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THIRD DIVISION
August 6, 2003

JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Resource Technology Corporation (RTC) is in the business ofcollecting methane gas generated by landfills and converting thegas into usable energy. In 1997, the Illinois CommerceCommission (Commission) determined that 15 of RTC's facilities,including one in Pontiac, Illinois, qualified as "qualified solidwaste energy facilities" (QSWEFs) under the Illinois Retail RateLaw. As a result, Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) was required topurchase electricity from RTC at a favorable retail rate. In2002, ComEd requested a declaratory ruling from the Commission,asking for a determination that it was not required to pay theretail rate for electricity at the Pontiac facility beyond the"configured capacity" of 10 megawatts (MW). The Commissionentered a declaratory ruling in ComEd's favor. RTC now appeals. We reverse the Commission's order.

FACTS

On January 9, 1997, RTC filed verified petitions with theCommission, seeking qualification of 15 proposed landfill-methane-gas-to-electric facilities as QSWEFs under the RetailRate Law. The section of the Illinois Public Utilities Actcommonly referred to as the "Retail Rate Law" was enacted in 1987to encourage the development of alternate energy productionfacilities in order to conserve energy resources and provide fortheir most efficient use. 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1(a) (West 2000). The Retail Rate Law is administered solely by the Commission. Under the Law, if a company is qualified by the Commission as aQSWEF, it is entitled to a long-term contract of at least 10years with an electric utility company. The utility company mustpurchase electricity from the QSWEF at a favorable "retail rate,"equal to the average cost per kilowatt-hour paid from time totime by the unit of local government in which the electricitygenerating facilities are located. 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1(c) (West2000).

The "retail rate" is substantially higher than the wholesalerate the utilities would otherwise pay for electricity boughtfrom private generators of electricity. CGE Ford Heights v.Miller, 306 Ill. App. 3d 431, 433, 714 N.E.2d 35 (1999). Theutility receives tax credits from the State in an amount equal tothe difference between the "retail rate" paid to the QSWEF andthe "avoided cost" were the utility to generate such electricityitself. The QSWEF must reimburse the State for the value of theissued tax credits after retirement of the debt incurred tofinance its construction. 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1(d) (West 2000).

On October 8, 1997, the Commission issued an orderdetermining that all 15 of RTC's proposed facilities werequalified as QSWEFs, with "a total gross generating capacity of65 megawatts located in fifteen Illinois locations." In theSummary of Evidence portion of the Order, the Pontiac facilitywas described as: "Docket 97-0034 landfill, located at 14732 East2100 North Road, Pontiac, Illinois, will have a capacity of 10MW, with a projected commercial operation date in the 1st quarterof 1998. The facility is located in ComEd's service territory."

According to RTC, shortly after the 1997 order it beganconstructing and activating the proposed facilities. Among thecapital costs incurred at the Pontiac facility, RTC expended inexcess of $700,000 in the construction of an "interconnect" tyingthe electric plant to ComEd's electrical transmission grid. Theeffect of the interconnect was to enable RTC to exceed 10 MW ofelectrical production capacity at the Pontiac facility. RTC saysComEd consented to the construction of this interconnect.

In November 1999, RTC filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern Districtof Illinois. The bankruptcy case was converted to Chapter 11 inFebruary 2000 and still is going on.

On October 6, 2000, RTC and ComEd executed a "Rate 18Standby Electric Service Contract," under which ComEd was to payRTC "Rider 3 retail rates" in accord with the requirementsimposed by the Retail Rate Law. ComEd purchases electricity fromgenerating facilities under two Commission-approved rates: Rider4, which applies to any customer operating an electric productionfacility, and Rider 3, which applies only if the facility isqualified by the Commission as a QSWEF. In December 2000, theten-year period during which ComEd was to pay the Rider 3 retailrate began. The initial phase of construction of the Pontiacfacility was completed in March 2001.

On June 14, 2002, ComEd sent a letter to RTC, informing RTCthat it would no longer pay the Rider 3 retail rate for itspurchase of electricity in excess of 10 MW. In the letter, ComEdsaid the Commission's QSWEF determination applied to RTC'sPontiac facility "as configured" at the time of the Order, whichreferenced a 10 MW capacity for that location.

ComEd said it had sent a letter to the Pontiac facilityrequesting information regarding its compliance with the QSWEFregulatory obligations. In response to its inquiry, ComEdreceived a copy of RTC's "application for re-self certificationunder FERC Commission Regulation No. 292-207," dated June 10,2002. According to RTC's Federal Energy Regulatory Commission(FERC) Form 556, "[t]he maximum gross electric power productioncapacity of the facility on a stand alone basis is 35,000kilowatts [35 MW] based on actual capacity of the generators atthe site." ComEd stated in the letter to RTC that it wouldutilize the 10 MW value to determine the amount of electricityeligible for Rider 3 pricing until such time as it receivedclarification of the Pontiac facility's QSWEF status for up to 35MW. The remaining capacity in excess of 10 MW would bereimbursed under Rider 4, at a lower rate than required by Rider3.

RTC then filed an Emergency Petition seeking a temporary andpreliminary injunction against ComEd in bankruptcy court. Thebankruptcy court issued a temporary restraining order on July 3,2002, requiring ComEd to compensate RTC for all electricityprovided to it from the Plant on or before July 12, 2002, atRider 3 retail rates. The order further provided:

"To the extent necessary, the automatic stay ishereby modified to permit Edison or RTC to filepleadings with, and otherwise proceed before, the ICC. Either Edison or RTC may request that the ICC interpretits [1997 order], in which the ICC granted QSWEF statusto the Plant, as configured in RTC's petition. EitherEdison or RTC may also request that the ICC determinethe existence and extent of the Plant's present QSWEFstatus and RTC's entitlement to be compensated for allelectricity produced at the Plant at Rider 3 rates."

On July 5, 2002, ComEd filed its Verified Emergency Petitionfor Declaratory Ruling and accompanying motion with theCommission. In the petition, ComEd requested that the Commissionissue a declaratory ruling "determining ComEd's obligations underthe provisions of the Public Utilities Act, including 220 ILCS5/9-102, 103, 104, 201, 240, and 241," to pay the Retail Rate forpurchases of energy from the Pontiac facility in excess of thatfacility's 10 MW configured capacity specified in the 1997 order,or for such other relief as the Commission deemed appropriate. ComEd was seeking relief on an emergency basis so that theCommission's determination would be available to the bankruptcycourt at a preliminary injunction hearing scheduled for July 9,2002.

On July 9, 2002, the bankruptcy court granted a preliminaryinjunction to RTC, reaffirming the lift of the automatic stay toallow the parties to "file pleadings with, and otherwise proceedbefore, the ICC to determine the existence and extent of thePlant's QSWEF certification."

On July 15, 2002, the Commission Staff filed a response toComEd's emergency petition. In the response, the Staff contendedthat the 1997 order, read in light of the testimony of GeorgeCalvert, RTC President, supported the conclusion that the Pontiacfacility's output was configured at 10 MW. ComEd's obligationthus was limited to the purchase at the retail rate of 10 MW. The Staff supported the entry of an order by the Commission tothat effect. The Staff also recommended that the Commission acton the petition as quickly as possible to provide guidance to thebankruptcy court and suggested an expedited briefing schedule.

On July 16, 2002, the Commission granted Staff's request toapprove the following schedule: receipt deadline of July 19,2002, for responses to ComEd's petition; and receipt deadline ofJuly 22, 2002, for replies to any responses.

On July 18, 2002, RTC filed a response in opposition toComEd's petition and the Commission Staff's response, includingobjections to the expedited schedule. RTC also filed anappearance. The Commission later allowed petitions to intervenein the proceeding filed by RTC and three of RTC's creditors--Banco Panamericano, Inc., Chiplease, Inc., and Leon Greenblatt.

Following the filing of replies by ComEd and the Staff, theCommission hearing officer issued a Proposed Order on July 29,2002. On September 4, 2002, the Commission issued its Order,finding ComEd was not obligated to pay the Rider 3 retail ratefor energy generated at the Pontiac facility in excess of 10 MW. RTC moved for a rehearing and an emergency stay, which weredenied on September 11, 2002. On September 13, 2002, RTC filedthis appeal.

On October 7, 2002, the Commission filed a motion to dismissthe appeal. The Commission contended the September 4, 2002,order is not appealable because it is a declaratory ruling undersection 200.220 of the Commission's Rules of Practice. 83 Ill.Adm. Code 200.220 (West 2000). Section 200.220 provides thatdeclaratory rulings are not appealable. ComEd filed a responsein support of the motion. RTC filed a response opposing themotion, contending the order was not a declaratory action withinthe meaning of section 200.220 and thus is appealable.

DECISION

I. Jurisdiction

The first issue we must address is whether to grant theCommission's motion to dismiss. The Commission and ComEd contendwe do not have jurisdiction to decide this appeal, citing section5-150(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, and Rule 200.220(i)of the Commission's Rules of Practice. Under both sections,declaratory rulings are not appealable. 5 ILCS 100/5-150(a)(West 2000); 83 Ill. Adm. Code 200.220(i) (West 2000).

Section 5-150(a) of the Administrative Procedure Actprovides:

"Requests for rulings. Each agency may in itsdiscretion provide by rule for the filing and promptdisposition of petitions or requests for declaratoryrulings as to the applicability to the personpresenting the petition or request of any statutoryprovision enforced by the agency or of any rule of theagency. Declaratory rulings shall not be appealable." 5 ILCS 100/5-150(a) (West 2000).

Rule 200.220 of the Rules of Practice for the Commissionprovides:

" a) When requested by the affected person, theCommission may in its sole discretion issue adeclaratory ruling with respect to:

1) the applicability of any statutory provisionenforced by the Commission or of any Commissionrule to the person(s) requesting a declaratoryruling; and

2) whether the person's compliance with a federalrule will be accepted as compliance with a similarCommission rule***

(i) Declaratory rulings shall not be appealable." 83Ill. Adm. Code 200.220(a),(i) (West 2000).

We find subsection(a)(1) is a separate subsection underwhich an affected person may request a declaratory ruling. Thereis no requirement that both (a)(1) and (a)(2) be satisfied inorder to request a declaratory ruling.

The question is whether the Commission's action was a proper"declaratory ruling" under section 200.220(a)(1). The answer tothis question will determine whether we have jurisdiction toreach the merits of this appeal.

There are certain instances where agency decisions areunreviewable exercises of discretion. See Greer v. IllinoisHousing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 498-99, 524N.E.2d 561 (1988). In Greer, one of the issues was whetherappellate review was precluded by language in the IllinoisHousing Development Act committing decisions about thecomposition of projects to the discretion of the Illinois HousingDevelopment Authority. The court held that most agency actionsare presumed reviewable in the absence of some express statutoryprohibition of review, or at least in the absence of languagecommitting the decision to unreviewable agency discretion. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 497. Whether, and to what extent, arelevant statute precludes judicial review is determined by itsexpress language, the structure of the statutory scheme, itsobjectives, its legislative history, and the nature of theadministrative action involved. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 497-98,citing Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 345,81 L. Ed. 2d 270, 104 S. Ct. 2450 (1984). Of particularimportance is whether the statute contains standards, goals, orcriteria by which a court may evaluate agency action. Greer, 122Ill. 2d at 498. See also Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268,276, 673 N.E.2d 251 (1996) (Prisoner Review Board's denial ofparole is not a reviewable order because statutory criteria andBoard rules are not objective enough to allow a court to evaluatethe Board's decision.)

In this case, the Commission contends its decision fitswithin its Rule 200.220 definition of Declaratory Ruling and thatthere are no standards this court can use to review the Order. ComEd joins forces with the Commission on this issue, contendingits Petition sought to determine the applicability to it ofvarious statutory provisions enforced by the Commission. ComEdcontends its sole purpose is to apply its rates properly andwithout preference or discrimination, as required by the PublicUtilities Act. See 220 ILCS 5/9-102, 9-103, 9-104, 9-201, 9-240,9-241 (West 2000).

Our review of Illinois decisions and Commission actions doesnot offer much guidance on the kinds of issues that areappropriate subjects for a Declaratory Ruling. Before Rule200.220 was promulgated by the Commission in 1996, two appellatedecisions held the Commission had no authority to renderdeclaratory rulings. An order directing a telephone company tocomply with Commission rules in projects not yet undertaken washeld to be an impermissible declaratory ruling in HarrisonvilleTelephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 176 Ill. App. 3d389, 393, 531 N.E.2d 43 (1988). And the Commission was held tohave been correct when it refused to decide whether it hadjurisdiction over a contract between a municipal electric agencyand the city of Highland. Illinois Municipal Electric Agency v.Illinois Commerce Commission, 247 Ill. App. 3d 857, 862, 617N.E.2d 1363 (1993).

The Commission declined to issue a Rule 200.220 declaratoryruling in Illinois Industrial Energy Consumers' Request forDeclaratory Ruling pursuant to 200.220 re: Section 16-102 of anAct Entitled "Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate ReliefLaw of 1997, Ill. Commerce Comm'n 98-0607 (March 10, 1999). TheCommission was asked to clarify the meaning of a provision of thePublic Utilities Act. The Commission said it has "no authorityto declare what a particular statute means in some abstractsense."

We decline to give Rule 200.220 the broad meaning suggestedby the Commission and ComEd. An administrative agency derivesits power to act solely from the statute by which it was created,although the agency charged with enforcing a statute is given"inherent authority and wide latitude to adopt regulations orpolicies reasonably necessary to perform the agency's statutoryduties." Chemed Corp. v. State of Illinois, 186 Ill. App. 3d402, 410, 542 N.E.2d 492 (1989).

Just about everything the Commission does involves, in oneway or the other, applicability of provisions of the PublicUtility Act. Taking that observation a step further, one couldargue for a declaratory ruling each time the Commission makes adecision concerning the Public Utilities Act. The argument goestoo far. The exception swallows the rule. Instead, we examinethe substance of ComEd's petition.

The Bankruptcy Court authorized ComEd and/or RTC to ask theCommission to interpret its 1997 Order and to determine whetherRTC was entitled to be paid at Rider 3 rates for all of itsoutput at Pontiac, or whether a maximum of 10 MW applies to Rider3. That is what ComEd did, although its Petition was dressed upin language that sought the Commission's view of statutoryapplication. The "affected person" was not ComEd, but RTC, whichstands to lose a substantial amount of revenue if ComEd is notrequired to pay the favorable retail rate for energy output atPontiac in excess of 10 MW.

We do not have to be experts in alternative energyproduction or energy rate calculations to decide this case. Weare empowered to consider whether the Commission has acted withinthe scope of its authority, whether any constitutional right hasbeen infringed, and whether the Commission's findings are foundedon the evidence. Cerro Copper Products v. Illinois CommerceCommission, 83 Ill. 2d 364, 370, 415 N.E.2d 345 (1980).

We conclude the Commission's September 4, 2002, Order wasnot a declaratory ruling within the meaning of Rule 200.220. Forthat reason, we deny the Commission's motion to dismiss thisappeal.

The question now becomes whether we can proceed to themerits of this appeal, or, having said the wrong procedure wasused, do we have to send the case back for a different kind ofhearing?

RTC participated in the Commission proceedings. It filed aresponse to ComEd's Petition. It received permission tointervene. When an Administrative Law Judge issued a ProposedOrder RTC filed a Brief and Exceptions to it. Once theCommission entered its Order RTC moved for a rehearing and anemergency stay. In its Emergency Motion Requesting Oral Argumentat the Commission RTC conceded that "[t]he matter has been fullybriefed, a proposed order has been tendered, and Briefs andExceptions have been filed. Further, various parties haveintervened in the matter."

We see no need for a fact hearing by the Commission. Atstake are matters of law, which require de novo review. Duringoral argument in this court RTC agreed nothing more would begained by a traditional fact hearing, with the possible exceptionof an opportunity to present its argument that the Commission andComEd are estopped from imposing limits on energy output atPontiac. We have examined RTC's estoppel argument and find nomerit to it.

Therefore, although the Commission improperly conducted adeclaratory ruling proceeding, there is no barrier to moving onto the merits of RTC's appeal.

Whether the Commission has been granted inherent or impliedauthority to impose maximum output levels at a qualified QSWEF isa serious question we need not decide. We do not read the 1997Order as imposing a maximum output level at the Pontiac facility. Taking the 1997 Order as evidence in this case, we find it doesnot support the 2002 Order appealed by RTC. See Brinker TruckingCo. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 19 Ill. 2d 354, 357, 166N.E.2d 18 (1960) (facts found by the Commission must afford areasonable basis for the order entered).

The 1997 Order was the result of RTC's request that 15 ofits landfill sites, including the site at Pontiac, be qualifiedas QSWEFs as defined in section 8-403.1 of the Public UtilitiesAct. 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1 (West 2000). During a hearing on RTC'spetition, its then-president, George Calvert, testified to theapproximate megawatt capacity for each of the 15 facilities underconsideration but not yet built. The total capacity, he said,was 65 MW.

The Commission, in its Findings portion of the 1997 Order,obviously relied on Calvert's testimony:

"(4) the evidence indicates that the electricgenerating facilities will be configured to have amaximum gross generating capacity of approximately 65MWs, they will be owned and operated by RTC; thefacilities will use methane generated from the landfilland possess characteristics which enable them toqualify as a small power production facilities underPURPA;"

and,

"(5) under the facts set forth in Finding (4), thefacilities as configured in the petition, will bequalified solid waste energy facilities pursuant toSection 8-403.1(b) of the Act;"

Findings (4) and (5) are in the plural. They refer to totalgross capacity and total configuration of facilities. There isno reference to any specific facility. Nor is there anysuggestion that a particular facility's output would be limitedto the approximate capacity referred to in Calvert's testimony.

Findings (4) and (5) form the basis for the OrderingParagraph that the Commission contends sets specific outputlimits:

"IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the electric generatingfacilities as configured with a total gross generatingcapacity of 65 megawatts located in fifteen Illinoislocations, which will be owned by Resource TechnologyCorporation and fueled by landfill methane and whichwill be located at the aforementioned landfills aredetermined to be qualified solid waste energyfacilities pursuant to Section 8-403.1(b) of the PublicUtilities Act." (Emphasis added.)

We read the Ordering Paragraph as describing a total outputfor the 15 facilities. Neither Pontiac nor any other specificfacility is referred to in any of the Ordering Paragraphs. TheOrdering Paragraphs contain no suggestion that the output at anyspecific facility would be limited. In addition, contrary to thereference in Finding (5), RTC's Petition did not contain anysuggested capacity limits.

We know the Commission knew how to impose a maximum outputfor a specific QSWEF site. On the same day the RTC Order wasissued, the Commission issued an Order in Avon Energy Partners,L.L.C., Ill. Commerce Comm'n Nos. 97-0073, 97-0074, 97-0075,cons. (October 8, 1997). That Order repeatedly referred to"maximum gross capacity" at each of three specific landfillsites. At one point it said: "Each contract shall be for thepurchase of electricity generated up to the maximum powerproduction capability for each facility as found in this Order." The Ordering Paragraph contained the "maximum gross generatingcapacity" for each of the three sites. There was no attempt tocompute the total capacity for the combined sites.

The word "maximum" appears nowhere in the OrderingParagraphs in the 1997 RTC Order. Nor is there any attempt inthem to place a maximum limit on the amount of power that wouldbe contained in the contract with the purchaser of power.

Estimating the total megawatt capacity of the 15 landfillsites does serve a purpose--to satisfy the requirement of section8-403.1(e) (220 ILCS 5/8-403.1(e) (West 2000)), which providesthe Commission cannot require an electric utility to buyelectricity from a QSWEF which is owned or operated by an entityprimarily engaged in the business of producing or sellingelectricity, gas, or other useful thermal energy from some sourceother than a QSWEF. In fact, the "primarily engaged" finding wasmade in the 1997 Order that qualified the RTC sites as QSWEFs,triggering the requirement that ComEd contract with RTC for thepurchase of power.

Nothing in this record indicates RTC's 15 landfill sites nowexceed 65 MW in output. Further, as indicated by a July 18,2002, affidavit of the current RTC President, John Connolly, theaggregate capacity output involving the ComEd service territoryis about 30 MW, lower than the estimated 39 MW anticipated in the1997 Order. The current net capacity at Pontiac is 19 MW.

CONCLUSION

We conclude the Commission's Order that ComEd is notobligated to pay the Rider 3 retail rate for energy generated atRTC's Pontiac facility in excess of 10 MW is not supported by therecord. We reverse the Order.

Reversed.

HALL, J., concurs.

HOFFMAN, J., specially concurs.

JUSTICE HOFFMAN, specially concurring:

I agree with the majority that we have jurisdiction toentertain this appeal. The Commission's ruling of September 4,2002, which is the subject of this appeal is not a declaratoryruling as defined in either Section 5-150(a) of theAdministrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/5-150(a) (West 2000)) orRule 200.220(a) of the Rules of Practice for the Commission (83Ill. Adm. Code 200.220(a) (West 2000)). The ruling is nothingmore than an interpretation of the Commission's order of October8, 1997, which determined that RTC's Pontiac facility is a"qualified solid waste energy facility" (QSWEF) and requiredvarious electric utilities, including ComEd, to purchase electricenergy from the facility for a period of ten years. I also agreewith the majority's analysis and conclusion that the October 8,1997, order did not place any limit on the amount of energy thatComEd was required to purchase at a "Rider 3 retail rate" fromRTC's Pontiac facility and, as a consequence, the Commission'sruling of September 4, 2002, must be reversed. I writeseparately because, unlike my colleagues, I believe that weshould address the issue of whether the Commission has theauthority to impose maximum output levels for QSWEF's.

As declared in section 8-403.1 of the Public Utilities Act,the policy of the State of Illinois is to "encourage thedevelopment of alternate energy production facilities in order toconserve our energy resources and to provide for their mostefficient use." 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1 (West 2002). The Commissionis charged with the responsibility of determining whether afacility is a QSWEF. Section 8-403.1(c) provides that theCommission "shall require electric utilities to enter into long-term contracts to purchase electricity from qualified solid wasteenergy facilities [QSWEF's] located in the electric utilitiesservice area, for a period beginning on the date that thefacility begins generating electricity and having a duration ofnot less than 10 years in the case of facilities fueled bylandfill-generated methane." (Emphasis added.) 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1(c) (West 2002). That same section of the statute providesa formula for computing the rate per kilowatt-hour to be paid bythe utilities to a QSWEF. 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1(c) (West 2002).

A plain reading of the statute reveals that, once theCommission has determined that a facility is a QSWEF, it mustrequire electric utilities in whose service area the QSWEF islocated to enter into long-term contracts to purchase electricityfrom the QSWEF. The statute says nothing about the Commissionbeing able to limit the amount of electricity that a utility isrequired to purchase from such a facility at the rate prescribedin section 8-403.1(c), unless "such purchase would result inestimated tax credits that exceed, on a monthly basis, theutility's estimated obligation to remit to the State taxes it hascollected under the Electricity Excise Tax Law [35 ILCS 640/2-1 et seq. (West 2002)]." 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1(d) (West 2002).

The powers of an administrative officer or agency are purelystatutory, and they only have the powers given to them bystatute. See Lake County Board of Review v. The Property TaxAppeal Board of the State of Illinois, 119 Ill. 2d 419, 427, 519N.E.2d 459 (1988). Any action by an administrative agency whichexceeds its authority is void. Chemed Corp. v. State ofIllinois, 186 Ill. App. 3d 402, 410, 542 N.E.2d 492 (1989). Administrative agencies have the inherent authority to adoptregulations and policies reasonably necessary to enable them toperform their statutory duties. Lake County Board of Review, 119Ill. 2d at 428. However, they may not promulgate rules orpolicies which are inconsistent with the provisions of a statutethey are charged with enforcing. Harton v. City of Chicago, 301Ill. App. 3d 378, 391, 703 N.E.2d 493 (1998).

The stated policy of this State is to maximize theproduction and use of alternate sources of energy and to requireutilities to purchase electricity from QSWEF's. I believe thatany attempt by the Commission to limit the amount of electricitythat a utility company is required to purchase from a QSWEFlocated within its service area, except as specifically providedby statute, is wholly inconsistent with the provisions of section8-403.1 of the Public Utilities Act and the public policydeclared therein. I would hold that any such attempt by theCommission, except as specifically authorized by statute, exceedsits authority and is, therefore, void.