over plaintiff's objection, gave the jury twoadditional instructions which were tendered by Conrail inconformity with IPI Civil No. 60.01. The first instruction statedthe following:

"There was in force in the State ofIllinois at the time of the occurrence inquestion a certain statute which providedthat:

Whenever any person driving a vehicleapproaches a railroad grade crossing suchperson must exercise due care and caution asthe existence of the railroad track across thehighway is a warning of danger, and under anyof the circumstances stated in this Section,the driver shall stop within 50 feet but notless than 15 feet from the nearest rail of therailroad and shall not proceed until he can doso safely. The foregoing requirements shallapply when:

***

• A railroad train approaching ahighway crossing emits a warningsignal and such railroad train, byreason of its speed or nearness tosuch crossing, is an immediatehazard; or
• An approaching railroad train isplainly visible and is in hazardousproximity to such crossing; or
• A railroad train is approaching soclosely that an immediate hazard iscreated.

If you decide that a person violated thestatute on the occasion in question, then youmay consider the fact together with all theother facts and circumstances in evidence indetermining whether and to what extent, ifany, a person was negligent before and at thetime of the occurrence."

The second instruction stated:

"There was in force in the State ofIllinois at the time of the occurrence inquestion a certain statute which providedthat:

No vehicle may be driven upon any highwayof this State at a speed which is greater thanis reasonable and proper with regard totraffic conditions and the use of the highway,or endangers the safety of any person orproperty. The fact that the speed of avehicle does not exceed the applicable maximumspeed does not relieve the driver from theduty to decrease speed when traveling upon anynarrow roadway, or when special hazard existswith respect to traffic or by reason ofweather or highway conditions.

If you decide that a person violatedthe statute on the occasion in question, thenyou may consider the fact together with allthe other facts and circumstances in evidencein determining whether and to what extent, ifany, a person was negligent before and at thetime of the occurrence."

According to plaintiff, by providing the above instructions inaddition to IPI Civil No. 73.01, the jury was informed that Rub hadcommitted multiple motor vehicle violations which "over-emphasized"Conrail's theory of contributory negligence.

Further, plaintiff claims that trial court ignored theexplicit directions on how to use IPI Civil 60.01 by allowingmultiple instructions based on the same legal principle. IllinoisPattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 60.01, Notes on Use (2000).

We recognize that, "[w]here several instructions embodying thesame legal principle are submitted to the court, it may select theone it sees fit and need not repeat the same proposition of law indifferent language in different instructions." Bernardoni v.Hebel, 101 Ill. App. 3d 172, 177, 427 N.E. 2d 1288 (1981); IPICivil, No. 60.01, Notes on Use (2000). However, we agree withConrail that the three instructions set forth above embodysufficiently different legal principles. As correctly noted byConrail, IPI Civil No. 73.01 establishes a common law duty to yieldthe right of way to the train. To the contrary, the instructiontendered by Conrail based on IPI Civil No. 60.01 establishes astatutory duty upon a motorist to stop his vehicle when a railroadtrain is approaching so closely that an immediate hazard iscreated. This statutory duty is imposed on motorists under section11-1201 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS 5/11-1201 (West1998).

The second instruction tendered by Conrail refers to amotorist's obligation to reduce his speed when a special hazardexists. This duty is imposed on motorists by section 11-601(a) ofthe Illinois Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West 1998). Inour view, therefore, the three instructions did not arise out ofthe same legal principle.

Even if we were to conclude otherwise, Conrail correctlyobserves that, "[m]erely because the court restates the law inanother instruction does not necessarily mean that the court undulyemphasizes any point in favor of the other." Riley v. Johnson, 98Ill. App. 3d 688, 695, 424 N.E.2d 842 (1981). Thus, plaintiff'scontention that the inclusion of Conrail's two instructions "over-emphasized" a theory of contributory negligence is not persuasive. Furthermore, we note that, "[a]s a general rule, a judgmentwill not be reversed where the jury instructions are faulty unlessthey misled the jury and the complaining party suffered prejudice." (Emphasis added.) Dabros by Dabros v. Wang, 243 Ill. App. 3d 259,269, 611 N.E.2d 1113 (1993). Thus, even if the instructions were"faulty," reversal would not be warranted unless the jury wasmisled. There is no evidence to support that the jury was misledby the instructions in the instant case.

Plaintiff also argues that the instructions provided the jurywith confusing and conflicting information concerning Rub's duty ofcare. Specifically, plaintiff claims that the jury was providedthree different instructions which required Rub to yield the rightof way, to stop, or to reduce his speed in the event of anapproaching train. Plaintiff offers no evidence that the jury wasmisled by "[t]his parade of different duties." Furthermore,Conrail was entitled to instruct the jury on its contributorynegligence theory. "[E]ach party is entitled to have the courtinstruct the jury on its theory of the case that is presented as anissue in the pleadings and preserved in the evidence." BellevilleToyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 316 Ill. App. 3d227, 244, 738 N.E.2d 938 (2000). Thus, we are not persuaded bythis argument.

Finally, plaintiff argues that the second instruction tenderedby Conrail, noted above, was not supported by any evidence in therecord. In particular, plaintiff contends that there was noevidence to support the fact that Rub was traveling at anunreasonable rate of speed prior to the collision. While there wasno actual testimony that Rub was traveling at an unreasonable rateof speed, evidence in the record does show that the Conrail trainwas approaching the Morris Road intersection at 40 miles per hourprior to the collision. Rub's vehicle was traveling atapproximately the same rate of speed. The record furtherdemonstrates that the road was wet and that the evening was darkand dreary.

The Conrail instruction at issue states that a driver may havethe obligation to reduce speed in the event of a special hazard,weather, or highway conditions. Based on an approaching train, aspecial hazard, and poor weather conditions, we find that there wassufficient evidence in the record to support this jury instruction,and it, "fairly, fully, and comprehensively informed [the jury] asto the relevant principles." Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 100. Wefurther conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretionby providing the instructions tendered by Conrail to the jury.

We next address whether the trial court abused its discretionwhen it excluded particular evidence concerning the extrahazardousnature of the Morris Road crossing. The admissibility of evidenceis within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decisionwill not be reversed on appeal unless that discretion has clearlybeen abused. Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 92.

Plaintiff correctly observes that a jury is charged withdetermining whether extrahazardous conditions are present at arailroad crossing which may impose a duty upon the railroad toprovide additional warning devices. Brennan v. Wisconsin Central Ltd., 227 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 1080, 591 N.E.2d 494 (1992); MerchantsNational Bank of Aurora v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 121Ill. App. 2d 445, 459, 257 N.E.2d 216 (1970); Baker v. Norfolk &Western Ry. Co., 120 Ill. App. 2d 296, 303, 256 N.E.2d 887 (1970). The above authority sets forth a variety of factors that the jurymay consider in reaching a determination as to whether a crossingis extrahazardous. Brennan, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 1080; MerchantsNational Bank, 121 Ill. App. 3d at 456; Baker, 120 Ill. App. 3d at304. Specifically, the court held in Brennan:

"Several factors the jury considers inassessing the questions of hazard andprotection are population, traffic, physicalobstructions to vision, volume and speed ofvehicular and train traffic, track arrangementand elevation, width of the crossing,intersecting driveways and roadways, characterof the surrounding neighborhood, and theeffect to which confusion, incident to therailroad or other business in the area, wouldhave on the sight or hearing of ordinarysignals." Brennan, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 1080.

Plaintiff, however, fails to acknowledge the general propositionthat evidence that is not relevant, and that would only confuse ormislead the jury, is properly excluded. People v. Averhart, 311Ill. App. 3d 492, 500, 724 N.E.2d 154 (1999). Further, althoughthe admissibility of relevant evidence is favored, even relevantevidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed byfactors such as prejudice, confusion, or the potential formisleading the jury. Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 314, 626N.E.2d 190 (1993). With these standards in place, we address thefollowing evidence which plaintiff contends was improperly barredby the trial court.

Plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred by barringevidence of a 60-mile-per-hour federal speed limit which could haveapplied to the Conrail tracks at the Morris Road crossing. It wasundisputed, however, that Conrail imposed a lower speed limit of 45miles per hour for trains traveling through the Morris Roadcrossing. Moreover, the evidence presented at trial showed thatthe Conrail train at issue was proceeding at 40 miles per hour whenit reached the crossing. Thus, we agree with defendant that thehigher 60-mile-per-hour federal speed limit had neither a factualconnection to the instant case, nor was it relevant. Plaintiffclaims that the trial court's ruling was inconsistent with theholding in Baker, cited above, where the trial court allowed thespeed limit of freight trains into evidence.

We distinguish Baker because each case must be decidedindependently by the jury, "whose task it is to determine, from thecircumstances in existence at the particular crossing at theparticular time the vehicle approaches, whether the crossing isextrahazardous and the amount of protection required." (Emphasisadded.) Brennan, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 1080. Additionally, inBaker, the speed limit for freight trains at the crossing at issuewas 60 miles per hour and the speed limit for passenger trains was78 miles per hour. The evidence in Baker revealed that thepassenger train which collided with the plaintiffs' automobile wastraveling between 60 and 78 miles per hour at the time of theaccident.

Plaintiff somewhat mischaracterizes Baker by claiming that thecourt in that case allowed evidence of the train's speed limit eventhough the train in Baker was traveling under the legal speed limitof 78 miles per hour. As we noted above, the evidence presented inBaker showed that the train was traveling somewhere between 60 and78 miles per hour. The speed limits therefore were relevantbecause the evidence indicated that the train's speed was betweenthe limits of 60 and 78 miles per hour. In this case, however, thefederal speed limit of 60 miles per hour was not relevant given theundisputed evidence that the train was proceeding at 40 miles perhour. Under these facts, the federal speed limit of 60 miles perhour does not relate to any of the circumstances surrounding thecrossing in the instant case. We therefore conclude that the trialcourt did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of thefederal speed limit.

Next, plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly barredevidence of the diminished reflectivity of the railroad crossingwarning sign which was located 390 feet north of the Morris Roadintersection. Specifically, plaintiff claims that the trial courterred by prohibiting the testimony of Randy Baxter and SteveDorsett, Dwight police officers, who would have testified that theadvance warning sign was no longer "shiny" in terms of itsreflectivity.

The record indicates that plaintiff's counsel asked OfficerBaxter if he could describe the "shininess" of the advance warningsign. Defense counsel objected on the basis that the questioncalled for an opinion by the witness. The trial court found that in the event Baxter's opinion was not disclosed, defense counsel'sobjection would be sustained. Supreme Court Rule 213(g) requiresthat any person who will offer opinion testimony must, upon writteninterrogatory, disclose the subject matter on which the opinionwitness is expected to testify. 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(g); Warrenderv. Millsop, 304 Ill. App. 3d 260, 265, 710 N.E.2d 512 (1999). Aside bar was then held where defense counsel said, "the degree ofreflectorization of the sign is a matter of scientificmeasurement." Defense counsel further argued that the witness'opinion was not competent because he was not an expert in optics,metallurgy, or any field which would determine how shiny a sign is. The position of plaintiff's counsel was that Baxter's testimony wasnot an opinion, but was merely an observation. After hearing fromboth parties, the trial court sustained the objection by defensecounsel. Although the trial court did not allow this particulartestimony, it did allow a photograph of the sign into evidencewhich was taken on the night of the accident.

We are not persuaded by plaintiff's argument that Merchantspermits all testimony concerning the reflectivity of crossingsigns. Here, the trial court initially indicated that thetestimony was an opinion and if it had not been properly disclosed,it would not be allowed. Plaintiff's counsel responded to thedefense objection by stating that what was being offered was not anopinion. Like the trial court, we do not agree. We conclude thatthe kind of testimony plaintiff was attempting to elicit throughOfficer Baxter was not simply an observation.

We also find that, contrary to plaintiff's claim, Merchantssuggests that this kind of testimony is properly provided by anexpert. One of the issues involved in Merchants was whether thetrial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting certainexpert testimony, specifically, the interaction of lightingconditions and retroflection. The appellate court found that theseareas of inquiry, "are of sufficient difficulty of comprehensionand explanation to justify the assistance of expert testimony." Merchants, 121 Ill. App. 2d at 462. In the instant case, the trialcourt found that Baxter's opinion concerning reflectivity of thesign was not properly disclosed under Supreme Court Rule 213(g). Moreover, as we later discuss, plaintiff called a lighting expert who testified about the sign's reflectivity. Thus, we concludethat the trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibitingthe testimony of the police officers in regard to the sign'sreflectivity.

Plaintiff's counsel also claims that the trial court's rulingon this point was especially harmful because it prohibited evidenceas to the "reflectivity" of the sign at the time of the accident. According to plaintiff, "[t]his [was] significant becauseplaintiff's lighting expert who was permitted to testify as to thesign's reflectivity, did not observe the sign until several yearsafter the accident." The record, however, reveals otherwise.

The evidence at trial showed that plaintiff's lighting expert,Henry Lowell Lazara, defined reflectivity as, "light striking anobject causing a brightness that you view ***. That brightness isthe reflectivity of [the] surface." Over defense counsel'sobjection, Lazara was permitted to testify regarding thereflectivity of the advance warning sign at issue, which heinspected in 1996. Lazara said:

"I observed the sign to be apparentlyquite old. I ran a test on it, the simplestandard test of shining a spotlight at a signto determine whether it had been treated witha reflective material, a typical Scotch-lite. If it had, there would be a shining back ofthe brightness on my spotlight. I saw noevidence of reflectivity to the surface ofthat sign."

Lazara further stated that he did not examine the particular signon November 25, 1992. However, he was permitted to give an opinionconcerning the sign's reflectivity as depicted in the photographtaken at the time of the accident. After viewing the photograph,Lazara said, "I do not see particular evidence of reflectivity onit."

Based on the above, the record reveals that the trial courtpermitted plaintiff's lighting expert to testify as to the sign'sreflectivity in 1996 and in 1992. We are therefore not persuadedby plaintiff's argument that prohibiting Officer Baxter's testimonywas prejudicial.

Further, while visibility is certainly a factor in determiningwhether a crossing is extrahazardous, each case is to be decidedindependently by the jury. Brennan, 227 Ill. App. 3d 1080. Finally, we observe that the picture of the sign admitted intoevidence allowed the jurors to assess the reflectivity of the signon their own. We therefore conclude that the trial court did notabuse its discretion by prohibiting the testimony of the Dwightpolice offers on this issue.

Plaintiff next asserts that the trial court improperly barred the testimony of Daniel Allen, the former village administrator ofDwight, concerning "switching activities" at the R.R. Donnellyprinting plant, which was located near the Morris Road crossing. We note that plaintiff's reference to switching activities concernsthe diversion of railroad cars and engines from one track toanother. Plaintiff claims that in Merchants and Brennan, evidenceof the activity of neighboring business was considered relevant towhether a crossing was extrahazardous.

Specifically, plaintiff argues that the court in Merchantsallowed evidence of switching activities on a spur track at anearby factory. However, in Merchants, plaintiff presentedtestimony that there were distracting conditions affectingvisibility as well as the physical sight distances. Specifically,plaintiff presented testimony:

"There was a cut switch train of 8 cars to thesouth of the crossing; and that on the sidingsome 1,000-1,680 *** feet north of thecrossing, in the same direction as defendant'sTrain No. 6 was approaching, there was aworking switch train with headlights,gyrolight, whistle and 8 cars, which a part ofthe conflicting testimony indicated would havebeen visible to the *** vehicle; and that on asiding for the Fleischmann factory, whichbuilding was located about 384 feet east ofthe crossing, there were 3 parked boxcars."Merchants, 121 Ill. App. 2d at 450-51.

Because such evidence was admissible in Merchants, plaintiffargues that the trial court erred by prohibiting it in this case. Here, the record reveals that the trial court prohibited thetestimony based on relevancy.

Unlike Merchants, there was no evidence in this record whichdemonstrated that the switching activities at the R.R. Donnellyplant were circumstances present at the instant crossing. Thus,the switching activity was not a distraction to the driver, "at theparticular crossing, at the particular time of the approach of thevehicle," as was apparent in Merchants. Merchants, 121 Ill. App.2d at 456. We therefore conclude that the trial court did notabuse its discretion in prohibiting the testimony.

Plaintiff further interprets Brennan and Morris to mean thata determination of whether a crossing is extrahazardous dependsupon overall conditions generally affecting a crossing, not justthose at the time of the accident. We are not prepared to extendthe holdings in those cases to allow any evidence concerning the conditions which affect a particular crossing at any time. Such adecision would not only limit a trial court's ability to excludeevidence based on relevancy but would frustrate the clear mandateof Brennan, which requires that each case involving specialcircumstances, "at the particular time the vehicle approaches," beindependently decided by the jury. Brennan, 227 Ill. App. 3d at1080.

Plaintiff also contends that the trial court abused itsdiscretion by limiting her use of demonstrative evidence in theform of a computer animation which illustrated how the streetlightsand house lights in Dwight camouflaged the headlights on thetrain's locomotive. The record reveals that the trial courtallowed some of the animation to be shown, but barred plaintifffrom showing the collision between the train and Rub's vehiclebecause of a risk of misinterpretation by the jury. The trialcourt also restricted the use of those animation clips which showedan angle of vison to "frozen (or stopped)" computer drawings. According to plaintiff, the trial court's ruling unduly restrictedplaintiff's ability to illustrate the points made by its expertwitnesses.

We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion inexcluding parts of this evidence because the record shows the trialjudge questioned the accuracy of the animation. In this regard,the trial judge stated:

"Fundamentally what [the computeranimator] said is that there are nomeasurements to determine the location and thelights, that there is no quantification of thedegree of illumination, it was all based onsubjectivity on the reports of the expertsafter they reviewed the animation and theexpert's suggesting through their subjectiverecollection that the animation now looks theway it should."

Based on the record, it is clear that the trial court did nottrust the accuracy of certain parts of the animation. We are notprepared to disturb that finding. We therefore conclude that thetrial court's decision to exclude certain portions of the animationfrom admission into evidence was not an abuse of discretion.

Next, plaintiff claims that the trial court abused itsdiscretion by excluding photographs of corn plants whichpurportedly obstructed the view of the Morris Road crossing duringsummer and early fall. The record demonstrates that the trialcourt excluded the evidence based on relevancy because the accidentoccurred on November 25, 1992. Plaintiff contends that cropsgrowing in the vicinity of the intersection for several months eachyear was relevant to the issue of whether the Morris Road crossingwas extrahazardous, and she further asserts that the evaluation ofwhether a crossing is extrahazardous is not limited to time whenthe accident occurred.

Initially, we find that plaintiff's contention concerning theexclusion of photographs of corn plants is waived under SupremeCourt Rule 341(e)(7). 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). In her brief,plaintiff failed to provide any citation to the record where thetrial court excluded this evidence. Under Supreme Court Rule341(e)(7), "an appellant's brief must contain his contentions andthe reasons therefor, accompanied by citation of authorities andpages of the record." Elder v. Bryant, 324 Ill. App. 3d 526, 533,755 N.E.2d 515 (2001). A failure to provide proper argument andauthority results in a forfeiture of the argument. Elder, 324 Ill.App. 3d at 533.

Waiver aside, we do not agree with plaintiff that Brennan,Merchants, and Baker allow the admissibility of evidence concerningthe extrahazardous nature of a crossing to extend beyond thecircumstances in existence at the particular crossing at theparticular time of the accident. In Merchants, and later inBrennan, the court set forth the relevant factors to be considered,but limited the circumstances to those in existence at theparticular crossing at the particular time the vehicle approaches.Merchants, 121 Ill. App. 2d at 456; Brennan, 227 Ill. App. 3d at1080. In this case, the trial court excluded the evidence asirrelevant because there were no crops growing at the time of theaccident. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretionby excluding this evidence.

Plaintiff also claims that she should have been able to showthat the Morris Road crossing was the only crossing in Dwight withcross bucks, and that all of the other crossings in Dwight,including the crossings immediately to the east and west of theMorris Road intersection, were protected by flashing lights. Therecord indicates that the trial court excluded this evidence basedon relevancy. Plaintiff claims that the characteristics of thesurrounding neighborhood are a factor which can be considered inregard to whether the crossing is extrahazardous. Brennan, 227Ill. App. 3d at 1080. We agree that the surrounding neighborhoodis a factor to be considered, but the factors, as pointed outabove, are to be considered "at the particular crossing at theparticular time to vehicle approaches." (Emphasis added). Brennan, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 1080. Thus, the trial court did notabuse its discretion by excluding evidence concerning othercrossings in Dwight.

Further, plaintiff claims that the trial court's ruling inregard to this evidence was especially prejudicial considering thefact that during voir dire defense counsel stated that "there [are]a lot" of cross bucks. Plaintiff suggests the comment left thejury with the impression that the majority of the intersections inDwight were protected only by cross bucks, when the exact oppositewas true.

We observe that the defense counsel's comment was made duringthe selection of the third panel of prospective jurors. Becausethe first and second panel of jurors had been selected and excused,the comment was made outside the presence of many of the selectedjurors. Further, the record reveals that the jurors were informedseveral times by the trial court that comments made by theattorneys were not evidence.

Despite the remark made by defense counsel during voir dire,we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion byexcluding the evidence of other crossings. Here, the trial judgedetermined that the presence of flashers at other crossings inDwight was not relevant to the characteristics of the crossingwhere the accident occurred. As we have stated repeatedly above,the admissibility of evidence is limited to the "particularcrossing at the particular time the vehicle approaches." Brennan,227 Ill. App. 3d at 1080. Thus, we find that the trial court didnot abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence.

Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred byprohibiting its expert, John Edward Baerwald, from testifying aboutstudies conducted by the Federal Highway Administration and FederalRailway Administration which had shown that flashers areapproximately 77% more effective than cross bucks in regard toaccident prevention. According to plaintiff, such testimony wasappropriate because it was an elaboration of Baerwald's testimonywhich was elicited during Conrail's cross-examination.

Specifically on cross-examination, counsel for Conrail askedBaerwald whether, in his opinion, flashers would have lowered theprobability of the accident in this case. On redirect, plaintiffsought to expand on this point by asking Baerwald about the resultsof federal studies which indicated the comparative effectiveness offlashers versus cross bucks in terms of protection. After a sidebar, the trial court prohibited plaintiff from eliciting the resultof the federal statistics from Baerwald on the basis that thisinformation was not previously revealed.

Conrail states that the trial court was correct in excluding the federal statistical studies as inadmissible because it wasneither mentioned in the expert's deposition nor mentioned inplaintiff's disclosure under Supreme Court Rule 213(g) (177 Ill. 2dR. 213 (g)). We agree.

Under Supreme Court Rule 213(g)(i), a party must state bywritten interrogatory the subject matter on which the opinionwitness is expected to testify. 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(g)(i). Ascorrectly noted by defendants, "Rule 213 disclosure requirementsare mandatory and subject to strict compliance by the parties." Seef v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 311 Ill. App. 3d 7, 21, 724N.E.2d 115 (1999).

In the instant case, we note that plaintiff's Rule 213disclosure contained in the record does not even mention Baerwald,let alone federal statistics upon which he intended to testify. The purpose of Rule 213 is to disclose the subject matter uponwhich all opinions are based in order to avoid surprising theopposing party. Seef, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 22. Such was the effectof the federal statistics raised by plaintiff during her redirectof Baerwald.

We further disagree with plaintiff's interpretation of Seef asit applies to the instant case. Plaintiff claims that Seef standsfor the proposition that "testimony which merely elaborates on adisclosed opinion does not violate Rule 213." In fact, Seef actually states, "[a]lthough elaborating on a disclosed opiniondoes not automatically violate Rule 213." Seef, 311 Ill. App. 3dat 23. Here, plaintiff sought to bolster Baerwald's testimony witha federal study that had not been disclosed. In our view, the actof raising undisclosed statistics on re-direct was not merelyelaborating on a previously disclosed opinion. Instead, weconclude that the conduct frustrated the purpose of Supreme CourtRule 213(g) because it surprised Conrail with testimony that hadnot been previously disclosed. 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(g)(i).

Further, plaintiff also claims that Seef provides "a party whoelicits testimony from an expert on cross-examination cannot objectto such testimony on grounds that it violates Rule 213 disclosurerequirements." While the court in Seef actually stated,"[p]laintiff's objection *** was to testimony elicited byplaintiffs' counsel during cross-examination ***. Plaintiffscannot now object to this testimony they elicited," we find thefacts in the instant case are distinguishable. Seef, 311 Ill. App.3d at 23.

Here, on cross-examination, counsel for Conrail elicited Baerwald's opinion that flashers would have lowered the probabilityof the accident in this case. On redirect, plaintiff sought toexpand on the point by asking Baerwald about the results of federalstatistics. Thus, plaintiff's attempt to elaborate was not basedmerely on Baerwald's testimony, the opinion that flashers wouldhave lowered the probability of an accident. Instead, plaintiffsought to expand on the testimony by using federal statistics thathad not been disclosed. As a result, we conclude that the trialcourt did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence.

We next consider whether the trial court erred by giving thejury certain limiting instructions that plaintiff claims wereprejudicial. Specifically, plaintiff complains that three limitinginstructions given by the trial court "unduly emphasized Rub'scontributory negligence."

In the first limiting instruction complained of, the courtstated:

"The indication that I'm going to give tothe jury is a preliminary indication, and thatis that the lighting on the front of thelocomotive here is being brought to theattention of the jury as to the allegations --as to the extent, if any, that the jury weighsthat information concerning the allegations ofthe defense that this collision was caused bythe negligent conduct of the automobile driverhimself.

There is no indication that there was anyviolation of any requirement with regard tothe lights that were situated on the front ofthe locomotive, so, therefore, this evidenceis not being admitted for the purpose ofsuggesting any negligence on the part of thedefendant railroad with regard to the lightsthey had on the front. It is admitted withregard to the conduct of the other party.

What other party? The other party beingthe person who was driving the motor vehicle,for whatever weight you wish to give, thevisibility or conspicuity of the railroadtrain and as to that issue, which is an issueconcerning the allegations by the defendantrailroad that the incident was caused by thenegligent conduct of the driver of the carhimself. As to that issue, the conspicuity orvisibility of the railroad train is relevant."

In the second limiting instruction, the trial court stated:

"There are two vehicles involved. One isa train, and one is an automobile here. Thereis no allegation by the plaintiff orsuggestion or evidence that the lights on thetrain were in violation of anything. Also, noallegation that there was negligence on thepart of the railroad defendant with regard tothe lights, none. So this is not beingadmitted for the purpose of suggesting anynegligence on the part of the railroad withregard to the lights.

* * *

Well, what is it being admitted for? Itis being admitted solely for the limitedpurpose of the visibility of the train as itwould come towards the intersection and it isbeing utilized for the purpose of theallegations of the defendant that thenegligent conduct of the automobile driver wasthe cause of this collision, which, of course,raises the question of what the automobiledriver could see or visibility or conspicuityof the train. For that purpose and thatpurpose only, we're talking about lights onthe intersection? No. Lights on the train."

Concerning the final limiting instruction, the court said:

"Any reference to the visibility of thetrain, its color, paint, the lighting on it,is in no way being brought into this case tosuggest to you that the lighting orconspicuity or visibility or the painting wasin any way, shape or form in violation of anyrule or regulation or in fact constituted anydeviation from ordinary care or was neglect.

* * *

It is being put into evidence for a verylimited purpose and a limited purpose only. One of the limited purposes is alreadyindicated to you previously is the weight, ifany, that you decide to give those elements,what elements? Elements of how visible thetrain was when you go back there and considerthe allegations of the railroad that theclaimant driver, decedent was comparativelynegligent when he drove onto the railroadtracks.

Visibility of the train when you consideralleged negligence of the driver of the trainas to what he could see with regard to thetrain."

The record reveals that plaintiff did not object to any ofthese limiting instructions at trial. As we noted above,"[f]ailureto raise an objection at trial or during post-trial proceedingsresults in waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal." Limanowski, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 118. Because plaintiff failed toobject to these limiting instructions at trial, the issue is waivedon appeal.

Waiver aside, we agree with Conrail that plaintiff's claimfails on the merits. Over an objection by defense counsel, thetrial court allowed plaintiff to ask questions in regard tolighting on the train, but only admitted the evidence for thelimited purpose of establishing Rub's contributory negligence. AsConrail correctly points out, "[i]t is fundamental to ouradversarial process that a party cannot claim error when it inducedthe trial judge's mistake." J.L. Simmons Co., Inc. ex. Rel.Hartford Insurance Group v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 108 Ill.2d 106, 116, 483 N.E.2d 273 (1985). Thus, we conclude that thetrial court did not err by providing the jury with the limitinginstructions set forth above, and we reject plaintiff's argument onthe fourth issue.

We turn to the final issue whether the cumulative effect ofthe errors alleged by plaintiff above denied her the right to afair trial. Here, we agree with Conrail that plaintiff has failedto demonstrate reversible error concerning any one of her claimsthus far. She cannot prevail by attempting to group the allegederrors together. If none of the alleged errors were prejudicial toplaintiff, neither is their cumulative effect. McShane v. ChicagoInvestment Co., 235 Ill. App. 3d 860, 878-79, 601 N.E.2d 1238(1992). We therefore reject defendant's claim on this issue.

In addition to the errors alleged in the first four questionson appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by allowing Conrail to ask plaintiff's traffic engineer a number ofimproper questions. Specifically, plaintiff suggests that it wasimproper for Conrail to ask the expert whether he had reason tobelieve that Rub had not seen the advance warning sign or knew ofany evidence that Rub had not seen the train.

Plaintiff also claims that the trial court erroneouslypermitted Conrail to ask its own expert if the train crew hadmaintained a proper lookout, while the court refused to allowplaintiff's expert to testify that the train crew was negligent inoperating the train. According to plaintiff, such disparatetreatment amounted to reversible error according to plaintiff.

With regard to these two errors, plaintiff neither explainswhy these decisions by the trial court were improper, nor does sheprovide any authority in support thereof. "Allegations of trialcourt error summarily raised without supporting authority aredeficient and warrant a finding of waiver." Elder v. Bryant, 324Ill. App. 3d 526, 533, 755 N.E.2d 515 (2001). "Contentionssupported by some argument but absolutely no authority do not meetthe requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7)." Avery v. StateFarm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 269, 277, 746N.E.2d 1242 (2001); 155 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). " ' A reviewingcourt is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinentauthority cited and is not simply a depository into which theappealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.' " Bryant, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 533, quoting People v. Hood, 210 Ill.App. 3d 743 746, 569 N.E.2d 228 (1991). Therefore, plaintiff'sargument in regard to these alleged errors is waived.

[The preceding material is non-publishable under Supreme Court Rule23.]

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GORDON and COUSINS, JJ., concur.