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FOURTH DIVISION 
September 25, 2003

1-02-2121

 PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the court:

This matter is before us on a certified question pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). The certifiedquestion is whether a trial court has discretion pursuant toIllinois Supreme Court Rule 183 (134 Ill. 2d R. 183) to extend thesix-month statutory period set forth in section 2-402 of the Codeof Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998)) for convertingrespondents in discovery to defendants. We answer this question inthe negative.

This appeal arises from the granting of two motions forextensions of time in a medical malpractice action. On June 15,1999, Bertha Robinson (plaintiff) filed a complaint alleging thewrongful death of her husband was caused by Advocate TrinityHospital while her husband was a patient at the hospital. Thecomplaint also named Drs. Claudia Johnson and Gregorio Aglipay asrespondents in discovery. Under section 2-402 of the Code of CivilProcedure, a respondent in discovery may be converted to be adefendant at any time within a six-month period from the date theperson or entity is named as a respondent in discovery. 735 ILCS5/2-402 (West 1998). In this case, the time to convert therespondents in discovery to defendants under section 2-402 was toexpire on December 15, 2001. On December 11, 2001, plaintiff filedan emergency motion seeking an extension of time until February 25,2002, to convert the respondents in discovery to defendants. Overthe respondents' objections, the motion was granted. On February13, 2002, plaintiff sought a second extension of time until March15, 2002, to convert the respondents in discovery to defendants. Over respondents' objections, the second motion was also granted. The defendant-doctors then moved for leave to appeal under IllinoisSupreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308).

Over plaintiff's objection, the trial court granted the Rule308 motion to certify the question for appeal. The questioncertified reads: "Whether the trial court has discretion pursuantto Illinois Supreme Court Rule 183 to extend the six-monthstatutory period set forth in 735 ILCS 5/2-402 for convertingrespondents in discovery to defendants." On August 29, 2002, thiscourt granted respondents-in-discovery's application to appeal.

On appeal, Drs. Johnson and Aglipay assert that the trialcourt erred in granting plaintiff's two motions for extensions oftime to convert the respondents in discovery to defendants wherethe statute has no provision for extensions of time. 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998). For the following reasons, we answer the trialcourt's question in the negative and we hold that a trial court maynot extend section 2-402's six-month period during which arespondent in discovery may be made a defendant.

BACKGROUND

The complaint in this case asserts the following pertinentfacts. On June 21, 1999, Abe Robinson (Robinson) was admitted to Advocate Trinity Hospital for rectal bleeding. On June 28, 1999,Dr. Aglipay performed anterior colon resection exploratory surgeryon Robinson. On June 29, 1999, Dr. Agliplay also performed surgeryon Robinson's right knee.

On July 7, 1999, while walking unassisted to the bathroom inthe hospital room, Robinson tripped and fell, striking the leftside of the back of his head. That same day, a CT scan of hisskull revealed an occipitoparietal hematoma of Robinson's brain.

On July 8, 1999, Dr. Johnson discharged Robinson from AdvocateTrinity Hospital. On July 15, 1999, Robinson went to Dr. Aglipayfor a follow-up visit for his colon resection surgery. Dr. Aglipayprescribed 2.5mg of Coumadin (a blood thinner) to be taken daily. The complaint alleges that Dr. Aglipay did not monitor Robinson'sINR level, which is a method to measure the effectiveness ofCoumadin. Robinson saw Dr. Aglipay on two other occasions, but hisINR level was never checked.

On September 4, 1999, a CT scan revealed an intracranialhemorrhage. On September 19, 1999, another CT scan revealed a newintraparenchymal acute hemorrhage in the right parietal lobe of hisbrain. Robinson died on September 21, 1999, from the hemorrhage.

On June 15, 2001, Bertha Robinson, as the specialadministrator of Robinson's estate, filed a wrongful death actionagainst Advocate Trinity Hospital; the same action named Drs.Johnson and Aglipay as respondents in discovery.

On August 23, 2001, Dr. Agliplay produced Robinson's medicalrecords. On October 5, 2001, Dr. Aglipaly answered the plaintiff'swritten interrogatories.

On October 29, 2001, Dr. Johnson replied to the plaintiff'srequest for written discovery. On December 7, 2001, plaintiffdeposed Dr. Johnson.

On November 30, 2001, Dr. Aglipay received a letter inquiringabout his availability for deposition. On December 7, 2001,plaintiff sent a letter to both Drs. Johnson and Aglipay indicatingshe would present an emergency motion seeking an extension of timeto convert respondents in discovery to defendants.

On December 11, 2001, plaintiff presented an emergency motionseeking additional time to convert respondents in discovery todefendants. Plaintiff's stated reason for the extension of timewas that Dr. Johnson's deposition had been taken on December 7,2001, and plaintiff "needed more time to have the transcriptwritten up and reviewed by [plaintiff's] consultant." Plaintiff'smotion was granted over respondents' objection. Plaintiff wasgiven until February 25, 2002, to file her motion to convertrespondents in discovery to defendants.

During January 2002, Dr. Aglipay's lawyer and plaintiff'scounsel had several conversations regarding scheduling Dr.Aglipay's deposition. Plaintiff's counsel informed the court thathe did not schedule Dr. Aglipay's deposition during January 2002because he was busy trying or preparing to try another case. Dr.Aglipay was deposed on February 13, 2002.

On February 21, 2002, plaintiff presented another motion toextend time. Plaintiff stated that Dr. Aglipay had been deposed onFebruary 13, 2002, and plaintiff's counsel "would need timethereafter to have the transcript written up and reviewed by[plaintiff's] consultant." Over the respondents' objections, thetrial court granted another extension until March 15, 2002. Ingranting this second extension of time, the trial court wrote "[n]ofurther extensions under any circumstances will be considered."

On March 15, 2002, plaintiff filed her motion to convertrespondents in discovery and sought leave to file the first amendedcomplaint at law instanter (motion to convert). The motion toconvert was set for presentation on March 21, 2002.

On March 21, 2002, when plaintiff failed to appear in court topresent the motion to convert, the trial court struck plaintiff'smotion. On April 8, 2002, plaintiff renoticed the motion toconvert respondents in discovery to defendants. The trial courtentered a briefing schedule on plaintiff's motion to convert andallowed plaintiff until April 22, 2002, to file a reply torespondents' response to her motion to convert.

On April 22, 2002, plaintiff filed her reply supporting themotion to convert. The trial court set May 14, 2002, for hearingon the motion.

On May 14, 2002, after hearing arguments from all litigants,the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to convertrespondents in discovery to defendants. In doing so, the trialcourt indicated that it was relying on Supreme Court Rule 183 (134Ill. 2d R. 183). The trial court then ordered plaintiff to filethe first amended complaint by May 21, 2002.

On May 17, 2002, plaintiff filed an emergency motion topetition the trial court for an extension of time to file the firstamended complaint. The plaintiff's stated reason for an extensionof time was "due to the nature of the arguments raised by theDefendants *** and the unavailability of the [plaintiff's] medicalconsultant." Over the respondents' objections, the trial courtgranted the extension of time and gave plaintiff until June 15,2002, to file the amended complaint.

On May 25, 2002, plaintiff filed her amended complaint. OnJune 11, 2002, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308,respondents filed a joint motion to certify the following questionfor appeal: "Whether the trial court has discretion pursuant toIllinois Supreme Court Rule 183 to extend the six month statutoryperiod set forth in 735 ILCS 5/2-402 for converting respondents indiscovery to defendants." On July 18, 2002, over plaintiff'sobjection, the trial court granted respondents' motion to certifythe question for appeal. On August 29, 2002, this court allowedthe defendant-doctors' appeals.

ANALYSIS

SECTION 2-402

On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff two extensions of time because section 2-402 hasno such provision.

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain andgive effect to the intention of the legislature. In re C.W., 199Ill. 2d 198, 211 (2002). The best means of determining legislativeintent is through the statutory language. Petersen v. Wallach, 198Ill. 2d 439, 444 (2002). "Where the language of the act is clear and unambiguous, we will apply the statute without resort tofurther aids of statutory construction." People v. O'Brien, 197Ill. 2d 88, 90-91 (2001). The interpretation of a statute is aquestion of law and is subject to de novo review. Petersen, 198Ill. 2d at 444.

Section 2-402 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure,governing respondents in discovery, states in pertinent part:

"The plaintiff in any civil action may designate asrespondents in discovery in his or her pleading thoseindividuals or other entities, other than the nameddefendants, believed by the plaintiff to have informationessential to the determination of who should properly benamed as additional defendants in the action. ***

Persons or entities so named as respondents in discoveryshall be required to respond to discovery by theplaintiff in the same manner as are defendants and may,on motion of the plaintiff, be added as defendants if theevidence discloses the existence of probable cause forsuch action.

A person or entity named as a respondent in discovery inany civil action may be made a defendant in the sameaction at any time within 6 months after being named asa respondent in discovery, even though the time duringwhich an action may otherwise be initiated against him orher may have expired during such 6 month period."  735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998).

"The legislative history of section 2-402 indicates that itspurpose [is] to provide plaintiffs in medical malpractice actionswith a means of filing suit without naming everyone in sight as adefendant." Bogseth v. Emanuel, 261 Ill. App. 3d 685, 690 (1994). In enacting section 2-402, the legislature balanced the need toprotect physicians from the increasing costs of medical malpracticeinsurance caused by the filing of frivolous lawsuits with theinjured plaintiff's need to determine the surrounding circumstancesand involvement of each person. Coyne v. OSF Healthcare System,332 Ill. App. 3d 717, 718 (2002).

"The purpose of section 2-402 is obviously to permit anaggrieved party in a malpractice case to name parties not asdefendants but as respondents to enable a plaintiff through liberaldiscovery rules to determine whether the respondent should be madea defendant." Hugley v. Alcaraz, 144 Ill. App. 3d 726, 734 (1986).

This court has held that section 2-402 is a special statutoryaction. See Hugley, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 734; Moomaw v. Mentor H/S,Inc., 313 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1037 (2000). This court has held:"[S]pecial statutory actions create rights unknown to the commonlaw on the condition that suit be brought in the time thereinspecified. Wilson v. Tromly, 336 Ill. App. 403 (1949)." Hugley,144 Ill. App. 3d at 734.

An action filed pursuant to the provisions of section 2-402 isa special statutory action because it creates a procedural right toname a party as a respondent in discovery for the purpose ofdiscovering against whom one may or may not have a cause of action.

Section 2-402 provides for broad discovery unknown to the commonlaw and makes the six-month time requirement an inherent element ofthe right. Froehlich v. Sheehan, 240 Ill. App. 3d 93, 103 (1992). Accordingly, it permits the plaintiff to add a respondent indiscovery as a defendant if the evidence discloses the existence ofprobable cause for such action. Meeting its requirements is acondition of the liability itself and not of the remedy alone;complying with its provisions is a condition precedent toplaintiff's right to seek a remedy. See Hugley, 144 Ill. App. 3dat 734.

Section 2-402 also provides that as long as a person or entityis named as a respondent in discovery within the statute oflimitations period, a plaintiff then has an additional six monthsto obtain information which may indicate that that person or entityshould be made a defendant. 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998). Allenv. Thorek Hospital, 275 Ill. App. 3d 695, 700 (1995). The six-month statutory period begins on the day the plaintiff files acomplaint naming respondents in discovery. Allen, 275 Ill. App. 3dat 701. The six-month provision of section 2-402 may only extend,and not foreshorten, any limitations period again a respondent indiscovery. Allen, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 700.

In this case, Robinson died on September 21, 1999. Under theIllinois wrongful death statute, plaintiff had two years to file anaction against the hospital and doctors alleging negligence incausing the wrongful death of her husband. 740 ILCS 180/2 (West1998).

On June 15, 2001, plaintiff filed a wrongful death actionagainst Advocate Trinity Hospital; the complaint also named Drs.Johnson and Aglipay as respondents in discovery. Under section 2-402, plaintiff had until December 15, 2001, to convert respondentsin discovery to defendants. Thus, plaintiff had 84 days after theWrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 et. seq. (West 1998)) statute oflimitations expired on September 21, 2001, to name Drs. Johnson andAglipay as defendants.

As this court has held, when a plaintiff is proceeding on aspecial statutory cause of action, she must scrupulously observeall the requirements mandated in the statute. The reason that"compliance with fixed limitations within the statute isindispensable to the maintenance of a right thereunder is that thestatutes create rights unknown to common law, fixing a time withinwhich the action may be commenced, which element is such anintegral part of the enactments that it necessarily is a conditionof the liability itself and not of the remedy alone." WoodAcceptance Co. v. King, 18 Ill. App. 3d 149, 150-51 (1974), citingWilson v. Tromley, 336 Ill. App. 403, 408-09 (1949). In otherwords, where a statute creates rights unknown to the common law,compliance with the time limit fixed by the statute is a conditionof the right itself. Since section 2-402 offers plaintiff theright to convert Drs. Johnson and Aglipay to defendants, she mustcomply with the time limit set forth by the statute.

The Illinois Supreme Court and the Appellate Court have consistently refused to extend section 2-402's six-month timelimit, despite the procedural and equitable arguments made by manyplaintiffs in the past. Murphy v. Giardina, 82 Ill. 2d 529 (1980),barred the naming of additional parties as defendants in a wrongfuldeath action because the six-month period for converting arespondent in discovery to a defendant had lapsed. Allen v. ThorekHospital, 275 Ill. App. 3d 695 (1995), affirmed the trial court'sorder barring the conversion of the respondent in discovery to adefendant because plaintiff was one day beyond the six-month timelimit. Froehlich v. Sheehan, 240 Ill. App. 3d 93 (1992), held thatto be timely, a plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint toconvert respondents in discovery to defendants must be filed withinsix months of naming respondents in discovery. Browning v. JacksonPark Hospital, 163 Ill. App. 3d 543 (1987), held that a plaintiffis not entitled to a second opportunity to present evidence toconvert a respondent in discovery beyond the statutorily prescribedsix-month time period. Flores v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital,149 Ill. App. 3d 371 (1986), held that when a plaintiff reliessolely on section 2-402 to avoid the preclusive effect of a statuteof limitations, he must comply with all of the provisions of thatsection. As already mentioned, Hugley v. Alcaraz, 144 Ill. App. 3d726 (1986), held that because converting a respondent in discoveryis a statutory cause of action, plaintiff must follow allprovisions in the statute as a condition precedent to plaintiff'sright to seek a remedy. Clark v. Brokaw Hospital, 126 Ill. App. 3d779 (1984), held that plaintiffs must file a motion and request ahearing to present evidence to convert a respondent in discoverywithin the six-month period, even though the actual hearing couldbe held outside the six-month window. Torley v. Foster G. McGawHospital, 116 Ill. App. 3d 19 (1983), held that section 2-402requires a plaintiff to move for leave to file the motion toconvert within the statutory six-month period, and failure to do sowithin the prescribed time period bars conversion.

Plaintiff argues that the two extensions of time which weregranted in the instant case were necessary because respondents hadfailed to respond to discovery in a timely manner.

Section 2-402 addresses discovery as follows:

"Persons or entities so named as respondents in discoveryshall be required to respond to discovery by theplaintiff in the same manner as are defendants and may,on motion of the plaintiff, be added as defendants if theevidence discloses the existence of probable cause forsuch action." 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998).

This language has been interpreted to mean that "[t]he poweracquired by service of notice [that a party is designated] as arespondent in discovery permits the circuit court to compeldiscovery in the same manner as from a defendant." Coyne, 332 Ill.App. 3d at 719. Further, "[s]ection 2-402 subjects respondents indiscovery to the same procedural and discovery rules and safeguardsas defendants." Coyne, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 719.

In this case, nothing in the record demonstrates that therespondents engaged in delay or evasive tactics to squanderplaintiff's six-month statutory period. Dr. Johnson answeredplaintiff's written interrogatories on October 29, 2001. Dr.Johnson was then deposed on December 7, 2001. Dr. Johnson answeredthe plaintiff's written interrogatories and was presented fordeposition within the six-month statutory period.

The record also reflects that Dr. Aglipay answered plaintiff'srequest to produce Robinson's medical records on August 23, 2001. Dr. Aglipay answered plaintiff's interrogatories on October 5,2001. Plaintiff's counsel did not schedule Dr. Aglipay's depositionduring January 2002 because plaintiff's counsel was busy trying orpreparing to try another case. Dr. Aglipay was deposed on February13, 2002. A review of the record indicates that the delays indiscovery were occasioned by the actions or inactions ofplaintiff's counsel as well as by the respondents. Indeed, hadDrs. Johnson and Aglipay been tardy in their responses, plaintiffshould have sought an order compelling compliance as provided bythe rules of discovery. 166 Ill. 2d R. 204. The fact that plaintiffdid not seek the court's assistance in compelling the defendants tocomply with discovery severely undercuts plaintiff's argument.

SUPREME COURT RULE 183

In allowing the plaintiff's motions to convert respondents indiscovery into defendants, the trial court said that it was relyingupon Supreme Court Rule 183. On appeal, defendants argue thatSupreme Court Rule 183 did not give the trial court the power togrant extensions of time under section 2-402.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 183 provides: "The court, for goodcause shown on motion after notice to the opposite party, mayextend the time for filing any pleading or the doing of any actwhich is required by the rules to be done within a limited period,either before or after the expiration of the time." (Emphasisadded.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 183.

When interpreting the supreme court rules, the appellate courtmust ascertain and give effect to the supreme court's intent. Irwin v. McMillan, 322 Ill. App. 3d 861, 869 (2001).

In this case, Rule 183's plain language indicates that it onlyapplies to the time limits set forth by the Illinois supreme courtrules. It simply does not apply to a statutory time limit. The six-months time limit mandated in the respondent-in-discovery statuteis a statutory time limit. 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998). Consequently, Rule 183 does not have any effect on this statutorytime limit. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting theplaintiff's two extensions

Our holding is also supported by the application of the rulesof statutory construction. "It is axiomatic that where the languageof a statute is plain and unambiguous, the only role of the courtis in its application." In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 69 (1993). Asthis court has held: "The court must not construe a statute to addexceptions or limitations or change the law set forth in thestatute so as to depart from the statute's plain language." Poullette v. Silverstein, 328 Ill. App. 3d 791, 794 (2002). Similarly, the trial court has no authority to alter a statute. Cunningham v. Huffman, 154 Ill. 2d 398, 403-04 (1993). Thelanguage of section 2-402 is unambiguous. It provides that if theplaintiff chooses to, the plaintiff must convert a respondent indiscovery to a defendant within six months after being named as arespondent in discovery. Under the plain and unambiguous languageof the statute, the trial court cannot grant an extension of timeto convert a respondent in discovery to a defendant beyond thestatutory six-month period.

Plaintiff asserts that it has been the custom and practice ofsome trial courts to grant extensions of time for filing motions toconvert respondents in discovery to defendants.

This court has held that custom and practice cannot be invokedwhere it circumvents a rule or statute. Metromedia, Inc. v. Kramer,152 Ill. App. 3d 459, 468 (1987). Thus, plaintiff's argument hasno merit because custom and practice cannot be used to circumventa clear and unambiguous statute.

The requirements mandated in section 2-402 must bescrupulously followed because "section 2-402 *** affords aplaintiff a six-month extension of the statute of limitation and anopportunity unknown at common law: the right to unilateraldiscovery." Froehlich, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 103.

THE TORT REFORM ACT

On appeal, defendants argue that the "Tort Reform Act" (Pub.Act 89-7 eff. March 9, 1995) is inapplicable in this case. Therecord shows that in plaintiff's first amended complaint, she citedto the "Tort Reform Act" as legal authority arguing that the trialcourt did not err in granting her the extensions. However, onappeal, plaintiff concedes that the 1995 amendment to section 2-402within the "Tort Reform Act" was found unconstitutional by theIllinois Supreme Court. Nonetheless, plaintiff urges us to look tothe legislative intent of Public Act 89-7 (Pub. Act 89-7, eff.March 9, 1995) and allow the extension of time under section 2-402.

In 1995, the Illinois legislature passed Public Act 89-7,commonly known as the "Tort Reform Act." The Tort Reform Act addedseveral provisions to section 2-402. One of these provisionsallowed for a six month extension to the original six-monthstatutory period in which a plaintiff could convert a respondent indiscovery to a defendant. The amendment provided, in pertinentpart:

"No extensions of this 6 month period shall be permittedunless the plaintiff can show a failure or refusal on thepart of the respondent to comply with timely fileddiscovery." 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998).

In Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997), oursupreme court declared Public Act 89-7 unconstitutional in itsentirety. Best, 179 Ill. 2d 367. Consequently, the additionalsix-month extension of time provision perished along with PublicAct 87-9.

As stated earlier, "[w]here the language [of the act] is clearand unambiguous, we will apply the statute without resort tofurther aids of statutory construction." O'Brien, 197 Ill. 2d at90-91. In addition, "it is fundamental to our judicial system that'once our supreme court declares the law on any point, its decisionis binding on all Illinois courts,' and we cannot refuse to followit because we have no authority to overrule or modify supreme courtdecisions." People v. Crespo, 118 Ill. App. 3d 815, 822 (1983),quoting People v. Jones, 114 Ill. App. 3d 576, 585 (1983). Assuch, plaintiff's argument has no merit and we will not resort toother aids to interpret a clear and unambiguous statute, nor willwe apply a void statutory amendment to this case.

UNJUST RESULTS

Finally, plaintiff argues that the law abhors absurd andunjust results. Plaintiff posits that a holding by this court thatthe extensions should have been denied is tantamount to forfeitingthe plaintiff's right to recover pecuniary damages for the allegedwrongful death of plaintiff's decedent caused by Drs. Johnson andAglipay and Advocate Trinity Hospital.

Our supreme court has held that "[t]he possibility of anunjust or absurd result is generally not enough to avoid theapplication of a clearly worded statute." Petersen, 198 Ill. 2d at447. In addition, as this court has held, "our role is to giveeffect to the statute in question-no matter the result." Turner v.Nama, 294 Ill. App. 3d 19, 33 (1997). Any alteration to thestatute, regardless of any perceived benefit or danger, mustnecessarily be sought from the legislature.

Accordingly, the trial court did not have discretion pursuantto Illinois Supreme Court Rule 183 to extend the six-monthstatutory period set forth in section 2-402 for convertingrespondents in discovery to defendants. The extension orders arevacated and the cause is remanded to the trial court for furtherproceedings consistent with this decision.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

REID and HARTIGAN, JJ., concur.

 FOURTH DIVISION
March 25, 2004

JUSTICE QUINN delivered the supplemental opinion upon thedenial of petition for rehearing of the court:

This matter is before us on a certified question pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 308. (155 Ill. 2d R. 308) The certifiedquestion is whether a trial court has discretion pursuant toIllinois Supreme Court Rule 183 (134 Ill. 2d R. 183) to extend thesix-month statutory period set forth in section 2-402 of the Codeof Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998) for convertingrespondents in discovery to defendants. We answer this question inthe negative.

This appeal arises from the granting of two motions forextensions of time in a medical malpractice action. On June 15,1999, Bertha Robinson (plaintiff) filed a complaint alleging thewrongful death of her husband was caused by Advocate TrinityHospital while her husband was a patient at the hospital. Thecomplaint also named Drs. Johnson and Aglipay as respondents indiscovery. Under Section 2-402 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arespondent in discovery may be converted to be a defendant at anytime within a six-month period from the date the person or entityis named as a respondent in discovery. 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West1998). In this case, the time to convert the respondents indiscovery to defendants under section 2-402 was to expire onDecember 15, 2001. On December 11, 2001, plaintiff filed anemergency motion seeking an extension of time until February 25,2002, to convert the respondents in discovery to defendants. Overthe respondents' objections, the motion was also granted. OnFebruary 13, 2002, plaintiff sought a second extension of timeuntil March 15, 2002, to convert the respondents in discovery todefendants. Over respondents' objections, the second motion wasalso granted. The defendant-doctors then moved for leave to appealunder Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308. (155 Ill. 2d R. 308.)

Over plaintiff's objection, the trial court granted the Rule308 motion to certify the question for appeal. The questioncertified reads: "Whether the trial court has discretion pursuantto Illinois Supreme Court Rule 183 to extend the six-monthstatutory period set forth in 735 ILCS 5/2-402 for convertingrespondents in discovery to defendants." On August 29, 2002, thiscourt granted respondents-in-discovery's application to appeal.

On appeal, Drs. Johnson and Aglipay assert that the trialcourt erred in granting plaintiff's two motions for extensions oftime to convert the respondents in discovery to defendants wherethe statute has no provision for extensions of time. 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998). For the following reasons, we answer the trialcourt's question in the negative and we hold that a trial court maynot extend section 2-402's six-month period during which arespondent in discovery may be made a defendant.

BACKGROUND

The complaint in this case asserts the following pertinentfacts. On June 21, 1999, Abe Robinson (Robinson) was admitted to Advocate Trinity Hospital for rectal bleeding. On June 28, 1999,Dr. Aglipay performed anterior colon resection exploratory surgeryon Robinson. On June 29, 1999, Dr. Agliplay also performed surgeryon Robinson's right knee.

On July 7, 1999, while walking unassisted to the bathroom inthe hospital room, Robinson tripped and fell, striking the leftside of the back of his head. That same day, a CT scan of hisskull revealed an occipitoparietal hematoma of Robinson's brain.

On July 8, 1999, Dr. Johnson discharged Robinson from AdvocateTrinity Hospital. On July 15, 1999, Robinson went to Dr. Aglipayfor a follow-up visit for his colon resection surgery. Dr. Aglipayprescribed 2.5mg of Coumadin (a blood thinner) to be taken daily. The complaint alleges that Dr. Aglipay did not monitor Robinson'sINR level, which is a method to measure the effectiveness ofCoumadin. Robinson saw Dr. Aglipay on two other occasions, but hisINR level was never checked.

On September 4, 1999, a CT scan revealed an intracranialhemorrhage. On September 19, 1999, another CT scan revealed a newintraparenchymal acute hemorrhage in the right parietal lobe of hisbrain. Robinson died on September 21, 1999 from the hemorrhage.

On June 15, 2001, Bertha Robinson (plaintiff), as the specialadministrator of Robinson's estate, filed a wrongful death actionagainst Advocate Trinity Hospital; the same action named Drs.Johnson and Aglipay as respondents in discovery.

On August 23, 2001, Dr. Agliplay produced Robinson's medicalrecords. On October 5, 2001, Dr. Aglipaly answered the plaintiff'swritten interrogatories.

On October 29, 2001, Dr. Johnson replied to the plaintiff'srequest for written discovery. On December 7, 2001, plaintiffdeposed Dr. Johnson.

On November 30, 2001, Dr. Aglipay received a letter inquiringabout his availability for deposition. On December 7, 2001,plaintiff sent a letter to both Drs. Johnson and Aglipay indicatingshe would present an emergency motion seeking an extension of timeto convert respondents in discovery to defendants.

On December 11, 2001, plaintiff presented an emergency motionseeking additional time to convert respondents in discovery todefendants. Plaintiff's stated reason for the extension of timewas that Dr. Johnson's deposition had been taken on December 7,2001, and plaintiff "needed more time to have the transcriptwritten up and reviewed by [plaintiff's] consultant." Plaintiff'smotion was granted over respondents' objection. Plaintiff wasgiven until February 25, 2002, to file her motion to convertrespondents in discovery to defendants.

During January 2002, Dr. Aglipay's lawyer and plaintiff'scounsel had several conversations regarding scheduling Dr.Aglipay's deposition. Plaintiff's counsel informed the court thathe did not schedule Dr. Aglipay's deposition during January 2002because he was busy trying or preparing to try another case. Dr.Aglipay was deposed on February 13, 2002.

On February 21, 2002, plaintiff presented another motion toextend time. Plaintiff stated that Dr. Aglipay had been deposed onFebruary 13, 2002, and plaintiff's counsel "would need timethereafter to have the transcript written up and reviewed by[plaintiff's] consultant." Over the respondents' objections, thetrial court granted another extension until March 15, 2002. Ingranting this second extension of time, the trial court wrote "[n]ofurther extensions under any circumstances will be considered."

On March 15, 2002, plaintiff filed her Motion to convertrespondents in discovery and sought leave to file the first amendedcomplaint at Law Instanter (motion to convert). The motion toconvert was set for presentation on March 21, 2002.

On March 21, 2002, when plaintiff failed to appear in court topresent the motion to convert, the trial court struck plaintiff'smotion. On April 8, 2002, plaintiff re-noticed the motion toconvert respondents in discovery to defendants. The trial courtentered a briefing schedule on plaintiff's motion to convert andallowed plaintiff until April 22, 2002, to file a reply torespondents' response to her motion to convert.

On April 22, 2002, plaintiff filed her reply supporting themotion to convert. The trial court set May 14, 2002, for hearingon the motion.

On May 14, 2002, after hearing arguments from all litigants,the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to convertrespondents in discovery to defendants. In doing so, the trialcourt indicated that it was relying on Supreme Court Rule 183. (134Ill. 2d R. 183.) The trial court then ordered plaintiff to filethe first amended complaint by May 21, 2002.

On May 17, 2002, plaintiff filed an emergency motion topetition the trial court for an extension of time to file the firstamended complaint. The plaintiff's stated reason for an extensionof time was "due to the nature of the arguments raised by theDefendants ... and the unavailability of the [plaintiff's] medicalconsultant." Over the respondents' objections, the trial courtgranted the extension of time and gave plaintiff until June 15,2002, to file the amended complaint.

On May 25, 2002, plaintiff filed her amended complaint. OnJune 11, 2002, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308,respondents filed a joint motion to certify the following questionfor appeal: "Whether the trial court has discretion pursuant toIllinois Supreme Court Rule 183 to extend the six month statutoryperiod set forth in 735 ILCS 5/2-402 for converting respondents indiscovery to defendants." On July 18, 2002, over plaintiff'sobjection, the trial court granted respondents' motion to certifythe question for appeal. On August 29, 2002, this court allowedthe defendant-doctors' appeals.

ANALYSIS

SECTION 2-402

On appeal, respondents argue that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff two extensions of time because section 2-402 hasno such provision.

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain andgive effect to the intention of the legislature. In re C.W., 199Ill. 2d 198, 211 (2002). The best means of determining legislativeintent is through the statutory language. Petersen v. Wallach, 198Ill. 2d 439, 444 (2002). "Where the language of the act is clearand unambiguous, a court will apply the statute without resort tofurther aids of statutory construction." People v. O'Brien, 197Ill. 2d 88, 90-91 (2001). The interpretation of a statute is aquestion of law, and is subject to de novo review. Petersen, 198Ill. 2d at 444.

Section 2-402 of the Illinois Code of Civil Proceduregoverning respondents in discovery, states in pertinent part:

"The plaintiff in any civil action may designate asrespondents in discovery in his or her pleadings thoseindividuals or other entities, other than the nameddefendants, believed by the plaintiff to have informationessential to the determination of who should properly benamed as additional defendants in the action. ***

Persons or entities so named as respondents in discoveryshall be required to respond to discovery by theplaintiff in the same manner as are defendants and may,on motion of the plaintiff, be added as defendants if theevidence discloses the existence of probable cause forsuch action.

* * *

A person or entity named as a respondent in discovery inany civil action may be made a defendant in the sameaction at any time within 6 months after being named asa respondent in discovery, even though the time duringwhich an action may otherwise be initiated against him orher may have expired during such 6 month period." 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998).

"The legislative history of section 2-402 indicates that itspurpose [is] to provide plaintiffs in medical malpractice actionswith a means of filing suit without naming everyone in sight as adefendant." Bogseth v. Emanuel, 261 Ill. App. 3d 685, 690 (1994). In enacting section 2-402, the legislature balanced the need toprotect physicians from the increasing costs of medical malpracticeinsurance caused by the filing of frivolous lawsuits with theinjured plaintiff's need to determine the surrounding circumstancesand involvement of each person. Coyne v. OSF Healthcare System,332 Ill. App. 3d 717, 718 (2002).

"The purpose of section 2-402 is obviously to permit anaggrieved party in a malpractice case to name parties not asdefendants but as respondents to enable a plaintiff through liberaldiscovery rules to determine whether the respondent should be madea defendant." Hugley v. Alcaraz, 144 Ill. App. 3d 726, 734 (1986).

This court has held that section 2-402 is a special statutoryaction. See Hugley, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 734; Moomaw v. Mentor H/S,Inc., 313 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1037 (2000). This court has held:"[S]pecial statutory actions create rights unknown to the commonlaw on the condition that suit be brought in the time thereinspecified. Wilson v. Tromly, 336 Ill. App. 403 (1949)" Hugley, 144Ill. App. 3d at 734

An action filed pursuant to the provisions of section 2-402 isa special statutory action because it creates a procedural right toname a party as a respondent in discovery for the purpose ofdiscovering against whom one may or may not have a cause of action. Section 2-402 provides for broad discovery unknown to the commonlaw and makes the six-month time requirement an inherent element ofthe right. Froehlich v. Sheehan, 240 Ill. App. 3d 93, 103 (1992). Accordingly, it permits the plaintiff to add a respondent indiscovery as a defendant if the evidence discloses the existence ofprobable cause for such action. Meeting its requirements is acondition of the liability itself and not of the remedy alone,complying with its provisions is a condition precedent toplaintiff's right to seek a remedy. See Hugley, 144 Ill. App. 3dat 734.

Section 2-402 also provides that as long as a person or entityis named as a respondent in discovery within the statute oflimitations period, a plaintiff then has an additional six monthsto obtain information which may indicate that that person or entityshould be made a defendant. 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998). Allenv. Thorex Hospital, 275 Ill. App. 3d 695, 700 (1995). The six-month statutory period begins on the day the plaintiff files acomplaint naming respondents in discovery. Allen, 275 Ill. App. 3dat 701. The six-month provision of section 2-402 may only extend,and not foreshorten, any limitations period again a respondent indiscovery. Allen, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 700.

In this case, Robinson died on September 21, 1999. Under theIllinois wrongful death statute, plaintiff had two years to file anaction against the hospital and doctors alleging negligence incausing the wrongful death of her husband. 740 ILCS 180/2 (West1998).

On June 15, 2001, plaintiff filed a wrongful death actionagainst Advocate Trinity Hospital; the complaint also named Drs.Johnson and Aglipay as respondents in discovery. Under section 2-402, plaintiff had until December 15, 2001, to convert respondentsin discovery to defendants. Thus, plaintiff had 84 days after theWrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 et seq (West 1998)) statute oflimitations expired on September 21, 2001, to name Drs. Johnson andAglipay as defendants.

As this court has held, when a plaintiff is proceeding on aspecial statutory cause of action, she must scrupulously observeall the requirements mandated in the statute. The reason that"compliance with fixed limitations within the statute isindispensable to the maintenance of a right thereunder is that thestatutes create rights unknown to common law, fixing a time withinwhich the action may be commenced, which element is such anintegral part of the enactments that it necessarily is a conditionof the liability itself and not of the remedy alone." WoodAcceptance Co. v. King, 18 Ill. App. 3d 149, 150-51, citing Wilsonv. Tromly, 336 Ill. App. 403, 408-09 (1949). In other words, wherea statute creates right unknown to the common law, compliance withthe time limit fixed by the statute is a condition of the rightitself. Since section 2-402 offers plaintiff the right to convertDrs. Johnson and Aglipay to defendants, she must comply with thetime limit set forth by the statute.

The Illinois Supreme Court and the Appellate Court have consistently refused to extend section 2-402's six-month timelimit, despite the procedural and equitable arguments made by manyplaintiffs in the past. Murphy v. Giardina, 82 Ill. 2d 529 (1980),barred the naming of additional parties as defendants in a wrongfuldeath action because the six-month period for converting arespondent in discovery to a defendant had lapsed. Allen v. ThorekHospital, 275 Ill. App. 3d 695 (1995), affirmed the trial court'sorder barring the conversion of the respondent in discovery to adefendant because plaintiff was one day beyond the six-month timelimit. Froehlich v. Sheehan, 240 Ill. App. 3d 93 (1993), held thatto be timely, a plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint toconvert respondents in discovery to defendants must be filed withinsix-months of naming respondents in discovery. Browning v. JacksonPark Hospital, 163 Ill. App. 3d 543 (1987), held that a plaintiffis not entitled to a second opportunity to present evidence toconvert a respondent in discovery beyond the statutorily prescribedsix-month time period. Flores v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital,149 Ill. App. 3d 371 (1986), held that when a plaintiff reliessolely on Section 2-402 to avoid the preclusive effect of a statuteof limitation, he must comply with all of the provisions of thatsection. As already mentioned, Hugley v. Alcaraz, 144 Ill. App. 3d726 (1986), held that because converting a respondent in discoveryis a statutory cause of action, plaintiff must follow allprovisions in the statute as a condition precedent to plaintiff'sright to seek a remedy. Clark v. Brokaw Hospital, 126 Ill. App. 3d779 (1984), held that plaintiffs must file a motion and request ahearing to present evidence to convert a respondent in discoverywithin the six-month period, even though the actual hearing couldbe held outside the six-month window. Torley v. Foster G. McGrawHospital, 116 Ill. App. 3d 19 (1983), held that section 2-402requires a plaintiff to move for leave to file the motion toconvert within the statutory six-month period, and failure to do sowithin the prescribed time period bars conversion.

Plaintiff argues that the two extensions of time which weregranted in the instant case were necessary because respondents hadfailed to respond to discovery in a timely manner.

Section 2-402 address discovery as follows:

"Persons or entities so named as respondents in discoveryshall be required to respond to discovery by theplaintiff in the same manner as are defendants and may,on motion of the plaintiff, be added as defendants if theevidence discloses the existence of probable cause forsuch action." 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998).

This language has been interpreted to mean that "[t]he poweracquired by service of notice [that a party is designated] as arespondent in discovery permits the circuit court to compeldiscovery in the same manner as from a defendant." Coyne, 332 Ill.App. 3d at 719. Further, "[S]ection 2-402 subjects respondents indiscovery to the same procedural and discovery rules and safeguardsas defendants." Coyne, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 719.

In this case, nothing in the record demonstrates that therespondents engaged in delay or evasive tactics to squanderplaintiff's six-month statutory period. Dr. Johnson answeredplaintiff's written interrogatories on October 29, 2001. Dr.Johnson was then deposed on December 7, 2001. Dr. Johnson answeredthe plaintiff's written interrogatories and was presented fordeposition within the six-month statutory period.

The record also reflects that Dr. Aglipay answered plaintiff'srequest to produce Robinson's medical records on August 23, 2001. Dr. Aglipay answered plaintiff's interrogatories on October 5,2001. Plaintiff's counsel did not schedule Dr. Aglipay'sdeposition during January 2002 because plaintiff's counsel was busytrying or preparing to try another case. Dr. Aglipay was deposedon February 13, 2002. A review of the record indicates that thedelays in discovery were occasioned by the actions or inactions ofplaintiff's counsel as well as by the respondents. Indeed, hadDrs. Johnson and Aglipay been tardy in their responses, plaintiffshould have sought an order compelling compliance as provided bythe rules of discovery. 166 Ill. 2d R. 204. The fact thatplaintiff did not seek the court's assistance in compelling thedefendants to comply with discovery severely undercuts plaintiff'sargument.

SUPREME COURT RULE 183

In allowing the plaintiff's motions to convert respondents indiscovery into defendants, the trial court said that it was relyingupon Supreme Court Rule 183. On appeal, respondents argue thatSupreme Court Rule 183 did not give the trial court the power togrant extensions of time under section 2-402.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 183 provides: "The court, for goodcause shown on motion after notice to the opposite party, mayextend the time for filing any pleading or the doing of any actwhich is required by the rules to be done within a limited period,either before or after the expiration of the time." (Emphasisadded). 134 Ill. 2d. 183.

When interpreting the Supreme Court Rules, the appellate courtmust ascertain and give effect to the supreme court's intent. Irwin v. McMillan, 322 Ill. App. 3d 861, 869 (2001).

In this case, Rule 183's plain language indicates that it onlyapplies to the time limits set forth by the Illinois supreme courtrules. It simply does not apply to a statutory time limit. Thesix-months time limit mandated in the respondent-in-discoverystatute is a statutory time limit. 725 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998). Consequently, Rule 183 does not have any effect on this statutorytime limit. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting theplaintiff two extensions

Our holding is also supported by the application of the rulesof statutory construction. "It is axiomatic that where thelanguage of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the only role ofthe court is in its application." In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 69(1993). As this court has held:"The court must not construe astatute to add exceptions or limitations or change the law setforth in the statute so as to depart from the statute's plainlanguage." Poullette v. Silverstein, 328 Ill. App.3d 791, 794(2002). Similarly, the trial court has no authority to alter astatute. Cunningham v. Huffman, 154 Ill. 2d 398, 403-04 (1993). The language of section 2-402 is unambiguous. It provides that ifthe plaintiff chooses to, the plaintiff must convert a respondentin discovery to a defendant within six months after being named asa respondent in discovery. Under the plain and unambiguouslanguage of the statute, the trial court cannot grant an extensionof time to convert a respondent in discovery to a defendant beyondthe statutory six-month period.

Plaintiff asserts that it has been the custom and practice ofsome trial courts to grant extensions of time for filing motions toconvert respondents in discovery to defendants.

This court has held that custom and practice cannot be invokedwhere it circumvents a rule or statute. Metromedia, Inc. v.Kramer, 152 Ill. App. 3d 459, 468 (1987). Thus, plaintiff'sargument has no merit because custom and practice cannot be used tocircumvent a clear and unambiguous statute.

The requirements mandated in section 2-402 must bescrupulously followed because "section 2-402 *** affords aplaintiff a six-month extension of the statute of limitation and anopportunity unknown at common law: the right to unilateraldiscovery." Froehlich, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 103.

THE TORT REFORM ACT

On appeal, respondents argue that the "Tort Reform Act" (Pub.Act 89-7 eff. March 9, 1995) is inapplicable in this case. Therecord shows that in plaintiff's first amended complaint, she citedto the "Tort Reform Act" as legal authority arguing that the trialcourt did not err in granting her the extensions. However, onappeal, plaintiff concedes that the 1995 amendment to section 2-402within the "Tort Reform Act" was found unconstitutional by theIllinois Supreme Court. Nonetheless, plaintiff urges us to look tothe legislative intent of Public Act 89-7 (Pub. Act 89-7, eff.March 9, 1995) and allow the extension of time under section 2-402.

In 1995, the Illinois legislature passed Public Act 89-7,commonly known as the "Tort Reform Act." The Tort Reform Act addedseveral provisions to section 2-402. One of these provisionsallowed for a six-month extension to the original six-monthstatutory period in which a plaintiff could convert a respondent indiscovery to a defendant. The amendment provided, in pertinentpart:

"No extensions of this six-month period shall bepermitted unless the plaintiff can show a failure orrefusal on the part of the respondent to comply with thetimely filed discovery." 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 1998).

In Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997), oursupreme court declared Public Act 89-7 unconstitutional in itsentirety. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 467. Consequently, the additionalsix-month extension of time provision perished along with PublicAct 87-9.

As stated earlier, "[w]here the language [of the act] is clearand unambiguous, we will apply the statute without resort tofurther aids of statutory construction." O'Brien, 197 Ill. 2d at90-91. In addition, "it is fundamental to our judicial system that'once our supreme court declares the law on any point, its decisionis binding on all Illinois courts,' and we cannot refuse to followit because we have no authority to overrule or modify supreme courtdecisions." People v. Crespo, 118 Ill. App. 3d 815, 822 (1983),quoting People v. Jones, 114 Ill. App. 3d 576, 585 (1983). Assuch, plaintiff's argument has no merit and we will not resort toother aids to interpret a clear and unambiguous statute, nor willwe apply a void statutory amendment to this case.

UNJUST RESULTS

Finally, plaintiff argues that the law abhors absurd andunjust results. Plaintiff posits that a holding by this court thatthe extensions should have been denied is tantamount to forfeitingthe plaintiff's right to recover pecuniary damages for the allegedwrongful death of plaintiff's decedent caused by Drs. Johnson andAglipay and Advocate Trinity Hospital.

Our supreme court has held that "the possibility of an unjustor absurd result is generally not enough to avoid the applicationof a clearly worded statute." Petersen, 198 Ill. 2d at 447. Inaddition, as this court has held, "our role is to give effect tothe statute in question-no matter the result." Turner v. Nama, 294Ill. App. 3d 19, 33 (1997). Any alteration to the statute,regardless of any perceived benefit or danger, must necessarily besought from the legislature.

Accordingly, the trial court did not have discretion pursuantto Illinois Supreme Court Rule 183 to extend the six-monthstatutory period set forth in section 2-402 for convertingrespondents in discovery to defendants. The extension orders arevacated and the cause is remanded to the trial court for furtherproceedings consistent with this decision.

This court granted leave to the Illinois Trial LawyersAssociation (ITLA) to file an amicus curiae petition for rehearingin support of Robinson's petition for rehearing. Both petitionsargue that if Supreme Court Rule 183 does not give the circuitcourt the ability to extend the period for conversion ofrespondents in discovery to defendants, plaintiffs will have noremedy when respondents in discovery fail to answer discovery in atimely manner. The petitions posit that the sanctions provided inSupreme Court Rule 219(c) to compel parties to comply withdiscovery requests and orders would either have no applicability toa recalcitrant respondent in discovery or would not providesubstantive relief to plaintiffs. Imposing reasonable attorneyfees and expenses and other monetary penalties may punish anuncooperative respondent in discovery, but the plaintiff wouldstill not have the requested discovery. Further, 219(c)(1)'sprovision that the circuit court may enter an order "stayingfurther proceedings until the order or rule is complied with" wouldnot be available as a sanction because of our holding that thetrial court does not have the authority to extend the six-monthconversion period even for good cause shown.

These are legitimate concerns. However, as we have previouslypointed out in this opinion, it is our role to give effect to aclearly worded statute, no matter the result. Turner, 294 Ill.App. 3d at 33; Petersen, 198 Ill. 2d at 447.

As we have also previously pointed out in this opinion, thebest remedy available to plaintiffs in cases in which respondentsin discovery fail to comply with discovery in a timely manner,whether due to purposeful misconduct or through no fault at all, isto convert the respondent in discovery into a defendant.

In her petition for rehearing, Robinson argues that ourholding that Rule 183 only applies to time-limits set forth in theIllinois Supreme Court Rules is erroneous. In support of herargument, Robinson cities Premo v. Falcone, 197 Ill. App. 3d 625(1990), which held that Section 2-622's requirement that a reportof a reviewing health professional be filed within 90 days of thefiling of a complaint may be extended for good cause shown underRule 183. Premo also noted that Section 2-1007 of the Code ofCivil Procedure contains similar language to Rule 183.

Section 2-1007 provides in pertinent part:

5/2-1007. Extension of Time and Continuances.

"On good cause shown, in the discretion of the court and onjust terms, additional time may be granted for the doing of any actor the taking of any step or proceeding prior to judgment.

The circumstances, terms and conditions under whichcontinuances may be granted, the time and manner in whichapplication therefor shall be made, and the effect thereof, shallbe according to rules." 735 ILCS 5/2-1007 (West 2002).

While the language of Section 2-1007 is similar to thelanguage of Rule 183, this does not aid Robinson's argument. Section 2-1007 is in the section of the Code of Civil Proceduretitled "Pretrial Steps." 735 ILCS 5/2-1001 et seq.. Section 2-1007has been employed to permit an extension of time to: file an answerLehman v. Stevens, 148 Ill. App. 3d 538 (1986); a late jury demandIn re Estate of Stewart, 148 Ill. App. 3d 298 (1995); raise anobjection to jurisdiction. Diaber v. Con/Chem, Inc., 57 Ill. App.3d 918 (1978). However, Section 2-1007 has never been interpretedas permitting the circuit court to extend the period of any statuteof limitations. Section 2-1007 has also been interpreted as givingthe circuit court authority to extend the time allowed by section2-622 for filing the required affidavits and medical reports. SeePremo v. Falcone, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 630-31, and Blalark v. Chung,177 Ill. App. 3d 541, 543 (1988). See also: Tucker v. St. JamesHospital, 279 Ill. App. 3d 696, 704 (1996).

Robinson's argument as to the applicability of Rule 183 andSection 2-1007 to Section 2-622 does not support her argument thatRule 183 may be employed to extend the statute of limitations forfiling suit. However, her argument does illuminate thepracticability of the solution previously suggested - the plaintiffmay simply file a motion to convert a respondent in discovery intoa defendant. If Section 2-402's six-month limit is beingapproached, a plaintiff could file a motion to convert therespondent in discovery into a defendant and after the respondentin discovery is actually converted into a defendant, the plaintiffcould employ both Rule 183 and Section 2-1007 to extend the time inwhich plaintiff must meet the requirements of Section 2-622.

Finally, in their petitions for rehearing, both Robinson andITLA request that we apply our ruling in this case prospectively. They argue that a retroactive application of our construction ofSection 2-402 would effectively prevent any plaintiff fromconverting a respondent in discovery to a defendant if theplaintiffs in these cases had ever sought and received from thetrial court an extension of the six-month time limit. They alsoargue that retroactive application of our decision would encouragemotions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment againstpresently named defendants who were previously respondents indiscovery and whose status as respondents were extended beyond sixmonths by court order.

"While, as a general rule, a decision will be appliedretrospectively, a court has the inherent power to determinewhether its decision should be prospectively or retroactivelyapplied." Carlson v. Moline Board of Education, School DistrictNo. 40, 231 Ill. App. 3d 493, 499 (1992). See also: Department ofTransportation v. Hunziker, et. al., 342 Ill. App. 3d 588, 602(2003); Contreras v. Industrial Commission, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1071,1077 (1997). The presumption that a decision by a court of reviewis to apply both retroactively and prospectively "can be overcomein two types of circumstances. First, the issuing court itself mayexpressly state that its decision will be applied prospectivelyonly. (Citation omitted) Second, a later court may, under certaincircumstances, override the presumption by declining to give theprevious opinion retroactive effect, at least with respect to theparties appearing before the later court." Aleckson v. Village ofRound Lake Park, 176 Ill. 2d 82, 86 (1997).

In Aleckson, the second district of the appellate courtconcluded that its previous decision in Mueller v. Board of Fireand Police Commission, 267 Ill. App. 3d 726 (1994), should not begiven a retroactive application to a particular case. Our supremecourt characterized the issue before them as follows: "On appealbefore this court, defendants maintain solely that the appellatecourt does not have the authority to apply Mueller prospectively. In defendants' view, only this court may declare whether a decisionwill apply prospectively. Alternatively, defendants maintain thateven if the appellate court possessed such a power, the courtimproperly exercised it in this case. Plaintiffs, on the otherhand, argue that the appellate court does have such a power andthat it exercised it properly in the instant case. We agree withplaintiffs and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the appellatecourt." Aleckson, 176 Ill. 2d at 86.

As we are the court which is initially issuing the decision inquestion, it would appear that we may simply say that it is ourdecision to apply our decision prospectively only. However, inTosado v. Miller, 188 Ill. 2d 186, 196 (1999), decided afterAleckson, our supreme court issued a decision which held that theone-year statute of limitation provided in section 8-101 of theTort Immunity Act applied to a given case. 745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West1996). In deciding whether to apply the decision onlyprospectively, the court considered the three factors whichAleckson applied to determine whether a later court should applythe decision of a prior court prospectively only. Tosado v.Miller, 188 Ill. 2d at 196-97.

The three factors to be considered are: (1) whether thedecision to be applied nonretroactively established a new principleof law, either by overruling clear past precedent on whichlitigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of firstimpression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2)whether, given the purpose and history of the new rule, itsoperation will be retarded or promoted by prospective application;and (3) whether substantial inequitable results would be producedif the former decision is applied retroactively. Aleckson, 176Ill. 2d at 92-94.

Our ruling that Supreme Court Rule 183 does not give thecircuit court the authority to extend the six-month limitationsperiod in section 2-402 was an issue of first impression whoseresolution was not clearly foreshadowed. The purpose of ourdecision, to clarify that Supreme Court Rule 183 does not extendthe statutory time limit in section 2-402, will be promoted byprospective application. We agree with Robinson and ITLA thatretroactive application of our decision would only promotelitigation by encouraging motions to dismiss and motions forsummary judgment against presently named defendants who werepreviously respondents in discovery whose status as respondentswere extended beyond six months by court order. Prospectiveapplication of our decision is also appropriate because substantialinequitable results would be produced if it is appliedretroactively. We agree with Robinson and ITLA that a retroactiveapplication of our holding would effectively prevent any plaintiffwho had sought and received an extension of the six-month timelimit from the circuit court, from converting a respondent indiscovery to a defendant. This result is particularly inequitablebecause the plaintiffs so affected could have filed motions toconvert the respondents in discovery to defendants in a timelymanner had the circuit court not granted the time-barredextensions.

Accordingly, we hold that our decision that Supreme Court Rule183 does not provide a basis to extend the six-month time limit ofsection 2-402 applies only to those cases in which plaintiffssought and received extensions of their section 2-402 motionsbeyond that section's six month time limit commencing after thedate of our decision in this case. However, we reject Robinson'srequest not to apply our ruling to the instant case. "On thoseoccasions when prospective application is warranted, the holding ofthe court still controls the case at bar; to not apply the rulewould render it dictum and deprive the challenger of the fruits ofhis efforts in questioning the old, erroneous rule." John CareyOil Co. v. W.C.P. Investments, 126 Ill. 2d 139, 149 (1988); alsosee Department of Transportation v. Hunziker, et al., 342 Ill. App.3d at 602-03.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Reid and Hartigan, JJ., concur.