Reece v. Board of Education

Case Date: 03/14/2002
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-00-4040 Rel

FOURTH DIVISION

March 14, 2002





No. 1-00-4040

 

THOMAS H. REECE, NORMA J. WHITE, )
PAMELYN MASSARSKY, MICHAEL J. WILLIAMS, )
MELVIN WILSON, and CLIFFORD WAGNER, )
)
                          Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
) Appeal from
v. ) the Circuit Court
) of Cook County.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF )
CHICAGO; DANIEL W. HYNES, Comptroller )
of the State of Illinois; RONALD J. )
GIDWITZ, Chairman of the Illinois State ) No. 00-CH-5481
Board of Education; SANDRA M. )
PELLEGRINO, Vice-Chair of the Illinois )
State Board of Education; MARILYN )
McCONACHIE, DAVID GOMEZ, CONNIE ROGERS, ) Honorable
WILLIAM E. HILL, VINCENT J. SERRITELLA, ) Robert V. Boharic,
JANET STEINER, Board Members of the ) Judge Presiding.
Illinois State Board of Education; )
ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; and )
GLENN W. McGEE, Illinois State )
Superintendent of Education, )
)
                       Defendants-Appellees. )

 

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs Thomas H. Reece, Norma J. White, Pamelyn Massarsky,Michael J. Williams, Melvin Wilson, and Clifford Wagner (collectively,plaintiffs) brought this action against defendants Board of Educationof the City of Chicago (Chicago Board of Education), Daniel W. Hynes,Ronald J. Gidwitz, Sandra M. Pellegrino, Marilyn McConachie, DavidGomez, Connie Rogers, William E. Hill, Vincent J. Serritella, JanetSteiner, Illinois State Board of Education, and Glenn W. McGee(collectively, defendants), alleging that section 2-3.25g of theIllinois School Code (School Code) (105 ILCS 5/2-3.25g (West 1996)),which allows school districts to petition the State Board of Educationfor a waiver or modification of the School Code's mandates, isunconstitutional. They sought to enjoin the disbursement of funds tothe Chicago Board of Education, pursuant to section 11-301 of the Codeof Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/11-301 (West 2000)), until it compliedwith all mandates of the School Code, including the requirement ofdaily physical education. On the parties' cross-motions for summaryjudgment, the trial court granted defendants' motion, finding section2-3.25g constitutional and denied plaintiffs' motion.

Plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that (1) the physical educationcurriculum is protected from waiver by section 34-8.14(3) of theSchool Code (105 ILCS 5/34-8.14(3) (West 1996)); (2) section 2-3.25gis unconstitutional because it modifies existing law without followingprocedural constitutional formalities; (3) section 2-3.25g constitutesan unconstitutional legislative veto; and (4) section 2-3.25g is animpermissible delegation of legislative authority to school boards. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Public Act 89-3 (Pub. Act 89-3,