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THIRD DIVISION

Date Filed: June 26, 2002

Nos. 1-01-1890 & 1-01-3063 cons.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HALL delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Joseph S. Beale, appeals from orders of thecircuit court of Cook County, granting the plaintiff's,Revolution Portfolio, LLC's motion to revive a judgment againstthe defendant and ordering the defendant to pay the sum of$6,108,683.78 to the plaintiff.

On November 30, 2000, the plaintiff filed a petition in thecircuit court of Cook County seeking to register a foreignjudgment against the defendant. The petition alleged thefollowing facts.

On February 19, 1992, a final judgment was entered againstthe defendant and Steven D. Bandolik in favor of the FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the circuit court of theFifteenth Judicial Circuit in the State of Florida in the amountof $3,516,845.95 plus interest. On November 21, 1997, thatjudgment was assigned to the plaintiff.

The petition further alleged that the judgment against thedefendant had not yet been satisfied, and there was still due andowing from the defendant the sum of $6,682,215.66, which includedinterest at the rate of $1,172.28 per day.

On December 1, 2000, the plaintiff filed a petition forrevival of judgment. The plaintiff alleged that the abovejudgment was in full force and effect and therefore claimed arevival of that judgment.

On January 9, 2001, the defendant filed a special andlimited appearance. Subsequently, the defendant waived hisspecial and limited appearance and filed a motion to dismiss thepetition for revival and to quash the registration of the Floridajudgment. In his motion, the defendant argued that the plaintiffdid not comply with the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign JudgmentsAct (735 ILCS 5/12-650 et seq. (West 1998)) (the Act) in filingthe Florida judgment in Illinois, that the enforcement of theFlorida judgment was barred by the statute of limitations, andthat the Florida judgment could not be revived in Illinois. Thecircuit court denied the motion to dismiss.

On March 1, 2000, the plaintiff filed a motion seeking theentry of an order to revive the Florida judgment. On April 12,2001, the circuit court granted the motion and revived thejudgment against the defendant in the amount of $3,516,845.95. The order further provided that the issues of payments previouslymade by the defendant and the rate of interest would be decidedby the court at a later date. Finally, the order provided thatthere was no just reason to delay enforcement of the judgment orappeal of the order as it related to the revival of the judgment. The defendant filed a notice of appeal from the April 12, 2001,order on May 14, 2001, which was docketed in this court as No. 1-01-1890.

Subsequently, on July 18, 2001, the circuit court entered anorder which determined the rate and amount of interest due on thejudgment and the amount of the payments from the defendant to becredited to the unpaid principal amount of the judgment. Thedefendant then filed a second notice of appeal on August 7, 2001,from the July 18, 2001, order. That appeal was docketed in thiscourt as No. 1-01-3063.

On October 17, 2001, this court granted the defendant'smotion to consolidate the appeals.

On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues:

whether the 1992 Florida judgment can be enforced in Illinois and whether a foreign judgment can be revived in Illinois. Theplaintiff raises an issue as to this court's jurisdiction toconsider this appeal.

In his jurisdictional statement in appeal No. 1-01-1890, thedefendant states that this court has jurisdiction pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) based on thecircuit court's finding in its April 12, 2001, order that theissues were final and appealable.

The purpose of the jurisdictional statement required bySupreme Court Rule 341(e)(4)(ii) (177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(4)(ii))is not merely to tell this court that it has jurisdiction. In reAdoption of Ginnell, 316 Ill. App. 3d 789, 791, 737 N.E.2d 1094,1096 (2000). Instead, the jurisdictional statement requirementwas intended to provoke counsel to make an independent review ofthe right to appeal before writing the brief. Ginnell, 316 Ill.App. 3d at 791, 737 N.E.2d at 1096.

Rule 304(a) provides in pertinent part that "[i]f multipleparties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action,an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or morebut fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trialcourt has made an express written finding that there is no justreason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both." 155Ill. 2d R. 304(a). An order is final and appealable if itterminates the litigation between the parties on the merits ordisposes of the rights of the parties either on the entirecontroversy or on a separate part thereof. Blott v. Hanson, 283Ill. App. 3d 656, 660, 670 N.E.2d 345, 348 (1996). A Rule 304(a)finding does not make a nonfinal order appealable; rather, a Rule304(a) finding makes a final order appealable where there aremultiple parties or claims in the same action. Blott, 283 Ill.App. 3d at 660, 670 N.E.2d at 348.

In the present case, there was a single plaintiff and asingle defendant and only one claim, i.e., the revival of theplaintiff's judgment. In addition, the July 18, 2001, orderprovided in pertinent part as follows:

"THIS CAUSE coming before the Court for further hearingon the motion of Revolution Portfolio, LLC, to revive itsjudgment, and on the response of Joseph S. Beale regardingpost-judgment interest and the application of payments madeby him ***."

The order concluded with the judgment being further revived inthe amount of $6,108,683.78.

It is clear from the language of the order that the circuitcourt was still acting on the petition to revive the judgment andthat the remaining issues of the postjudgment interest and creditfor payments were not separate claims but issues in the revivalclaim. Therefore, the April 12, 2001, order which reserved theissues of the payments and interest rate on the judgment enteredby the circuit court was a nonfinal order and not appealable evenwith the Rule 304(a) language.

The defendant points out that the circuit court's order ofJuly 18, 2001, disposed of all pending matters in the case andconstituted a final order, and therefore, this court hasjurisdiction based upon his second notice of appeal. However,the plaintiff's second notice of appeal only specified the July18, 2001, order. Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(2) (155 Ill. 2d R.303(b)(2)) provides that the notice of appeal shall "specify thejudgment *** appealed from." Therefore, the defendant's appealin this case would be limited to the issues presented by the July18, 2001, order, namely, the postjudgment interest and thecredit-for-payments issues.

Nonetheless, the notice of appeal is to be liberallyconstrued and unless the appellee is prejudiced, the appellant'sfailure to comply strictly with the form of the notice is notfatal if the deficiency is one of form and not substance. Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 433-34,394 N.E.2d 380, 383 (1979). An unspecified judgment isreviewable if it is a "'step in the procedural progressionleading' to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal." Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d at 435, 394 N.E.2d at 383, quoting ElfmanMotors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d Cir.1977).

Since the April 12, 2001, order was not a final order, theappeal in No. 1-01-1890 must be dismissed. However, since theApril 12, 2001, order was in the procedural progression leadingup to the entry of the July 18, 2001, order, and in the absenceof any apparent prejudice to the plaintiff in this case, thefailure to specify the April 12, 2001, order in the notice ofappeal does not prevent this court from reviewing the merits ofthe issues raised on appeal by the defendant stemming from theApril 12, 2001, order.⁽¹⁾, ⁽²⁾

Issues as to statutory construction are reviewed de novo. People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 98, 720 N.E.2d 225, 229 (1999).

The defendant contends that Illinois's seven-year limit onenforcement of judgments applies to the enforcement of foreignjudgments.⁽³⁾ Since the Florida judgment was entered nine yearsago, the defendant maintains that the judgment cannot be enforcedin Illinois.

In Illinois, apart from exceptions not applicable in thiscase, no judgment can be enforced after the expiration of sevenyears from the time the judgment is rendered, unless the judgmentis revived by a proceeding provided for in section 2-1601 of theCode of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1601 (West 1998)). See 735ILCS 5/12-108(a) (West 1998).

In In re Estate of Sarron, 317 Ill. App. 3d 402, 736 N.E.2d133 (2000), the claimant sought enforcement of Florida judgmentsrendered in 1982, 1983 and 1988. The trial court allowed theclaims in full. On review, however, the appellate courtreversed, holding that because the claimant failed to registerthe judgments in Illinois prior to the expiration of theapplicable five-year statute of limitations, the claims werebarred. Sarron, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 406, 736 N.E.2d at 136.⁽⁴⁾ See also In re Marriage of Kramer, 253 Ill. App. 3d 923, 625N.E.2d 808 (1993).

While we agree with the defendant that the seven-yearlimitations period contained in section 12-108(a) is applicableto foreign judgments as well as to domestic ones, nonetheless,section 12-108(a) further provides that the judgment can beenforced if it has been revived in accordance with section 2-1601. 735 ILCS 5/2-1601, 12-108(a) (West 1998).

Section 13-218 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) provides that judgments in the circuit court may be revived asprovided by section 2-1601, within 20 years next after the dateof the judgment and not after. 735 ILCS 5/13-218 (West 1998).

Contrary to the defendant's argument, a judgment does nothave to be revived prior to the expiration period contained insection 12-108(a) but may be revived up to 20 years after thejudgment is entered. See First National Bank of Marengo v.Loffelmacher, 236 Ill. App. 3d 690, 695, 603 N.E.2d 80, 83-84(1992) (the court noted that since, under section 12-108, ajudgment could be enforced within seven years from the time itwas rendered, it would make no sense to require that the revivalmust also take place within the same seven-year period).

The defendant's reliance on the holdings in Sarron andKramer is misplaced. In neither case, did the parties seek torevive their respective judgments pursuant to section 2-1601.

The defendant's reliance on Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v.Phifer, 181 Ariz. 5, 887 P.2d 5 (1994), is equally misplaced. Inthat case, the court held that while filing a foreign judgmentunder the Uniform Act (ARIZ. REV. STAT.